Agusta AW139
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Malabo, can you outline why you are so confident in the 139 float system? I for one would not like to suffer the brown out following an inadvertant/uncommanded float deployment at 155kts in the cruise
. It has happened on other types.
Having had so many different strange 'electrical things' happen with the 139 I do not share your confidence.
The last one that confused me was when we were told (CAS warning) that the OEI 2.5 min limit was about to expire. We were parked with both engines matched and in fly, Nr at 102 and just about to taxi. Confused? I guess so for a while, luckly not for as long as the engineers who had to trouble shoot it.
I may be wrong but I believe both incidents that Pitchlink refers to were uncommanded float deployments.
Anyway, very interested to here your views. I guess a few may have thought Agusta just didn't have much experience of offshore ops.
ATB
Red
. It has happened on other types.Having had so many different strange 'electrical things' happen with the 139 I do not share your confidence.
The last one that confused me was when we were told (CAS warning) that the OEI 2.5 min limit was about to expire. We were parked with both engines matched and in fly, Nr at 102 and just about to taxi. Confused? I guess so for a while, luckly not for as long as the engineers who had to trouble shoot it.
I may be wrong but I believe both incidents that Pitchlink refers to were uncommanded float deployments.
Anyway, very interested to here your views. I guess a few may have thought Agusta just didn't have much experience of offshore ops.
ATB
Red
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Arming/Disarming the Floats
"
Hi Geoff,
We disarm the floats after reaching Vy during after T.O checks, and arm them again at 90kts decellerating to the deck. I think due to the fact we had 2 inadvertent float deployments (on the ground) when we first got the aircraft! I'm sure you already know about that."
Hi Geoff,
We disarm the floats after reaching Vy during after T.O checks, and arm them again at 90kts decellerating to the deck. I think due to the fact we had 2 inadvertent float deployments (on the ground) when we first got the aircraft! I'm sure you already know about that."
The second occurrence happened in the same aircraft under the same conditions, at a different operating base. This time the engineering investigation did reveal the cause and the problem was rectified on this airframe.
This company operates 5 different types and I can understand the desire to standardise the "Float arming procedure" for the AW139 with common practice on all their other types across the rest of the fleets, however it does appear to be counter to the advice in the RFM Supp.
I would suggest that as the Test Function was the cause of the inadvertent deployment in both cases, both of which occurred on the same aircraft, there should be no further cause for concern. However a prudent pilot might consider arming floats at 80KIAS when coasting out and subsequently increasing speed confident that the system will not deploy until its needed, ie on contact with the water.
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A change for the better??
Well I got the response I was hoping for having kept my ear to the ground during the courses we run and discussed the topic with colleagues who have much more experience with AW products than I do.
First point - please be cautious if you choose not to follow the RFM. Only do this if the changed procedure is properly documented and approved by the National Aviation Authority - or better still EASA and/or the OEM.
Second point - Other AW types (Merlin and Sea King) I am reliably informed have operated this procedure for many years and floats get armed when the coast is crossed and the feet are wet and switched off when the feet are dry. No snags with them that we know of.
Third point - If you are concerned about the possibility of an inadvertant inflation when the floats are armed then simply turn the switch to arm and off again during the pre-take off checks. This action is normally included in the PTO checklist anyway, to take care of the offshore departure. If the darn things are going to go off chances are that it will be at that moment.
Fourth point - your family will enjoy a large financial settlement I guess, if they pop off in the cruise and thereby bring about your untimely demise. You having complied in all respects with the manufacturer's written instructions in the RFM.
Fifth point - on the other hand your family, or at least your 'estate', could be on the wrong end of a suit for damages should you cause the demise of others by not following the express wishes of the manufacturer who said you should arm them whenever you are over water.
G
First point - please be cautious if you choose not to follow the RFM. Only do this if the changed procedure is properly documented and approved by the National Aviation Authority - or better still EASA and/or the OEM.
Second point - Other AW types (Merlin and Sea King) I am reliably informed have operated this procedure for many years and floats get armed when the coast is crossed and the feet are wet and switched off when the feet are dry. No snags with them that we know of.
Third point - If you are concerned about the possibility of an inadvertant inflation when the floats are armed then simply turn the switch to arm and off again during the pre-take off checks. This action is normally included in the PTO checklist anyway, to take care of the offshore departure. If the darn things are going to go off chances are that it will be at that moment.
Fourth point - your family will enjoy a large financial settlement I guess, if they pop off in the cruise and thereby bring about your untimely demise. You having complied in all respects with the manufacturer's written instructions in the RFM.
Fifth point - on the other hand your family, or at least your 'estate', could be on the wrong end of a suit for damages should you cause the demise of others by not following the express wishes of the manufacturer who said you should arm them whenever you are over water.
