Crash near Bude, Cornwall: 24th July 2011
AnFI: I haven't really explained that very well
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Rotorspeed,
Yes, thanks. I feel that simply suggesting lower and slower is not the solution to the problem. There are times when that course of action may be wise (and legal seeing as you raised that point) and others when it's not....
and it seems you at times agree
Preflight planning will for me dictate limits beyond which I won't proceed. I'm paid to deliver people safely, not at any cost.
With regard to your cloudbase enquiry - at a height whereby:
a)the aircraft is under control in IMC/IIMC when it hits something solid, or
b)the loss of control IMC/IIMC still exists when the aircraft hits something solid, or
c)the return to vmc does not allow sufficient time for control to be regained before hitting something solid.
Not getting in to the situation is the wisest solution to this problem. How to achieve that solution in terms of training is the Golden Question
Yes, thanks. I feel that simply suggesting lower and slower is not the solution to the problem. There are times when that course of action may be wise (and legal seeing as you raised that point) and others when it's not....
and it seems you at times agree
Ref the Gazelle accident, the real issue here is why did the pilot keep (pretty accurately) to a presumably straight line route that he had planned, rather than simply divert a few miles west, which would have enabled him to keep to much lower ground to the west of Gloucester where the cloud base was quite adequate at 1000ft. He was obviously aware of the lowering cloud base and rising ground, causing him to descend to an unsafe and probably illegal height.
He was clearly being too rigid in his navigation. Mention is made of him having a hand written note of his route, so he had flight planned to an extent. But was it because he was being too inflexible? Are pilots taught enough in training to be prepared to improvise in flight and modify their routing when weather requires?
He was clearly being too rigid in his navigation. Mention is made of him having a hand written note of his route, so he had flight planned to an extent. But was it because he was being too inflexible? Are pilots taught enough in training to be prepared to improvise in flight and modify their routing when weather requires?
With regard to your cloudbase enquiry - at a height whereby:
a)the aircraft is under control in IMC/IIMC when it hits something solid, or
b)the loss of control IMC/IIMC still exists when the aircraft hits something solid, or
c)the return to vmc does not allow sufficient time for control to be regained before hitting something solid.
Not getting in to the situation is the wisest solution to this problem. How to achieve that solution in terms of training is the Golden Question
Last edited by Sliding Doors; 7th Aug 2011 at 09:20.
I don't have the time just now... gotta go
A small quibble: folk often talk about instinct when they mean learned responses. Some reactions might be instinctive; like pulling back on the cyclic when going IIMC. But most inputs in a helicopter are about good or bad learning (and their respective teaching counterparts).
RRPM management is taught and learnt; or poorly taught and poorly learnt; or not taught, and not learnt. Unless, that is, you are a born RRPM manager.
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1st draft - (not yet in English...)
Not showing people how to fly visually is like not showing people what dynamic roll over is and just telling them to stay away from sloping ground
I am becoming more surprised that the ability /understanding of how to guard visual cues is not that widespread – maybe worse than 80% !
Fundamentals of Visual Reference Flying – VRF - (1st Draft)
1st principle:
Guard your Visual References – never lose your VR – (you are in a machine who’s position and velocity can be controlled quickly and very accurately – for example you never have to take your machine 1 foot further than you can guarantee. If you can see to guarantee 20feet ahead then planning on flying 10 feet further should not be dangerous – but obviously you can’t be flying at 60knots because that would then commit you to occupying a position further than you can guarantee.)
A. know what visual references you are using – normally this is easy – you have Billions of visual cues – if that falls to a million visual cues then you probably wouldn’t give that much thought – even a thousand Visual Cues can look pretty good … 100 not too bad … 10 getting pretty serious … how many more can you afford to loose? At 3 then loss of one would be very serious (unacceptable), know what your reliable cues are and guard them.
