Almost died in the Gulf of Mexico yesterday..
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We could try that. I don't know about what you do, but in my business it would shortly be followed by, "No Vote - No Flight."
And then by the hospital saying, "No Flight - no Contract," and the company saying, "No Contract - No Job."
But we could try it.
And then by the hospital saying, "No Flight - no Contract," and the company saying, "No Contract - No Job."
But we could try it.
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My point is that if he is for real, he created a new account and came on here with the sole purpose of causing serious trouble for the pilot and operator in question, not to stimulate an informed debate. And, considering the legal ramifications of such claims, they should be handled through the proper channels. His post should never have been allowed on here considering that. Having seen some of the posts deleted by SP here before, I'm surprised something like this was not deleted without a second thought.
Taking into account the aforementioned serious trouble in the top paragraph of this post, that's exactly what I'm saying. This is a forum for professional pilots, is it not? During an investigation of an incident like this, it would be noted that a person's observations(including pilots) during times of stress or traumatic events can be drastically distorted, and would only account for a very small piece of a larger picture needed to piece together what actually happened. Claims such as "...and banks helicopter about 30 feet off of the Gulf at high rate of speed. Death was certain..." would be considered, but with a grain of salt. If it was one of the large operators they will have recording equipment on board to tell what really happened, even on the smaller ships. Once again, this is not the place for such claims before an investigation has taken place.
I have problems with this poster being given a voice on this forum on a few different levels. Including what I posted earlier.
You've as much as said, "we're pilots, you're not, so you're not worth our time. Go away."
I have problems with this poster being given a voice on this forum on a few different levels. Including what I posted earlier.
Last edited by darrenphughes; 24th Jan 2012 at 22:28. Reason: added last paragragh
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Much ado about nothing?
This is a most interesting thread...
Both sides of the argument here are meritous, though their delivery may not be so.
Response to helicopter industry colleagues...
OP (Original Poster) has clearly been scared by the occassion, and this is not good.
The helicopter industry is 'traditionally' up against it. The art which we call 'Rotorcraft Flying' is to most people, simply, a black art surrounded by myth and fantasy. "Helicopters can't glide....when you lose an engine you fall out of the sky....it's as hard as making love to your woman whilst standing up in a hammock!'; that sort of thing. (Ok, I'll admit to using the last one myself as a chat up line...but you get my drift!)
Couple that with the fact that helicopter crashes are always spectacular fireballs in which no one has a chance in hell of getting out...at least, that's what Hollywood would have you believe.
To top things off, we have our continual struggle against the NIMBY's (Not-In-My-Back-Yard) folk, who contiually try to shut us down with noise complaints to the local authority, anytime we encroach on their section of the world.
Public perception of our industry is not that good.
In that case, as helicopter pilots, we should be doing everything we can to improve the public view of what we do. That is, in our daily routine with passengers, in the sky with the layman looking up at us, and in forums such as these, where any anonymous person can get an insight into the kind of people we are; our own actions serve to either perpetuate the 'doom and gloom' which shrouds or work, or clear up misconceptions; its our choice. A better image will make all our lives easier.
If someone thinks we fall out of the sky like a brick when the engine fails, explain why we don't. If someone complains of our noise when we evacuate a victim from the sea and transport them to a hosipital, remind them that we'd do the same for them. If someone gets nervous with the movements of the machine in the air, fly so they can't feel them.
Maybe OP's pilot could consider why his passenger was so unhappy with his performance...did OP's pilot understand his passenger's concerns...did he 'sell' our industry?
We know that most people's fear is because of their ignorance. Yet, how can we expect our passengers to not be ignorant? They've not had the extensive training we have had. What seems simple and mundane to us, may be the most frightening event to the untrained eye. Sitting in the back, passengers have restricted view. They might not see the horizon from where they are, whereas you can see it clearly. If they can't see anything out of the front, they get scared, unless they understand our capabilities. Fly with that in mind. Keep them in the loop. Assure them.
-----------------------------------
However...
The OP has described an incident, which on the surface would appear very alarming, and deserving of shock and horror. Yet, we can't verify what actually happened.
