Helicopter crash off the coast of Newfoundland - 18 aboard, March 2009
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I think what SAS is pointing to is the fact that total loss of MGB OIL PRESSURE is a land immediately situation and was described as such in the ECL at the time of the accident. The crew chose not to do this. Had they ditched immediately then the outcome would likely have been very different.
The TSB wrote a very detailed Report...and conducted a wide ranging investigation and documented their work.
They addressed the Run Dry issue, and clearly described the situation that existed at the time of the Accident.
The had access to the CVR and know the content and context of the discussion between the Cougar Base and the Crew....but do not go into detail what that was.
They plainly reported their findings which included the conversation held between the Captain and the The Base so we have to accept the TSB would have reported any mention of a 30 Minute Run Dry Time. They did not....therefore it follows there was none.
The CVR also had no mention of that.
The RFM had no mention of that.
The Cougar SOP had no mention of that.
The Checklist had no mention of that.
The TSB discussed the multi-year long argument here at Rotor Heads, without naming the site, and concluded the 30 Minute Run Dry situation had reached a point that no reasonable assumption could be made that it was valid.
Sikorsky and the Operators of the 92 held weekly Web Casts discussing 92 issues amongst which was the MGB and all the issues surrounding that.
Folks who cling to the Myth this accident occurred because the Crew thought they could fly for 30 minutes with a Dry MGB are just not accepting the facts.
The TSB very clearly challenged the FAA and other Authorities over the Certification process and the Run Dry issue, as well as Sikorsky. They did a very good job at discussing the entire issue of Run Dry Gearboxes.....and did not just limit themselves to the Cougar 92.
Strongly held False Ideas, no matter how firmly believed....are still wrong. FH is welcome to his opinion but he is not entitled to his own set of facts. I take mine from the TSB Report.....all of it.
They addressed the Run Dry issue, and clearly described the situation that existed at the time of the Accident.
The had access to the CVR and know the content and context of the discussion between the Cougar Base and the Crew....but do not go into detail what that was.
They plainly reported their findings which included the conversation held between the Captain and the The Base so we have to accept the TSB would have reported any mention of a 30 Minute Run Dry Time. They did not....therefore it follows there was none.
The CVR also had no mention of that.
The RFM had no mention of that.
The Cougar SOP had no mention of that.
The Checklist had no mention of that.
The TSB discussed the multi-year long argument here at Rotor Heads, without naming the site, and concluded the 30 Minute Run Dry situation had reached a point that no reasonable assumption could be made that it was valid.
Sikorsky and the Operators of the 92 held weekly Web Casts discussing 92 issues amongst which was the MGB and all the issues surrounding that.
Folks who cling to the Myth this accident occurred because the Crew thought they could fly for 30 minutes with a Dry MGB are just not accepting the facts.
The TSB very clearly challenged the FAA and other Authorities over the Certification process and the Run Dry issue, as well as Sikorsky. They did a very good job at discussing the entire issue of Run Dry Gearboxes.....and did not just limit themselves to the Cougar 92.
Strongly held False Ideas, no matter how firmly believed....are still wrong. FH is welcome to his opinion but he is not entitled to his own set of facts. I take mine from the TSB Report.....all of it.
Folks who cling to the Myth this accident occurred because the Crew thought they could fly for 30 minutes with a Dry MGB are just not accepting the facts.
I'm not sure what motivated FH to post what he just did, but I'm with SAS and 212man on this one - there is nothing in the TSB report that indicates the captain based his decisions on a belief that the MGB would run for 30 minutes without oil.
If a pilot is concerned that a loss of lubricant may have occurred, knowledge of the run dry capabilities of the aircraft is of critical importance in determining the necessary flight profile to ensure that the helicopter is landed or ditched prior to a potential failure of the MGB or related component failure due to a loss of MGB lubricant.
The fact you cannot grasp is they never thought they had lost all the Oil....they thought they had other problems....not a complete loss of Oil.
That is documented in the Report.
This is not the "Little Ship Table" in a PHI Crew Room.....we deal with facts here and polite discussion here unlike the LST.
Quote us the section in the Report where the TSB explains the Trouble Shooting and mistakes the Crew made in that regard....and the reasons they made that false diagnosis. You will see they did not recognize the absence of an increase in the MGB Oil Temperature as being an indication the was not as expected for the case of having some Oil left and the absence of an increasing Oil Temperature would suggest the "lack" of Oil.
They were good Guys....but just got it wrong. The Captain made some bad decisions, the Co-Pilot was not assertive enough despite knowing what the "right" action was......as he pointed it out the Captain.
If you do....you will have to see the truth of the matter.
Good God. Do we HAVE to go through this again? Somebody shoot me...PLEASE shoot me in the head. I'd rather that happen than have one of these pointless arguments with SASless.