G
Hi Geoff,
If you are saying we should always act in accordance with the RFM and therefore the published emergency checklist please take the time to have a look at the emergency drill for exhaust fire after shutdown. Spot the deliberate mistake which has been pointed out to Agusta who have still not made any correction.
Should we therefore idly follow checklist or actually think about what it is we are doing? Reminds me a bit of the AirTransat flight that landed in the Azores having run out of fuel because nowhere in the checklist did it say to close the crossfeed after confirmation of a fuel leak!
If you are saying we should always act in accordance with the RFM and therefore the published emergency checklist please take the time to have a look at the emergency drill for exhaust fire after shutdown. Spot the deliberate mistake which has been pointed out to Agusta who have still not made any correction.
Should we therefore idly follow checklist or actually think about what it is we are doing? Reminds me a bit of the AirTransat flight that landed in the Azores having run out of fuel because nowhere in the checklist did it say to close the crossfeed after confirmation of a fuel leak!
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Geoff
I had a busy morning flying and have not had a chance to check the RFM supplement, however if my memory serves me right this is covered under Normal Ops, so not in the Limitations section.
The company checklists, both normal and emergency, have been altered.
This has been thought through at a highest level within the company, and a policy developed.
What should us line pilots do? And, why is what we are doing so very, very wrong? I don't see the problem here. Why is it any less safe to do what we are doing or to put it another way, why is it so much safer to do it Agusta's way?
I ask in the light of my own experience where as I said I have seen some very strange electrical goings-on. I have used the windscreen wipers and not been able to turn them off in the normal fashion. Not good for expensive plastic windscreens!
I've nearly fallen foul to the nose wheel re-locking having been unlocked while taxiing. And many more.
My point is that these are just 'simple electrical functions' which now have computerised rocket science driving them. In the old technology a switch was a connection to a power source not a signal to a computer to commence a series of logic functions and finally to remotely operate the bit you wanted. So why not the possibility of a mis-signal to fire the floats, if armed, in flight?
I'm starting to sound like a ludite, and I don't mean to. We are moving in the right direction. But just because it's new doesn't necessarily mean its better and the old way is pants. If there is a remote (10 to the power of nine or whatever) chance of deployment in flight, why not reduce it further by isolating the circuit? If the crew are not in a position to 'arm as required' my feeling is that the floats may not save the day anyway.
I should point out that I am all in favour of AFDS i.e. a suplimentry system to fire the floats once armed by the crew at the apropriate time/speed, should the crew, by that time, be unable to fire them.
I genuinely hope to hear some good counter arguments on this one.
Now Geoffers, you baited your hook well and reeled in a good sized fish. So I will cast a wee tempter back towards you.
When converting guys/girls onto the 139 do you ensure that they have the fwd vent running (heater off) or they have a DV window (tricky in the sim) open when MPOG/HIGE/HOGE in wind speeds less than 25 knts?
Honest answers only now.
Being a limitation we all do it religiously. I don't know why I have to do it, all I do know is that it is bloody chilly in the winter!
All the very best
Red
I had a busy morning flying and have not had a chance to check the RFM supplement, however if my memory serves me right this is covered under Normal Ops, so not in the Limitations section.
The company checklists, both normal and emergency, have been altered.
This has been thought through at a highest level within the company, and a policy developed.
What should us line pilots do? And, why is what we are doing so very, very wrong? I don't see the problem here. Why is it any less safe to do what we are doing or to put it another way, why is it so much safer to do it Agusta's way?
I ask in the light of my own experience where as I said I have seen some very strange electrical goings-on. I have used the windscreen wipers and not been able to turn them off in the normal fashion. Not good for expensive plastic windscreens!
I've nearly fallen foul to the nose wheel re-locking having been unlocked while taxiing. And many more.
My point is that these are just 'simple electrical functions' which now have computerised rocket science driving them. In the old technology a switch was a connection to a power source not a signal to a computer to commence a series of logic functions and finally to remotely operate the bit you wanted. So why not the possibility of a mis-signal to fire the floats, if armed, in flight?
I'm starting to sound like a ludite, and I don't mean to. We are moving in the right direction. But just because it's new doesn't necessarily mean its better and the old way is pants. If there is a remote (10 to the power of nine or whatever) chance of deployment in flight, why not reduce it further by isolating the circuit? If the crew are not in a position to 'arm as required' my feeling is that the floats may not save the day anyway.
I should point out that I am all in favour of AFDS i.e. a suplimentry system to fire the floats once armed by the crew at the apropriate time/speed, should the crew, by that time, be unable to fire them.
I genuinely hope to hear some good counter arguments on this one.
Now Geoffers, you baited your hook well and reeled in a good sized fish. So I will cast a wee tempter back towards you.
