R-22 ROTOR SEPARATION? Florida Photo
Join Date: Feb 2008
Location: Manitoba Canada
Age: 72
Posts: 223
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
If a coning bolt has failed to maintain tension due to fatigue/embrittlement/over-torquing, or for any other reason, then the immediate outcome is that the disk is not teetering about the teeter hinge, it becomes some point offset in the direction of the coning bolt that has lost tension. That is annoying in the hover.. in forward flight it would impose some pretty dramatic loads.
But if one cone hinge has more (or less) freedom of movement than the other .... all of a sudden you have two or three hinge points trying to figure out which one should provide the momentary flap in some situations.
CF should be the main contender in keeping the cone angles the same on both blades ..... but a split second out-of-phase situation could occur if one cone hinge is sticky or one is too loose .... without a drag hinge an out-of-phase blade will begin to self destruct within two rotations.
Join Date: Feb 2013
Location: usa
Posts: 10
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
ready?
$3,000 reward offered in recovery of missing helicopter blade | wtsp.com
water is warm....time to go!
water is warm....time to go!
Join Date: Jul 2008
Location: Australia
Posts: 372
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Too late!
Susiegfish
I can tell you from personal experience that much of the meaningful crash information would be well and truly obscured by now. I have seen one of these blades which exhibited evidence of widespread disbonding in the honeycomb section of the blade well away from the edges of the bonds after about one month's submersion and the OEM's response was that the immersion in the water caused the disbonds. Now as an expert in adhesive bond failure forensics I can tell you that disbonds due to water exposure occur from the edges of the bond and propagate inwards. They do not initiate in the middle of a bond.
I'll bet they give the same response this time.
Regards
Blakmax
I can tell you from personal experience that much of the meaningful crash information would be well and truly obscured by now. I have seen one of these blades which exhibited evidence of widespread disbonding in the honeycomb section of the blade well away from the edges of the bonds after about one month's submersion and the OEM's response was that the immersion in the water caused the disbonds. Now as an expert in adhesive bond failure forensics I can tell you that disbonds due to water exposure occur from the edges of the bond and propagate inwards. They do not initiate in the middle of a bond.
I'll bet they give the same response this time.
Regards
Blakmax
Last edited by blakmax; 29th Jul 2013 at 09:16.
.
Hello blakmax,
Susiegfish has recovered the first one.
He's going to try to recover the second one.
too late or not, that's doesn't concern him.
Robinson or NTSB will say if it was worth it.
but I think you're right.
.
Hello blakmax,
Susiegfish has recovered the first one.
He's going to try to recover the second one.
too late or not, that's doesn't concern him.
Robinson or NTSB will say if it was worth it.
but I think you're right.
.
Last edited by HeliHenri; 29th Jul 2013 at 12:25.
Join Date: Feb 2013
Location: usa
Posts: 10
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
second blade
This is a view of the second blade, you can clearly see the shaft side of the rotor, and appears to be in one piece unlike blade on that had a chunk out of it, but was still hanging on by a thread...I am going to get it this week as the water has been unusually clear in Tampa Bay.
blade 2 is in post# 98...
q
blade 2 is in post# 98...
q
Last edited by susieqfish; 29th Jul 2013 at 12:07.
.
I'm surprised this has gone quiet. Can anyone update on this....one of the most concerning seemingly unexplained failures for anyone ever needing to drive a 22, including myself. I might have missed it, apologies if I have.
Join Date: Feb 2013
Location: usa
Posts: 10
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Well.....I tried..again....spent 5 hours on the water with the side scan sonar....expanded my search area for the blade...no joy.....I did find some of the cabin and a skid......but the blade eluded me. It may be in too small pieces for me to discern, or it was flung more then 1000 feet from the original blade site.....
The water is getting cold again, and I am done looking this year.
The water is getting cold again, and I am done looking this year.
For sure all here really appreciate your efforts.
While looking again on your post #98
http://www.pprune.org/7698544-post98.html
blade was there...
Most of us with some underwater experience know well that bottom
of the sea is living beast. Sea can spit out that blade next year, or even
after some more time. Take another attempt while passing by next year,
your luck may be there (like mine, more than once).
The other way now, or after future miss with side-scan, is to go with
parametric sub bottom profiler, but that toy cost bit more than side-scan,
and cover of area is much slower.