(And Variable Load, the post was moved over to this thread from another thread discussing the merits of flying high versus flying low. This accident was one I used as an example of the type of catastrophic failures that some pilots worry about in their irrational justification to fly low. My point was that even without the mythical "30-minute run-dry time" the crew of CHI91 had plenty of time to get the ship down and land safely. But they chose not to.
As for why the Moderators moved the post, I have no earthly idea. I don't know why the Moderators of this forum do the things they do. Sometimes I just shake my head.)
Moving on to the S-92 crash...
Look, we cannot know what any pilot was thinking right before he crashed. We cannot know what was *not* said over the intercom or radio; we only know what *was* said.
However, we know that while the SIC mentioned a couple of times that they were at the "Land Immediately" point in the emergency checklist (and the PIC certainly knew what "land immediately" meant), the PIC did not do this. And it wasn't like he merely chose to not exercise that option, for it was not an option. He consciously chose to contradict the emergency procedure. And so we have to ask ourselves why a mature, professional, properly-trained and experienced aviator would disregard such clear instructions? It even puzzled the TSB investigators.
Even though there was no direct mention of the 30-minute run-dry capability by the crew, we know that both pilots were aware of it. How do we know this? Because WE ALL are aware of it. And, despite SASless's disingenuous protestations to the contrary, the TSB did talk about it in Section 1.18.1.3 of their report. It gets to the heart of what we're saying here. The PIC balanced the risk of ditching against the risk of a MGB failure.
So it's not correct to say that the TSB report "never mentioned" the 30-minute run-dry capability. It did. Obviously. (Do some of you suffer from reading comprehension issues? I think you must.)
And it's equally not correct to say that the pilot(s) did not consider the run-dry capability of the S-92 simply because neither one of them mentioned directly. It had to play a role, as the TSB agrees.
There is no question that the PIC failed to follow the emergency procedure for the indications he was given. No question. But to say that his knowledge of the run-dry capability absolutely had nothing to do with that decision is just stupid. I mean, it's asinine. Idiotic.
(And Variable Load, the post was moved over to this thread from another thread discussing the merits of flying high versus flying low. This accident was one I used as an example of the type of catastrophic failures that some pilots worry about in their irrational justification to fly low. My point was that even without the mythical "30-minute run-dry time" the crew of CHI91 had plenty of time to get the ship down and land safely. But they chose not to.
As for why the Moderators moved the post, I have no earthly idea. I don't know why the Moderators of this forum do the things they do. Sometimes I just shake my head.)
Moving on to the S-92 crash...
Look, we cannot know what any pilot was thinking right before he crashed. We cannot know what was *not* said over the intercom or radio; we only know what *was* said.
However, we know that while the SIC mentioned a couple of times that they were at the "Land Immediately" point in the emergency checklist (and the PIC certainly knew what "land immediately" meant), the PIC did not do this. And it wasn't like he merely chose to not exercise that option, for it was not an option. He consciously chose to contradict the emergency procedure. And so we have to ask ourselves why a mature, professional, properly-trained and experienced aviator would disregard such clear instructions? It even puzzled the TSB investigators.
Even though there was no direct mention of the 30-minute run-dry capability by the crew, we know that both pilots were aware of it. How do we know this? Because WE ALL are aware of it. And, despite SASless's disingenuous protestations to the contrary, the TSB did talk about it in Section 1.18.1.3 of their report. It gets to the heart of what we're saying here. The PIC balanced the risk of ditching against the risk of a MGB failure.
The decision to land or ditch immediately could hinge on the pilots' interpretation of the "land immediately" definition and their assessment of the risks associated with landing immediately versus prolonging flight to reach a more suitable landing area. One possible factor which can influence a pilot's decision-making process is the consideration of a helicopter's run dry capability. If a pilot is concerned that a loss of lubricant may have occurred, knowledge of the run dry capabilities of the aircraft is of critical importance in determining the necessary flight profile to ensure that the helicopter is landed or ditched prior to a potential failure of the MGB or related component failure due to a loss of MGB lubricant.
And it's equally not correct to say that the pilot(s) did not consider the run-dry capability of the S-92 simply because neither one of them mentioned directly. It had to play a role, as the TSB agrees.
There is no question that the PIC failed to follow the emergency procedure for the indications he was given. No question. But to say that his knowledge of the run-dry capability absolutely had nothing to do with that decision is just stupid. I mean, it's asinine. Idiotic.
I don't know about this shooting folks in the Head thing.....but I do on the rare occasion shift them to the Peanut Gallery. It is a rare thing at Rotor Heads but it does happen. Adidos Muchacho!
SADfull:
Awwwwwww, again? I'm inconsolable!
Actually, this is not the first time SAS has put me on "Ignore." But he absolutely cannot resist arguing with people. So he generously takes me back. And then puts me on "Ignore" again. It's a neurosis, I think.