When converting guys/girls onto the 139 do you ensure that they have the fwd vent running (heater off) or they have a DV window (tricky in the sim) open when MPOG/HIGE/HOGE in wind speeds less than 25 knts?
Honest answers only now.
Being a limitation we all do it religiously. I don't know why I have to do it, all I do know is that it is bloody chilly in the winter!
All the very best
Red
Last edited by RedWhite&Blue; 22nd Apr 2008 at 18:42.
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Pitchlink and Red White and Blue
Pitchlink.
The point I am making is not that any OEM's docs are perfect and yes ours are behind the game when it comes to catching up with glitches, typos and foul-ups. I recommend caution when dealing with these things. For example is the statement in the RFM Supp ref Float Operation policy a 'mistake'? Clearly not. This 'policy' was carried over from other previous types and may even be a function of the certification process. If you, as an individual aircraft commander decide unilaterally, to operate a different policy then I believe you are standing into danger. I venture to suggest that you may not survive the 'in the subsequent enquiry test'.
If you spot a mistake in any procedure or you believe it is inadequate or inappropriate you must bring it to the notice of your superiors - preferably in writing - and even complete an MOR or equivalent Air Safety Report. They should notify their local Aviation Authority and or the OEM.
I know it's tough when you want to change NOW but beware doing it in any way that exposes you to difficulties if it all goes pear-shaped on you.
I have had some colleagues of mine who have been decimated in the witness box by barristers who can put you on the spot with statements like 'So tell me Captain Smithers, are you telling this inquiry that you know better than the people who designed, developed, tested and certified this helicopter and specifically stated that this procedure must be followed'.
Not impossible to get out of but you really don't want to be in that situation if you can avoid it.
Red
My point is that these are just 'simple electrical functions' which now have computerised rocket science driving them. In the old technology a switch was a connection to a power source not a signal to a computer to commence a series of logic functions and finally to remotely operate the bit you wanted. So why not the possibility of a mis-signal to fire the floats, if armed, in flight?
Do you think this possibility wasn't covered in the design/cerification process?
I'm starting to sound like a ludite, and I don't mean to. We are moving in the right direction. But just because it's new doesn't necessarily mean its better and the old way is pants. If there is a remote (10 to the power of nine or whatever) chance of deployment in flight, why not reduce it further by isolating the circuit? If the crew are not in a position to 'arm as required' my feeling is that the floats may not save the day anyway.
Everybody - well nearly everybody, wants AFDS. There seems little point in having it if you don't trust it and use it. I'm sure we can find some examples in the statistics where such a system either did save the day or would have saved the day - can anybody out there point out any specific ones?
If we revert to the old methods we negate the potential for saving our skins one day. Lets FIX IT so we can USE IT.
Now Geoffers, you baited your hook well and reeled in a good sized fish. So I will cast a wee tempter back towards you.
When converting guys/girls onto the 139 do you ensure that they have the fwd vent running (heater off) or they have a DV window (tricky in the sim) open when MPOG/HIGE/HOGE in wind speeds less than 25 knts?
Honest answers only now.
My Get Out of Jail Free Card is quite simple. The TR course is designed around the basic aircraft and we do not include Customer Specified Equipment (if it needs a Supp to the RFM then its CSE). We don't cover use of the heater. Pathetic but true, I can't even find the reference you are talking about in my electronic copies of the RFM or the QRH. Where can I find it?
I'm a great believer in PPrunes ability to air and resolve these topics. The more the merrier, keep them coming and we will all get to learn something.
G
The point I am making is not that any OEM's docs are perfect and yes ours are behind the game when it comes to catching up with glitches, typos and foul-ups. I recommend caution when dealing with these things. For example is the statement in the RFM Supp ref Float Operation policy a 'mistake'? Clearly not. This 'policy' was carried over from other previous types and may even be a function of the certification process. If you, as an individual aircraft commander decide unilaterally, to operate a different policy then I believe you are standing into danger. I venture to suggest that you may not survive the 'in the subsequent enquiry test'.
If you spot a mistake in any procedure or you believe it is inadequate or inappropriate you must bring it to the notice of your superiors - preferably in writing - and even complete an MOR or equivalent Air Safety Report. They should notify their local Aviation Authority and or the OEM.
I know it's tough when you want to change NOW but beware doing it in any way that exposes you to difficulties if it all goes pear-shaped on you.
I have had some colleagues of mine who have been decimated in the witness box by barristers who can put you on the spot with statements like 'So tell me Captain Smithers, are you telling this inquiry that you know better than the people who designed, developed, tested and certified this helicopter and specifically stated that this procedure must be followed'.
Not impossible to get out of but you really don't want to be in that situation if you can avoid it.
Red
My point is that these are just 'simple electrical functions' which now have computerised rocket science driving them. In the old technology a switch was a connection to a power source not a signal to a computer to commence a series of logic functions and finally to remotely operate the bit you wanted. So why not the possibility of a mis-signal to fire the floats, if armed, in flight?
