Helicopter crash off the coast of Newfoundland - 18 aboard, March 2009
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Automatic float inflation and externally-launched life-rafts have been systematically fitted in the offshore fleet. It is real progress. However, during a crash, any portions of the emergency kit that is in the impact zone is likely to be damaged and cease to function. We have seen in modelling tests that critical elements of the emergency equipment can be lifted away from the likely impact zone - attention must be paid when considering such reasonably probable events.
Like the S-92 rafts in the front of the sponsons that themselves are designed to seperate in the event of a crash.
The picture of the post crash Cougar machine in the hangar shows this.
Good try - but wrong. More squib66 bs
Last edited by Variable Load; 5th Mar 2011 at 06:22.
Jim
In a recent conversation with an acknowledged expert in this field I gleaned 2 key pieces of information -
1. In cold water you have at most 5 seconds and probably less because of the body's reaction to immersion ie gasping/hyperventilation - it is not really a 'breath-hold'.
2. In order to escape promptly, you are far better off being on the air system before immersion rather than having to panic to find it afterwards.
Interestingly, it is possible to train yourself to improve breath holding time following cold water immersion but it involves (guess what) immersing yourself in cold water regularly - probably not that practical for oil workers I suspect.
We know that cold shock can reduce the breath-hold capacity to less than 10 seconds - even for very experienced personnel.
1. In cold water you have at most 5 seconds and probably less because of the body's reaction to immersion ie gasping/hyperventilation - it is not really a 'breath-hold'.
2. In order to escape promptly, you are far better off being on the air system before immersion rather than having to panic to find it afterwards.
Interestingly, it is possible to train yourself to improve breath holding time following cold water immersion but it involves (guess what) immersing yourself in cold water regularly - probably not that practical for oil workers I suspect.
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The TSB estimated that (see report section 1.15.1):
However because the structure absorbed some of that acceleration:
The effect of these lower g levels are clearly evidenced by the suprisingly low level of impact injury amongst the passengers (though not the crew).
From the TSB report (1.3) it is clear both sponsons broke off (which is what Sikorsky's marketing said they would do):
On the rafts (from 1.12.7 - underling added):
The sole survivor in his testimony to the public inquiry did see the rafts blowing away in the wind (the raft sea anchors are manually deployed once someone is on board the raft - an area for possible design improvement).
The LH sponson was postioned alongside the fuselage:
It is clear that the sponson is not attached to the LH main landing gear support structure which is still attached to the fuselage.
Critically to this dicussion the LH liferaft bay remains at the front of the sponnson and attached to the fueslage.
Therefore I believe my earlier statment is correct Vertical Load based on facts.
I also note that in 1.12.7 it is clear that Jim L's point on the protection of ctitical systems was not properly addressed in the case of the S-92 to the satisfaction of the TSB:
There is very little point being able to survive an impact if you drown rapidly because essential safety systems have been disabled.
CHI91 impacted with the water with an estimated force in the magnitude of 20g to 25g.
Except for the four passenger seats that bottomed out, the occupants were generally subjected to inertia load factors between at least 5.3g and 8.6gin the direction of the vertical seat axis. In addition, the helicopter struck the surface with a forward velocity of approximately 55 to 60 knots which would have introduced a horizontal force on the occupants of approximately 5g to 8g
From the TSB report (1.3) it is clear both sponsons broke off (which is what Sikorsky's marketing said they would do):
Some floating debris was recovered by surface vessels including the left sponson and fuel bladder, rear cargo door, two life rafts, other lightweight buoyant materials, and some personal effects.
The right sponson and fuel bladder were not recovered.
The right sponson and fuel bladder were not recovered.
The helicopter was equipped with two life rafts, one stowed in the forward portion of each sponson. Both life rafts were recovered fully inflated and floating near the impact site. The rafts likely inflated when the lanyards, attached to the rafts and used to manually inflate them, were pulled as the storage compartment's cover separated from the sponsons at the time of the impact.
The LH sponson was postioned alongside the fuselage:
It is clear that the sponson is not attached to the LH main landing gear support structure which is still attached to the fuselage.
Critically to this dicussion the LH liferaft bay remains at the front of the sponnson and attached to the fueslage.
Therefore I believe my earlier statment is correct Vertical Load based on facts.
I also note that in 1.12.7 it is clear that Jim L's point on the protection of ctitical systems was not properly addressed in the case of the S-92 to the satisfaction of the TSB:
The immersion switches in the wheel wells were disabled when the sponsons were torn away by the impact.
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A very good point JimL/Squib66
At Heli-Expo at least one company is showing the robustness of the MGBs they make after an oil loss
Timken Hosts Famed U.S. Army Pilot at Heli-Expo -- CANTON, Ohio, March 3, 2011 /PRNewswire/ --
At Heli-Expo at least one company is showing the robustness of the MGBs they make after an oil loss
Timken Hosts Famed U.S. Army Pilot at Heli-Expo -- CANTON, Ohio, March 3, 2011 /PRNewswire/ --
Apache's Timken-built Transmission Survived Extreme Dry-Run Conditions In Afghanistan
CANTON, Ohio, March 3, 2011 /PRNewswire/ --
The Timken Company (NYSE: TKR) hosts former U.S. Army Chief Warrant Officer 4, Jim Hardy, at its 2011 Heli-Expo exhibit #1306, March 6-7, 2011 in Orlando, Fla. Timken invites attendees and exhibitors at the show to meet Hardy and hear his story first-hand.
Hardy piloted his Boeing Apache AH-64A 50 miles back to base after it suffered complete oil loss as a result of an enemy air strike during operations in Eastern Afghanistan. The Apache's Timken-built transmission helped ensure that Hardy and his team were able to fly back to base, even under these extreme operating conditions.
During a military security detail, a rocket-propelled grenade attack left several Apache AH-64A rotorcraft severely impaired. The worst damage was to an Apache that had lost its weapon controls and was hemorrhaging oil from a battering of bullets and grenades.
As one of the most experienced pilots on the mission, Hardy directed his fellow officer in the more severely wounded Apache to follow him. Forced to make an emergency landing under open fire, Hardy moved to quickly inspect the more damaged Apache and found its transmission oil reservoir was completely drained. He knew that abandoning the helicopter would require a dangerous recovery mission; also, he considered the greater risk that the Apache could end up in enemy hands.
Finding neither of these scenarios acceptable, the team fed six quarts of spare oil into the Apache's constantly-depleting reservoir, and Hardy took command of the damaged aircraft in a swap with his fellow officer. Then, testing his own nerve and the performance of the Apache's Timken-built transmission, Hardy piloted the Apache nearly 50 miles back to base.
The successful 26-minute journey ensured the safety of everyone on the security detail, for which Hardy received the U.S. Army's Distinguished Flying Cross.
"Hardy's story is an awe-inspiring reminder that the technology Timken delivers often is involved in risky operations and sometimes heroic events, in civilian and military service alike," says Erik Paulhardt, Timken vice president - aerospace and defense. "We place tremendous emphasis on the quality of our products, which serve a mission-critical role. Whether our technology is involved in powering flight to fight wild fires or to carry out rescues, we never forget that every day, crucial operations rely on Timken's promise of performance, backed by our industry leading expertise in power transmission."
CANTON, Ohio, March 3, 2011 /PRNewswire/ --
The Timken Company (NYSE: TKR) hosts former U.S. Army Chief Warrant Officer 4, Jim Hardy, at its 2011 Heli-Expo exhibit #1306, March 6-7, 2011 in Orlando, Fla. Timken invites attendees and exhibitors at the show to meet Hardy and hear his story first-hand.
Hardy piloted his Boeing Apache AH-64A 50 miles back to base after it suffered complete oil loss as a result of an enemy air strike during operations in Eastern Afghanistan. The Apache's Timken-built transmission helped ensure that Hardy and his team were able to fly back to base, even under these extreme operating conditions.