B. The End of The World
In VRF the Limit of what you can see (and interpret) is the ‘End Of your World’… do not fly beyond the End of your World! The furthest Visual Reference in the direction of travel is the Critical Reference (CR) – it is the most important VR…
B.i The End of the World should always advance as you advance – if the EoW ceases to advance (or worse is ‘consumed’) then this must a) be detected immediately b) be responded to immediately – it cannot be allowed to persist for ‘any’ time at all…
B.ii The line from your eye to the CR is the demarkation between guaranteed VR and probability … (probability is unacceptable) the A/C must be actively controlled so that it is always able to stay in the ‘Guaranteed Sector’. (so : if you are too energetic (speed/height) you almost certainly are committed to a trajectory which forces you into the Probable Sector… (unacceptable)
B.iii Angle to the CR: at about 2degrees or less in the cruise the cyclic is often sufficient to stay in the Guaranteed Sector. 3 degrees is about the limit. ( and equates to 600ft at 2nm(4kvis) or 4nm (7kvis) at 1200ft) at Cruise speed at say 3kvis and 1200feet it is not plausible to guarantee staying in the Guaranteed Sector – you are ‘at DANGER’ because the speed loss will force your angle of descent to be shallower than required… You need to be at sufficiently ‘low energy’ to be able to stay only in the Guaranteed Sector…
So to simplify:
You must fly at a height and speed which enables you to stay in the Gauranteed Sector. With a speed which enables you to stop by (before) the End of the World.
You must be (totally) alert to the disappearance of the furthest cue (ideally not only on the direction of flight but in all possible directions).
Often people avoid clouds by ‘seeing’ them … this is obviously* not good enough. Clouds may not be visible (discernable/detectable) by day (as can be the case at night). So if you depend on seeing them to avoid them you will fail… sometimes (ie … not good enough)
… this applies not just to clouds but many types of obstacles, coal slag heaps at night, snow banks, white mountains in a field of white, trees at night from over-illuminated cockpits in badly lit landing sites … etc.
So there are some principles which need to be stood on their head.
One is you must assure the definite absence of cloud – this principle is often used at night – where an invisible object is revealing background – you cannot see the object but you can see where it certainly is not. (most people would do that instinctively – for others once this principle is shown/used it can become instinctive). This happens in daylight with clouds sometimes – where a cloud is above the ‘demarkation line’ but has no contrast with the poor visibility … the vis may be 8k but the (undetectable) cloud is at 1k… It becomes detectable by what it obscures rather than actually being visible (directly discernable).
Parralax – used often in mountain flying – is no more than using a normal visual cue although during ‘normal life’ is seldom relied upon – once the ‘victims’ attention has been drawn to this aspect of the visual field then the information from it becomes more relevant/obvious/natural.
Sliding doors:
I am sure you intend to fly your pax safely – obtaining the weather forecast is all very commendable – it enables you to cancel when you don’t like what it says. BUT holding a (worthless) piece of paper in your hand which claims the wx is good (enough) gets no prizes from St Peter when the wx turns out not to be what they said. IE a WX forecast (or sparse actuals) are not sufficiently certain to avoid IMC … they enable you to not go – but they don’t help when you meet circumstances requiring total guaranteed ablity to maintain your Visual References in light of the actual conditions encountered – I suspect that the casual way you refer to IMC and re-gaining visual cues infers that you are (or have been) an IRF pilot…
Sliding Doors - the example of the Gazelle pilot is a great one - weather (basically) ok but Visual Referance Flight methodology missing... result dead.
One clue (I often hear) to someone getting the wrong picture from outside is when people say the vis is getting worse – when infact they have climbed into a position where the forward view has reduced – the conditions were the same but their positioning of the aircraft has changed (they think it is something happening to them – rather than something they are causing) (some others: “the cloud has come down” – when in fact they have gone up! “That plane looks very low” – when infact it is at 2000ft and you are at 3000ft etc)
(TorqueTalk: pedantic (true) point about instinct – sure, nature/nurture etc blah blah.. but if you are taught then know then understand then implement subconsciously … then I think it’s fair to call it ‘instictive’ . But more importantly I think your point about pressing on into a place where the screen goes white points to a belief that there are a set of conditions where suddenly there is risk when previously there was not – only a ‘no risk’ approach is good enough and that should not depend on the conditions actually encountered…. )
IMHO early exposure to IRF diminishes the importance a pilot attaches to staying VMC and undermines VRF. It also can make him think that “life is like a box of chocolates” and becoming IMC is just something that can just happen to you if you fly in poor conditions… no you must keep VR in a VMC machine full stop. You need to want to AND you need to know HOW to (VRF) - both!
Being assaulted by a drunken Russian just now (who’s telling me (in Russian) that he killed 5 in Afganistan …
etc) no time for finishing/editing … please make allowance for that…
I am becoming more surprised that the ability /understanding of how to guard visual cues is not that widespread – maybe worse than 80% !