Do you think this possibility wasn't covered in the design/cerification process?
I'm starting to sound like a ludite, and I don't mean to. We are moving in the right direction. But just because it's new doesn't necessarily mean its better and the old way is pants. If there is a remote (10 to the power of nine or whatever) chance of deployment in flight, why not reduce it further by isolating the circuit? If the crew are not in a position to 'arm as required' my feeling is that the floats may not save the day anyway.
Everybody - well nearly everybody, wants AFDS. There seems little point in having it if you don't trust it and use it. I'm sure we can find some examples in the statistics where such a system either did save the day or would have saved the day - can anybody out there point out any specific ones?
If we revert to the old methods we negate the potential for saving our skins one day. Lets FIX IT so we can USE IT.
Now Geoffers, you baited your hook well and reeled in a good sized fish. So I will cast a wee tempter back towards you.
When converting guys/girls onto the 139 do you ensure that they have the fwd vent running (heater off) or they have a DV window (tricky in the sim) open when MPOG/HIGE/HOGE in wind speeds less than 25 knts?
Honest answers only now.
My Get Out of Jail Free Card is quite simple. The TR course is designed around the basic aircraft and we do not include Customer Specified Equipment (if it needs a Supp to the RFM then its CSE). We don't cover use of the heater. Pathetic but true, I can't even find the reference you are talking about in my electronic copies of the RFM or the QRH. Where can I find it?
I'm a great believer in PPrunes ability to air and resolve these topics. The more the merrier, keep them coming and we will all get to learn something.
G
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Geoff
With regard to the change in arming the floats procedure, neither Pitchlink nor I had anything to do with it. That said I'm still not convinced what we are doing is so criminal.
If your counter is that we will be ripped apart at the subsequent inquiry that’s one thing. My response would be we are doing as our company check list requires, so our normal procedure supersedes the normal procedure in the RFM. The company have addressed the perceived problem and formed a policy. To what extent the Authority have been involved I'm not aware.
I'm more interested in why you are so sure the floats won't inflate in flight from a technical point of view.
You ask me "Do you think this possibility wasn't covered in the design/certification process?"
My thoughts are that clearly not everything has been well thought out, yet still certified. As Pitchlink points out there is a blooper in the certified RFM with regard to one fire drill. Should we just follow the drill and run from the flames?
How the search light was 'certified' is a mystery to me. It is completely useless to the RHP when landing at night on an offshore platform! It's a joke. All it does is cast a shadow of the nose gear over the deck. Add to that that you need a vvvvvery long thumb to reach the switch while operating the FTR collective trigger switch. It becomes more of a distraction and a hazard than an aid. I tend not to bother with it any more. It is better from the left seat. That is my pet hate, but it has been certified. Ask other 139 pilots what bothers them and you may be surprised buy the length of the list. All certified but still leaving people scratching their heads.
Tell me, how did a design of escape window pass certification and then need a speedy modification following the loss of one in flight? The subsequent modification, which must also have been certified, was then proven to fail to jettison when tested on more than one airframe (modified by the manufacturer). Now having been modified again, I have been lead to believe, two have ‘departed’ in flight again.
Read the JAR requirements for an AVAD and then think of how poorly the 139 complies. Yes, it passed certification but only by the thickness of a comma. I believe it offers poor protection for offshore ops. Imagine in a dark cockpit with the Aural Warning Regrade switch inadvertently (Why no CAS warning or advisory!!!
) in the wrong position. Now no 150 ft call and no Check Height! Just a little black box subsequently filled with the letters MIN at DH. Geoff, I know you see where I’m going on this one.
My point is that just because it was certified doesn't mean it is right. We all know of examples of aircraft which following certification - and all that that requires - that have had to be modified once being shaken down in service.
Someone still needs to explain to me in simple talk why this is such a safe system that it should be armed in the cruise.
.
Everybody - well nearly everybody, wants AFDS. There seems little point in having it if you don't trust it and use it.
I agree, but the AFDS I’m used to allows the pilot to arm the AFDS system at the appropriate speed/time when should there be a fault and the floats pop there and then, then the consequences should not be catastrophic. Why have the floats armed at 2000/3000 ft MSL for 120 Nm at 155kts?
With regard to my little teaser, from memory try the basic RFM, limitations for ventilation.
ATB
Red
With regard to the change in arming the floats procedure, neither Pitchlink nor I had anything to do with it. That said I'm still not convinced what we are doing is so criminal.
If your counter is that we will be ripped apart at the subsequent inquiry that’s one thing. My response would be we are doing as our company check list requires, so our normal procedure supersedes the normal procedure in the RFM. The company have addressed the perceived problem and formed a policy. To what extent the Authority have been involved I'm not aware.