If this was Inadvertant IMC, then there are definitely questions the pilot / operator should be asking. We all make mistakes, and Inadvertant IMC is well documented as one which the best of pilots can get into. However, there are some operations which should not be getting close to that. Through company policy, support for the pilots, a 'No Blame Culture' and all those other things we learn in the CRM courses we go to, operators should be able to demand / expect / acheive almost 100% security against Inadvertant IMC. So to that pilot / operator...ask questions.
On the other hand, we also know from our training, is when encountering IMC which you don't want to be in, do as OP describes...make a 180 degree turn back towards the VMC. It sounds to me that OP's pilot did the right thing. Yet, OP still calls him a retard.
We can't read too much into a 'layman's' account of speeds and altitude, and even the actual conditions. Unless OP was a pilot able to see the instruments and / or a meterologist able to make accurate assessment of the conditions, I am not going to be too alarmed by his account. A fearful person sees the worst.
OP's account of the incident has the hallmarks of being dressed up, either out of emotion, or for the sake of excitement. Probably a little of both. Lacking credible technical reference (how was the altitude / speed / rate of bank, what type of aircraft and how is it fitted, what were the actual conditions), the account suggests that this is a layman's account.
This is a problem when laymen tell their story. What they see may not be what happened. Let's not get too fussed over this, until the events can be verified.
-----------------------------
So what is my point?
I guses if anything, I'm trying to say that we in the industry should regard seriously any occasion when our customers are not happy. We should conduct ourselves at all times as if we were trying to sell our product. Whether we be in the air or not. That's because we have to.
At the same time, we cannot jump to conclusions based on a layman's account of an event. Take everything with a pinch of salt. Sure, where there's smoke there's fire...but how much? It could be that the pilot was absolutely absolutely in control of the situation, operating within company and personal parameters, and was taking a fair and calculated risk within his capability to recover. Maybe OP simply perceived the situation to be worse than it was.
OP's account was not the best way to address what happened. Piling into a helicopter pilot's forum with such a story was inevitably going to be met with some pretty emotional responses!
-------------------------------
My response to OP is thus:
Mate,
There's a way of doing things.
If you were concerned by the conduct of this pilot, then you have the right (and should feel no guilt) in raising the situation sensitively and discretely to the right people, and through the correct channels.
As you do, reflect on the fact that your own perception of the situation may be warped due to a number of factors. Consider your own experience, your ability to see and observe the crucial factors, your knowledge of aviation and helicopter operations and consider whether you have all the information with which to make such allegations. Support evidence with facts.
If you raise your concerns responsibly and carefully, then you will (should) get an equally responsible and careful response from the right people. Sometimes an air of rhetoric enquiry works better than straight out allegation. With good 'people skills', you'll get what you want. Stamping feet and shouting doesn't usually work!
On the other hand, throwing allegations around a public / anonymous internet forum does not help your credibility, and certainly is not the way to expect changes. You certainly haven't alarmed or shocked me.
Lastly, if there is any ulterior malicious reason for your posting (to get at someone personally), then you need to take a good look at your own self first, and really have no business posting here.
Good luck!
Consider this: A passenger on the left side of a large aircraft. He can't see much forward...only sky out of the front if he can even see the windshields at all. Out of the left window, he can see a cold front ahead, and clear sky abeam and behind. He sees the horizon in the distance.
The aircraft goes through a few whisks of cloud, and the pilot decides to turn and bug out, before going IMC. So the pilot executes a right bank. A higher rate than normal, but still safely in sight of the horizon in front, and within the parameters of the aircraft.
The passenger, now is looking upwards into this wall of cloud. No horizon, and therefore no visual reference. If the pilot looks out of the cockpit, he might see some sea out of the right side of the cockpit. The green blue blur of the ocean is all that is visible out of the right windows across the cabin.
The passenger has NO visual references. Last sensation was that they were entering cloud.
As the pilot banks, he also reduces speed in a level decelleration.
What does our Human Factors training tell us about somatographic illusion? What will the passenger feel is happening?
Exactly, the passenger will feel a pitch down attitude, giving the illusion that the aircraft is in a descent, when actually it is simply flying level and descellerating.
