Helicopter crash off the coast of Newfoundland - 18 aboard, March 2009
Talkspike,
Although the tail pylon is not cantered, the TGB is, so the effects are similar. Regarding coupling, the mixing unit does have a mechanical Collective/Yaw function, but not a trim related airspeed one that you describe.
The RFM has the following preamble to the TR malfunctions section:
Although the tail pylon is not cantered, the TGB is, so the effects are similar. Regarding coupling, the mixing unit does have a mechanical Collective/Yaw function, but not a trim related airspeed one that you describe.
The RFM has the following preamble to the TR malfunctions section:
With loss of tail rotor thrust, it is impossible to remain in level flight. This failure is associated with a loss in drive and characterized by a sharp, right yaw of the aircraft that requires immediate entry into autorotation (if in forward flight) or landing (if in a hover). If thrust is lost in forward flight (60 KIAS or above) roll excursions up to 10°, pitch attitude changes up to 5° and heading changes up to 50° may be experienced during the transition to autorotation. Once established in autorotation the aircraft can be flown to a stable pitch and roll attitude with an acceptable level of sideslip
Went back thru my old Black hawk notes (1988!) and it said that the side lift from the cambered fin helps unload the tail rotor at approx 100knts and above 100knts (approx 120) flight with loss of t/r should be possible? and that was from Sikorsky instructors ,when I saw the 92 had no camber on the fin I thought it must be
A: the loss of t/r drive was so remote it wasn't needed or
B: it wouldn't matter how big the camber or fin size was it wouldn't stop the a/c from spinning.
Thanks for your insite into the fins on BH John.
A: the loss of t/r drive was so remote it wasn't needed or
B: it wouldn't matter how big the camber or fin size was it wouldn't stop the a/c from spinning.
Thanks for your insite into the fins on BH John.
Blackhawk9 Comment
Is it possible that your notes were in reference to the amount of tail rotor control available to the pilot after losing hydraulics to both stages of the tail rotor servos? In that instance a loss of both the No.1 Primary and the No. 3 stage ( powered by the 3rd stage electrically driven backup pump) is assumed , so only the No.2 Primary pump is running. That pressurizes the boost servos however, and so, since you still have a yaw boost servo working for you, between it and your strong legs pushing on the pedals, you can force a limited range of tail rotor control. That control range is under most circumstances good enough to fly level from about 40 kts to 120 kts, ( with the aid of some very small aerodynamic assistance from the remaining very small cambered section of vertical fin that exists ). And it is quite enough range to allow a run-on type landing.
This discussion assumes that tail rotor drive is intact.
Thanks,
John Dixson
This discussion assumes that tail rotor drive is intact.
Thanks,
John Dixson
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For those interested the inquiry into helo safety in NL commences in full tomorrow. Attached is the link to the site where you can review the transcripts and testimonials.
Offshore Helicopter Safety Inquiry : Home
Hopefully some good will come out of this tragedy to improve safety in our industry...
Safe flying
Max
Offshore Helicopter Safety Inquiry : Home
Hopefully some good will come out of this tragedy to improve safety in our industry...
Safe flying
Max
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Chopper instantly filled with icy water after N.L. crash, sole survivor says
1 hour, 23 minutes ago
By Sue Bailey, The Canadian Press
ST. JOHN'S, N.L. - Robert Decker clung to the seat in front of him when the pilot of Cougar Flight 491 called over the helicopter's PA: "Ditching, ditching, ditching!" moments before the helicopter crashed in the North Atlantic.
The lone survivor of the devastating disaster on March 12 described the doomed aircraft's last terrifying moments to an inquiry packed with loved ones of the 17 people who died that day.
"I guess almost as soon as they said 'Ditch' the helicopter lost control," Decker said Thursday in his first detailed public account of the tragedy.
"I was looking out my window for most of it so I knew when we were going to hit the water."
The 28-year-old said the chopper's bow came up slightly and the aircraft turned quickly to its starboard, or right side, just before it crashed about 60 kilometres east of St. John's.
"The next thing I can remember was waking up in a submerged helicopter," Decker said.
"It was instantly filled with water ... it was kind of as if it was sinking the same way it was dropping through the sky."
Decker showed little emotion throughout his testimony, except for when he thanked the rescuers who saved his life, which brought him to tears.
Since 2006, Decker has worked as a weather and ice observer with Provincial Aerospace. He had flown about 50 times to the three offshore oil sites about 300 kilometres east of St. John's before that fateful day.
Decker had been asleep in a window seat along the starboard of the Sikorsky S-92A. A passenger woke him up just as the pilot announced a mechanical problem that forced the flight to turn back toward land.
He initially didn't think much of it.
It was a cold, clear day that seemed ideal for flying, Decker said. He wasn't supposed to head out until the next day but had received a call the night before asking him to move up his trip because of ice conditions at sea.
Window seats are coveted, and people try to "muscle" to the head of pre-boarding lineups to get them, he told the inquiry.
"Everybody's looking for the most comfortable seats so you don't have to sit next to anyone or the auxiliary fuel tank," Decker said.