While looking again on your post #98
http://www.pprune.org/7698544-post98.html
blade was there...
Most of us with some underwater experience know well that bottom
of the sea is living beast. Sea can spit out that blade next year, or even
after some more time. Take another attempt while passing by next year,
your luck may be there (like mine, more than once).
The other way now, or after future miss with side-scan, is to go with
parametric sub bottom profiler, but that toy cost bit more than side-scan,
and cover of area is much slower.
.
Your efforts are definitely appreciated. I'm still staggered that official efforts weren't made at the time to recover all the debris which is surely critical evidence. Were the company/investigators that satisfied that they have covered all the bases regarding cause, so early in the piece, that they were happy to leave the rest behind? I sincerely hope they have it right and we get some answers.
Join Date: Jul 2008
Location: Australia
Posts: 372
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Those sonar images
Thanks for reminding us of the sonar images 9A+. Looking at the first image it appears that there is a complete blade and the second shows what appear to be several separate segments of the blade arranged in a neat pattern with some segments missing. Critically the missing segments are from the middle of the blade, not the ends. If this had been a blade failure as for DQ-IHE the blade segments would not be co-located as shown in the second sonar scan.The segments would have been thrown well apart.
I suspect that the failure is not related to the blade itself but may be within the root/hub region. In which case even if the blade segments were found they would exhibit consequential evidence, not causal.
However, I agree with Kiwi500 that there should have been a bit more official effort than just offering a paltry reward that would barely cover the costs for S-q-fish.
Regards
Blakmax
I suspect that the failure is not related to the blade itself but may be within the root/hub region. In which case even if the blade segments were found they would exhibit consequential evidence, not causal.
However, I agree with Kiwi500 that there should have been a bit more official effort than just offering a paltry reward that would barely cover the costs for S-q-fish.
Regards
Blakmax
Join Date: Feb 2013
Location: usa
Posts: 10
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
The area where I found blade one is only ten feet deep with a smooth hard sand bottom. The ocean is very dynamic, but that is not the case for this area of Tampa bay as it is only a couple hundred yards from shore and in an area where there is no wave/wind activity. The pieces of the cabin and the skid are exactly where they were when I found them last year.
There was much activity after the first blade was recovered, literally dozens of boats out there looking and dragging the bottom for days, so the blade may have been snagged and dragged away by somebody, but that seems unlikely.
I went to the exact area of blade two, and searched extensively but found nothing but the wreck debris previously mentioned.
A sub bottom profiler would not be of much help here, as the bottom is hard sand and I am sure the blade is on top....somewhere. As an example, not far from this crash site there is a huge 6000# anchor and about 1000 feet of monster chain on the bottom that was lost there by a phosphate cargo ship, also in 12 feet of water and the anchor and chain are still right on the surface as if they were lost yesterday, not 20 years ago. So the dynamics of the area there are few and would not cause something to sink, especially a carbon blade being as lite as it is.
So it is a mystery.....if I get bored enough I may give it one more shot as it has to be somewhere......as I hate to loose
LOL......
There was much activity after the first blade was recovered, literally dozens of boats out there looking and dragging the bottom for days, so the blade may have been snagged and dragged away by somebody, but that seems unlikely.
I went to the exact area of blade two, and searched extensively but found nothing but the wreck debris previously mentioned.
A sub bottom profiler would not be of much help here, as the bottom is hard sand and I am sure the blade is on top....somewhere. As an example, not far from this crash site there is a huge 6000# anchor and about 1000 feet of monster chain on the bottom that was lost there by a phosphate cargo ship, also in 12 feet of water and the anchor and chain are still right on the surface as if they were lost yesterday, not 20 years ago. So the dynamics of the area there are few and would not cause something to sink, especially a carbon blade being as lite as it is.
So it is a mystery.....if I get bored enough I may give it one more shot as it has to be somewhere......as I hate to loose
LOL......
Join Date: Feb 2013
Location: usa
Posts: 10
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
News
NTSB Identification: ERA13FA070
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Friday, November 30, 2012 in Apollo Beach, FL
Probable Cause Approval Date: 02/04/2014
Aircraft: ROBINSON HELICOPTER R22 BETA II, registration: N2626N
Injuries: 1 Fatal.
NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.The helicopter was in cruise flight about 500 feet above ground level, over a bay beach, when both of its main rotor blades separated. The helicopter subsequently descended into the bay, and the wreckage with the exception of the main rotor blades was recovered 2 days later. One main rotor blade was subsequently recovered about 1 month later, and the other main rotor blade was not recovered. With the exception of the separation of the main rotor blades, examination of the airframe and engine did not reveal any evidence of preimpact mechanical malfunctions or anomalies. Metallurgical examination of the rotor hub and the recovered main rotor blade revealed features consistent with overstress, and no preexisting cracking or fatigue was noted. Additionally, damage to the teetering stops on the rotor hub was consistent with mast bumping. The observed mast bumping could have resulted from large, abrupt flight control inputs or from a mechanical failure of the unrecovered main rotor blade.
Toxicological testing and review of the pilot's medical records revealed a history of near nightly use of zolpidem (Ambien) as a sleep aid and frequent use of rizatripan (Maxalt) to treat migraine headaches. Neither condition or its respective prescription medication for treatment was reported to the Federal Aviation Administration and if it had been, would have most likely disqualified the pilot for a medical certificate based on the frequency of use/symptoms; however, the investigation could not determine the effects, if any, that the recurrent migraine, chronic zolpidem use, and underlying sleep problems might have had on the pilot at the time of the accident.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be:
Mast bumping for reasons that could not be determined because one main rotor blade was not recovered.
ERA13FA070HISTORY OF FLIGHT
On November 30, 2012, about 1512 eastern standard time, a Robinson R22 BETA II, N2626N, operated by Fly N Choppers, was substantially damaged when it impacted water, following a main rotor blade separation in flight near Apollo Beach, Florida. The airline transport pilot was fatally injured. The personal flight was conducted under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and no flight plan was filed for the local flight that departed Peter O Knight Airport (TPF), Tampa, Florida, about 1502.
According to radar data provided by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the helicopter departed its home base at Clearwater Airpark (CLW), Clearwater, Florida, about 1405. It flew over the local area and landed briefly at TPF, before performing another local flight. Witnesses reported that the helicopter was flying along the beach, from north to south, about 500 feet above ground level. The witnesses heard a bang, followed by a main rotor blade separation. The helicopter then immediately rolled right and descended nose down in to a bay, about 200 yards from shore. The last radar target was recorded at 1511:51, indicating an altitude of 200 feet, about 400 yards from shore. Review of the previous five radar targets revealed that the helicopter had climbed from approximately 500 feet, to 800 feet, before descending into the water.
PILOT INFORMATION
The pilot, age 60, held an airline transport pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single-engine land, airplane single-engine sea, airplane multiengine land, airplane multiengine sea, and rotorcraft helicopter. His most recent FAA first-class medical certificate was issued on September 26, 2012. At that time, he reported a total flight experience of 31,500 hours. Review of the pilot's logbook revealed that he had accumulated about 290 hours of helicopter experience; of which, 10 hours were flown during the 90-day period preceding the accident. All 10 hours were flown in the accident helicopter.
AIRCRAFT INFORMATION
The two-seat helicopter, serial number 3644, was manufactured in 2004. It was equipped with a Lycoming O-360, 180-horsepower engine. The helicopter's most recent 100-hour inspection was completed on November 12, 2012. At that time, the helicopter had accumulated 3412.8 hours of operation. The helicopter had flown approximately 55.2 hours from the time of the last inspection, until the accident flight.
A mechanic reported that during the most recent inspection, he had found one main rotor blade exhibiting delamination. He then replaced both main rotor blades with used blades; however, the used blades had 142.4 hours remaining on their 2,200-hour life limit and were inspected before being installed on the accident helicopter.
METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION
MacDill Air Force Base (MCF), Tampa, Florida, was located about 8 miles northwest of the accident site. The recorded weather at MCF, at 1455, was: wind 070 degrees at 8 knots; visibility 10 miles; few clouds at 8,000 feet; temperature 26 degrees C; dew point 13 degrees C; altimeter 30.17 inches Hg.