What you see as a passenger, is not always what is happening.
Both sides of the argument here are meritous, though their delivery may not be so.
Response to helicopter industry colleagues...
OP (Original Poster) has clearly been scared by the occassion, and this is not good.
The helicopter industry is 'traditionally' up against it. The art which we call 'Rotorcraft Flying' is to most people, simply, a black art surrounded by myth and fantasy. "Helicopters can't glide....when you lose an engine you fall out of the sky....it's as hard as making love to your woman whilst standing up in a hammock!'; that sort of thing. (Ok, I'll admit to using the last one myself as a chat up line...but you get my drift!)
Couple that with the fact that helicopter crashes are always spectacular fireballs in which no one has a chance in hell of getting out...at least, that's what Hollywood would have you believe.
To top things off, we have our continual struggle against the NIMBY's (Not-In-My-Back-Yard) folk, who contiually try to shut us down with noise complaints to the local authority, anytime we encroach on their section of the world.
Public perception of our industry is not that good.
In that case, as helicopter pilots, we should be doing everything we can to improve the public view of what we do. That is, in our daily routine with passengers, in the sky with the layman looking up at us, and in forums such as these, where any anonymous person can get an insight into the kind of people we are; our own actions serve to either perpetuate the 'doom and gloom' which shrouds or work, or clear up misconceptions; its our choice. A better image will make all our lives easier.
If someone thinks we fall out of the sky like a brick when the engine fails, explain why we don't. If someone complains of our noise when we evacuate a victim from the sea and transport them to a hosipital, remind them that we'd do the same for them. If someone gets nervous with the movements of the machine in the air, fly so they can't feel them.
Maybe OP's pilot could consider why his passenger was so unhappy with his performance...did OP's pilot understand his passenger's concerns...did he 'sell' our industry?
We know that most people's fear is because of their ignorance. Yet, how can we expect our passengers to not be ignorant? They've not had the extensive training we have had. What seems simple and mundane to us, may be the most frightening event to the untrained eye. Sitting in the back, passengers have restricted view. They might not see the horizon from where they are, whereas you can see it clearly. If they can't see anything out of the front, they get scared, unless they understand our capabilities. Fly with that in mind. Keep them in the loop. Assure them.
-----------------------------------
However...
The OP has described an incident, which on the surface would appear very alarming, and deserving of shock and horror. Yet, we can't verify what actually happened.
If this was Inadvertant IMC, then there are definitely questions the pilot / operator should be asking. We all make mistakes, and Inadvertant IMC is well documented as one which the best of pilots can get into. However, there are some operations which should not be getting close to that. Through company policy, support for the pilots, a 'No Blame Culture' and all those other things we learn in the CRM courses we go to, operators should be able to demand / expect / acheive almost 100% security against Inadvertant IMC. So to that pilot / operator...ask questions.
On the other hand, we also know from our training, is when encountering IMC which you don't want to be in, do as OP describes...make a 180 degree turn back towards the VMC. It sounds to me that OP's pilot did the right thing. Yet, OP still calls him a retard.
We can't read too much into a 'layman's' account of speeds and altitude, and even the actual conditions. Unless OP was a pilot able to see the instruments and / or a meterologist able to make accurate assessment of the conditions, I am not going to be too alarmed by his account. A fearful person sees the worst.
OP's account of the incident has the hallmarks of being dressed up, either out of emotion, or for the sake of excitement. Probably a little of both. Lacking credible technical reference (how was the altitude / speed / rate of bank, what type of aircraft and how is it fitted, what were the actual conditions), the account suggests that this is a layman's account.
This is a problem when laymen tell their story. What they see may not be what happened. Let's not get too fussed over this, until the events can be verified.
-----------------------------
So what is my point?
I guses if anything, I'm trying to say that we in the industry should regard seriously any occasion when our customers are not happy. We should conduct ourselves at all times as if we were trying to sell our product. Whether we be in the air or not. That's because we have to.