He stressed in later testimony that it would have been "next to impossible" for those in seats away from the windows to escape."I just can't see how this person would ever stand a chance," he said, pointing to a rear inside seat on a diagram of the chopper's layout.
There was an auxiliary fuel tank blocking windows on the port, or left side, of the helicopter.
After the crash, the helicopter was dimly lit from the glow emitted by the survival suits that each passenger had hastily zipped up in the flight's last moments.
Fighting the water pressure inside the plummeting chopper, Decker unbuckled his seatbelt, escaped through the broken window beside him and floated toward the light above.
Once he broke the surface, he managed to inflate a pillow-like flotation collar on his suit to keep his head above water. But he couldn't get to two lifeboats floating nearby nor fully use his hands because the cold water numbed his fingers.
Trying to swim with a ruptured vertebrae, dislocated ankle and broken sternum "was a losing battle," he said.
Decker remembered worrying that he was paralyzed until he realized he could move his toes. He talked and sang to himself to keep panic at bay, though the fear of internal bleeding gripped him.
Decker had also inhaled sea water, though he doesn't remember fighting for breath.
He recalled seeing a Provincial Aerospace plane flying toward him. At one point he fought panic again as the plane appeared to turn around.
He knew he'd been spotted when the aircraft flew low over him and tipped its wings.
A Cougar search and rescue helicopter arrived later and a basket was lowered. But by then, Decker was hypothermic and could hardly move because of the icy water that had seeped into his survival suit. His body temperature on arrival at a hospital was logged at 28 C, nine degrees below normal.
Rescue swimmer Ian Wheeler, the leader of Cougar's in-house search and rescue team, was lowered into the sea beside Decker, who said he was almost blind and irrational with shock by that point.
Decker thought he recalled Wheeler yelling something about needing to go back for another piece of equipment.
He remembered grabbing Wheeler, begging him: "Please don't leave me here."
Decker was hoisted into the chopper and rushed to a St. John's hospital where he remained for nearly three weeks.
He said there were long-standing concerns among passengers about survival suits that don't properly fit. And he said the five-day simulated crash training he took in 2006 was inadequate.
"A couple of days of controlled immersion in a pool every few years is not enough to allow anyone to develop the instinctive reactions that they need to have a chance of escaping a helicopter crash like Cougar 491."
He credits his survival to a childhood spent sailing the waters of Conception Bay - and sheer luck.
"Many times I've been thrown into the cold sea water from an overturned boat. I think that experience meant that when the helicopter suddenly filled with icy water I could react instinctively ... it was like a reflex to take a breath and hold it and to stay calm until I could get to the surface," he said.
"I don't think that anyone will ever know why it was that I survived this disaster and the others did not. There probably is no good reason. Just luck."
Decker said he won't fly offshore anymore. But the key to protecting workers who still board choppers everyday lies with the safety of the aircraft, he said.
"Safety starts with the helicopter and I think everything else is secondary."
The inquiry is trying to assess whether the risks of flying to the offshore are as low as is reasonably practical.
Union leader Sheldon Peddle, who represents about 700 offshore workers, said he is confident Cougar is a cautious operator. It's the Sikorsky S-92A he's not sure about.
"With all of the issues that we're seeing, I just hope we don't have another crash," he said.
Sikorsky officials were called this week to inspect the main gearbox of an S-92 to determine what caused a hairline crack on a chopper based in Halifax.
Two international aviation regulatory agencies also recently issued directives that mandate visual inspections of the mounting feet of S-92s after every 10 hours of flight.
The Transportation Safety Board is still probing the crash, but investigators have said that a mounting stud on the filter bowl assembly broke, causing a loss of oil to the main gearbox.
1 hour, 23 minutes ago
By Sue Bailey, The Canadian Press
ST. JOHN'S, N.L. - Robert Decker clung to the seat in front of him when the pilot of Cougar Flight 491 called over the helicopter's PA: "Ditching, ditching, ditching!" moments before the helicopter crashed in the North Atlantic.
The lone survivor of the devastating disaster on March 12 described the doomed aircraft's last terrifying moments to an inquiry packed with loved ones of the 17 people who died that day.
"I guess almost as soon as they said 'Ditch' the helicopter lost control," Decker said Thursday in his first detailed public account of the tragedy.
"I was looking out my window for most of it so I knew when we were going to hit the water."
The 28-year-old said the chopper's bow came up slightly and the aircraft turned quickly to its starboard, or right side, just before it crashed about 60 kilometres east of St. John's.
"The next thing I can remember was waking up in a submerged helicopter," Decker said.
"It was instantly filled with water ... it was kind of as if it was sinking the same way it was dropping through the sky."
Decker showed little emotion throughout his testimony, except for when he thanked the rescuers who saved his life, which brought him to tears.
Since 2006, Decker has worked as a weather and ice observer with Provincial Aerospace. He had flown about 50 times to the three offshore oil sites about 300 kilometres east of St. John's before that fateful day.
Decker had been asleep in a window seat along the starboard of the Sikorsky S-92A. A passenger woke him up just as the pilot announced a mechanical problem that forced the flight to turn back toward land.
He initially didn't think much of it.