Fundamentals of Visual Reference Flying – VRF - (1st Draft)
1st principle:
Guard your Visual References – never lose your VR – (you are in a machine who’s position and velocity can be controlled quickly and very accurately – for example you never have to take your machine 1 foot further than you can guarantee. If you can see to guarantee 20feet ahead then planning on flying 10 feet further should not be dangerous – but obviously you can’t be flying at 60knots because that would then commit you to occupying a position further than you can guarantee.)
A. know what visual references you are using – normally this is easy – you have Billions of visual cues – if that falls to a million visual cues then you probably wouldn’t give that much thought – even a thousand Visual Cues can look pretty good … 100 not too bad … 10 getting pretty serious … how many more can you afford to loose? At 3 then loss of one would be very serious (unacceptable), know what your reliable cues are and guard them.
B. The End of The World
In VRF the Limit of what you can see (and interpret) is the ‘End Of your World’… do not fly beyond the End of your World! The furthest Visual Reference in the direction of travel is the Critical Reference (CR) – it is the most important VR…
B.i The End of the World should always advance as you advance – if the EoW ceases to advance (or worse is ‘consumed’) then this must a) be detected immediately b) be responded to immediately – it cannot be allowed to persist for ‘any’ time at all…
B.ii The line from your eye to the CR is the demarkation between guaranteed VR and probability … (probability is unacceptable) the A/C must be actively controlled so that it is always able to stay in the ‘Guaranteed Sector’. (so : if you are too energetic (speed/height) you almost certainly are committed to a trajectory which forces you into the Probable Sector… (unacceptable)
B.iii Angle to the CR: at about 2degrees or less in the cruise the cyclic is often sufficient to stay in the Guaranteed Sector. 3 degrees is about the limit. ( and equates to 600ft at 2nm(4kvis) or 4nm (7kvis) at 1200ft) at Cruise speed at say 3kvis and 1200feet it is not plausible to guarantee staying in the Guaranteed Sector – you are ‘at DANGER’ because the speed loss will force your angle of descent to be shallower than required… You need to be at sufficiently ‘low energy’ to be able to stay only in the Guaranteed Sector…
So to simplify:
You must fly at a height and speed which enables you to stay in the Gauranteed Sector. With a speed which enables you to stop by (before) the End of the World.
You must be (totally) alert to the disappearance of the furthest cue (ideally not only on the direction of flight but in all possible directions).
Often people avoid clouds by ‘seeing’ them … this is obviously* not good enough. Clouds may not be visible (discernable/detectable) by day (as can be the case at night). So if you depend on seeing them to avoid them you will fail… sometimes (ie … not good enough)
… this applies not just to clouds but many types of obstacles, coal slag heaps at night, snow banks, white mountains in a field of white, trees at night from over-illuminated cockpits in badly lit landing sites … etc.
So there are some principles which need to be stood on their head.
One is you must assure the definite absence of cloud – this principle is often used at night – where an invisible object is revealing background – you cannot see the object but you can see where it certainly is not. (most people would do that instinctively – for others once this principle is shown/used it can become instinctive). This happens in daylight with clouds sometimes – where a cloud is above the ‘demarkation line’ but has no contrast with the poor visibility … the vis may be 8k but the (undetectable) cloud is at 1k… It becomes detectable by what it obscures rather than actually being visible (directly discernable).
Parralax – used often in mountain flying – is no more than using a normal visual cue although during ‘normal life’ is seldom relied upon – once the ‘victims’ attention has been drawn to this aspect of the visual field then the information from it becomes more relevant/obvious/natural.
Sliding doors:
I am sure you intend to fly your pax safely – obtaining the weather forecast is all very commendable – it enables you to cancel when you don’t like what it says. BUT holding a (worthless) piece of paper in your hand which claims the wx is good (enough) gets no prizes from St Peter when the wx turns out not to be what they said. IE a WX forecast (or sparse actuals) are not sufficiently certain to avoid IMC … they enable you to not go – but they don’t help when you meet circumstances requiring total guaranteed ablity to maintain your Visual References in light of the actual conditions encountered – I suspect that the casual way you refer to IMC and re-gaining visual cues infers that you are (or have been) an IRF pilot…
Sliding Doors - the example of the Gazelle pilot is a great one - weather (basically) ok but Visual Referance Flight methodology missing... result dead.
