Go Back  PPRuNe Forums > Aircrew Forums > Rotorheads
Reload this Page >

Helicopter crash off the coast of Newfoundland - 18 aboard, March 2009

Rotorheads A haven for helicopter professionals to discuss the things that affect them

Helicopter crash off the coast of Newfoundland - 18 aboard, March 2009

Old 16th Feb 2011, 21:33
  #921 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Jul 2004
Location: Durham, NC USA
Posts: 373
Likes: 0
Received 4 Likes on 3 Posts
Initially the S-92 was conceived as a large cabin Superhawk, with a gross weight of 22220 lbs. The gear boxes and dynamic components of the S-92 were conceptually designed to be utilized on future upgraded versions of the H-60. As such, the baseline designs began with current, at the time, H-60 components. At the time, Sikorsky already had operational data from more than 2,000,000 H-60 flight hours. As the S-92’s gross weight increased, changes were made to the system. Two of those changes were to increase rotor speed from 258 RPM to 271 RPM (>5%) and to increase in main rotor diameter (53.66 ft. to 56.3 ft.). These changes combined to provide some of the additional lift required for the higher gross weight. I have to believe that MGB vibratory signatures changed from those historically seen on the H-60.

Additionally, system changes were made to provide for better maintainability/supportability. The location of the oil filter assemblies were relocated to allow for servicing from the top rather than from inside the cabin.
Jack Carson is offline  
Old 16th Feb 2011, 21:41
  #922 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Mar 2002
Location: Canada
Posts: 690
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
Two of those changes were to increase rotor speed from 258 RPM to 271 RPM (>5%) and to increase in main rotor diameter (53.66 ft. to 56.3 ft.).
Jack

Do you know when those changes were introduced into the design?
zalt is offline  
Old 16th Feb 2011, 23:27
  #923 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Aug 2003
Location: Sale, Australia
Age: 80
Posts: 3,832
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
Power transfer from the APU generator or EXT PWR to the No. 1 generator may cause disengagement of SAS 1, SAS 2, TRIM, AUTO PLT, and stabilator.
I'm guessing the possible loss of SAS perhaps went unnoticed in the heat of the moment, and again perhaps, explain the large pitch and roll excursions. 212man or other drivers care to comment.
Brian Abraham is offline  
Old 17th Feb 2011, 00:55
  #924 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Jul 2004
Location: Durham, NC USA
Posts: 373
Likes: 0
Received 4 Likes on 3 Posts
Zalt,
As near as I can recall, the following is a trail of the weight increases through the life of the program.

1993 – 22220 lbs.
1995 – 24100 lbs.
1998 – 25200 lbs.
2001 – 26150 lbs.

Sometime after that the weight continued to increase to 26500. The latest came with a change in the fuel system that increased the amount of usable fuel.

With respect to Brian’s concerns with generator under frequency, a circuit through the weight on wheels (WOW) switch inhibits the generator under frequency protection while in flight. However, there is no protection for generator under voltage. The generators will drop off the line at some lower rotor speed. I believe that you would have to reduce the rotor speed to approximately 80% or less.
Jack Carson is offline  
Old 17th Feb 2011, 16:26
  #925 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Feb 2007
Location: Canada
Posts: 2
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
TSB report, read it.

Finish reading the TSB report before asking all these questions and to speculate to much.

Plenty of good info in there. For them who post here, fly the SK-92 you should be looking into your company maintenance and ask if they wore following the right maintenance procedure issued by Sikorsky following the Australia incident. Also be sure you know your systems.

Many loose ends led to this, ask more where we sit now and what can be done in the future more than just not fly over rough water with out your helmet on.
IsKan is offline  
Old 17th Feb 2011, 16:32
  #926 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Aug 2009
Location: Texas
Age: 64
Posts: 7,131
Received 319 Likes on 204 Posts
I'm guessing the possible loss of SAS perhaps went unnoticed in the heat of the moment, and again perhaps, explain the large pitch and roll excursions. 212man or other drivers care to comment.
Brian, I am making an assumption (possibly incorrect) that the AFCS similarities between S-92 and the various Hawks are sufficient that similar loss of flight control quality would be experienced if the generators dropped off line.