During a military security detail, a rocket-propelled grenade attack left several Apache AH-64A rotorcraft severely impaired. The worst damage was to an Apache that had lost its weapon controls and was hemorrhaging oil from a battering of bullets and grenades.
As one of the most experienced pilots on the mission, Hardy directed his fellow officer in the more severely wounded Apache to follow him. Forced to make an emergency landing under open fire, Hardy moved to quickly inspect the more damaged Apache and found its transmission oil reservoir was completely drained. He knew that abandoning the helicopter would require a dangerous recovery mission; also, he considered the greater risk that the Apache could end up in enemy hands.
Finding neither of these scenarios acceptable, the team fed six quarts of spare oil into the Apache's constantly-depleting reservoir, and Hardy took command of the damaged aircraft in a swap with his fellow officer. Then, testing his own nerve and the performance of the Apache's Timken-built transmission, Hardy piloted the Apache nearly 50 miles back to base.
The successful 26-minute journey ensured the safety of everyone on the security detail, for which Hardy received the U.S. Army's Distinguished Flying Cross.
"Hardy's story is an awe-inspiring reminder that the technology Timken delivers often is involved in risky operations and sometimes heroic events, in civilian and military service alike," says Erik Paulhardt, Timken vice president - aerospace and defense. "We place tremendous emphasis on the quality of our products, which serve a mission-critical role. Whether our technology is involved in powering flight to fight wild fires or to carry out rescues, we never forget that every day, crucial operations rely on Timken's promise of performance, backed by our industry leading expertise in power transmission."
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Therefore I believe my earlier statment is correct Vertical Load based on facts
The middle section has fusable mounts like an engine pylon on fixed wing jet, allowing it to break away fron the front and rear parts taking the fuel away from the occupants in a ditching and hopfully not rupture in a crash landing on land. if you look at other clearer pics of the sponson taken fron the other side you will see the forward (and rear) sponson still attached to the fuselage. with the raft container empty.
Squib,
as Variable Load flies the S-92 (and has done so for 5 years) and Ironcheflay maintains them, I think it's fair to say that they know what they are talking about, so I'd back down on that one........
as Variable Load flies the S-92 (and has done so for 5 years) and Ironcheflay maintains them, I think it's fair to say that they know what they are talking about, so I'd back down on that one........
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IC - well spotted. However if you compare the paint scheme of the structure behind it with a photograph of the Cougar scheme it appears that the raft structure did seperate from the aicraft because they don't match.
The rafts still seperated from the aircraft and blew a way from survivors and the float system was still disrupted and did not activate..
The rafts still seperated from the aircraft and blew a way from survivors and the float system was still disrupted and did not activate..
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212man - just seen your post. So you don't think much of JimL's comments then? Do you know his backround by any chance
. Pity - I though there were some forward thinking ideas from Jim there.
Unions are still pretty unimpressed with the S-92 too:
N.L. union joins call to investigate chopper - Nfld. & Labrador - CBC News
I'd be really interested in hearing from anyone in Shell what their views are on this.
After all, Shell's 7/7=1 strategy is heavily underpinned by a move to aircraft that comply with the lastest certification standards.
Its ironic that the S-92s first fatal accident has been so closely linked to a failuer to meet a certification requirement that other types have achieved (or exceeded) and a failure that earlier generation types could actually better cope with.
The suggestion that pressure during certification to waive a safety rule resulted in a fatally flawed design being released in to service is clearly one that is exercising a lot of concern here in Canada.
. Pity - I though there were some forward thinking ideas from Jim there.Unions are still pretty unimpressed with the S-92 too:
The union representing some Newfoundland and Labrador offshore workers is supporting a call on the federal government to investigate the certification of the type of helicopter that killed 17 people after crashing off the coast of Newfoundland in 2009.
The families of Cougar crash victims and the sole survivor, Robert Decker, want Transport Canada to find out why the chopper – a Sikorsky S–92a – was permitted to fly in Canada when it was shown in 2002 that it couldn't run for 30 minutes without oil.
Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union representative Kevin Kelly, who speaks for some workers on two offshore oil platforms east of St. John's, said the union supports the families' request.
Kelly said the S–92a dry-run time isn't the only problem that needs to be addressed.
"We also had cracked footing mounts … so over time, if they can't resolve these issues they'll look to another chopper, right?," he said.
Last May and earlier in January 2010, a Cougar Helicopters Sikorsky chopper was been grounded in St. John's because of a crack near the gearbox.
U.S.-based manufacturer Sikorsky said the crack is in a footing that attaches the main rotor's gearbox to the body of the aircraft. In a separate incident, another Cougar S–92a helicopter was grounded in Halifax in November 2009, after a hairline crack was found.
Last week, the families and Decker wrote Federal Transportation Minster Chuck Strahl to investigate certification of that model of helicopter by the Federal Aviation Administration in the U.S.
The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) released its final report on the crash Feb. 9.
Relatives of the passengers killed and Decker have had time to review the report and believe fundamental issues related to the S-92a's certification have not been addressed.
"Did Transport Canada succumb to pressure from the United States Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) or Sikorsky, or did they simply fail to recognize a serious safety/certification issue?" said the letter to Strahl.
Cougar flight 491 crashed 11 minutes after its pilots saw an indicator suggesting the helicopter's main gearbox was losing oil pressure.
The letter said it should have been "obvious" to Sikorsky and the FAA in 2002 that the S–92a did not have the 30-minute run-dry time it was advertised as having.
"On Aug. 6, 2002, Sikorsky carried out its initial certification test to demonstrate to the FAA that the MGB could run dry … the main gearbox suffered a catastrophic failure approximately 11 minutes into test," the letter said.
"At that point, it was obvious to Sikorsky and the FAA that the helicopter was incapable of meeting the run dry requirements for certification."
Minister supports recommendations
"We support the intent of the TSB recommendations to improve helicopter safety," Strahl said last week in a response emailed to the CBC.
"We intend to respond within the required 90 days. However, I have instructed my department to respond to the recommendations as soon as possible so that appropriate action can be taken to improve the safety and security of Canadian aviation."
The Minister also said he has directed his department to work with the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration "to ensure we have a closely aligned and appropriate system in place for assessing the airworthiness of aircrafts and parts."
The families of Cougar crash victims and the sole survivor, Robert Decker, want Transport Canada to find out why the chopper – a Sikorsky S–92a – was permitted to fly in Canada when it was shown in 2002 that it couldn't run for 30 minutes without oil.
Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union representative Kevin Kelly, who speaks for some workers on two offshore oil platforms east of St. John's, said the union supports the families' request.
Kelly said the S–92a dry-run time isn't the only problem that needs to be addressed.
"We also had cracked footing mounts … so over time, if they can't resolve these issues they'll look to another chopper, right?," he said.
Last May and earlier in January 2010, a Cougar Helicopters Sikorsky chopper was been grounded in St. John's because of a crack near the gearbox.
U.S.-based manufacturer Sikorsky said the crack is in a footing that attaches the main rotor's gearbox to the body of the aircraft. In a separate incident, another Cougar S–92a helicopter was grounded in Halifax in November 2009, after a hairline crack was found.
Last week, the families and Decker wrote Federal Transportation Minster Chuck Strahl to investigate certification of that model of helicopter by the Federal Aviation Administration in the U.S.
The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) released its final report on the crash Feb. 9.
Relatives of the passengers killed and Decker have had time to review the report and believe fundamental issues related to the S-92a's certification have not been addressed.
"Did Transport Canada succumb to pressure from the United States Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) or Sikorsky, or did they simply fail to recognize a serious safety/certification issue?" said the letter to Strahl.
Cougar flight 491 crashed 11 minutes after its pilots saw an indicator suggesting the helicopter's main gearbox was losing oil pressure.
The letter said it should have been "obvious" to Sikorsky and the FAA in 2002 that the S–92a did not have the 30-minute run-dry time it was advertised as having.