One clue (I often hear) to someone getting the wrong picture from outside is when people say the vis is getting worse – when infact they have climbed into a position where the forward view has reduced – the conditions were the same but their positioning of the aircraft has changed (they think it is something happening to them – rather than something they are causing) (some others: “the cloud has come down” – when in fact they have gone up! “That plane looks very low” – when infact it is at 2000ft and you are at 3000ft etc)
(TorqueTalk: pedantic (true) point about instinct – sure, nature/nurture etc blah blah.. but if you are taught then know then understand then implement subconsciously … then I think it’s fair to call it ‘instictive’ . But more importantly I think your point about pressing on into a place where the screen goes white points to a belief that there are a set of conditions where suddenly there is risk when previously there was not – only a ‘no risk’ approach is good enough and that should not depend on the conditions actually encountered…. )
IMHO early exposure to IRF diminishes the importance a pilot attaches to staying VMC and undermines VRF. It also can make him think that “life is like a box of chocolates” and becoming IMC is just something that can just happen to you if you fly in poor conditions… no you must keep VR in a VMC machine full stop. You need to want to AND you need to know HOW to (VRF) - both!
Being assaulted by a drunken Russian just now (who’s telling me (in Russian) that he killed 5 in Afganistan …
etc) no time for finishing/editing … please make allowance for that…
AnFI
I've read this twice, carefully. Sorry - I really want to understand and I've made allowances for drunken Russian murderers interupting you, but sadly, I still don't have a clue what you're talking about. You're either exceedingly clever, or not. I can't make up my mind.
I've read this twice, carefully. Sorry - I really want to understand and I've made allowances for drunken Russian murderers interupting you, but sadly, I still don't have a clue what you're talking about. You're either exceedingly clever, or not. I can't make up my mind.
or not............
There is nothing more in there than slow down or go down to avoid bad weather.
Just like driving a car, if the visibility reduces then so should your speed.
All the rest about retaining VR (as if it is some magic phenomenon) is just confusing and pointless.
There is nothing more in there than slow down or go down to avoid bad weather.
Just like driving a car, if the visibility reduces then so should your speed.
All the rest about retaining VR (as if it is some magic phenomenon) is just confusing and pointless.
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Having taught both mil and civvy students, the major difference I found is that mil pilots will slow down and go down, whereas the civvy pilots are terrified that the CAA will prosecute them for breaking the 500' Rule 5. As a result, they try to stay as high as possible, suckering them into low scud.
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What is an LPC then!?
SO there is no post qualification training or checking except in the Mil....? really? don't we all do LPC's? ever tried to SFH without a check ride!? some of us pay for our flying and take it seriously and safely, others have the taxpayers pay for their flying and appear to be out of touch with GA. let's share the sky amicably and not resort to ill informed slagging off? afterall in 2012 the Mil boys and girls will be shutting down whole areas of the UK for the Olympics as their own playground to practice in and patrol in all weathers!
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toptobottom
You're not alone! You may have missed my Post 96:
AnFI
I'm not sure whether you're living proof that bull**** baffles brains, just having a laugh or really have got a very wierd take on all this.
Maintaining visual reference is a pretty simple concept that doesn't need some pyscho-babble analysis, guaranteed to confuse those you're supposedly trying to help. Can you see the ground clearly? And if not, do something about it so you can, such as turn or descend.
Frankly if you can't grasp that you shouldn't be flying. Or driving on the roads in wet, misty or foggy conditions that reduce visibility and present similar challenges in terms of maintaining adequate visual reference.
And looks like Crab agrees with me, too.
AnFI: Out of interest, what's your background? Commercial pilot? Instructor? Or armchair theoretician?
You're not alone! You may have missed my Post 96:
AnFI
I'm not sure whether you're living proof that bull**** baffles brains, just having a laugh or really have got a very wierd take on all this.
Maintaining visual reference is a pretty simple concept that doesn't need some pyscho-babble analysis, guaranteed to confuse those you're supposedly trying to help. Can you see the ground clearly? And if not, do something about it so you can, such as turn or descend.
Frankly if you can't grasp that you shouldn't be flying. Or driving on the roads in wet, misty or foggy conditions that reduce visibility and present similar challenges in terms of maintaining adequate visual reference.
And looks like Crab agrees with me, too.
AnFI: Out of interest, what's your background? Commercial pilot? Instructor? Or armchair theoretician?
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Keeping VMC
Anfi: to apply your list one has to be in an armchair.
Why not keep it simpless as you proclaim yourself.
As been said before, stay in the middle of the clouds and the ground (vertical references), with other words take some margin staying away from both...
And as been said in previous threads: horizontally apply the French rule of 30 sec visibility, otherwise slow down.
For example 800m = 51 knots
d3
Why not keep it simpless as you proclaim yourself.