I'm more interested in why you are so sure the floats won't inflate in flight from a technical point of view.
You ask me "Do you think this possibility wasn't covered in the design/certification process?"
My thoughts are that clearly not everything has been well thought out, yet still certified. As Pitchlink points out there is a blooper in the certified RFM with regard to one fire drill. Should we just follow the drill and run from the flames?
How the search light was 'certified' is a mystery to me. It is completely useless to the RHP when landing at night on an offshore platform! It's a joke. All it does is cast a shadow of the nose gear over the deck. Add to that that you need a vvvvvery long thumb to reach the switch while operating the FTR collective trigger switch. It becomes more of a distraction and a hazard than an aid. I tend not to bother with it any more. It is better from the left seat. That is my pet hate, but it has been certified. Ask other 139 pilots what bothers them and you may be surprised buy the length of the list. All certified but still leaving people scratching their heads.
Tell me, how did a design of escape window pass certification and then need a speedy modification following the loss of one in flight? The subsequent modification, which must also have been certified, was then proven to fail to jettison when tested on more than one airframe (modified by the manufacturer). Now having been modified again, I have been lead to believe, two have ‘departed’ in flight again.
Read the JAR requirements for an AVAD and then think of how poorly the 139 complies. Yes, it passed certification but only by the thickness of a comma. I believe it offers poor protection for offshore ops. Imagine in a dark cockpit with the Aural Warning Regrade switch inadvertently (Why no CAS warning or advisory!!!
) in the wrong position. Now no 150 ft call and no Check Height! Just a little black box subsequently filled with the letters MIN at DH. Geoff, I know you see where I’m going on this one.My point is that just because it was certified doesn't mean it is right. We all know of examples of aircraft which following certification - and all that that requires - that have had to be modified once being shaken down in service.
Someone still needs to explain to me in simple talk why this is such a safe system that it should be armed in the cruise.
.
Everybody - well nearly everybody, wants AFDS. There seems little point in having it if you don't trust it and use it.
I agree, but the AFDS I’m used to allows the pilot to arm the AFDS system at the appropriate speed/time when should there be a fault and the floats pop there and then, then the consequences should not be catastrophic. Why have the floats armed at 2000/3000 ft MSL for 120 Nm at 155kts?
With regard to my little teaser, from memory try the basic RFM, limitations for ventilation.
ATB
Red
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Red
Great debate. We need more but please, if we are to get things right then we need to
1. Iron out misunderstandings
2. Correct misconceptions
3. Identify and correct procedures that are inappropriate
4. Ensure the documentation supports the above in a timely fashion.
How do we do that? My recommendation is sustained pressure either through the OEM's channels or through your local aviation authority channels (CAA, FAA etc). Unilateral action may plug a gap but if you remember the Airbus Accident in NY just after 911 they found that the clever-clogs at the sim centre had been teaching the guys to 'pick-up' a 'turbulance induced dropped wing' with rudder. They thought they were doing the right thing when all along it turned out to be the wrong thing and it killed a bunch of people. The OEM knew what was right but poorly communicated it to the guys at the sharp end.
Floats do not get armed during an approach a bunch of times - remember I've been there and I know how the real world works. The probability is that during a hurried approach that is complicated by other factors - at night - and we are then in the 'zone' that auto-floats were designed for.
I could go on but risk boring you. Remember that I don't work for the OEM and anyway am so far down the pecking order that what I say seemingly has little if any effect. Ask the 7 crews (so far!) that have slavishly followed the checklist after Double Gen fail (at night and or IMC) and have then switched off the Batt Mast instead of the Batt Main. OOps - at night = very tricky and IMC = YOU'RE DEAD. The checklist should read Main Batt not Batt Main but can I get it changed? Well it's been a year now and nothing yet despite repeated reports up the chain.
Now all I can do is shine a light in the right direction - you guys have to get vocal and get some changes made, not sit around dreaming up fixes that might just be your version of the Airbus drama mentioned above.
G
1. Iron out misunderstandings
2. Correct misconceptions
3. Identify and correct procedures that are inappropriate
4. Ensure the documentation supports the above in a timely fashion.
How do we do that? My recommendation is sustained pressure either through the OEM's channels or through your local aviation authority channels (CAA, FAA etc). Unilateral action may plug a gap but if you remember the Airbus Accident in NY just after 911 they found that the clever-clogs at the sim centre had been teaching the guys to 'pick-up' a 'turbulance induced dropped wing' with rudder. They thought they were doing the right thing when all along it turned out to be the wrong thing and it killed a bunch of people. The OEM knew what was right but poorly communicated it to the guys at the sharp end.
Floats do not get armed during an approach a bunch of times - remember I've been there and I know how the real world works. The probability is that during a hurried approach that is complicated by other factors - at night - and we are then in the 'zone' that auto-floats were designed for.