It was a cold, clear day that seemed ideal for flying, Decker said. He wasn't supposed to head out until the next day but had received a call the night before asking him to move up his trip because of ice conditions at sea.
Window seats are coveted, and people try to "muscle" to the head of pre-boarding lineups to get them, he told the inquiry.
"Everybody's looking for the most comfortable seats so you don't have to sit next to anyone or the auxiliary fuel tank," Decker said.
He stressed in later testimony that it would have been "next to impossible" for those in seats away from the windows to escape."I just can't see how this person would ever stand a chance," he said, pointing to a rear inside seat on a diagram of the chopper's layout.
There was an auxiliary fuel tank blocking windows on the port, or left side, of the helicopter.
After the crash, the helicopter was dimly lit from the glow emitted by the survival suits that each passenger had hastily zipped up in the flight's last moments.
Fighting the water pressure inside the plummeting chopper, Decker unbuckled his seatbelt, escaped through the broken window beside him and floated toward the light above.
Once he broke the surface, he managed to inflate a pillow-like flotation collar on his suit to keep his head above water. But he couldn't get to two lifeboats floating nearby nor fully use his hands because the cold water numbed his fingers.
Trying to swim with a ruptured vertebrae, dislocated ankle and broken sternum "was a losing battle," he said.
Decker remembered worrying that he was paralyzed until he realized he could move his toes. He talked and sang to himself to keep panic at bay, though the fear of internal bleeding gripped him.
Decker had also inhaled sea water, though he doesn't remember fighting for breath.
He recalled seeing a Provincial Aerospace plane flying toward him. At one point he fought panic again as the plane appeared to turn around.
He knew he'd been spotted when the aircraft flew low over him and tipped its wings.
A Cougar search and rescue helicopter arrived later and a basket was lowered. But by then, Decker was hypothermic and could hardly move because of the icy water that had seeped into his survival suit. His body temperature on arrival at a hospital was logged at 28 C, nine degrees below normal.
Rescue swimmer Ian Wheeler, the leader of Cougar's in-house search and rescue team, was lowered into the sea beside Decker, who said he was almost blind and irrational with shock by that point.
Decker thought he recalled Wheeler yelling something about needing to go back for another piece of equipment.
He remembered grabbing Wheeler, begging him: "Please don't leave me here."
Decker was hoisted into the chopper and rushed to a St. John's hospital where he remained for nearly three weeks.
He said there were long-standing concerns among passengers about survival suits that don't properly fit. And he said the five-day simulated crash training he took in 2006 was inadequate.
"A couple of days of controlled immersion in a pool every few years is not enough to allow anyone to develop the instinctive reactions that they need to have a chance of escaping a helicopter crash like Cougar 491."
He credits his survival to a childhood spent sailing the waters of Conception Bay - and sheer luck.
"Many times I've been thrown into the cold sea water from an overturned boat. I think that experience meant that when the helicopter suddenly filled with icy water I could react instinctively ... it was like a reflex to take a breath and hold it and to stay calm until I could get to the surface," he said.
"I don't think that anyone will ever know why it was that I survived this disaster and the others did not. There probably is no good reason. Just luck."
Decker said he won't fly offshore anymore. But the key to protecting workers who still board choppers everyday lies with the safety of the aircraft, he said.
"Safety starts with the helicopter and I think everything else is secondary."
The inquiry is trying to assess whether the risks of flying to the offshore are as low as is reasonably practical.
Union leader Sheldon Peddle, who represents about 700 offshore workers, said he is confident Cougar is a cautious operator. It's the Sikorsky S-92A he's not sure about.
"With all of the issues that we're seeing, I just hope we don't have another crash," he said.
Sikorsky officials were called this week to inspect the main gearbox of an S-92 to determine what caused a hairline crack on a chopper based in Halifax.
Two international aviation regulatory agencies also recently issued directives that mandate visual inspections of the mounting feet of S-92s after every 10 hours of flight.
The Transportation Safety Board is still probing the crash, but investigators have said that a mounting stud on the filter bowl assembly broke, causing a loss of oil to the main gearbox.
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You're Welcome Heli-Ice
............................................................ .............
Offshore union hopes survivor's testimony brings change
Source: CBC News
Posted: 11/06/09 7:34AM
Filed Under: Canada
A union leader representing offshore oil industry workers in Newfoundland and Labrador says testimony from the sole survivor of the Cougar helicopter crash underscores serious problems with offshore safety.
Sheldon Peddle, who works on the Hibernia platform and is president of Local 2121 of the Communications, Energy and Paperworkers union, sat in an inquiry room Thursday and listened intently as Robert Decker told his story of what happened before and after the crash.
Decker was testifying at the inquiry into offshore helicopter safety, prompted by the March 12 crash off St. John's that killed 17 people.
Peddle said he sometimes struggled as he listened to Decker explain what he went through after the Sikorsky S-92A crashed into the ocean and sank into deep water.
"I think for Robert it was hardest of all," Peddle told CBC news following the testimony. "I noticed that for a little while he struggled a bit. I did myself actually. Yeah, It was pretty tough."
Decker told the inquiry that the training people must complete before they are allowed to travel to offshore work isn't adequate.