As been said before, stay in the middle of the clouds and the ground (vertical references), with other words take some margin staying away from both...
And as been said in previous threads: horizontally apply the French rule of 30 sec visibility, otherwise slow down.
For example 800m = 51 knots
d3
dibdab - don't get the hump - I know there are plenty of GA pilots with a professional outlook and approach to flying - the ones we are talking about (and who end up having their accidents dissected on pprune) seem to be different.
Out of interest have any of your LPCs or check rides for SFH included dealing with bad weather or were they all about general handling and emergencies? And by definition they are check rides rather than post-graduate training are they not?
Out of interest have any of your LPCs or check rides for SFH included dealing with bad weather or were they all about general handling and emergencies? And by definition they are check rides rather than post-graduate training are they not?
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d3 - 'simples'
D3: yup it is 'simples' - for those who do get it...
yes the French rule is quite good - 60kts = 100ft/sec (so 30kts = 50fps) - its good to look at distance in terms of time..
The half way between cloud and ground it 'quite good' with 2 qualifiers...
1 Determining where the cloud is is not always clear to all pilots - especially when the clouds have no contrast to the poor vis
2 Visual references is not only about clouds - and indestinct sea may be equally inadequate (or snow, sand, inadequate surface illumination at night etc..)
rotorspeed -
You are wrong. TOO LATE !- You don't want to be getting as far as the "if not" part.
Your advice is dangerous - and people die that way...
They are flying ... what do you think we should do about that ? Just let Darwin sort out these people who deserve to die? (fine carry on without me then!) People deserve to live.
Yes - exactly - but with a third dimension into which people climb and die ...
a) You agree with someone who does not know how to solve the problem..
You agree with that?.... great, your choice, your life....
b) Crab is an IMC pilot ... (of a stabilised, autopiloted A/C)
c) has very limited experience (with negative success) of civil instruction.
d) Has military self confidence in his military background... believes that civilians cannot possibly know what they are talking about
... etc.
As for the background bit - I am just a guy who is trying to help - with enough experience to know - but I really don't want to get personal about it ... if I can help I will but I'm not here to talk about my size in the shower ... I certainly don't have the confidence Crab has ... but I do have (much) more experience in this field.... Its not about who's saying it its about whether the ideas 'stack up' - the general view here is that my ideas do not ... so fine ... carry on without me - my conscience is clear that I have tried.....
yes the French rule is quite good - 60kts = 100ft/sec (so 30kts = 50fps) - its good to look at distance in terms of time..
The half way between cloud and ground it 'quite good' with 2 qualifiers...
1 Determining where the cloud is is not always clear to all pilots - especially when the clouds have no contrast to the poor vis
2 Visual references is not only about clouds - and indestinct sea may be equally inadequate (or snow, sand, inadequate surface illumination at night etc..)
rotorspeed -
Can you see the ground clearly? And if not, do something about it so you can, such as turn or descend.
Your advice is dangerous - and people die that way...
Frankly if you can't grasp that you shouldn't be flying.
Or driving on the roads in wet, misty or foggy conditions that reduce visibility and present similar challenges in terms of maintaining adequate visual reference.
And looks like Crab agrees with me, too.
Sadly, I don't have an answer to the problem so regarding it as a Darwinian selection process seems fair.
b) Crab is an IMC pilot ... (of a stabilised, autopiloted A/C)
c) has very limited experience (with negative success) of civil instruction.
d) Has military self confidence in his military background... believes that civilians cannot possibly know what they are talking about
... etc.As for the background bit - I am just a guy who is trying to help - with enough experience to know - but I really don't want to get personal about it ... if I can help I will but I'm not here to talk about my size in the shower ... I certainly don't have the confidence Crab has ... but I do have (much) more experience in this field.... Its not about who's saying it its about whether the ideas 'stack up' - the general view here is that my ideas do not ... so fine ... carry on without me - my conscience is clear that I have tried.....
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AnFI
Ok well you responded to all the points I didn't ask you to. Some odd answers, again though, to which I comment: (1) Poor vis generally develops progressively, you rarely just hit a white out. (2) When I said people shouldn't be flying, I meant they should not be given a licence to fly. (3) I don't think you'll find many people climb into IMC, they tend to stumble into it more or less ahead of them. Apart from which, the driving principle is the same - maintain visual reference with the ground/road/kerb. And in the air you'll usually achieve that by going down, not up. (4) And I've just agreed with Crab with his answer in his most recent post, 128, not the one you strangely quote from his much earlier post 103.