At the same time, we cannot jump to conclusions based on a layman's account of an event. Take everything with a pinch of salt. Sure, where there's smoke there's fire...but how much? It could be that the pilot was absolutely absolutely in control of the situation, operating within company and personal parameters, and was taking a fair and calculated risk within his capability to recover. Maybe OP simply perceived the situation to be worse than it was.
OP's account was not the best way to address what happened. Piling into a helicopter pilot's forum with such a story was inevitably going to be met with some pretty emotional responses!
-------------------------------
My response to OP is thus:
Mate,
There's a way of doing things.
If you were concerned by the conduct of this pilot, then you have the right (and should feel no guilt) in raising the situation sensitively and discretely to the right people, and through the correct channels.
As you do, reflect on the fact that your own perception of the situation may be warped due to a number of factors. Consider your own experience, your ability to see and observe the crucial factors, your knowledge of aviation and helicopter operations and consider whether you have all the information with which to make such allegations. Support evidence with facts.
If you raise your concerns responsibly and carefully, then you will (should) get an equally responsible and careful response from the right people. Sometimes an air of rhetoric enquiry works better than straight out allegation. With good 'people skills', you'll get what you want. Stamping feet and shouting doesn't usually work!
On the other hand, throwing allegations around a public / anonymous internet forum does not help your credibility, and certainly is not the way to expect changes. You certainly haven't alarmed or shocked me.
Lastly, if there is any ulterior malicious reason for your posting (to get at someone personally), then you need to take a good look at your own self first, and really have no business posting here.
Good luck!
Consider this: A passenger on the left side of a large aircraft. He can't see much forward...only sky out of the front if he can even see the windshields at all. Out of the left window, he can see a cold front ahead, and clear sky abeam and behind. He sees the horizon in the distance.
The aircraft goes through a few whisks of cloud, and the pilot decides to turn and bug out, before going IMC. So the pilot executes a right bank. A higher rate than normal, but still safely in sight of the horizon in front, and within the parameters of the aircraft.
The passenger, now is looking upwards into this wall of cloud. No horizon, and therefore no visual reference. If the pilot looks out of the cockpit, he might see some sea out of the right side of the cockpit. The green blue blur of the ocean is all that is visible out of the right windows across the cabin.
The passenger has NO visual references. Last sensation was that they were entering cloud.
As the pilot banks, he also reduces speed in a level decelleration.
What does our Human Factors training tell us about somatographic illusion? What will the passenger feel is happening?
Exactly, the passenger will feel a pitch down attitude, giving the illusion that the aircraft is in a descent, when actually it is simply flying level and descellerating.
What you see as a passenger, is not always what is happening.
Last edited by cl12pv2s; 25th Jan 2012 at 04:40.
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The pilot did a good job. Nothing happened apart from a steep bank, where in the regs does it say you can't make a steep turn! Obviously he should have flown into IMC, but he responded the right way.
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The pilot did a good job. Nothing happened apart from a steep bank, where in the regs does it say you can't make a steep turn! Obviously he should have flown into IMC, but he responded the right way.
Having the benefit of seeing at first hand the operational standards in the GOM by one large operator who's target is zero, I can well believe this incident happened. Have none of you read the 'Another accident in the GOM' thread??
Why do you think that a passenger who flies regularly offshore cannot voice his concerns about an incident. This site, as is often stated, is a rumour network. If you don't like what you read Darrenphughes then I suggest you stop reading and go back to JH.
The passenger may well have filed some kind of occurance report with his company but any oil company that allows it's empoyees to fly offshore in tired, old single engine, VFR machines is not going to take much notice.
I can imagine the reaction of an offshore passenger in Europe being told to climb aboard a Bell 206 to get to work. None of them are particularly overjoyed at having to fly in a helicopter but at least they know that they have a very good chance of actually getting to the platform without being scared out of their wits in a small, underpowered helicopter that has to fly around weather and is flown by one pilot who does not have the option of IFR and is under pressure to get the job done.
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The pilot did a good job. Nothing happened apart from a steep bank, where in the regs does it say you can't make a steep turn! Obviously he should have flown into IMC, but he responded the right way.
Epiphany,
I just want to reiterate my view, lest you should misunderstand where I'm coming from.