"As good as the training is, a couple of days of controlled emergency training in a pool [are] not enough to allow anyone to develop the instinctive reaction to survive a crash like this," he told the inquiry.
Decker escaped the helicopter as it plummeted deep into the ocean. He said that when he reached the surface, he had problems with his survival suit.
"I couldn't get the gloves on and even in the training in warm water when you have complete dexterity with your fingers, I think they're a little bit tricky to get on. And there is also a shield that you pull over from around the hood that kind of protects the spray from getting on your face and I wasn't able to access that, either," Decker said.
Peddle said he shares Decker's concern about the survival suits.
"I haven't flown in a helicopter since the spring because of survival suit issues. I don't have a suit that fits me," he said.
Peddle said he hopes Decker's testimony will have a powerful effect on the offshore industry, as the offshore workers he represents still have many questions about the Sikorsky S-92A.
He said the latest news that a crack was found in the gearbox footing of a Halifax-based Sikorsky this week has amplified their concerns.
"To know now that we are developing cracks in the gearbox is a very unsettling thought. I think a lot of members feel that the helicopter has significant safety problems."
Following Decker's testimony, the offshore helicopter inquiry adjourned until Nov. 16.
............................................................ .............
Offshore union hopes survivor's testimony brings change
Source: CBC News
Posted: 11/06/09 7:34AM
Filed Under: Canada
A union leader representing offshore oil industry workers in Newfoundland and Labrador says testimony from the sole survivor of the Cougar helicopter crash underscores serious problems with offshore safety.
Sheldon Peddle, who works on the Hibernia platform and is president of Local 2121 of the Communications, Energy and Paperworkers union, sat in an inquiry room Thursday and listened intently as Robert Decker told his story of what happened before and after the crash.
Decker was testifying at the inquiry into offshore helicopter safety, prompted by the March 12 crash off St. John's that killed 17 people.
Peddle said he sometimes struggled as he listened to Decker explain what he went through after the Sikorsky S-92A crashed into the ocean and sank into deep water.
"I think for Robert it was hardest of all," Peddle told CBC news following the testimony. "I noticed that for a little while he struggled a bit. I did myself actually. Yeah, It was pretty tough."
Decker told the inquiry that the training people must complete before they are allowed to travel to offshore work isn't adequate.
"As good as the training is, a couple of days of controlled emergency training in a pool [are] not enough to allow anyone to develop the instinctive reaction to survive a crash like this," he told the inquiry.
Decker escaped the helicopter as it plummeted deep into the ocean. He said that when he reached the surface, he had problems with his survival suit.
"I couldn't get the gloves on and even in the training in warm water when you have complete dexterity with your fingers, I think they're a little bit tricky to get on. And there is also a shield that you pull over from around the hood that kind of protects the spray from getting on your face and I wasn't able to access that, either," Decker said.
Peddle said he shares Decker's concern about the survival suits.
"I haven't flown in a helicopter since the spring because of survival suit issues. I don't have a suit that fits me," he said.
Peddle said he hopes Decker's testimony will have a powerful effect on the offshore industry, as the offshore workers he represents still have many questions about the Sikorsky S-92A.
He said the latest news that a crack was found in the gearbox footing of a Halifax-based Sikorsky this week has amplified their concerns.
"To know now that we are developing cracks in the gearbox is a very unsettling thought. I think a lot of members feel that the helicopter has significant safety problems."
Following Decker's testimony, the offshore helicopter inquiry adjourned until Nov. 16.
There certainly is much more scope for more realistic training for offshore workers but good luck trying to get their fat arses out and into a realistic environment.
As for survival suits not fitting correctly? Perhaps they should address limiting the size of persons who are flying offshore? Lets face it - no matter if you had ejection seats in these aircraft, most of the offshore workers are tragically unfit and wouldn't survive 'realistic' conditions. Before decisions are made about safety offshore - persons should address their personal contributions to their survival.
As for all the copious discussions about what these pilots did correct and incorrectly - its totally irrelevant. There is a time and place for 'seat of the pants' flying and trying to outsmart this problem via the checklist is folly. You can apply all the numbers and end up well behind the curve. We seem to be living in an time of life where human interface is being discredited and superceeded by computerisation and this is contributing to a disassociation between the pilot and his aircraft. We don't fly airliners, we shouldn't be 'managing' our aircraft but integrating ourselves into them. I have always said "strap the aircraft on and take responsibility for it"
Never let the aircraft or environment call the play. Flying offshore decays a pilots hands on feel for his aircraft and complete simulator training exacerbates this lack of 'feel'.
Sit back and read some stories about the old timers. Some of these guys performed miracles with aircraft problems they encountered and they knew half the information we do about POF or aircraft physics. I'm humbled as I consider what problems they dealt with.
I just wonder if its time for a complete rethink of training and pilot selection. We can have all the safety systems in the world. Its a dangerous job and you get one shot at making a good decision.
As for survival suits not fitting correctly? Perhaps they should address limiting the size of persons who are flying offshore? Lets face it - no matter if you had ejection seats in these aircraft, most of the offshore workers are tragically unfit and wouldn't survive 'realistic' conditions. Before decisions are made about safety offshore - persons should address their personal contributions to their survival.