"On Aug. 6, 2002, Sikorsky carried out its initial certification test to demonstrate to the FAA that the MGB could run dry … the main gearbox suffered a catastrophic failure approximately 11 minutes into test," the letter said.
"At that point, it was obvious to Sikorsky and the FAA that the helicopter was incapable of meeting the run dry requirements for certification."
Minister supports recommendations
"We support the intent of the TSB recommendations to improve helicopter safety," Strahl said last week in a response emailed to the CBC.
"We intend to respond within the required 90 days. However, I have instructed my department to respond to the recommendations as soon as possible so that appropriate action can be taken to improve the safety and security of Canadian aviation."
The Minister also said he has directed his department to work with the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration "to ensure we have a closely aligned and appropriate system in place for assessing the airworthiness of aircrafts and parts."
I'd be really interested in hearing from anyone in Shell what their views are on this.
After all, Shell's 7/7=1 strategy is heavily underpinned by a move to aircraft that comply with the lastest certification standards.
Its ironic that the S-92s first fatal accident has been so closely linked to a failuer to meet a certification requirement that other types have achieved (or exceeded) and a failure that earlier generation types could actually better cope with.
The suggestion that pressure during certification to waive a safety rule resulted in a fatally flawed design being released in to service is clearly one that is exercising a lot of concern here in Canada.
Zalt,
I've no idea what you are talking about?? I was referring to the exchange between Squib and Variable Load regarding the sponson design. The fact that the raft containing structure may well have detached, is not related to the sponsoon design with respect to the fuel tank detachability - it simply reflects the strength of the impact. Like many topics in this thread, it's a red herring as even if they had remained attached they would not have been deployable in this case, as by all accounts it appears the aircraft started sinking quite quickly.
Another red herring is the sea state - SS4 is not one that the average offshore pilot in NE Canada or the North Sea would consider rough. It is actually at the lower end of the range of typical sea states seen day to day, and I do not accept it would be seen as a deterrent. I do accept that the sea temperature might be, but if a controlled ditching is carried out it shouldn't be a deterrent in its own right.
That's not to say that discussion of sea state's is not a valid topic and discussion point. Adverse Weather Policies came into effect in the North Sea following the G-TIGH accident in March 1992, where significant difficulties were encountered in rescuing survivors. It was night, 55+ kt winds and 10m waves! Oh, and snowing. So I agree that sea state limits probably do need applying for routine operations.
One point the TSB note is the possible conditioning of the crew by their simulator training. I think this is an important point and I have personally raised this subject in the past. In fact, at the time of this accident it was not possible to simulate total oil loss or a zero pressure event and I'm surprised that this wasn't mentioned. Even with this simulation added, there are still aural and vibration cues that develop which are precisely the kind of additional symptoms the commander was looking for and so the potential for conditioning still remains.
JimL? Yes, I'm well aware of his background thanks very much for asking. He's also one of my Facebok friends, Skype contacts and in my phone contacts.....
I've no idea what you are talking about?? I was referring to the exchange between Squib and Variable Load regarding the sponson design. The fact that the raft containing structure may well have detached, is not related to the sponsoon design with respect to the fuel tank detachability - it simply reflects the strength of the impact. Like many topics in this thread, it's a red herring as even if they had remained attached they would not have been deployable in this case, as by all accounts it appears the aircraft started sinking quite quickly.
Another red herring is the sea state - SS4 is not one that the average offshore pilot in NE Canada or the North Sea would consider rough. It is actually at the lower end of the range of typical sea states seen day to day, and I do not accept it would be seen as a deterrent. I do accept that the sea temperature might be, but if a controlled ditching is carried out it shouldn't be a deterrent in its own right.
That's not to say that discussion of sea state's is not a valid topic and discussion point. Adverse Weather Policies came into effect in the North Sea following the G-TIGH accident in March 1992, where significant difficulties were encountered in rescuing survivors. It was night, 55+ kt winds and 10m waves! Oh, and snowing. So I agree that sea state limits probably do need applying for routine operations.
One point the TSB note is the possible conditioning of the crew by their simulator training. I think this is an important point and I have personally raised this subject in the past. In fact, at the time of this accident it was not possible to simulate total oil loss or a zero pressure event and I'm surprised that this wasn't mentioned. Even with this simulation added, there are still aural and vibration cues that develop which are precisely the kind of additional symptoms the commander was looking for and so the potential for conditioning still remains.
JimL? Yes, I'm well aware of his background thanks very much for asking. He's also one of my Facebok friends, Skype contacts and in my phone contacts.....
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However if you compare the paint scheme of the structure behind it with a photograph of the Cougar scheme it appears that the raft structure did seperate from the aicraft because they don't match.
however, the rafts stayed on the surface so the system worked. if they remained tethered to the aircraft they would have been dragged under so you cant blame sikorsky because they floated away! a sea anchor wouldnt stop that either unless its made of iron and goes to the sea floor, and thats unlikely!
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At Heli-Expo at least one company is showing the robustness of the MGBs they make after an oil loss
Thanks for the link. That particular AH-64 MRGB lube system situation was a bit different than what happened with the Cougar S-92 MRGB, but it does provide a perfect example of how a gearbox can achieve a loss-of-lube operational capability.
Most MRGB's have high lube circuit flow rates because they use lube oil for cooling. To keep weight down, the MRGB lube system oil volume is kept to a minimum, and thus the turn-over rates tend to be quite high. I don't know the specifics behind the S-92 MRGB, but if I had to guess, I'd say its lube oil circuit turn-over rate is probably around 15 or 20 seconds at most. And if there's a serious leak in an external hose, filter housing, heat exchanger, etc. that contains 100% of the system flow rate, all of the MRGB oil volume can be discharged very quickly.
While the noted AH-64 MRGB has a qualified loss-of-lube capability, what really helped it survive was that the oil leak situation was probably not completely catastrophic in nature, and possibly some small amount of oil remained circulating. Even a fine mist of oil sprayed on the gears and bearings is enough to reduce friction and limit thermal failure of these parts.
Supplementary total loss back-up lube circuits are a very effective way to provide an MRGB loss-of-lube operational capability. But such systems tend to be complex, expensive, and add weight, so they are not widely used. If there is a push to qualify MRGB's with loss-of-lube capabilities beyond 30 minutes, they may become more common.
riff_raff
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Aviation.ca - Your Number One Source for Canadian Aviation News, Jobs and Information! - Grim Anniversary Remembered
Grim Anniversary Remembered
Sikorsky have the chance to testify.
N.L. chopper crash inquiry enters Phase 2 - Nfld. & Labrador - CBC News
N.L. chopper crash inquiry enters Phase 2
RIP
Grim Anniversary Remembered
Two years ago today, the crash of Cougar Flight 491 changed the lives of many in Newfoundland and Labrador. A memorial service will be held Saturday evening at the Anglican Cathedral in St. John's to remember the 17 people who died in the crash. Cougar Flight 491 crashed into the Atlantic on March 12, 2009. One man, Robert Decker, survived the accident. The public service Saturday is being organized by Ezra Chaplaincy, and will take place at 6:30 p.m.
The crash prompted an inquiry in this province into offshore helicopter safety. The Transportation Safety Board issued its report on the crash last month, citing sixteen factors which contributed to the accident.
NDP leader Lorraine Michael released a statement marking the second anniversary. Michael says that March 12th is a day that will be forever etched in the hearts and minds of all Newfoundlanders and Labradorians, adding that her thoughts and prayers are with the families of the victims, and with the sole survivor, Robert Decker. Much as been accomplished in the last two years, Michael notes, including the release of the Offshore Helicopter Safety Inquiry recommendations, and she thanks author Justice Robert Wells for his dedication. Michael also remarks that, as we remember those who lost their lives, we should be directing our attention towards a safer oil industry. She adds that we owe it to the crash victims and their families to make the offshore as safe as possible. Positive changes will continue to happen as a result of Cougar Flight 491, Michael concludes, and she hopes no family will ever be forced to face this type of tragedy again.