I could go on but risk boring you. Remember that I don't work for the OEM and anyway am so far down the pecking order that what I say seemingly has little if any effect. Ask the 7 crews (so far!) that have slavishly followed the checklist after Double Gen fail (at night and or IMC) and have then switched off the Batt Mast instead of the Batt Main. OOps - at night = very tricky and IMC = YOU'RE DEAD. The checklist should read Main Batt not Batt Main but can I get it changed? Well it's been a year now and nothing yet despite repeated reports up the chain.
Now all I can do is shine a light in the right direction - you guys have to get vocal and get some changes made, not sit around dreaming up fixes that might just be your version of the Airbus drama mentioned above.
G
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Geoffers
As normal your approach to this is exemplary, your vast flying and management experience out shines most of us Rotorheads, and I hope you know that I for one respect your views enormously.
After some lively debate we boil this issue down to your four points.
Iron out misunderstandings
Correct misconceptions
Identify and correct procedures that are inappropriate
Ensure the documentation supports the above in a timely fashion.
I agree this is the way forward. But… Isn’t there just always a but?
Seemingly you can’t, after a year of pushing at your end, solve a check list problem which could ”kill a bunch of people”. Failure against three out of four of your own criteria.
And, we are doing things, which some perceive, are unwise and which may or may not have come about by a misconception or misunderstanding.
Add to that a list of short comings from an operators point of view, such as; the AVAD or not, the Gear up warning system (No air speed function just rad alt, not the best system for operating to high helipads.). TCAS/Radar interface problems which means the MFD picture zooms out to 150 miles just when you need a close range image. The list goes on.
Now we have all been banging on, for over a year, about such issues. Yet, no one seems to be making any headway. We must ask why are we failling?
It strikes me that where this whole process falls down is a lack of both action and feedback from the manufacturer. Maybe there is a greater focus on getting machines out the factory gates, and not on getting to grips with issues like these. After all these issues cost money to solve rather than adding to the bottom line, like selling and building another ten airframes.
Of course the real cost of issues like this will have an impact on the bottom line at some stage, to a greater or lesser extent. I guess the bean counters would prefer to stave the costs off as long as possible.
Yes, we should all keep shining a light in the right direction. We are and we have been vocal too. But how do we get the folks that can change things to look in the same direction, and motivate them to act in a timely fashion? Now that is a whole different problem.
Just some thoughts.
Anyway, here’s another question. I was always taught that if you have a full authority AFCS/Autopilot, that to protect anyone under the disc from the dangers of a control hard-over, you disengage it while on the ground. But we don’t in the 139. Why?
And, I still don't know what the ventilation limitation is all about.
ATB
Red
As normal your approach to this is exemplary, your vast flying and management experience out shines most of us Rotorheads, and I hope you know that I for one respect your views enormously.
After some lively debate we boil this issue down to your four points.
Iron out misunderstandings
Correct misconceptions
Identify and correct procedures that are inappropriate
Ensure the documentation supports the above in a timely fashion.
I agree this is the way forward. But… Isn’t there just always a but?
Seemingly you can’t, after a year of pushing at your end, solve a check list problem which could ”kill a bunch of people”. Failure against three out of four of your own criteria.
And, we are doing things, which some perceive, are unwise and which may or may not have come about by a misconception or misunderstanding.
Add to that a list of short comings from an operators point of view, such as; the AVAD or not, the Gear up warning system (No air speed function just rad alt, not the best system for operating to high helipads.). TCAS/Radar interface problems which means the MFD picture zooms out to 150 miles just when you need a close range image. The list goes on.
Now we have all been banging on, for over a year, about such issues. Yet, no one seems to be making any headway. We must ask why are we failling?
It strikes me that where this whole process falls down is a lack of both action and feedback from the manufacturer. Maybe there is a greater focus on getting machines out the factory gates, and not on getting to grips with issues like these. After all these issues cost money to solve rather than adding to the bottom line, like selling and building another ten airframes.
Of course the real cost of issues like this will have an impact on the bottom line at some stage, to a greater or lesser extent. I guess the bean counters would prefer to stave the costs off as long as possible.
Yes, we should all keep shining a light in the right direction. We are and we have been vocal too. But how do we get the folks that can change things to look in the same direction, and motivate them to act in a timely fashion? Now that is a whole different problem.
Just some thoughts.
Anyway, here’s another question. I was always taught that if you have a full authority AFCS/Autopilot, that to protect anyone under the disc from the dangers of a control hard-over, you disengage it while on the ground. But we don’t in the 139. Why?
And, I still don't know what the ventilation limitation is all about.