As for all the copious discussions about what these pilots did correct and incorrectly - its totally irrelevant. There is a time and place for 'seat of the pants' flying and trying to outsmart this problem via the checklist is folly. You can apply all the numbers and end up well behind the curve. We seem to be living in an time of life where human interface is being discredited and superceeded by computerisation and this is contributing to a disassociation between the pilot and his aircraft. We don't fly airliners, we shouldn't be 'managing' our aircraft but integrating ourselves into them. I have always said "strap the aircraft on and take responsibility for it"
Never let the aircraft or environment call the play. Flying offshore decays a pilots hands on feel for his aircraft and complete simulator training exacerbates this lack of 'feel'.
Sit back and read some stories about the old timers. Some of these guys performed miracles with aircraft problems they encountered and they knew half the information we do about POF or aircraft physics. I'm humbled as I consider what problems they dealt with.
I just wonder if its time for a complete rethink of training and pilot selection. We can have all the safety systems in the world. Its a dangerous job and you get one shot at making a good decision.
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There certainly is much more scope for more realistic training for offshore workers but good luck trying to get their fat arses out and into a realistic environment.
I hate to burst your bubble, but the offshore oil and gas industry is not a military regime, it's a business, and in such the oil companies and relevant authorities decide who is fit for work, not you. For your information all offshore workers have to pass a CAPP medical every 3 years, and shorter intervals the older you get e.g. 40+ is every 2 years, including a EKG. The BST-R survival refresher is not a simple walk in the park either, trust me I've done enough of them. You don't pass the course you don't go offshore, period.
Survival training is always a compromise of what is safe to do whilst emulating actual typical scenarios e.g. current limits on immersion depth when performing HUEBA training to prevent potential injury to lungs. I'm sure that what we currently do will be reviewed and revised by suitably competent organisations post-491. Continuous improvement is key in all aspects of helo operations.
How realistic do you wish things to be? Do you actually think that a more rigorous training regime such as cold-water immersion in a leaking suit every 3 years would prepare anybody for a 20G crash? We already jump off a perfectly good boat every 3 years and know what the feeling of the Grand banks sea on your face is like, but in an immersion suit that generally doesn't leak, and from a controlled escape route.
Robert Decker has made some excellent statements, especially the one regarding the helo should stay in the air, everything else is secondary.
So give us controlled landings in the drink as a last resort (SS6 for S-92 plus enough run-dry time to allow a soft and upright landing), suits that keep us dry, therefore a better chance of escaping a capsized/submerged helo (HUEBA now gives us that at least) if you really want to be proactive.
On a more personal note I'm sure you will receive similar feedback from us PAX up here who remember the loss of our fellow colleagues on a daily basis. I just hope that your comments do not get read by the families of the deceased. Shame on you for being so insensitive, especially considering what thread you have decided to post on.
Max
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Max,
Everyone on this board appreciates your comments about the tragic accident. Another forum would probably be a better place for this discusion but let me offer a partial defence of Steve76. Apparently in Canada and other places, all offshore workers have to go through a complete physical and demonstate a level of fitness, but here in the Gulf of Mexico, that kind of screening is problamatic at best. We often have a problem with passengers, who to say the least, are huge. This is especially true of service hands. I'm sure any of us who have been doing this for some time have had to refuse to carry passengers because they couldn't get the life jackets on or couldn't get the seat belt around them. That's the easy part. Its the passengers that can - barely - that I worry about were an emergency ditching to happen. Frankly there should be no need for a special step for passengers who weigh over 400 pounds for the 92.
I will say that histroy has shown, in a controlled ditching, passengers can and do escape often with no training at all. The Northwest Airline ditching in the Hudson River, the Bristow Super Puma ditching several years ago in the North Sea and the Air Log 76 ditching after the Allison engine blew up and took out the DC junction box meaning no floats and the aircraft immediately began to roll over are some examples.
Perhaps as part of offshore training, having everyone demonstrate they can fit through a window frame should be required.
Everyone on this board appreciates your comments about the tragic accident. Another forum would probably be a better place for this discusion but let me offer a partial defence of Steve76. Apparently in Canada and other places, all offshore workers have to go through a complete physical and demonstate a level of fitness, but here in the Gulf of Mexico, that kind of screening is problamatic at best. We often have a problem with passengers, who to say the least, are huge. This is especially true of service hands. I'm sure any of us who have been doing this for some time have had to refuse to carry passengers because they couldn't get the life jackets on or couldn't get the seat belt around them. That's the easy part. Its the passengers that can - barely - that I worry about were an emergency ditching to happen. Frankly there should be no need for a special step for passengers who weigh over 400 pounds for the 92.
I will say that histroy has shown, in a controlled ditching, passengers can and do escape often with no training at all. The Northwest Airline ditching in the Hudson River, the Bristow Super Puma ditching several years ago in the North Sea and the Air Log 76 ditching after the Allison engine blew up and took out the DC junction box meaning no floats and the aircraft immediately began to roll over are some examples.