1. OP has every right to address his concerns, yet there is a right way and a wrong way. Simply stamping feet will not result in the UNIVERSAL sympathy and support he seeks. Especially not from those feet he's stamped on. Let's not hide behind the name 'Rumour Network' as an excuse to step outside normal social / proffessional boundries. Any big oil patch operator would have, as well as the administrator (FAA?), a method for reporting occurrences. I'm sure OP's own company and industry have their ways of dealing with problems, and if the worm was on the other foot(!) and the finger pointed at him, he'd hope the proper procedure be followed through.
2. The pilot / company / operator should maybe be reflecting on their practices, based on the fact that one of their passengers got scared. That might be to review minima, go / no-go criterea, aircraft choice...etc..etc.. I won't go there, since there are much more learned people to comment on that side of things.
3. OP's account may not be accurate, and therefore is simply information, rather than fact. Subsequent responses here should reflect that. It may have happened. It may not have happened. That's all.
4. Maybe the oil company is not the best place to file the complaint either (for the reasons you mention). Voicing concern in a place like this, COULD be a very fruitful platform to get people thinking about the subject (although its been done before with little effect). It would need a slightly different approach though. OPs post came across as an unsubstantiated gripe / whinge / moan to me. That, I can't take seriously.
In short, I agree with you. Most would I think. It's just the manner in which he raised it, which is possibly counter productive to his cause.
Still, its food for thought for everyone, eh?!
(FWIW, I agree wholeheartedly with the multi crew, multi engine concept for IFR ops.)
Last edited by cl12pv2s; 25th Jan 2012 at 07:35.
Episodes like the one described in the original post happen almost on a daily basis in the GOM, it's unfortunate but it's true.
The reasons for these occurrences are due to the (still) individual nature of the job, as long as there are single piloted unrestricted VFR operations with WX minimums that border the marginal VFR these episodes are going to continue.
BTDT, I must add.
I am going out on a limb here and state that this was was probably a contract for a second tier "production management" customer with possibly contract passengers on board.
I have to agree with Epiphany on this, it's very unlikely something like this would have happened had the operation been conducted with a multi-pilot, IFR capable twin.
The reasons for these occurrences are due to the (still) individual nature of the job, as long as there are single piloted unrestricted VFR operations with WX minimums that border the marginal VFR these episodes are going to continue.
BTDT, I must add.
I am going out on a limb here and state that this was was probably a contract for a second tier "production management" customer with possibly contract passengers on board.
I have to agree with Epiphany on this, it's very unlikely something like this would have happened had the operation been conducted with a multi-pilot, IFR capable twin.
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it's very unlikely something like this would have happened had the operation been conducted with a multi-pilot, IFR capable twin.
SP has been really astute in removing the specific details of the flight and permitting the post to remain for discussion. Perhaps we can reward him for that, avoid the rhetoric, and provide a constructive discussion.
It does not surprise me that the main issues that are being discussed here are the ethics of the passenger in initiating this thread, and the actions of the pilot having encountered IIMC; the basis of a 'blame culture' which might result in these incidents being swept under the carpet (as has been recommended).
In one sense this is similar to a parallel and constructive discussion that is going on in the HEMS threads - trying to bring to the fore, and address, the serious problems of 'loss of control' (LOC) and 'CFIT'.
Perhaps the first thing we ought to do is to acknowledge the two elements that were in favour of a safe outcome: (1) the skill of the pilot in executing a reversal of track manoeuvre; and (2) a sizeable helping of luck.
Even though not resulting in an accident, the precursors to this incident would have been similar! These precursors would also be the same for a LOC or CFIT that occurred in any other segment of the industry. One mitigating factor in this case would have been the absence of obstacles that is a feature of offshore operations (but with a concomitant reduction of visual cues).
Perhaps we can move the debate on, examine these 'threats' and consider how to 'control' them. An examination of VFR operations will surface the following:
For a potential LOC (for offshore coupled with CFIT) incident/accident - one threat will be:
attitude cannot be maintained by reference to visual cues
The first control might be:
One thing that needs to be emphasized is that encountering adverse weather en-route should be anticipated. This anticipation will consist of a process of monitoring the conditions and having an 'abort plan' (sometimes called an Operational Decision Point (ODP)) which can be brought into operation if the weather nears and then reduces below in-flight limits.