The crash prompted an inquiry in this province into offshore helicopter safety. The Transportation Safety Board issued its report on the crash last month, citing sixteen factors which contributed to the accident.
NDP leader Lorraine Michael released a statement marking the second anniversary. Michael says that March 12th is a day that will be forever etched in the hearts and minds of all Newfoundlanders and Labradorians, adding that her thoughts and prayers are with the families of the victims, and with the sole survivor, Robert Decker. Much as been accomplished in the last two years, Michael notes, including the release of the Offshore Helicopter Safety Inquiry recommendations, and she thanks author Justice Robert Wells for his dedication. Michael also remarks that, as we remember those who lost their lives, we should be directing our attention towards a safer oil industry. She adds that we owe it to the crash victims and their families to make the offshore as safe as possible. Positive changes will continue to happen as a result of Cougar Flight 491, Michael concludes, and she hopes no family will ever be forced to face this type of tragedy again.
N.L. chopper crash inquiry enters Phase 2 - Nfld. & Labrador - CBC News
N.L. chopper crash inquiry enters Phase 2
An investigation into the crash of Cougar Flight 491 is heading into its second phase.
The public inquiry, headed by Commissioner Robert Wells, was launched following the crash, which killed 17 people off the coast of Newfoundland in March 2009. The helicopter was travelling to an offshore oil platform with 18 people aboard when the accident happened. There was only one survivor, Robert Decker.
In Phase II, Wells is looking for updates on safety initiatives and suggestions on how the commission should approach the findings of the Transportation Safety Board.
He has already met with participants from Phase I who requested standing in Phase II. The general public can also make written submissions.
Interested groups or individuals have until April 15th to submit.
The public inquiry, headed by Commissioner Robert Wells, was launched following the crash, which killed 17 people off the coast of Newfoundland in March 2009. The helicopter was travelling to an offshore oil platform with 18 people aboard when the accident happened. There was only one survivor, Robert Decker.
In Phase II, Wells is looking for updates on safety initiatives and suggestions on how the commission should approach the findings of the Transportation Safety Board.
He has already met with participants from Phase I who requested standing in Phase II. The general public can also make written submissions.
Interested groups or individuals have until April 15th to submit.
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The MGB certification is not going to go away:
Report brings new attention to 2009 crash of Pa. firm's copter | Philadelphia Inquirer | 03/20/2011
Note the error on the AS332 is repeated: The S-92A MGB only managed to be as good as the L and ran 17 mins less than the L2 after a true oil loss.
Report brings new attention to 2009 crash of Pa. firm's copter | Philadelphia Inquirer | 03/20/2011
Posted on Sun, Mar. 20, 2011
Report brings new attention to 2009 crash of Pa. firm's copter
By Linda Loyd
Inquirer Staff Writer
A transport helicopter built by Coatesville-based Sikorsky Global Helicopters was ferrying workers to an oil rig 200 miles off the coast of Newfoundland in March 2009 when a complete loss of oil from its gearbox sent the chopper plunging helplessly into the North Atlantic.
Only one of the 18 people aboard the Sikorsky S-92 survived. All were citizens of Canada, and the incident got little attention here.
However, a report issued last month on the crash and renewed calls by families of the victims for tougher safety standards on large passenger helicopters - and on the multimillion-dollar S-92 in particular - have focused new attention on the two-year-old tragedy.
The U.S. Federal Aviation Administration says the S-92 aircraft that is used for oil-rig commutes, rescue work, and VIP shuttles around the world met its safety requirements.
In a 176-page accident report released Feb. 9, Canada's Transportation Safety Board (TSB) called on the FAA and regulators in Canada and Europe to require all so-called Category A passenger helicopters to be able to stay in the air at least 30 minutes after a total loss of lubrication oil in the transmission's main gearbox.
The helicopter that crashed with 16 passengers and two crew members aboard was 28 minutes into a 90-minute flight from St. John's, Newfoundland, to the massive Hibernia oil platform when an oil-pressure warning light flashed on.
The crew did not know that two of three titanium studs that held the oil filter to the main gearbox had broken, and the brawny helicopter was out of oil - with just 11 minutes to safely land. It was on its way back to St. John's when it fell out of the sky.
The S-92 - there are 132 in the world - is made by Sikorsky Global Helicopters, formerly Keystone Helicopter Corp., in Coatesville. The S-92 that crashed was manufactured in 2006 and leased to Cougar Helicopters Inc., of Canada. Some assembly work was done at Sikorsky's plant in Stratford, Conn., and some in Coatesville, where all Sikorsky commercial helicopters are now built.
After the fatal accident, upgrades were made to the S-92, including replacing titanium studs with steel and redesigning the mounting that bolts the transmission to the helicopter, Sikorsky spokesman Paul Jackson said.
"In the last 12 months, we've made 21 major upgrades to that helicopter. We are working on additional gearbox improvements," Jackson said.
"Sikorsky and, from what we are told, our customers stand 100 percent behind the S-92 helicopter. It's solid. It's safe. It's proven."
While a repeat of the stud failure that caused the 2009 crash is highly unlikely, "that gearbox still has only 11 minutes" after a loss of its oil, said Wendy Tadros, chairwoman of Canada's TSB.
Every helicopter that competes with the S-92 has met the certification requirement of draining the main gearbox oil and continuing operation for 30 minutes - a term referred to as "run dry," the TSB report said.
"Every Sikorsky helicopter, other than the S-92, has a 30-minute run-dry capacity," said Martin Brigham, a Philadelphia lawyer representing the Canadian families. The helicopters include the UH-60, Sikorsky's Black Hawk military helicopter; the Sikorsky S-61 and the VH-3, which is the presidential helicopter; and the Sikorsky S-76.
"Every other large commercial helicopter in the world has a 30-minute run-dry capacity, including the Eurocopter Puma series (AS332 and EC225) that carry 19 passengers and are used for offshore oil rigs," Brigham said, "as well as the Eurocopter AS365 and EC155, and Agusta Westland AW139."
A smaller helicopter, the McDonnell Douglas MD-900 Explorer, also has that run-dry capacity.
The TSB and the victims' families want the FAA to do away with what they consider a loophole in the current rule.
A 1988 FAA rule requires that a helicopter be capable of continued flight for at least 30 minutes after gearbox oil loss, but also includes a provision exempting a manufacturer if such a failure was considered "extremely remote."
It was on that basis that the S-92 was certified in 2004 by the FAA as airworthy, even though it had failed the initial certification test.
During a demonstration with the FAA in 2002, the S-92 gearbox failed about 11 minutes into the test. Rather than redesign the gearbox, Sikorsky asserted - and the FAA accepted - that the S-92 should be certified because the risk of a complete oil loss in the main gearbox was "extremely remote."
"We are asking the FAA to remove the 'extremely remote' phrase and say flat out this helicopter, and every helicopter in this category, has to meet the 30-minute run-dry test," Tadros said.
The FAA and its Canadian equivalent, Transport Canada, are expected to respond by May 15, within 90 days of receiving the recommendations. "I can't answer how we are going to respond," FAA spokesman Les Dorr said. "We certificated the helicopter. We believe the way that Sikorsky showed compliance with that 30-minute run-dry provision satisfied the requirement."
The families of the Canadian flight victims and the one survivor sued Sikorsky and its parent, United Technologies Corp., in Philadelphia Common Pleas Court.
The case settled quickly, and the families received undisclosed financial compensation. A cadre of lawyers in Philadelphia, New York, and Canada were involved, led by Marty Brigham of Raynes McCarty, of Philadelphia, for the families, and James Stroud of Rawle & Henderson L.L.P., also here, for Sikorsky.