WRECKAGE INFORMATION
The helicopter was recovered from the bay 2 days later. The engine and rotor mast remained attached to the airframe. The rotor hub remained attached to the rotor mast and the elastic teeter stops exhibited impact damage. Both spindle assemblies and their respective rotor blades had separated from the hub; one main rotor blade (with spindle assembly) was recovered from the water about 1 month after the accident and the other main rotor blade was not located. The tailboom separated about 6 feet from the transmission and the tailrotor remained with the tailboom. Both tailrotor blades exhibited impact damage. The horizontal stabilizer separated from the tailboom and the vertical stabilizer remained attached to the horizontal. The tailboom exhibited impact damage on the upper left side. The right skid remained attached and the left skid separated. The toe from the left skid was separated and not recovered.
The cockpit was crushed and the windscreen was not recovered. Localized impact damage was observed on the left lower side of the cockpit. Both collectives and the cyclic T-bar remained attached. The antitorque pedals on both sides of the cockpit remained attached. Continuity was established from the tailrotor through the tailrotor drive shaft, to the break in the tailboom, and in to the transmission. Continuity was also confirmed from the main rotor, through the transmission, to the tailrotor drive shaft. The cyclic remained connected via push-pull tubes to the mixer, where push-pull tubes were separated about 1 inch vertically of the mixer consistent with overstress. The push-pull tubes then continued to the swashplate. The antitorque pedals remained connected to push-pull tubes to the lower bellcrank. A push-pull tube had separated about 18 inches vertically of the lower bellcrank, consistent with overstress. Beyond the separation, the upper bellcrank was fractured and there was also a separation of a push-pull tube in the tailboom.
The carburetor heat was in the off position. The mixture control was in the full rich position. The magnetos were selected to both. The fuel selector was not recovered.
The valve covers and top spark plugs were removed from the engine and oil was noted throughout the engine. The spark plug electrodes were intact and light gray in color. The caps were also removed from the magnetos. The crankshaft was rotated by hand via the fan wheel. Camshaft, crankshaft, and valve train continuity was confirmed to the rear accessory section and thumb compression was attained on all cylinders. Both magneto gears rotated when the crankshaft rotated. The carburetor remained attached to the engine and was undamaged.
The rotor hub and the recovered main rotor blade with spindle assembly were forwarded to the NTSB Materials Laboratory, Washington, D.C., for further examination. Metallurgical examination of the components revealed features consistent with overstress and no preexisting cracking or fatigue was noted. Additionally, damage to the teetering stops was consistent with a mast bump (for more information, see Materials Laboratory Factual Reports in the NTSB Public Docket.)
MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION
An Autopsy was performed on the pilot on December 2, 2012, by the State of Florida District 13 Medical Examiner's Office, Tampa, Florida. The cause of death was noted as due to blunt impact to the head and torso. Toxicological testing was performed on the pilot by the FAA Bioaeronautical Science Research Laboratory, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. Review of the toxicological report revealed:
"Rizatriptan detected in Urine
Zolpidem detected in Liver
Zolpidem detected in Urine"
Review of the pilot's applications for FAA medical certificates revealed that he was first medically certified in 1973 and routinely medically recertified thereafter. The pilot did not report any medications, medical conditions, or physician visits until 2010, when he reported having had hernia surgery.
For many years, the pilot's aviation medical examiner was his personal physician. This physician had prescribed zolpidem (a sleep aid marketed under the trade name Ambien) for many years with the caution "do not fly an aircraft for 24 hours after taking this med." According to pharmacy records, during the last few months before the accident, the pilot had refilled this prescription monthly for 30 tablets each time. In addition, the physician had referred the pilot to a neurologist for evaluation and treatment of migraine headaches and was aware that the pilot had been prescribed rizatriptan (a vasoactive medication used to treat migraines, marketed under the trade name Maxalt) for these headaches. According to pharmacy records, the pilot routinely refilled his prescription for 9 tablets/month. According to the treating neurologist, the migraines were successfully aborted by this medication.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
According to the FAA-H-8083-21A, Helicopter Flying Handbook, "…mast bumping is the result of excessive rotor flapping. Each rotor system design has a maximum flapping angle. If flapping exceeds the design value, the static stop will contact the mast. It is the violent contact between the static stop and the mast during flight that causes mast damage or separation."
ERA13FA070
Untitled Page
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Friday, November 30, 2012 in Apollo Beach, FL
Probable Cause Approval Date: 02/04/2014
Aircraft: ROBINSON HELICOPTER R22 BETA II, registration: N2626N
Injuries: 1 Fatal.
NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.The helicopter was in cruise flight about 500 feet above ground level, over a bay beach, when both of its main rotor blades separated. The helicopter subsequently descended into the bay, and the wreckage with the exception of the main rotor blades was recovered 2 days later. One main rotor blade was subsequently recovered about 1 month later, and the other main rotor blade was not recovered. With the exception of the separation of the main rotor blades, examination of the airframe and engine did not reveal any evidence of preimpact mechanical malfunctions or anomalies. Metallurgical examination of the rotor hub and the recovered main rotor blade revealed features consistent with overstress, and no preexisting cracking or fatigue was noted. Additionally, damage to the teetering stops on the rotor hub was consistent with mast bumping. The observed mast bumping could have resulted from large, abrupt flight control inputs or from a mechanical failure of the unrecovered main rotor blade.
Toxicological testing and review of the pilot's medical records revealed a history of near nightly use of zolpidem (Ambien) as a sleep aid and frequent use of rizatripan (Maxalt) to treat migraine headaches. Neither condition or its respective prescription medication for treatment was reported to the Federal Aviation Administration and if it had been, would have most likely disqualified the pilot for a medical certificate based on the frequency of use/symptoms; however, the investigation could not determine the effects, if any, that the recurrent migraine, chronic zolpidem use, and underlying sleep problems might have had on the pilot at the time of the accident.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be:
Mast bumping for reasons that could not be determined because one main rotor blade was not recovered.
ERA13FA070HISTORY OF FLIGHT
On November 30, 2012, about 1512 eastern standard time, a Robinson R22 BETA II, N2626N, operated by Fly N Choppers, was substantially damaged when it impacted water, following a main rotor blade separation in flight near Apollo Beach, Florida. The airline transport pilot was fatally injured. The personal flight was conducted under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and no flight plan was filed for the local flight that departed Peter O Knight Airport (TPF), Tampa, Florida, about 1502.
According to radar data provided by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the helicopter departed its home base at Clearwater Airpark (CLW), Clearwater, Florida, about 1405. It flew over the local area and landed briefly at TPF, before performing another local flight. Witnesses reported that the helicopter was flying along the beach, from north to south, about 500 feet above ground level. The witnesses heard a bang, followed by a main rotor blade separation. The helicopter then immediately rolled right and descended nose down in to a bay, about 200 yards from shore. The last radar target was recorded at 1511:51, indicating an altitude of 200 feet, about 400 yards from shore. Review of the previous five radar targets revealed that the helicopter had climbed from approximately 500 feet, to 800 feet, before descending into the water.
PILOT INFORMATION
The pilot, age 60, held an airline transport pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single-engine land, airplane single-engine sea, airplane multiengine land, airplane multiengine sea, and rotorcraft helicopter. His most recent FAA first-class medical certificate was issued on September 26, 2012. At that time, he reported a total flight experience of 31,500 hours. Review of the pilot's logbook revealed that he had accumulated about 290 hours of helicopter experience; of which, 10 hours were flown during the 90-day period preceding the accident. All 10 hours were flown in the accident helicopter.
AIRCRAFT INFORMATION
The two-seat helicopter, serial number 3644, was manufactured in 2004. It was equipped with a Lycoming O-360, 180-horsepower engine. The helicopter's most recent 100-hour inspection was completed on November 12, 2012. At that time, the helicopter had accumulated 3412.8 hours of operation. The helicopter had flown approximately 55.2 hours from the time of the last inspection, until the accident flight.
A mechanic reported that during the most recent inspection, he had found one main rotor blade exhibiting delamination. He then replaced both main rotor blades with used blades; however, the used blades had 142.4 hours remaining on their 2,200-hour life limit and were inspected before being installed on the accident helicopter.
METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION
MacDill Air Force Base (MCF), Tampa, Florida, was located about 8 miles northwest of the accident site. The recorded weather at MCF, at 1455, was: wind 070 degrees at 8 knots; visibility 10 miles; few clouds at 8,000 feet; temperature 26 degrees C; dew point 13 degrees C; altimeter 30.17 inches Hg.