So SAS won't be able to see any of my posts anymore (at least until he does). And *I'M* supposed to feel bad? Heh.
Any of you readers who think that the CHI 91 accident occurred because the pilot absolutely, positively did not: a) at least consider the possibility that they'd lost all their oil (even though that possibility was never verbalized) and that b) the PIC absolutely, positively did not consider the run-dry time of the S-91 transmission...either you are not helicopter pilots or you're not very good helicopter pilots. Of course he did. OF COURSE HE DID.
Put yourself in his shoes. He was not a complete moron. He was a pilot, probably a lot like me and you (if *you* are actually a pilot and not just playing one on silly internet forums). He saw that his MGB pressure had gone to zero (or nearly so). He isolated the oil cooler using the Emergency Bypass, but did *not* see the expected rise in MGB temperature. Yet he knew...KNEW from his training in the ship that a rise in MGB temperature was to be EXPECTED. Hmm.
Somewhere in the deep, dark recesses of his mind he had to think, "Maybe there is no oil?" He might not have thought it consciously, but that possibility was there in his brain. It had to be...unless he was a complete noob with zero flight time. Because from our earliest days of flying we are taught that if you have zero gearbox pressure and the the temperature does not go up, THEN YOU MIGHT NOT HAVE ANY OIL. In a loss of MGB pressure, a lack of temperature increase IS the secondary indication! To say he was totally unaware of this phenomenon is just, as I say, stupid, because it is just *one* of the possibilities that would be running through ALL of our minds.
So although he did not actually say out loud into the intercom, "Gee, maybe we lost all our gearbox oil!" he had to be thinking it on some level. To assume otherwise is to give him a very serious insult and discredit. He made a decision based on what he knew...based on ALL of the things he knew, not just what was showing on his gauges.
I don't know about this shooting folks in the Head thing.....but I do on the rare occasion shift them to the Peanut Gallery. It is a rare thing at Rotor Heads but it does happen. Adidos Muchacho!
Actually, this is not the first time SAS has put me on "Ignore." But he absolutely cannot resist arguing with people. So he generously takes me back. And then puts me on "Ignore" again. It's a neurosis, I think.
So SAS won't be able to see any of my posts anymore (at least until he does). And *I'M* supposed to feel bad? Heh.
Any of you readers who think that the CHI 91 accident occurred because the pilot absolutely, positively did not: a) at least consider the possibility that they'd lost all their oil (even though that possibility was never verbalized) and that b) the PIC absolutely, positively did not consider the run-dry time of the S-91 transmission...either you are not helicopter pilots or you're not very good helicopter pilots. Of course he did. OF COURSE HE DID.
Put yourself in his shoes. He was not a complete moron. He was a pilot, probably a lot like me and you (if *you* are actually a pilot and not just playing one on silly internet forums). He saw that his MGB pressure had gone to zero (or nearly so). He isolated the oil cooler using the Emergency Bypass, but did *not* see the expected rise in MGB temperature. Yet he knew...KNEW from his training in the ship that a rise in MGB temperature was to be EXPECTED. Hmm.
Somewhere in the deep, dark recesses of his mind he had to think, "Maybe there is no oil?" He might not have thought it consciously, but that possibility was there in his brain. It had to be...unless he was a complete noob with zero flight time. Because from our earliest days of flying we are taught that if you have zero gearbox pressure and the the temperature does not go up, THEN YOU MIGHT NOT HAVE ANY OIL. In a loss of MGB pressure, a lack of temperature increase IS the secondary indication! To say he was totally unaware of this phenomenon is just, as I say, stupid, because it is just *one* of the possibilities that would be running through ALL of our minds.
So although he did not actually say out loud into the intercom, "Gee, maybe we lost all our gearbox oil!" he had to be thinking it on some level. To assume otherwise is to give him a very serious insult and discredit. He made a decision based on what he knew...based on ALL of the things he knew, not just what was showing on his gauges.
....keeripes
A nobody; a nitwit; a pilot; a motorcyclist; a raconteur; a lover...of life - who loves to laugh, who tries to not take myself (or anything) too seriously...just a normal guy who knows his place in the universe by being in touch with my spiritual side. What more is there?
FN1100: Chill out bubba. You're semi retired, with all the physical accoutrements of either a TIA or an MI. Don't speed up what fate already has in store for you by reiterating your views in a derogatory or offensive manner.
Stick with your own description of yourself and you won't go far wrong.
And SAS: Don't take it so seriously bud: You seem to be parking too many of us in that "peanut Gallery" (whatever that is). You'll be talking to yourself in here soon.........
You know what they say,.."if you can dole it out, then be prepared to take it too".......Geez....you yanks...if you're not beating up the rest of the world, you're beating each other up.