Before the crash, Sikorsky was investigating a July 2008 incident in Australia that also involved broken titanium studs on an S-92 helicopter, which made a forced landing after a sudden loss of oil pressure.
After Australia, Sikorsky put in place new maintenance procedures for the studs, but they did not immediately require replacement.
On Jan. 28, 2009 - six weeks before the March 12 crash off Newfoundland - Sikorsky issued an Alert Service Bulletin requiring that all titanium studs be replaced with steel, but it gave operators 1,250 flight hours, or up to a year, to do it.
The FAA immediately after the accident ordered the S-92 fleet grounded until all titanium studs were replaced with steel.
Although the litigation is over, the families still have questions. They wrote Canada's minister of transport last month, demanding an investigation of the original S-92 certification and asking why Transport Canada did not take action soon after the Australia incident.
"It should have been obvious to Transport Canada that the potential for complete loss of oil from the S-92 was anything but 'extremely remote' and the assumption on which the aircraft was certified was invalid," the families wrote.
Jobs in the offshore oil and gas industry pay well, and nearly everyone on the Canadian coast knows someone who works on an offshore rig.
Passengers on the fatal flight included Allison Maher, 26, the youngest, who worked in housekeeping. The oldest was Peter Breen, 55, a father of four who was a steward in catering. Others were engineers, scaffolding and rigging workers, a cook, a hydraulic technician, a medic and registered nurse, and a shipboard director of kitchen and laundry.
In the North Sea, the United Kingdom operates 215 offshore oil and gas installations, employing 30,000 workers. Canada has seven offshore platforms, employing 2,000. Worldwide, there are 2,800 offshore rigs.
"We want the FAA to look at today's operating environment, and the technology that's available, because these types of helicopters are operating further afield," Tadros said. "The question is: Are the certification standards that were set in the late 1980s adequate for today's operations?"
Helicopter Safety
After the March 2009 fatal crash of a Sikorsky transport helicopter 35 nautical miles from Newfoundland in the North Atlantic, safety investigators in Canada have called for four reforms:
Require all large transport helicopters worldwide to be able to operate at least 30 minutes after a loss of main gearbox lubrication - a measure taken from the military, where if enemy fire punctures the oil supply, the aircraft has 30 minutes to get to safer territory.
Consider extending the "run dry" rule well beyond 30 minutes, since aircraft are flying farther offshore and technology is available.
Forbid helicopters from operating over water in Canada when rough seas exceed the capability of the chopper's emergency flotation system.
Require supplemental breathing equipment in all transport helicopters in Canada, in the event the helicopter capsizes and passengers are in the water.
SOURCE: Canada's Transportation Safety Board
Contact staff writer Linda Loyd at 215-854-2831 or [email protected].
Report brings new attention to 2009 crash of Pa. firm's copter
By Linda Loyd
Inquirer Staff Writer
A transport helicopter built by Coatesville-based Sikorsky Global Helicopters was ferrying workers to an oil rig 200 miles off the coast of Newfoundland in March 2009 when a complete loss of oil from its gearbox sent the chopper plunging helplessly into the North Atlantic.
Only one of the 18 people aboard the Sikorsky S-92 survived. All were citizens of Canada, and the incident got little attention here.
However, a report issued last month on the crash and renewed calls by families of the victims for tougher safety standards on large passenger helicopters - and on the multimillion-dollar S-92 in particular - have focused new attention on the two-year-old tragedy.
The U.S. Federal Aviation Administration says the S-92 aircraft that is used for oil-rig commutes, rescue work, and VIP shuttles around the world met its safety requirements.
In a 176-page accident report released Feb. 9, Canada's Transportation Safety Board (TSB) called on the FAA and regulators in Canada and Europe to require all so-called Category A passenger helicopters to be able to stay in the air at least 30 minutes after a total loss of lubrication oil in the transmission's main gearbox.
The helicopter that crashed with 16 passengers and two crew members aboard was 28 minutes into a 90-minute flight from St. John's, Newfoundland, to the massive Hibernia oil platform when an oil-pressure warning light flashed on.
The crew did not know that two of three titanium studs that held the oil filter to the main gearbox had broken, and the brawny helicopter was out of oil - with just 11 minutes to safely land. It was on its way back to St. John's when it fell out of the sky.
The S-92 - there are 132 in the world - is made by Sikorsky Global Helicopters, formerly Keystone Helicopter Corp., in Coatesville. The S-92 that crashed was manufactured in 2006 and leased to Cougar Helicopters Inc., of Canada. Some assembly work was done at Sikorsky's plant in Stratford, Conn., and some in Coatesville, where all Sikorsky commercial helicopters are now built.
After the fatal accident, upgrades were made to the S-92, including replacing titanium studs with steel and redesigning the mounting that bolts the transmission to the helicopter, Sikorsky spokesman Paul Jackson said.
"In the last 12 months, we've made 21 major upgrades to that helicopter. We are working on additional gearbox improvements," Jackson said.
"Sikorsky and, from what we are told, our customers stand 100 percent behind the S-92 helicopter. It's solid. It's safe. It's proven."
While a repeat of the stud failure that caused the 2009 crash is highly unlikely, "that gearbox still has only 11 minutes" after a loss of its oil, said Wendy Tadros, chairwoman of Canada's TSB.
Every helicopter that competes with the S-92 has met the certification requirement of draining the main gearbox oil and continuing operation for 30 minutes - a term referred to as "run dry," the TSB report said.
"Every Sikorsky helicopter, other than the S-92, has a 30-minute run-dry capacity," said Martin Brigham, a Philadelphia lawyer representing the Canadian families. The helicopters include the UH-60, Sikorsky's Black Hawk military helicopter; the Sikorsky S-61 and the VH-3, which is the presidential helicopter; and the Sikorsky S-76.
"Every other large commercial helicopter in the world has a 30-minute run-dry capacity, including the Eurocopter Puma series (AS332 and EC225) that carry 19 passengers and are used for offshore oil rigs," Brigham said, "as well as the Eurocopter AS365 and EC155, and Agusta Westland AW139."
A smaller helicopter, the McDonnell Douglas MD-900 Explorer, also has that run-dry capacity.
The TSB and the victims' families want the FAA to do away with what they consider a loophole in the current rule.
A 1988 FAA rule requires that a helicopter be capable of continued flight for at least 30 minutes after gearbox oil loss, but also includes a provision exempting a manufacturer if such a failure was considered "extremely remote."
It was on that basis that the S-92 was certified in 2004 by the FAA as airworthy, even though it had failed the initial certification test.
During a demonstration with the FAA in 2002, the S-92 gearbox failed about 11 minutes into the test. Rather than redesign the gearbox, Sikorsky asserted - and the FAA accepted - that the S-92 should be certified because the risk of a complete oil loss in the main gearbox was "extremely remote."
"We are asking the FAA to remove the 'extremely remote' phrase and say flat out this helicopter, and every helicopter in this category, has to meet the 30-minute run-dry test," Tadros said.
The FAA and its Canadian equivalent, Transport Canada, are expected to respond by May 15, within 90 days of receiving the recommendations. "I can't answer how we are going to respond," FAA spokesman Les Dorr said. "We certificated the helicopter. We believe the way that Sikorsky showed compliance with that 30-minute run-dry provision satisfied the requirement."
The families of the Canadian flight victims and the one survivor sued Sikorsky and its parent, United Technologies Corp., in Philadelphia Common Pleas Court.
The case settled quickly, and the families received undisclosed financial compensation. A cadre of lawyers in Philadelphia, New York, and Canada were involved, led by Marty Brigham of Raynes McCarty, of Philadelphia, for the families, and James Stroud of Rawle & Henderson L.L.P., also here, for Sikorsky.
Before the crash, Sikorsky was investigating a July 2008 incident in Australia that also involved broken titanium studs on an S-92 helicopter, which made a forced landing after a sudden loss of oil pressure.