Perhaps as part of offshore training, having everyone demonstrate they can fit through a window frame should be required.
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Thanks js0987 for the clarification and positive feedback
After reading through some of Steve76's previous posts I appreciate that he may be inadvertently comparing NL PAX to GOM PAX, or even New Zealand PAX where I believe he was once based/originated from, however that may be highlighting a GOM PAX offshore certification issue completely unrelated to this thread. As you suggested, perhaps a new thread should be set up to assist in discussing that issue. Without knowing all the relevant facts of helo ops up here in NL and the ongoing safety inquiry it is not possible IMHO for anybody to make such statements.
Wrt. PAX being able to fit through a S-92 window, that most definitely should be one of the revised aspects of all HUET training where this type of A/C is operated, same applies for all other A/C. The NL BST and BST-R HUET does have modified windows that are meant to emulate the S-92 size, but don't quote me on the size comparison being exact or realistic. What I can say is that myself at a strapping 240 lbs can fit through the provided gap easily, even with the big clumpy E-452 flight suit boots. I recall offshore "bears" from my North Sea days that would never fit through a Tiger or Super Puma window, and we used to all avoid the middle seat at the back as everybody knew your survival chances from that spot were certainly reduced. So what's changed, well for one thing PAX confidence in helos, particularly the S92a. That's a human nature reaction and sadly only time with no further accidents will bring that confidence back. The latest scrutiny of the MGB housing mounting feet cracks, and still no official report from TSB confirming the root cause failure mode of flight 491 is definitely not helping things...
One of the other issues that Robert mentioned was the HUET exercise only being performed with 2 PAX at a time as earlier BST courses highlighted inboard PAX having issues with the window-adjacent PAX restricting their egress. So do we now go down to a no aux fuel tank configuration and/or seat reduction to remove inboard seat positions? I'm sure the operators won't be keen on that option, more flights = more risk = more cost = what's the benefit of using a S-92 now? Is the 19-seat configuration approved based on yet another extremely remote statistic?
Interesting times ahead...
Safe flying
Max
After reading through some of Steve76's previous posts I appreciate that he may be inadvertently comparing NL PAX to GOM PAX, or even New Zealand PAX where I believe he was once based/originated from, however that may be highlighting a GOM PAX offshore certification issue completely unrelated to this thread. As you suggested, perhaps a new thread should be set up to assist in discussing that issue. Without knowing all the relevant facts of helo ops up here in NL and the ongoing safety inquiry it is not possible IMHO for anybody to make such statements.
Wrt. PAX being able to fit through a S-92 window, that most definitely should be one of the revised aspects of all HUET training where this type of A/C is operated, same applies for all other A/C. The NL BST and BST-R HUET does have modified windows that are meant to emulate the S-92 size, but don't quote me on the size comparison being exact or realistic. What I can say is that myself at a strapping 240 lbs can fit through the provided gap easily, even with the big clumpy E-452 flight suit boots. I recall offshore "bears" from my North Sea days that would never fit through a Tiger or Super Puma window, and we used to all avoid the middle seat at the back as everybody knew your survival chances from that spot were certainly reduced. So what's changed, well for one thing PAX confidence in helos, particularly the S92a. That's a human nature reaction and sadly only time with no further accidents will bring that confidence back. The latest scrutiny of the MGB housing mounting feet cracks, and still no official report from TSB confirming the root cause failure mode of flight 491 is definitely not helping things...
One of the other issues that Robert mentioned was the HUET exercise only being performed with 2 PAX at a time as earlier BST courses highlighted inboard PAX having issues with the window-adjacent PAX restricting their egress. So do we now go down to a no aux fuel tank configuration and/or seat reduction to remove inboard seat positions? I'm sure the operators won't be keen on that option, more flights = more risk = more cost = what's the benefit of using a S-92 now? Is the 19-seat configuration approved based on yet another extremely remote statistic?
Interesting times ahead...
Safe flying
Max
Last edited by maxwelg2; 7th Nov 2009 at 21:51.
Without intending to be completely obnoxious, I hardly think that the pax carried offshore in NFL are any better than those in the global offshore market. Neither physically better nor more better trained. Everyone does HUET & sea survival and as stated earlier - plenty of instances of successful HUET moments in real life.
I just don't want to see a fine aircraft blamed. We seem constantly to be looking for excuses or something to blame for what is just an accident. To infer that any aircraft out there is not built to be 100% faultless by intent is ridiculous.
What are people hoping to gain from this? The safer option is to take the boat. Go for it. The same environment sank the Titanic.
What has happened to PPRUNE. It used to be PILOTS discussing PILOTING issues. Isn't there a better place for passangers to take their complaints? Are we fuelling a debate here and informing persons with ZERO experience behind the controls and NO aviation qualifications?
How detremental is this to our industry. How many of these posts are from the media?
I just don't want to see a fine aircraft blamed. We seem constantly to be looking for excuses or something to blame for what is just an accident. To infer that any aircraft out there is not built to be 100% faultless by intent is ridiculous.
What are people hoping to gain from this? The safer option is to take the boat. Go for it. The same environment sank the Titanic.