In the main, only the LOC hazard has been addressed here because for offshore flying LOC/CFIT correlate quite closely. For HEMS and onshore operations, CFIT will have its own specific threats, escalations and controls.
Jim
It does not surprise me that the main issues that are being discussed here are the ethics of the passenger in initiating this thread, and the actions of the pilot having encountered IIMC; the basis of a 'blame culture' which might result in these incidents being swept under the carpet (as has been recommended).
In one sense this is similar to a parallel and constructive discussion that is going on in the HEMS threads - trying to bring to the fore, and address, the serious problems of 'loss of control' (LOC) and 'CFIT'.
Perhaps the first thing we ought to do is to acknowledge the two elements that were in favour of a safe outcome: (1) the skill of the pilot in executing a reversal of track manoeuvre; and (2) a sizeable helping of luck.
Even though not resulting in an accident, the precursors to this incident would have been similar! These precursors would also be the same for a LOC or CFIT that occurred in any other segment of the industry. One mitigating factor in this case would have been the absence of obstacles that is a feature of offshore operations (but with a concomitant reduction of visual cues).
Perhaps we can move the debate on, examine these 'threats' and consider how to 'control' them. An examination of VFR operations will surface the following:
For a potential LOC (for offshore coupled with CFIT) incident/accident - one threat will be:
attitude cannot be maintained by reference to visual cues
The first control might be:
Dispatch only to approved weather limits
In that case 'threat escalations' could be:
Following a 'dispatch to approved weather' limits, if adverse weather is encountered, the following threats might be encountered:Operating base does not provide an adequate planning system
Pilots do not meet minimum standards for offshore flying
There is pressure to launch below limits
Pilot self-approves flights below limits
Dispatch limits are not well understood
Dispatch limits are not enforced
Pilots do not meet minimum standards for offshore flying
There is pressure to launch below limits
Pilot self-approves flights below limits
Dispatch limits are not well understood
Dispatch limits are not enforced
En-route weather nears in-flight limits
En-route weather deteriorates below in-flight limits
En-route weather deteriorates below in-flight limits
With the following 'threat escalations':
Having encountered weather below limits a threat control might be:The pilot does not understand the importance of visual cues
The pilot does not recognise the systems of degradation of visual cues
The pilot cannot estimate visibility in flight
The pilot does not understand the importance of minimum en-route altitude discipline
The pilot does not recognise the systems of degradation of visual cues
The pilot cannot estimate visibility in flight
The pilot does not understand the importance of minimum en-route altitude discipline
Crew elect to convert to IFR
With the 'threat esclations':
Although, the continuation of the process will result in at least one 'escalation control' for each 'escalation', that is left for the time being. Needless to say, these controls are contained within the broad areas of 'Operational Control', 'Dispatch Control', Safety Oversight', 'crew selection', 'crew training', 'crew discipline' all of which fall within the scope of SMS and culture.The pilot has not planned for an IFR recovery
The aircraft is not certificated for flight in IMC
The crew is not qualified, or have recency for flight in IMC
The aircraft is not certificated for flight in IMC
The crew is not qualified, or have recency for flight in IMC
One thing that needs to be emphasized is that encountering adverse weather en-route should be anticipated. This anticipation will consist of a process of monitoring the conditions and having an 'abort plan' (sometimes called an Operational Decision Point (ODP)) which can be brought into operation if the weather nears and then reduces below in-flight limits.
In the main, only the LOC hazard has been addressed here because for offshore flying LOC/CFIT correlate quite closely. For HEMS and onshore operations, CFIT will have its own specific threats, escalations and controls.
Jim
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I have recent experience flying with experienced GOM pilots who were largely ignorant of IFR operation and procedures even though they were flying IFR helicopters. When I aked why they avoided clouds like the plague I was told that the only time they fly IFR is in the sim. The company discouraged any IFR flying due to costs and diversion fuel/weight penalties incurred.