After Australia, Sikorsky put in place new maintenance procedures for the studs, but they did not immediately require replacement.
On Jan. 28, 2009 - six weeks before the March 12 crash off Newfoundland - Sikorsky issued an Alert Service Bulletin requiring that all titanium studs be replaced with steel, but it gave operators 1,250 flight hours, or up to a year, to do it.
The FAA immediately after the accident ordered the S-92 fleet grounded until all titanium studs were replaced with steel.
Although the litigation is over, the families still have questions. They wrote Canada's minister of transport last month, demanding an investigation of the original S-92 certification and asking why Transport Canada did not take action soon after the Australia incident.
"It should have been obvious to Transport Canada that the potential for complete loss of oil from the S-92 was anything but 'extremely remote' and the assumption on which the aircraft was certified was invalid," the families wrote.
Jobs in the offshore oil and gas industry pay well, and nearly everyone on the Canadian coast knows someone who works on an offshore rig.
Passengers on the fatal flight included Allison Maher, 26, the youngest, who worked in housekeeping. The oldest was Peter Breen, 55, a father of four who was a steward in catering. Others were engineers, scaffolding and rigging workers, a cook, a hydraulic technician, a medic and registered nurse, and a shipboard director of kitchen and laundry.
In the North Sea, the United Kingdom operates 215 offshore oil and gas installations, employing 30,000 workers. Canada has seven offshore platforms, employing 2,000. Worldwide, there are 2,800 offshore rigs.
"We want the FAA to look at today's operating environment, and the technology that's available, because these types of helicopters are operating further afield," Tadros said. "The question is: Are the certification standards that were set in the late 1980s adequate for today's operations?"
Helicopter Safety
After the March 2009 fatal crash of a Sikorsky transport helicopter 35 nautical miles from Newfoundland in the North Atlantic, safety investigators in Canada have called for four reforms:
Require all large transport helicopters worldwide to be able to operate at least 30 minutes after a loss of main gearbox lubrication - a measure taken from the military, where if enemy fire punctures the oil supply, the aircraft has 30 minutes to get to safer territory.
Consider extending the "run dry" rule well beyond 30 minutes, since aircraft are flying farther offshore and technology is available.
Forbid helicopters from operating over water in Canada when rough seas exceed the capability of the chopper's emergency flotation system.
Require supplemental breathing equipment in all transport helicopters in Canada, in the event the helicopter capsizes and passengers are in the water.
SOURCE: Canada's Transportation Safety Board
Contact staff writer Linda Loyd at 215-854-2831 or [email protected].
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The MGB certification is not going to go away:
It remains a political issue here.
Certification of S-92 needs change: widow
Published: March 23, 2011 2:57 p.m.
Last modified: March 23, 2011 3:02 p.m.
OTTAWA - The widow of one of 17 people killed in a helicopter crash off Newfoundland two years ago is questioning why Transport Canada certified the aircraft when it "failed an important test."
Lori Chynn is pressing the federal government to review its certification standards and explain why it gave the Sikorsky S-92 an airworthiness certificate when it couldn't meet a certain requirement.
In a statement Wednesday, Chynn and two federal NDP MPs said it was known years before the Newfoundland crash that the helicopter couldn't fly for 30 minutes without oil.
In a letter to Transport Minister Chuck Strahl, she said she wanted to know why "this type of helicopter (was) given an airworthiness certificate when it failed an important test."
Chynn said more needs to be done to protect workers travelling long distances to get to offshore oil platforms, like the one her husband worked on as a nurse.
"I believe that we must learn from this tragedy and do what is necessary to ensure the safety of those who continue to work offshore," she said at a news conference in Ottawa.
"Safety must come before profit."
Chynn's husband, John Pelley, died along with 16 others when the S-92 they were in went down in waters off St. John's as it headed to a rig. Only one person survived.
A Canadian investigation into the crash showed that some of the titanium gearbox studs broke, causing a critical loss of oil.
Jack Harris, NDP transport critic, said Wednesday that aviation standards require a helicopter to fly for a minimum of a half-hour without any oil in the main gearbox.
But he said a certification test in August 2002 showed the Sikorsky couldn't meet that 30-minute standard, failing after 11 minutes of dry operation.
Still, Harris said Transport Canada certified the S-92 as safe to fly, with the caveat that a complete loss of lubricant was extremely remote.
He said the government also didn't address the certification issue when the same model of helicopter crashed in Australia in 2008 due to a loss of lubricant in the gearbox.
Harris said Canadian officials examined that gearbox and found "the Sikorsky S-92 did not meet the 30-minute dry run capability and it had a problem about the loss of oil.
"Yet no changes were made to the certification of the S-92."
Harris said after the Newfoundland crash, the studs were ordered to be replaced with steel ones but the helicopter still lacks the 30-minute dry run capability.
Transport Canada was not available for comment.
Published: March 23, 2011 2:57 p.m.
Last modified: March 23, 2011 3:02 p.m.
OTTAWA - The widow of one of 17 people killed in a helicopter crash off Newfoundland two years ago is questioning why Transport Canada certified the aircraft when it "failed an important test."
Lori Chynn is pressing the federal government to review its certification standards and explain why it gave the Sikorsky S-92 an airworthiness certificate when it couldn't meet a certain requirement.
In a statement Wednesday, Chynn and two federal NDP MPs said it was known years before the Newfoundland crash that the helicopter couldn't fly for 30 minutes without oil.
In a letter to Transport Minister Chuck Strahl, she said she wanted to know why "this type of helicopter (was) given an airworthiness certificate when it failed an important test."
Chynn said more needs to be done to protect workers travelling long distances to get to offshore oil platforms, like the one her husband worked on as a nurse.
"I believe that we must learn from this tragedy and do what is necessary to ensure the safety of those who continue to work offshore," she said at a news conference in Ottawa.
"Safety must come before profit."
Chynn's husband, John Pelley, died along with 16 others when the S-92 they were in went down in waters off St. John's as it headed to a rig. Only one person survived.
A Canadian investigation into the crash showed that some of the titanium gearbox studs broke, causing a critical loss of oil.
Jack Harris, NDP transport critic, said Wednesday that aviation standards require a helicopter to fly for a minimum of a half-hour without any oil in the main gearbox.
But he said a certification test in August 2002 showed the Sikorsky couldn't meet that 30-minute standard, failing after 11 minutes of dry operation.
Still, Harris said Transport Canada certified the S-92 as safe to fly, with the caveat that a complete loss of lubricant was extremely remote.
He said the government also didn't address the certification issue when the same model of helicopter crashed in Australia in 2008 due to a loss of lubricant in the gearbox.
Harris said Canadian officials examined that gearbox and found "the Sikorsky S-92 did not meet the 30-minute dry run capability and it had a problem about the loss of oil.
"Yet no changes were made to the certification of the S-92."
Harris said after the Newfoundland crash, the studs were ordered to be replaced with steel ones but the helicopter still lacks the 30-minute dry run capability.
Transport Canada was not available for comment.
Metro - Certification of S-92 needs change: widow
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It looks like an attempt by Sikorsky to stop a court hearing in Canada has failed:
The helicopter in question was originally purchased by CHC Helicopter Corporation as part of the sale of 12 such rotorcraft. That sales agreement provided that the law of Connecticut governed. The helicopter was then sold by CHC to Lloyds TSB General Leasing (No 20) Limited, which, together with certain Lloyd's underwriters, is its beneficial owner.
On the sale of the aircraft to Lloyds 20, a novation agreement was executed wherein the obligations assumed by CHC were transferred to Lloyds 20, which became bound by the original contract of sale, with the exception that Sikorsky now accepted that the law of England and Wales applied and exclusive jurisdiction for the resolution of disputes was with the English courts.
In March 2007 Cougar leased the helicopter from Lloyds 20. Under the terms of that lease, Lloyds 20 was to be the loss payee under the insurance that was to be procured for the helicopter.