What has happened to PPRUNE. It used to be PILOTS discussing PILOTING issues. Isn't there a better place for passangers to take their complaints? Are we fuelling a debate here and informing persons with ZERO experience behind the controls and NO aviation qualifications?
How detremental is this to our industry. How many of these posts are from the media?
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S-92 MRGB "run-dry" time....
maxwelg2,
The MRGB in the S-92, like all other FAA certified rotorcraft MRGB's, is qualified for operating in a 30 minute loss of lube condition while maintaining power levels sufficient for level flight. Thus the pilot has a 30 minute period after the HUMS gives an indication of loss of lube circuit pressure, in which to continue at level flight and/or perform an emergency landing. So that should not be a concern to you.
Regards,
riff_raff
The MRGB in the S-92, like all other FAA certified rotorcraft MRGB's, is qualified for operating in a 30 minute loss of lube condition while maintaining power levels sufficient for level flight. Thus the pilot has a 30 minute period after the HUMS gives an indication of loss of lube circuit pressure, in which to continue at level flight and/or perform an emergency landing. So that should not be a concern to you.
Regards,
riff_raff
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Just to make clear, I have little experience with other helicopters than the Schweizer 300C so I am not able to base my comments on matters regarding other types than on what I read about them.
From my point of view I find it worrying that in case of a TR failure in the S92, the only option is to enter autorotation.
Another worrying thing is the cracks observed in the MGB housing mounting feet. From reading about these facts, I am not sure if I would be comfortable flying these machines. One of my friends works at Cougar and he is very satisfied with flying the S92 and he tells me that Cougars' approach to all around safety in their operations is of the highest standards.
The S92 seems to be a safe machine and has accumulated lots of flight hours in harsh environments without many major problems. I am sure that Sikorsky is doing everything to make their helicopters as safe as humanly possible however, the teething problems seem to be of the bigger nature and I am not surprised that passengers are a little worried when strapping in those machines.
I agree with those who say that it is not fair to blame the aircraft if the passengers are not able to squeeze themselves out the aircraft windows because of the passengers size or fitness. HUET training, as is with all other emergency training in offshore operations, is an absolute necessity. I don't know the intervals of that training with the offshore workers but maybe that is something that needs more attention from the operators?
In Iceland, all fishermen have to undergo Maritime Survival Training before being able to take on jobs on fishing vessels. But they only have to do recurrency training every 5 years which I believe is to infrequent. I have done that training and I think it is very important, but I have to say that I would like to be able to do that at least every 2 years to be better prepared if/when things go wrong.
From my point of view as a pilot, I think that the HUET training of offshore workers should be performed at least every 2 years and at best, annually. When things go wrong out at sea, on board ships or other man made stuff that hits the sea, it is every man for himself and from that point of view, good emergency training cannot be replaced by any kind of emergency equipment. If you don't know how to operate the equipment or know how to react or where to go, you are in for trouble. We should never have to depend only on luck in emergency situations.
That being said, I am in no way saying that the emergency training was a deciding factor in survivability in the Cougar crash, nor am I saying that the unfortunate people on board the helicopter were unfit or badly trained.
Lets just make the most out of learning from this terrible tragedy to prevent it from happening to others.
From my point of view I find it worrying that in case of a TR failure in the S92, the only option is to enter autorotation.
Another worrying thing is the cracks observed in the MGB housing mounting feet. From reading about these facts, I am not sure if I would be comfortable flying these machines. One of my friends works at Cougar and he is very satisfied with flying the S92 and he tells me that Cougars' approach to all around safety in their operations is of the highest standards.
The S92 seems to be a safe machine and has accumulated lots of flight hours in harsh environments without many major problems. I am sure that Sikorsky is doing everything to make their helicopters as safe as humanly possible however, the teething problems seem to be of the bigger nature and I am not surprised that passengers are a little worried when strapping in those machines.
I agree with those who say that it is not fair to blame the aircraft if the passengers are not able to squeeze themselves out the aircraft windows because of the passengers size or fitness. HUET training, as is with all other emergency training in offshore operations, is an absolute necessity. I don't know the intervals of that training with the offshore workers but maybe that is something that needs more attention from the operators?
In Iceland, all fishermen have to undergo Maritime Survival Training before being able to take on jobs on fishing vessels. But they only have to do recurrency training every 5 years which I believe is to infrequent. I have done that training and I think it is very important, but I have to say that I would like to be able to do that at least every 2 years to be better prepared if/when things go wrong.
From my point of view as a pilot, I think that the HUET training of offshore workers should be performed at least every 2 years and at best, annually. When things go wrong out at sea, on board ships or other man made stuff that hits the sea, it is every man for himself and from that point of view, good emergency training cannot be replaced by any kind of emergency equipment. If you don't know how to operate the equipment or know how to react or where to go, you are in for trouble. We should never have to depend only on luck in emergency situations.
That being said, I am in no way saying that the emergency training was a deciding factor in survivability in the Cougar crash, nor am I saying that the unfortunate people on board the helicopter were unfit or badly trained.
Lets just make the most out of learning from this terrible tragedy to prevent it from happening to others.
Last edited by Heli-Ice; 8th Nov 2009 at 13:31.