ATB
Red
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Where is the 'POWER' in this struggle
Red
I remember in my past dealing with the NHS deciding at one point that the biggest struggle of all was communicating and that communicating with the NHS was like wandering around a beached whale trying to find the appropriate orifice for intelligent, informed conversation........ you know where I'm going with this ......
YOU .... have the power. YOU are the customer. I am but a voice in the wilderness. If the people in your organisation don't know how to use that power then we will forever be condemned to a painful gestation. Get together with other customers, bully the CAA/FAA and GET SOME BLOODY ANSWERS.
We have an OEM with a great product but this OEM must realise that he is not working in a vacuum. His products are 'alive' and take some care to get them through their birth-pangs. YOU have to convince them to be a responsible and caring parent. Selling can only be one small part of a bright future. Good parenting leads to successful offspring and the success of all those MkII and MKIII etc. etc. AW139s will keep them in business for a long while for basically this machine is the mother and father of a bloody good helicopter with real potential.
GO TO IT........ please....
Ref the other question - AP's go OFF in the After Landing Checklist. RFM Page 2-34
I cannot find the heating/Vent limitation either - is it for real???
G
I remember in my past dealing with the NHS deciding at one point that the biggest struggle of all was communicating and that communicating with the NHS was like wandering around a beached whale trying to find the appropriate orifice for intelligent, informed conversation........ you know where I'm going with this ......
YOU .... have the power. YOU are the customer. I am but a voice in the wilderness. If the people in your organisation don't know how to use that power then we will forever be condemned to a painful gestation. Get together with other customers, bully the CAA/FAA and GET SOME BLOODY ANSWERS.
We have an OEM with a great product but this OEM must realise that he is not working in a vacuum. His products are 'alive' and take some care to get them through their birth-pangs. YOU have to convince them to be a responsible and caring parent. Selling can only be one small part of a bright future. Good parenting leads to successful offspring and the success of all those MkII and MKIII etc. etc. AW139s will keep them in business for a long while for basically this machine is the mother and father of a bloody good helicopter with real potential.
GO TO IT........ please....
Ref the other question - AP's go OFF in the After Landing Checklist. RFM Page 2-34
I cannot find the heating/Vent limitation either - is it for real???
G
Anyway, here’s another question. I was always taught that if you have a full authority AFCS/Autopilot, that to protect anyone under the disc from the dangers of a control hard-over, you disengage it while on the ground. But we don’t in the 139. Why?
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212 Man
So f***ed up avionics is not just an Italian/US thing then??
You sometimes feel as if you have been sold and are operating the 'Beta' version don't you!
G
You sometimes feel as if you have been sold and are operating the 'Beta' version don't you!
G
We were definitely the IFTU I would say! In fairness (and I love the 155) most faults tended to be low tech and not avionics stuff, though a lot of heartache resulted. That and the 27 engines that failed their EPACS at about 300 hours
Mind you, I never had a gearbox decide to cook itself on me!
Mind you, I never had a gearbox decide to cook itself on me!
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Where is the 'POWER' in this struggle
Geoffers - I think we may be sunk. So much inertia, commercial not rotor.
But we can keep trying. I would love to here what pet hates other pilots have with the 139.
Why don't we construct a wish list here on Pprune?
I'd like:
1. A proper AVAD.
2. A CAS caution or advisory of Aural Warning Regraded.
3. Properly integrated TCAS and WX Radar
4. An airspeed feed to the Gear up warning system.
5. A Guidance Controller in my field of vision when flying on instruments, maybe where the VNE placards are, and one for each pilot.
6. Better batteries.
7. Repeater for Glide slope info on the HSI.
8. Better DME display
9. More logical wind direction display.
10. Rotor Low aural warning inhibited by WOW
There you go ten to start things off. I agree that this could be a truly great helicopter, just not quite yet.
Regarding AP off after landing I will enquire why our normal operating procedure omits this.
Oh and Geoff - I think 'The' NHS is great. But I guess I would, hey?
Best wishes
Red
PS. the vent limitaion is no wind up. Its in out OM B but I need to check a RFM. I will let you know
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Your wish list
Red
You have good idea there. I hope that others contribute and then we have the basis for a healthy debate that could put those items into categories....
Urgent, URGENT, URGENT
BLOODY GOOD IDEA
NICE BUT NOT ESSENTIAL - WAIT FOR THE 'B' MODEL THEN GET IT RIGHT!!
You then go out and organise an 'Operator's Conference' with your agenda nice and clear and all singing from the same hymn sheet. You invite AW and the NAAs.
Lock the doors and don't let them leave until you have a commitment and a time-line and an action-list with the names of those responsible. Change may come at a price and you may grumble at it but 'just living with it' will make us look immature and irresponsible.