Two separate legal proceedings ensued as a result of the crash.
The first, commenced in June 2010, involved Sikorsky commencing an action against Cougar and Lloyds 20, seeking a declaratory order that any claim related to the crash would be adjudicated in Connecticut, in accordance with Connecticut law, and further seeking an order prohibiting Cougar, Lloyds 20 or the Lloyd's underwriters from commencing litigation in any other jurisdiction. This application was opposed.
Eight days after the Connecticut application was filed, Sikorsky was served with a Newfoundland claim commenced by Cougar, Lloyds 20 and the Lloyd's underwriters (as well as others). As an aside, one of the other parties was Helicopter Support Inc (HIS). After commencement of this proceeding, the plaintiffs served a notice of discontinuance with respect to the HSI claim and the proposed issuance of such notice was unsuccessfully challenged by Sikorsky.
The overall claim was based on alleged torts that had occurred in Newfoundland - more specifically, negligent design and manufacture of the main gearbox on the helicopter, negligent/wilful/fraudulent misrepresentation and failure to warn. No breach of contract was identified in the claim and there is no contract between Cougar and Sikorsky (although Lloyds and Sikorsky are contractually linked, as discussed above).
On receiving the claim in the Newfoundland action, Sikorsky sought to prevent Cougar and Lloyds from proceeding with the Newfoundland claim for a number of reasons.
In short, the Newfoundland court had to decide whether:
On this point Justice LeBlanc took special note of the fact that Sikorsky not only opposed the discontinuance against HSI, but went so far as to seek (unsuccessfully) an order further barring the plaintiffs from commencing further proceedings against HSI on the theory that any such action should be taken in Connecticut.
On the issue of staying the matter pending the decision of the Connecticut court and the critical decision of the Supreme Court in Van Breda v Village Resorts Ltd (which is to be argued in March 2011), the court was equally unsympathetic. With regard to the Connecticut litigation, the court noted that although the decision was expected imminently, it was still outstanding and the judge in that case had indicated that further evidence and argument might be required before a ruling on that case could be made.
Regarding the Van Breda decision, the court noted that while the Supreme Court's decision would be relevant to the assessment of the matter of territorial jurisdiction, it was unlikely that the decision would be released until late 2011. Accordingly, LeBlanc decided that a temporary stay would not be appropriate given, among other things, the delay that would arise and the substantial losses that had been incurred.
On the third issue, the real and substantial connection to Newfoundland, LeBlanc placed heavy reliance on the test set out by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Muscutt v Courcelles, as modified in Van Breda. He found a real and substantial connection based on the following factors:Before leaving this issue, LeBlanc addressed the participation of the Lloyds 20 and the Lloyd's underwriters in the litigation. He noted that it was the claim itself and not the residence of the parties that established jurisdiction. In the case of Lloyds 20 and the Lloyd's underwriters, he specifically indicated that:
Regardless of the attornment, a review of the non-exhaustive list of factors set out in Muscutt, Van Breda and Teck Cominco Metals Ltd v Lloyd's Underwriters would lead to the same conclusion. The court agreed that Sikorsky would face additional costs litigating in Newfoundland, and that witnesses would have to be called from outside the jurisdiction. However, it held that:
On the sale of the aircraft to Lloyds 20, a novation agreement was executed wherein the obligations assumed by CHC were transferred to Lloyds 20, which became bound by the original contract of sale, with the exception that Sikorsky now accepted that the law of England and Wales applied and exclusive jurisdiction for the resolution of disputes was with the English courts.
In March 2007 Cougar leased the helicopter from Lloyds 20. Under the terms of that lease, Lloyds 20 was to be the loss payee under the insurance that was to be procured for the helicopter.
Two separate legal proceedings ensued as a result of the crash.
The first, commenced in June 2010, involved Sikorsky commencing an action against Cougar and Lloyds 20, seeking a declaratory order that any claim related to the crash would be adjudicated in Connecticut, in accordance with Connecticut law, and further seeking an order prohibiting Cougar, Lloyds 20 or the Lloyd's underwriters from commencing litigation in any other jurisdiction. This application was opposed.
Eight days after the Connecticut application was filed, Sikorsky was served with a Newfoundland claim commenced by Cougar, Lloyds 20 and the Lloyd's underwriters (as well as others). As an aside, one of the other parties was Helicopter Support Inc (HIS). After commencement of this proceeding, the plaintiffs served a notice of discontinuance with respect to the HSI claim and the proposed issuance of such notice was unsuccessfully challenged by Sikorsky.
The overall claim was based on alleged torts that had occurred in Newfoundland - more specifically, negligent design and manufacture of the main gearbox on the helicopter, negligent/wilful/fraudulent misrepresentation and failure to warn. No breach of contract was identified in the claim and there is no contract between Cougar and Sikorsky (although Lloyds and Sikorsky are contractually linked, as discussed above).
On receiving the claim in the Newfoundland action, Sikorsky sought to prevent Cougar and Lloyds from proceeding with the Newfoundland claim for a number of reasons.
In short, the Newfoundland court had to decide whether:
- in contesting the discontinuance against HSI, Sikorsky had attorned to the jurisdiction of the Newfoundland courts;
- it was appropriate to order a temporary stay of the Newfoundland action while the Connecticut application was determined (and while a case involving similar issues was determined by the Supreme Court of Canada);
- the claim had a real and substantive connection to Newfoundland; and
- the Newfoundland court was the most convenient forum to deal with the claim.
On this point Justice LeBlanc took special note of the fact that Sikorsky not only opposed the discontinuance against HSI, but went so far as to seek (unsuccessfully) an order further barring the plaintiffs from commencing further proceedings against HSI on the theory that any such action should be taken in Connecticut.
On the issue of staying the matter pending the decision of the Connecticut court and the critical decision of the Supreme Court in Van Breda v Village Resorts Ltd (which is to be argued in March 2011), the court was equally unsympathetic. With regard to the Connecticut litigation, the court noted that although the decision was expected imminently, it was still outstanding and the judge in that case had indicated that further evidence and argument might be required before a ruling on that case could be made.
Regarding the Van Breda decision, the court noted that while the Supreme Court's decision would be relevant to the assessment of the matter of territorial jurisdiction, it was unlikely that the decision would be released until late 2011. Accordingly, LeBlanc decided that a temporary stay would not be appropriate given, among other things, the delay that would arise and the substantial losses that had been incurred.
On the third issue, the real and substantial connection to Newfoundland, LeBlanc placed heavy reliance on the test set out by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Muscutt v Courcelles, as modified in Van Breda. He found a real and substantial connection based on the following factors:
- The courts of Newfoundland are presumed to have jurisdiction, as the rules of practice prima facie permit the service of a claim in that province (because it is a claim "founded on a tort committed in the province");
- Although Sikorsky's defence relies (at least in part) on contract law principles, the claim is entirely founded in tort;
- Although the crash did not occur in Newfoundland proper (it occurred 35 miles offshore), the alleged misrepresentations were relied on by Cougar in the province (where the most significant part of its business operates - even though the president of Cougar resides in British Columbia);
- There were significant losses accruing to Cougar in the province - for example, lost profits, payroll and administration costs, public relations management costs, monies paid to families of employees and costs for search and rescue flights; and
- In accordance with the Supreme Court of Canada's ruling in Moran v Pyle National (Canada) Ltd:
"[b]y tendering… products in the market place directly or through normal distributive channels, a manufacturer ought to assume the burden of defending those products wherever they cause harm as long as the forum into which the manufacturer is taken is one that he reasonably ought to have had in his contemplation."
"the claim of Lloyds 20 and Lloyd's Underwriters cannot be seen to be separate and apart from that of Cougar. The claim of each of the plaintiffs is grounded on the same factual basis."