But you've still not really answered the one the question I did ask you, about your background? We are interested to know, so could we now have an answer to that please? Very general of course. And tell us a bit more about your own practical experience. About how many hours (very approx) might you have flown in poor VMC - when for example the cloud base has been less than say 700ft and vis less than, well, 3000m?
Ok well you responded to all the points I didn't ask you to. Some odd answers, again though, to which I comment: (1) Poor vis generally develops progressively, you rarely just hit a white out. (2) When I said people shouldn't be flying, I meant they should not be given a licence to fly. (3) I don't think you'll find many people climb into IMC, they tend to stumble into it more or less ahead of them. Apart from which, the driving principle is the same - maintain visual reference with the ground/road/kerb. And in the air you'll usually achieve that by going down, not up. (4) And I've just agreed with Crab with his answer in his most recent post, 128, not the one you strangely quote from his much earlier post 103.
But you've still not really answered the one the question I did ask you, about your background? We are interested to know, so could we now have an answer to that please? Very general of course. And tell us a bit more about your own practical experience. About how many hours (very approx) might you have flown in poor VMC - when for example the cloud base has been less than say 700ft and vis less than, well, 3000m?
"1 Determining where the cloud is is not always clear to all pilots - especially when the clouds have no contrast to the poor vis
2 Visual references is not only about clouds - and indistinct sea may be equally inadequate (or snow, sand, inadequate surface illumination at night etc..)"
I understand where you coming from but think you have not put it over well, as others here say it is not just low hour PPL or commercial that get it wrong, it is across the board, I would like to fly with an IR pilot to see how quick I would loose orientation.
Was there 2 x 206 from same Co that crashed 2 one going to rescue 1 one in Alaska a few years ago cause no\ poor horizon I think.
Seem to remember GP had a bad moment in the gulf with co-pilot flying ? sorry if my memory is wrong GP.
2 Visual references is not only about clouds - and indistinct sea may be equally inadequate (or snow, sand, inadequate surface illumination at night etc..)"
I understand where you coming from but think you have not put it over well, as others here say it is not just low hour PPL or commercial that get it wrong, it is across the board, I would like to fly with an IR pilot to see how quick I would loose orientation.
Was there 2 x 206 from same Co that crashed 2 one going to rescue 1 one in Alaska a few years ago cause no\ poor horizon I think.
Seem to remember GP had a bad moment in the gulf with co-pilot flying ? sorry if my memory is wrong GP.
Last edited by 500e; 8th Aug 2011 at 22:35.
You agree with that?.... great, your choice, your life....
b) Crab is an IMC pilot ... (of a stabilised, autopiloted A/C)
c) has very limited experience (with negative success) of civil instruction.
d) Has military self confidence in his military background... believes that civilians cannot possibly know what they are talking about ... etc.
b) Crab is an IMC pilot ... (of a stabilised, autopiloted A/C)
c) has very limited experience (with negative success) of civil instruction.
d) Has military self confidence in his military background... believes that civilians cannot possibly know what they are talking about ... etc.
a. I have many hours in IMC in an unstabilised single (Gazelle AH1 - single pilot) as well as many more in stabilised autopiloted aircraft doing full procedural IF.
b. I do have limited civil instruction but 3000 hours of my 8000 total (in 29 years of flying) is instructional time in every role from basic student, through instructing instructors, to teaching and examining operational SAR techniques which, funnily enough, involve very poor weather flying day and night over land and sea and including mountains.
c. I do have confidence in my training and abilities because they are tested on a daily basis. I do not think civilians cannot know what they are talking about but I do have a great deal of experience flying with many gifted (and some not so) pilots and have a pretty good grasp of what happens to them when their capacity limit is reached, especially in poor weather.
I can only hope your ability to explain basic helicopter techniques to your students is better than your attempt to explain VR here.
We have gone a bit off-piste here talking about white-out in snow - the basic premise of this thread has been scud-running or pushing on in worsening visibility and lowering cloudbase and the decision making process required to turn back/land/hover rather than end up IIMC followed by achieving the ground/air interface in a less than fashionable attitude.
Weather appreciation, both in terms of understanding a forecast and in recognising unexpected deterioration and reacting to it are fundamentals for safe VFR flight - perhaps it is this element that needs to be drummed into pilots more thoroughly - proper pre-flight planning considering the what-ifs rather than 'kick the tyres, light the fires and go'. How many low time pilots on a VFR transit have even thought about an alternate LS or a bad weather plan?