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Steve 76
HUET is not as universal as you make think..... or wish. There are 45,000 offshore workers in the Campos Basin, Brazil, whose (Petrobras) employers have been persuaded NOT to introduce HUET. I am not exactly sure who has persuaded who but it is not been mandated and it is a regrettable lapse.
There is a first class HUET training facility in Macae but, alas it was just ticking over last time I was there.
G.
There is a first class HUET training facility in Macae but, alas it was just ticking over last time I was there.
G.
Not the 30 mins again!!!
Thanks for the prompt Brian, but life it too short to go round that loop yet again - maybe its your turn to clarify the point now you are enlightened!
Clearly the guy knows nothing about the S92 since he think its the HUMS system that alerts the pilots to low oil pressure. I think by now all S92 pilots understand the capabilities of the transmission in the absence of any oil, so my work here is done!
If the on-lookers still don't understand and can't read does it really matter? Moral: Never listen to your maintenance technician telling you what the aircraft can and cannot do, just follow the RFM!
A mellow HC
Clearly the guy knows nothing about the S92 since he think its the HUMS system that alerts the pilots to low oil pressure. I think by now all S92 pilots understand the capabilities of the transmission in the absence of any oil, so my work here is done!
If the on-lookers still don't understand and can't read does it really matter? Moral: Never listen to your maintenance technician telling you what the aircraft can and cannot do, just follow the RFM!
A mellow HC
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maxwelg2,
The MRGB in the S-92, like all other FAA certified rotorcraft MRGB's, is qualified for operating in a 30 minute loss of lube condition while maintaining power levels sufficient for level flight. Thus the pilot has a 30 minute period after the HUMS gives an indication of loss of lube circuit pressure, in which to continue at level flight and/or perform an emergency landing. So that should not be a concern to you.
Regards,
riff_raff
The MRGB in the S-92, like all other FAA certified rotorcraft MRGB's, is qualified for operating in a 30 minute loss of lube condition while maintaining power levels sufficient for level flight. Thus the pilot has a 30 minute period after the HUMS gives an indication of loss of lube circuit pressure, in which to continue at level flight and/or perform an emergency landing. So that should not be a concern to you.
Regards,
riff_raff
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What has happened to PPRUNE. It used to be PILOTS discussing PILOTING issues. Isn't there a better place for passangers to take their complaints? Are we fuelling a debate here and informing persons with ZERO experience behind the controls and NO aviation qualifications?
I know of quite a few PAX up here in NL who look to this forum for information either out of general interest, or whilst waiting for the TSB investigation and ongoing helicopter safety inquiry to complete their due process and provide findings as applicable. In hindsight perhaps this forum and the lack of rumour control and media usage of such outweighs the benefit to all. Personally I have a better understanding of the limitations of the S-92, in particular the current lack of MRGB run-dry time.
If you do not wish to engage PAX in a proactive and information-sharing way, then perhaps you should discuss this matter with the moderators. I for one would see this as a step backwards in collectively advancing helicopter technology awareness.
Heli-ice, you make some excellent points wrt. offshore safety training. In NL we currently do a refresher survival course every 3 years, used to be just 2 days, but may be longer now with the addition of the HUEBA training, which we did this year as a 1-day separate course. I suspect that we will see quite a few more changes in offshore survival training, and perhaps even in the offshore medical requirements. This however will not replace resolving the currently known S-92 "teething" issues.
Safe flying
Max
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frequency-occurance-consequence
The first cracks in the MRGB mounting feet were noticed 10 months ago. Since then, it has happened not once, or twice, or six times, it's happened a lot. Tight inspection and replacement schedule of the main mounting bolts has been introduced, along with a re-designed OEM press fit process for the steel bushings, and it's still happening ?
A Sikorsky rep. was recently quoted ""Analysis shows the aircraft can operate safely for a minimum of 10 hours, even assuming a full mount fracture and resulting worst-case stresses " Jackson said.
He said the company has advised all operators worldwide to visually inspect the footings every 10 hours."
Considering the latest fleet total TIS, number of occurances, and the potential consequences, it would be interesting to find out, under the present circumstances, whether or not there is now any increased risk (and if so how much) calculated by the OEM, Regulators, Owners, Operators, Oil Companies, Aircrew and/or PAX, of an accident occurring, if the aircraft continues to be used in the offshore environment before the root cause of this problem is identified and rectified ?
(not the risk to each party, the risk of an accident occurring)
A Sikorsky rep. was recently quoted ""Analysis shows the aircraft can operate safely for a minimum of 10 hours, even assuming a full mount fracture and resulting worst-case stresses " Jackson said.
He said the company has advised all operators worldwide to visually inspect the footings every 10 hours."
Considering the latest fleet total TIS, number of occurances, and the potential consequences, it would be interesting to find out, under the present circumstances, whether or not there is now any increased risk (and if so how much) calculated by the OEM, Regulators, Owners, Operators, Oil Companies, Aircrew and/or PAX, of an accident occurring, if the aircraft continues to be used in the offshore environment before the root cause of this problem is identified and rectified ?
(not the risk to each party, the risk of an accident occurring)