In determining the fourth issue - namely, whether Newfoundland was the most convenient forum to deal with the claim -LeBlanc noted first that, based on the jurisprudence, a party loses the ability to argue forum non conveniens once it attorns to the jurisdiction.Regardless of the attornment, a review of the non-exhaustive list of factors set out in Muscutt, Van Breda and Teck Cominco Metals Ltd v Lloyd's Underwriters would lead to the same conclusion. The court agreed that Sikorsky would face additional costs litigating in Newfoundland, and that witnesses would have to be called from outside the jurisdiction. However, it held that:
- the same would apply if the matter were heard in Connecticut;
- the claim could be presented primarily through witnesses resident in Newfoundland;
- it was unclear whether the laws of Connecticut would apply, given that the claim was founded in tort, not contract;
- there would not necessarily be a multiplicity of proceedings, given that the Connecticut court had not yet ruled on the application before it;
- if the action were pursued in Connecticut, the plaintiffs would be at a juridical disadvantage since, in that jurisdiction, they would be unable to recover pure economic loss in a product liability proceeding of this sort; and
- the evidence from the Canadian regulators in this case would be more important than that from the Federal Aviation Administration.
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Good to see the law actually working for us up here for a change.
Bring it on, this is what is needed to make SAC wake up and smell the coffee. The more media coverage and information sharing/awareness the better IMHO.
Safe flying
Max
Bring it on, this is what is needed to make SAC wake up and smell the coffee. The more media coverage and information sharing/awareness the better IMHO.
Safe flying
Max
Last edited by maxwelg2; 28th Mar 2011 at 00:28.
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Crash victims challenge S-92 certification
More pressure on the certification issue reported here: Crash victims challenge S-92 certification: AINonline
In an open letter to Canada’s minister of transport, the lawyer representing the families of the passengers killed in, and the sole survivor of, the March 2009 crash of Cougar Helicopters Flight 491 has challenged the certification Transport Canada granted to the Sikorsky S-92A in 2005. The accident helicopter, which ditched 30 nm east of St. John’s, Newfoundland, and Labrador, was carrying 18 people. Sikorsky declined to comment on the letter.
The letter was sent a few days after the Transportation Safety Board (TSB) of Canada released its final report (see AIN, March, page 51). Attorney Joe Fiorante asserted that the report does not satisfactorily address questions relating to the S-92’s initial certification. “Transport Canada should never have certified as airworthy a helicopter that could not fly for at least 30 minutes after the complete loss of main gearbox oil,” he stated.
Therefore, on behalf of his clients, he called on Minister of Transport Chuck Strahl to investigate the certification of the S-92. He urged him to “take all necessary measures” to ensure that, in the future, Transport Canada “rigorously enforces the safety standards.” He made it clear that the purpose of his request is to “advance aviation safety” and not for compensation purposes, as his clients’ legal claims have been resolved.
Transport Canada would not comment on the letter to the minister. The administration said that an official answer would be issued within 90 days after the TSB report was released (it was released on Feb 9). The agency also pointed out that it has already started implementing TSB recommendations, such as size selection for passenger survival suits.”
History of Failures
The survivor’s and victim families’ call for an investigation is based on a list of “incontrovertible facts.” First, Flight 491 crashed 11 minutes after, and as the direct result of, a complete loss of main gearbox oil. Canada’s airworthiness regulation requires that the main gearbox be able to run dry (that is, without oil) for 30 minutes. The only exemption is when it can be demonstrated that such a failure is extremely unlikely–no more than once per 10 million flight hours.
The lawyer emphasized that during the S-92’s development, Sikorsky had pledged that the helicopter would have this 30-minute run-dry capability. However, in 2002, the run-dry test resulted in a failure after only 11 minutes. Sikorsky then asserted the S-92 should be certified on the basis that the risk of complete loss of main gearbox oil was “extremely remote.” Both the FAA and Transport Canada accepted the conjecture, the lawyer wrote.
In July 2008, an S-92 suffered a complete loss of main gearbox oil. Fortunately, the aircraft landed seven minutes later. This incident demonstrated that the “extremely remote” assumption was erroneous, according to the lawyer. The S-92 fleet had logged a total 100,000 flight hours at that time. Transport Canada did not take any safety action, the lawyer pointed out.
Yet, after the crash of Cougar Flight 491, Transport Canada issued an AD requiring mandatory replacement of the titanium mounting studs that had failed and caused the oil loss. Sikorsky is looking for a better design. Nevertheless, the lawyer insisted, today the S-92still lacks 30-minute run-dry capability.
The letter also raised a question: “Did Transport Canada succumb to pressure from the FAA or Sikorsky, or did it simply fail to recognize a serious safety/certification issue?”
In an open letter to Canada’s minister of transport, the lawyer representing the families of the passengers killed in, and the sole survivor of, the March 2009 crash of Cougar Helicopters Flight 491 has challenged the certification Transport Canada granted to the Sikorsky S-92A in 2005. The accident helicopter, which ditched 30 nm east of St. John’s, Newfoundland, and Labrador, was carrying 18 people. Sikorsky declined to comment on the letter.
The letter was sent a few days after the Transportation Safety Board (TSB) of Canada released its final report (see AIN, March, page 51). Attorney Joe Fiorante asserted that the report does not satisfactorily address questions relating to the S-92’s initial certification. “Transport Canada should never have certified as airworthy a helicopter that could not fly for at least 30 minutes after the complete loss of main gearbox oil,” he stated.
Therefore, on behalf of his clients, he called on Minister of Transport Chuck Strahl to investigate the certification of the S-92. He urged him to “take all necessary measures” to ensure that, in the future, Transport Canada “rigorously enforces the safety standards.” He made it clear that the purpose of his request is to “advance aviation safety” and not for compensation purposes, as his clients’ legal claims have been resolved.
Transport Canada would not comment on the letter to the minister. The administration said that an official answer would be issued within 90 days after the TSB report was released (it was released on Feb 9). The agency also pointed out that it has already started implementing TSB recommendations, such as size selection for passenger survival suits.”
History of Failures
The survivor’s and victim families’ call for an investigation is based on a list of “incontrovertible facts.” First, Flight 491 crashed 11 minutes after, and as the direct result of, a complete loss of main gearbox oil. Canada’s airworthiness regulation requires that the main gearbox be able to run dry (that is, without oil) for 30 minutes. The only exemption is when it can be demonstrated that such a failure is extremely unlikely–no more than once per 10 million flight hours.
The lawyer emphasized that during the S-92’s development, Sikorsky had pledged that the helicopter would have this 30-minute run-dry capability. However, in 2002, the run-dry test resulted in a failure after only 11 minutes. Sikorsky then asserted the S-92 should be certified on the basis that the risk of complete loss of main gearbox oil was “extremely remote.” Both the FAA and Transport Canada accepted the conjecture, the lawyer wrote.
In July 2008, an S-92 suffered a complete loss of main gearbox oil. Fortunately, the aircraft landed seven minutes later. This incident demonstrated that the “extremely remote” assumption was erroneous, according to the lawyer. The S-92 fleet had logged a total 100,000 flight hours at that time. Transport Canada did not take any safety action, the lawyer pointed out.
Yet, after the crash of Cougar Flight 491, Transport Canada issued an AD requiring mandatory replacement of the titanium mounting studs that had failed and caused the oil loss. Sikorsky is looking for a better design. Nevertheless, the lawyer insisted, today the S-92still lacks 30-minute run-dry capability.
The letter also raised a question: “Did Transport Canada succumb to pressure from the FAA or Sikorsky, or did it simply fail to recognize a serious safety/certification issue?”
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Finally, the FAA have actually certified the S-92 auto-hover that has been in use in Europe for years.
However, with the longer summer nights approaching it seems all the pressure is off Transport Canada approving the equipment for use in Newfoundland.
However, with the longer summer nights approaching it seems all the pressure is off Transport Canada approving the equipment for use in Newfoundland.