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.... it's not over till the problem is solved
It's not about willy waiving...
... the fact that Crab confirms he has less hours/years/appropriate experience should not diminish the value of his input... he'd love to solve it or understand it just as much as any right minded person would...
He is making IMHO the common mistake which I have tried to highlight:
80% of people can look out of the window and interpret reasonably accurately what they are seeing. It is of course completely unsurprising that Crab cannot understand that some pilots cannot use those cues which he does not consciously realise he is using.
Perhaps he (and all of you) might give some thought to expressing exactly what process you do use...
That is those of you who can and do understand how to alter course/slow/ descend or stop in the face of any conditions which might arise... in order to maintain VR .... this is a key task in VRF (Visual Reference Flying - which is a technique)... If people were able to do this then they would probably chose that over death .... don't you think? ( Are you perhaps someone who cannot... ?)
A starting point is to look at the CAA report into DVE (15 yrs study? With analysis of some of the cues used ... 'Tau' for instance) - read that first ... get up to speed then let's try making a more intelligent comment than put downs and insults to the dead..... (if you think my hurried explanation is impenetrable read that first then come back to me!)
Crab - just try analysing/expressing what you do (sub-consciously) use to stay visual ... try to do it from an imperative of maintaining VR and (if you can) compensate for your own excessive exposure/reliance on IRF .... remember the mil expose their pilots to IRF very early as 'the solution' .... inappropriate advice from experts in inappropriate fields of aviation can be dangerous...
why do I bother? - because I care...
... the fact that Crab confirms he has less hours/years/appropriate experience should not diminish the value of his input... he'd love to solve it or understand it just as much as any right minded person would...
He is making IMHO the common mistake which I have tried to highlight:
80% of people can look out of the window and interpret reasonably accurately what they are seeing. It is of course completely unsurprising that Crab cannot understand that some pilots cannot use those cues which he does not consciously realise he is using.
Perhaps he (and all of you) might give some thought to expressing exactly what process you do use...
That is those of you who can and do understand how to alter course/slow/ descend or stop in the face of any conditions which might arise... in order to maintain VR .... this is a key task in VRF (Visual Reference Flying - which is a technique)... If people were able to do this then they would probably chose that over death .... don't you think? ( Are you perhaps someone who cannot... ?)
A starting point is to look at the CAA report into DVE (15 yrs study? With analysis of some of the cues used ... 'Tau' for instance) - read that first ... get up to speed then let's try making a more intelligent comment than put downs and insults to the dead..... (if you think my hurried explanation is impenetrable read that first then come back to me!)
Crab - just try analysing/expressing what you do (sub-consciously) use to stay visual ... try to do it from an imperative of maintaining VR and (if you can) compensate for your own excessive exposure/reliance on IRF .... remember the mil expose their pilots to IRF very early as 'the solution' .... inappropriate advice from experts in inappropriate fields of aviation can be dangerous...
why do I bother? - because I care...
No it's not about willy waving but you still haven't come down from your ivory tower to state your hours/years/appropriate experience.
So, as someone who trains people to deal with deteriorating weather, especially when there is no IF option due to icing and the job still has to get done because you have casualties on board, I have no appropriate experience???
Your attempt to make a science of VR is pitiful and, whilst there are visual traps and illusions (scale, goldfishbowl and hidden ridgelines for example) the fact is you can either see where you are going or not. If you have to descend below your minima to keep visual then you should turn back or land or divert using a bad-weather plan - this is not rocket surgery.
What we are dealing with is poor decision making, not whether there are enough visual cues to control the helicopter - that happens after the poor decisions are made and the sucker keeps on going.
If we are talking about analysing visual cues, I don't suppose you have hovered in recirculating snow at night using a mixture of white light and NVG??? You can blather on about 'Tau' all you like but it comes down to searching desperately for enough visual information to assess your height and speed (or lack of it). This is not where we should train VFR pilots to be - we should train pilots to avoid such situations unless they are properly equipped in terms of aircraft fit and adequate training to manage those conditions.
Out of interest, I took part in a BAE study in a simulator in Bedford 15 or so years ago which was looking at visual cueing Vs handling characteristics and how degrading one meant improving the other in order to maintain adequate control. The sortie profile looked a low level flight, hovering, mask and unmask behind obstacles and transitions to and from the hover and I suspect that much of what we discovered was eventually fed into all sorts of other studies (including the CAA) as it was pioneering work at the time.