The difference between North Sea and GOM offshore operations is enormous and I was staggered at the prevailing attitude in GOM. I also attended a CRM course there which lasted all of 30 minutes.
Re-equipping to multi-pilot IFR machines is not the cure-all either. The Bell 206 single-pilot VFR mentality needs to change too and judging by my experiences they have a very long way to go.
The difference between North Sea and GOM offshore operations is enormous and I was staggered at the prevailing attitude in GOM. I also attended a CRM course there which lasted all of 30 minutes.
Re-equipping to multi-pilot IFR machines is not the cure-all either. The Bell 206 single-pilot VFR mentality needs to change too and judging by my experiences they have a very long way to go.
Give the Op a break for f**ks sake. He isn't (obviously) a happy passenger at the best of times, being thrust continually into the back of a cab crossing hostile territory, often in dubious weather. And then he got frightened by a dumb ass pilot.
Irrespective of whether the pilot actually flew to those extreme parameters, the pilot departed normal flight in the eyes of the pax and that is enough to set alarm bells ringing.
If I was the FSO on that rig I would want all pax to report all incidents to me so that I had a handle on how the operation was running. It may be something or nothing but give the guy cred - no smoke without fire etc.
And to those drivers out there who still think they are mightier than everyone else because they fly for a living - get real...you're just a glorified van driver with a view at the end of the day
Irrespective of whether the pilot actually flew to those extreme parameters, the pilot departed normal flight in the eyes of the pax and that is enough to set alarm bells ringing.
If I was the FSO on that rig I would want all pax to report all incidents to me so that I had a handle on how the operation was running. It may be something or nothing but give the guy cred - no smoke without fire etc.
And to those drivers out there who still think they are mightier than everyone else because they fly for a living - get real...you're just a glorified van driver with a view at the end of the day
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Hey Gordy,
I think 'your man' must be ill. Do you think we should organise for someone to trot around there with a nice warm water bag and a bowl of junket and make sure he's all tucked in nice an cosy?
Hate to see him get a chill and lose his voice.
regards tet
I think 'your man' must be ill. Do you think we should organise for someone to trot around there with a nice warm water bag and a bowl of junket and make sure he's all tucked in nice an cosy?
Hate to see him get a chill and lose his voice.
regards tet
I flew in the GOM for PHI so I'll add my $0.02.
In the 13 years I flew "small ships" I often flew right down to PHI's cross-country minimums of 500 foot ceiling and 3 miles of visibility. But here's the deal: When the weather is bad, it is never "smooth." When it's "500/3" out, there'll be some areas that are a lot better...and some areas that are a lot worse. Some days you pick your way around, trying to stay in the good areas. Some days it's pretty hard, especially if you have a 50 or 60 or 80 mile flight. Meh- that's the nature of the job. It'd be nice if we all had two-pilot, twin-engine, IFR-capable helicopters, but that's just a fantasy of certain pilots who have no idea of how things work in the GOM.
Have I ever flown into deteriorating weather? Sure, lots of times. Has it ever really gone to hell in a hurry forcing me to make a turn into the sun and climb? Yup. Oh yeah. So...
Did the event as described by the OP happen? Probably. If so, it worked out other than (at least) one scared passenger. How close did it come to being an accident? We'll never know. Maybe "this close," maybe not close at all.
I'll surmise that the OP was sitting up front with a view of the gauges. Happens a lot in small ships; the oil company guys fight for the front seat. So he saw what was going on, knew they were low, knew they were "in deep sh*t" as we say.
Our #1 job is to fly the customer safely from here to there. But it's more than that, eh? Along with that our job is to not scare the customer. I get a feeling from the OP's post that he did not have a whole lot of confidence in the pilot. That was something I had to deal with when I first arrived in the GOM: Some of those oil company guys had many, many years of riding around in helicopters offshore. They knew what was up better than I did. I had to show/convince them that I knew what I was doing. So I'd bet the OP's pilot was a newbie or relatively so.
If I have one comment to the OP's pilot, I would say SLOW DOWN. I doubt they went from "clear/blue and 22" to "FOG!" in an instant - otherwise the pilot would have seen that they were approaching a fog/cloud bank. So he was "probably" bombing along in bad weather when..."Oops! This is bad. Can't go that way."