Our industry is a proud one and a competent one. Those industrialists who think that the answer lay in increasing sales of a faulty product can be likened to those so-called 'bankers' who sold mortgages to people who could never afford to pay and were described by one journalist as 'not real bankers - just financial engineers' . The same could be said of those whose bonus depends on sales numbers rather than satisfied customers.
(Gee - hope I don't get the sack for that!!)
signed Herbert Gruntbucket, Southend.
You have good idea there. I hope that others contribute and then we have the basis for a healthy debate that could put those items into categories....
Urgent, URGENT, URGENT
BLOODY GOOD IDEA
NICE BUT NOT ESSENTIAL - WAIT FOR THE 'B' MODEL THEN GET IT RIGHT!!
You then go out and organise an 'Operator's Conference' with your agenda nice and clear and all singing from the same hymn sheet. You invite AW and the NAAs.
Lock the doors and don't let them leave until you have a commitment and a time-line and an action-list with the names of those responsible. Change may come at a price and you may grumble at it but 'just living with it' will make us look immature and irresponsible.
Our industry is a proud one and a competent one. Those industrialists who think that the answer lay in increasing sales of a faulty product can be likened to those so-called 'bankers' who sold mortgages to people who could never afford to pay and were described by one journalist as 'not real bankers - just financial engineers' . The same could be said of those whose bonus depends on sales numbers rather than satisfied customers.
(Gee - hope I don't get the sack for that!!)
signed Herbert Gruntbucket, Southend.
You then go out and organise an 'Operator's Conference' with your agenda
Sound like an idea for AW?
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AW conference
I claim no credit whatsoever and am delighted at the prospects of what might be if the owners/operators get together beforehand and sort out thier gripes into categories. The odd software glitch that is found in one machine and not another is for each owner to resolve. The systemic failures in manufacture and/or design are the meat of the argument and you will have a better chance of making rapid progress if these are notified to AW BEFORE the conference and they are given the opportunity to respond positively rather than gape opened mouthed at your sizeable shopping list.
I am sure there are some very serious issues that once resolved will benefit the majority. Dont' allow these issues to be buried under a plethora of niggles.
If you want the searchlight moved then make your point and it may even be in the 'B' model but if you want a 'no-objection' certificate for your own modification then I sure AW engineers will engage with you and help find ways to minimise the cost....... but it will cost. Maybe the (non-aviator??) who ordered your offshore machine with the current searchlight spec. needs to learn a lesson or to about involving the sharp-end when agreeing the spec with the OEM.
Meanwhile the sim searchlight works beautifully because of course the nose wheel is only imaginary. Is this a serious shortcoming with the sim visuals???
.......no.....we're not going to change the visuals but imagine if the sim was that clever and did reveal such anomolies.
I look forward to hearing news in May.
G
I am sure there are some very serious issues that once resolved will benefit the majority. Dont' allow these issues to be buried under a plethora of niggles.
If you want the searchlight moved then make your point and it may even be in the 'B' model but if you want a 'no-objection' certificate for your own modification then I sure AW engineers will engage with you and help find ways to minimise the cost....... but it will cost. Maybe the (non-aviator??) who ordered your offshore machine with the current searchlight spec. needs to learn a lesson or to about involving the sharp-end when agreeing the spec with the OEM.
Meanwhile the sim searchlight works beautifully because of course the nose wheel is only imaginary. Is this a serious shortcoming with the sim visuals???
.......no.....we're not going to change the visuals but imagine if the sim was that clever and did reveal such anomolies.
I look forward to hearing news in May.
G
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Ventilation Limitation
Geoffers
As promised here is your reference.
AB139-RFM-4D Pg 1-31 Rev 14 EASA approved.
Miscellaneou Limitations.
Ventilation.
At MPOG/HIGE/HOGE or with the helicopter forward velocity below 25Kts, operate cockpit fans or open pilot or copilot window.
By the way, have you got an electronic copy of the VNE Power On Limitations in KIAS, (temp against alltitude) placard which is screwed to the insrtument panel - that you could post here. I don't, but I do have a question for anyone who could help me with a quandry about it.
I can't believe the good folks at Agusta have made a school boy error, but I can't fathom the logic out either. I will of course apply the limits religiously regardless.
ATB
Red
As promised here is your reference.
AB139-RFM-4D Pg 1-31 Rev 14 EASA approved.
Miscellaneou Limitations.
Ventilation.
At MPOG/HIGE/HOGE or with the helicopter forward velocity below 25Kts, operate cockpit fans or open pilot or copilot window.
By the way, have you got an electronic copy of the VNE Power On Limitations in KIAS, (temp against alltitude) placard which is screwed to the insrtument panel - that you could post here. I don't, but I do have a question for anyone who could help me with a quandry about it.
I can't believe the good folks at Agusta have made a school boy error, but I can't fathom the logic out either. I will of course apply the limits religiously regardless.
ATB
Red