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Remember not to believe the marketing hype
6 years on
RIP the Cougar 17
Cougar 491 crash remembered 6 years later - Newfoundland & Labrador - CBC News
RIP the Cougar 17
Cougar 491 crash remembered 6 years later - Newfoundland & Labrador - CBC News
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Interesting Cougar Memorial ... looks like Leonardo da Vinci’s Air Screw
Cougar 491 crash remembered 6 years later - Newfoundland & Labrador - CBC News
Cougar 491 crash remembered 6 years later - Newfoundland & Labrador - CBC News
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Amnesia?
On Fa(r)cebook their is a group called Sikorsky S-92 professionals and a discussion on PHI S-92s deploying to Barrow, AK.
Two messages posted yesterday, one a question the other an answer:
Is this an official Sikorsky position?
Two messages posted yesterday, one a question the other an answer:
David Franklin
Why did phi go to seastate 6 floats I hate those sponson floats
Nick Lappos
International pressure from the CAA. They mandated the SS6 floats, against the massive data to show how seldom they would be used.
Why did phi go to seastate 6 floats I hate those sponson floats
Nick Lappos
International pressure from the CAA. They mandated the SS6 floats, against the massive data to show how seldom they would be used.
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OK I'll be the one to bite.
How can anyone "hate" Sea State 6 floats? I can understand a discussion that statistically they may not be necessary, but to focus a level of emotion that I reserve for sweet wine wine and jazz compilations bought from Starbucks on a piece of kit that can only improve safety does seem a little strange.
How can anyone "hate" Sea State 6 floats? I can understand a discussion that statistically they may not be necessary, but to focus a level of emotion that I reserve for sweet wine wine and jazz compilations bought from Starbucks on a piece of kit that can only improve safety does seem a little strange.
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Inputshaft,
First, recognize (unlike zalt) that we on the supply side of this collective effort provide what our customers want and need, so any discussion of the relative merit of SS6 floats is nearly academic - we deliver what you folks want to buy.
The issue is not that any particular piece of kit makes things "safer", because by that logic, we pile it all on until we are absolutely as safe as can be, and carry one passenger in a 50,000 lb machine.
The question is always "What is the next most valuable pound of weight and dollar of cost going to buy that makes the aircraft safer?" Example: should we spend 100 lbs (invented number) going from SS5 to SS6 on the floats, or provide 100 more horsepower when OEI? Both weigh 100 lbs, which makes the aircraft safer? Which do we burden the aircraft with?
That is the essence of design, and operators, manufacturers and regulators all dance together to balance the equation.
First, recognize (unlike zalt) that we on the supply side of this collective effort provide what our customers want and need, so any discussion of the relative merit of SS6 floats is nearly academic - we deliver what you folks want to buy.
The issue is not that any particular piece of kit makes things "safer", because by that logic, we pile it all on until we are absolutely as safe as can be, and carry one passenger in a 50,000 lb machine.
The question is always "What is the next most valuable pound of weight and dollar of cost going to buy that makes the aircraft safer?" Example: should we spend 100 lbs (invented number) going from SS5 to SS6 on the floats, or provide 100 more horsepower when OEI? Both weigh 100 lbs, which makes the aircraft safer? Which do we burden the aircraft with?
That is the essence of design, and operators, manufacturers and regulators all dance together to balance the equation.
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dirty shot, zalt.
All of us in this industry, in every job, strive to make the best total operations - manufacturers of components, aircraft, engines, operators of the aircraft, pilots, engineers, logistics experts, refuellers, regulators - all of us work our careers to give our passengers the proper safe comfortable and productive flight.
The pilots and engineers that I know from AW, Bell, Mil, Kamov, Airbus and Sikorsky (and I know lots of them) are all professionals, and they lose sleep, as I do, when our best efforts aren't good enough.
All of us in this industry, in every job, strive to make the best total operations - manufacturers of components, aircraft, engines, operators of the aircraft, pilots, engineers, logistics experts, refuellers, regulators - all of us work our careers to give our passengers the proper safe comfortable and productive flight.
The pilots and engineers that I know from AW, Bell, Mil, Kamov, Airbus and Sikorsky (and I know lots of them) are all professionals, and they lose sleep, as I do, when our best efforts aren't good enough.
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It's not an unreasonable question. From reading the TSB report stainless steel used on the UH-60 was replaced with more expensive titanium. As I've never heard of an aircraft that was 'too light' perhaps it was for weight saving. Or perhaps there was another perfectly sensible reason to switch. The trouble is the TSB don't explain why that design choice made perfect sense at the time.
It would be a service to all those other dedicated designers out there, who are perhaps working on components for the next generation of helicopters, if they could better understand those decisions.
It would be a service to all those other dedicated designers out there, who are perhaps working on components for the next generation of helicopters, if they could better understand those decisions.