WRECKAGE INFORMATION
The helicopter was recovered from the bay 2 days later. The engine and rotor mast remained attached to the airframe. The rotor hub remained attached to the rotor mast and the elastic teeter stops exhibited impact damage. Both spindle assemblies and their respective rotor blades had separated from the hub; one main rotor blade (with spindle assembly) was recovered from the water about 1 month after the accident and the other main rotor blade was not located. The tailboom separated about 6 feet from the transmission and the tailrotor remained with the tailboom. Both tailrotor blades exhibited impact damage. The horizontal stabilizer separated from the tailboom and the vertical stabilizer remained attached to the horizontal. The tailboom exhibited impact damage on the upper left side. The right skid remained attached and the left skid separated. The toe from the left skid was separated and not recovered.
The cockpit was crushed and the windscreen was not recovered. Localized impact damage was observed on the left lower side of the cockpit. Both collectives and the cyclic T-bar remained attached. The antitorque pedals on both sides of the cockpit remained attached. Continuity was established from the tailrotor through the tailrotor drive shaft, to the break in the tailboom, and in to the transmission. Continuity was also confirmed from the main rotor, through the transmission, to the tailrotor drive shaft. The cyclic remained connected via push-pull tubes to the mixer, where push-pull tubes were separated about 1 inch vertically of the mixer consistent with overstress. The push-pull tubes then continued to the swashplate. The antitorque pedals remained connected to push-pull tubes to the lower bellcrank. A push-pull tube had separated about 18 inches vertically of the lower bellcrank, consistent with overstress. Beyond the separation, the upper bellcrank was fractured and there was also a separation of a push-pull tube in the tailboom.
The carburetor heat was in the off position. The mixture control was in the full rich position. The magnetos were selected to both. The fuel selector was not recovered.
The valve covers and top spark plugs were removed from the engine and oil was noted throughout the engine. The spark plug electrodes were intact and light gray in color. The caps were also removed from the magnetos. The crankshaft was rotated by hand via the fan wheel. Camshaft, crankshaft, and valve train continuity was confirmed to the rear accessory section and thumb compression was attained on all cylinders. Both magneto gears rotated when the crankshaft rotated. The carburetor remained attached to the engine and was undamaged.
The rotor hub and the recovered main rotor blade with spindle assembly were forwarded to the NTSB Materials Laboratory, Washington, D.C., for further examination. Metallurgical examination of the components revealed features consistent with overstress and no preexisting cracking or fatigue was noted. Additionally, damage to the teetering stops was consistent with a mast bump (for more information, see Materials Laboratory Factual Reports in the NTSB Public Docket.)
MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION
An Autopsy was performed on the pilot on December 2, 2012, by the State of Florida District 13 Medical Examiner's Office, Tampa, Florida. The cause of death was noted as due to blunt impact to the head and torso. Toxicological testing was performed on the pilot by the FAA Bioaeronautical Science Research Laboratory, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. Review of the toxicological report revealed:
"Rizatriptan detected in Urine
Zolpidem detected in Liver
Zolpidem detected in Urine"
Review of the pilot's applications for FAA medical certificates revealed that he was first medically certified in 1973 and routinely medically recertified thereafter. The pilot did not report any medications, medical conditions, or physician visits until 2010, when he reported having had hernia surgery.
For many years, the pilot's aviation medical examiner was his personal physician. This physician had prescribed zolpidem (a sleep aid marketed under the trade name Ambien) for many years with the caution "do not fly an aircraft for 24 hours after taking this med." According to pharmacy records, during the last few months before the accident, the pilot had refilled this prescription monthly for 30 tablets each time. In addition, the physician had referred the pilot to a neurologist for evaluation and treatment of migraine headaches and was aware that the pilot had been prescribed rizatriptan (a vasoactive medication used to treat migraines, marketed under the trade name Maxalt) for these headaches. According to pharmacy records, the pilot routinely refilled his prescription for 9 tablets/month. According to the treating neurologist, the migraines were successfully aborted by this medication.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
According to the FAA-H-8083-21A, Helicopter Flying Handbook, "…mast bumping is the result of excessive rotor flapping. Each rotor system design has a maximum flapping angle. If flapping exceeds the design value, the static stop will contact the mast. It is the violent contact between the static stop and the mast during flight that causes mast damage or separation."
ERA13FA070
Untitled Page