When it's crappy, we *have* to slow down. It's counter-intuitive sometimes, like when we're getting close to the destination and we really, really want to be there and get this day over with. You shouldn't fly into a cloud/fog bank at all, but if you do you REALLY shouldn't fly into one at cruise airspeed. And remember, a lower airspeed will require a shallower turn should a reversal be necessary.
I've gotten into some really, really bad stuff in the GOM. Anyone who's flown there for any length of time surely has as well. It's how you deal with it that makes the difference between a safe, professional pilot whose passengers have confidence in him and one who gets blasted in forums like this. We have not heard the OP's pilot's version of this event, but let's hope that he learned a lesson from it that he'll take with him into the future.
In the 13 years I flew "small ships" I often flew right down to PHI's cross-country minimums of 500 foot ceiling and 3 miles of visibility. But here's the deal: When the weather is bad, it is never "smooth." When it's "500/3" out, there'll be some areas that are a lot better...and some areas that are a lot worse. Some days you pick your way around, trying to stay in the good areas. Some days it's pretty hard, especially if you have a 50 or 60 or 80 mile flight. Meh- that's the nature of the job. It'd be nice if we all had two-pilot, twin-engine, IFR-capable helicopters, but that's just a fantasy of certain pilots who have no idea of how things work in the GOM.
Have I ever flown into deteriorating weather? Sure, lots of times. Has it ever really gone to hell in a hurry forcing me to make a turn into the sun and climb? Yup. Oh yeah. So...
Did the event as described by the OP happen? Probably. If so, it worked out other than (at least) one scared passenger. How close did it come to being an accident? We'll never know. Maybe "this close," maybe not close at all.
I'll surmise that the OP was sitting up front with a view of the gauges. Happens a lot in small ships; the oil company guys fight for the front seat. So he saw what was going on, knew they were low, knew they were "in deep sh*t" as we say.
Our #1 job is to fly the customer safely from here to there. But it's more than that, eh? Along with that our job is to not scare the customer. I get a feeling from the OP's post that he did not have a whole lot of confidence in the pilot. That was something I had to deal with when I first arrived in the GOM: Some of those oil company guys had many, many years of riding around in helicopters offshore. They knew what was up better than I did. I had to show/convince them that I knew what I was doing. So I'd bet the OP's pilot was a newbie or relatively so.
If I have one comment to the OP's pilot, I would say SLOW DOWN. I doubt they went from "clear/blue and 22" to "FOG!" in an instant - otherwise the pilot would have seen that they were approaching a fog/cloud bank. So he was "probably" bombing along in bad weather when..."Oops! This is bad. Can't go that way."
When it's crappy, we *have* to slow down. It's counter-intuitive sometimes, like when we're getting close to the destination and we really, really want to be there and get this day over with. You shouldn't fly into a cloud/fog bank at all, but if you do you REALLY shouldn't fly into one at cruise airspeed. And remember, a lower airspeed will require a shallower turn should a reversal be necessary.
I've gotten into some really, really bad stuff in the GOM. Anyone who's flown there for any length of time surely has as well. It's how you deal with it that makes the difference between a safe, professional pilot whose passengers have confidence in him and one who gets blasted in forums like this. We have not heard the OP's pilot's version of this event, but let's hope that he learned a lesson from it that he'll take with him into the future.
Join Date: Dec 2003
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Let me posit one example of Gulf weather that can be a Gotcha. Its hazy, visiblity is 4-5 miles and there is a thick broken layer at about 1000 ft. It's bight and sunny above so the sun shining through the breaks reflects off the haze followed by dark shadows under the clouds. You're tooling along in your 206 for 50-60 miles, going from light area to dark area, when that light area up ahead looks a little funny. Whoa Horses! That's not light relecting off the haze, its a fog bank. Deceptive visibility combines with a certain amount of complacency about what you had been flying in, and, fortunately, a 180 was still possible. If you're VMC, beware of sunlight relecting off the haze - it may not be what it seems.