The fact is that in an unstabilised aircraft like a robbie, any degradation in visual cues cannot be offset by an improvement in handling qualities and a departure from controlled flight is simply a matter of time. Therefore I come back to the same conclusion - only by avoiding those deteriorating conditions can you fly VFR safely and all the macho 'we pushed on but still got through but it was quite exciting' is what keeps encouraging people to push on when they should turn back.
Flying VFR safely is not a science or an art, it is all about decision making - not formulas about visibility vs cloudbase - if in doubt chicken out - pressonitis kills!
By the way - your Desktop Virtual Environment studies are directed towards electronically representing the outside world (HUDs, DNVGs, Apache monocles etc) and are only relevant in that they emphasise that poor contrast due to low light levels or reducing visibility greatly affects the brain's ability to judge distance and speed - no sh*t sherlock!
BTW2 - the answer to reducing visual cues is SCAN but this is not for low-time pilots in R22s - the answer for them is don't go or turn back/land!
So, as someone who trains people to deal with deteriorating weather, especially when there is no IF option due to icing and the job still has to get done because you have casualties on board, I have no appropriate experience???
Your attempt to make a science of VR is pitiful and, whilst there are visual traps and illusions (scale, goldfishbowl and hidden ridgelines for example) the fact is you can either see where you are going or not. If you have to descend below your minima to keep visual then you should turn back or land or divert using a bad-weather plan - this is not rocket surgery.
What we are dealing with is poor decision making, not whether there are enough visual cues to control the helicopter - that happens after the poor decisions are made and the sucker keeps on going.
If we are talking about analysing visual cues, I don't suppose you have hovered in recirculating snow at night using a mixture of white light and NVG??? You can blather on about 'Tau' all you like but it comes down to searching desperately for enough visual information to assess your height and speed (or lack of it). This is not where we should train VFR pilots to be - we should train pilots to avoid such situations unless they are properly equipped in terms of aircraft fit and adequate training to manage those conditions.
Out of interest, I took part in a BAE study in a simulator in Bedford 15 or so years ago which was looking at visual cueing Vs handling characteristics and how degrading one meant improving the other in order to maintain adequate control. The sortie profile looked a low level flight, hovering, mask and unmask behind obstacles and transitions to and from the hover and I suspect that much of what we discovered was eventually fed into all sorts of other studies (including the CAA) as it was pioneering work at the time.
The fact is that in an unstabilised aircraft like a robbie, any degradation in visual cues cannot be offset by an improvement in handling qualities and a departure from controlled flight is simply a matter of time. Therefore I come back to the same conclusion - only by avoiding those deteriorating conditions can you fly VFR safely and all the macho 'we pushed on but still got through but it was quite exciting' is what keeps encouraging people to push on when they should turn back.
Flying VFR safely is not a science or an art, it is all about decision making - not formulas about visibility vs cloudbase - if in doubt chicken out - pressonitis kills!
By the way - your Desktop Virtual Environment studies are directed towards electronically representing the outside world (HUDs, DNVGs, Apache monocles etc) and are only relevant in that they emphasise that poor contrast due to low light levels or reducing visibility greatly affects the brain's ability to judge distance and speed - no sh*t sherlock!
BTW2 - the answer to reducing visual cues is SCAN but this is not for low-time pilots in R22s - the answer for them is don't go or turn back/land!
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From Crab -
I think that just about covers it nicely. Poor decisions, poor captaincy and poor airmanship are the problems.
VFR is VFR, let's not try to complicate things any more. If anyone is having to fly low and slow in order to maintain VMC then it is time to reconsider why you are there.
Tam
Your attempt to make a science of VR is pitiful and, whilst there are visual traps and illusions (scale, goldfishbowl and hidden ridgelines for example) the fact is you can either see where you are going or not. If you have to descend below your minima to keep visual then you should turn back or land or divert using a bad-weather plan - this is not rocket surgery.
What we are dealing with is poor decision making, not whether there are enough visual cues to control the helicopter - that happens after the poor decisions are made and the sucker keeps on going.
What we are dealing with is poor decision making, not whether there are enough visual cues to control the helicopter - that happens after the poor decisions are made and the sucker keeps on going.
I think that just about covers it nicely. Poor decisions, poor captaincy and poor airmanship are the problems.
VFR is VFR, let's not try to complicate things any more. If anyone is having to fly low and slow in order to maintain VMC then it is time to reconsider why you are there.
Tam