As to undervoltage vs underfreq, good catch, Jack, my memory isn't as good as I thought. I think the Hawk WoW switch functions as you state.
Lonewolf_50 is offline  
Old 19th Feb 2011, 10:25
  #927 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Sep 2008
Location: Croydon
Posts: 285
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
Is it true that the Canadian MHP / Cyclone / S-92F will have to pass the conventional "30 mins with loss of lubricant test" for acceptance into service?
squib66 is offline  
Old 19th Feb 2011, 17:41
  #928 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Nov 2010
Location: Earth
Posts: 694
Received 14 Likes on 9 Posts
Is it true that the Canadian MHP / Cyclone / S-92F will have to pass the conventional "30 mins with loss of lubricant test" for acceptance into service?
Well thats the $64,000 question. The original contract for CH148 stated a 30 minute run dry requirement pretty clearly. However it also stated flatly there would be fines, penalties, etc for a late delivery (by the day) and we all know what has happed with that.

Im betting some of the R&D time and money spent on the 5 bladed 92 head for VXX/CSARX could have better been spent on completing the IDMGB, which is supposed to be the catch-all solution for Canada and the S92A fleet.

Though when you can shoestring the Canadian MoD along for 3 years after the delivery deadline because you know they desperately need an AC, you end up with a nice source of supplemental S92 R&D funding you didnt otherwise have available.
SansAnhedral is offline  
Old 20th Feb 2011, 15:09
  #929 (permalink)  
chw
 
Join Date: Feb 2011
Location: yhz
Posts: 8
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
Comments on the TSB report and questions.

I bet the draft report would be very interesting to read (the one before all the snake oil sales man had they're influence ).

Los of all oil out of a gear box is a very isolated occurrence, after fixing the oil filter housing installation the Sk 92 has as much chance of losing all its transmission oil as any other helicopter model some would have a lot more chances of losing they're transmission oil due to the many and/or longer external oil lines.

Blaming the pilot for not understanding the aircraft's MGB pressure system is a disservice to the industry, maybe the presentation on the MFD is the problem .

Make the transmission oil pressure Caution and Warning display the source like X for transducer and S for switch and leave them both displayed when the pressure drops below they're set level.

It appears that Cougar spent lots of money on training they're crews so why did the crew lack understanding? Should the SK provide manuals be reviewed.
You Just do not land a Helicopter in the Atlantic with out a clear indication.

The emphases in the report is on survival after a successfully landing on the Atlantic Ocean not on avoiding it.

Comment in a leading Canadian helicopter magazine by some one claiming he flew 80 different type of helicopter are very disappointing. One can not be "flying" a helicopter by just studying a check list (such a pilot is called a passenger).

Can some one help me out here concerning page 130 , 2.7.94
"with out an ELT signal not being received ....SAR sources not being launched in a timely manner"
Was it not that SAR was very quickly launched be cause of Superior satellite position reporting system employed by Cougar helicopters.

Is it not that the Crash has been caused by design engineering practice of saving weight at the wrong place ( a few grams), than after the design we load the aircraft up with safety equipment (300.000 gram +) that has not been needed for 30 + years and at the end only saved one person. All other offshore crashes on the east coast did not needed any of the safety equipment other than the raft.

Howe much super cold oil do we need to inject in to the XMSN to keep flying until the helicopter can be landed at a better place than the Atlantic Ocean.

Does any one knows how many successful landing have been made at gusting wind to 35 Knots waves at 2.5 meters on the Atlantic Ocean?

Is a twin rotor helicopter a inherently safer design, no tail rotor 25 % of power not wasted, power shared by two transmissions , does it have a less critical CG?

Last but not least check out the net concerning "Proven designs" suggested as better alternatives to the SK 92. ( Eurocopter AS 332 notable accidents and incidents)
chw is offline  
Old 20th Feb 2011, 16:06
  #930 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Mar 2002
Location: Canada
Posts: 690
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
Helicopter crash widow speaks out - Local - News - The Telegram

Helicopter crash widow speaks out
'This was preventable' says Lori Chynn

For Lori Chynn, the crash of Cougar Flight 491 is about the two small, titanium studs that sheared off as the helicopter flew to the Grand Banks oilfields on the morning of March 12, 2009.

Her husband, White Rose medic John Pelley, was among the 17 people who died when the helicopter crashed and sank into the North Atlantic.

Chynn describes the broken bolts as the root cause of the crash, and says inspecting and replacing them would have prevented the tragedy.

“That’s the part that’s so hard to hear — that this was preventable,” she said.

“I just feel that if the helicopter was not in the air this would not have happened.

“It shouldn’t have been in the air. The studs should have been replaced right away.”

Chynn has closely followed the Transportation Safety Board (TSB) investigation of the crash and took part in the helicopter safety inquiry led by commissioner Robert Wells.

“My husband was a very outspoken person and he stood up for what he believed in.

“So, I feel that each time something comes out he has to have a voice. That’s very important.”

More than a week ago, Chynn listened as TSB officials outlined their investigation report to the families of passengers killed in the crash.

They were briefed on its contents at a separate location before the report was released to the media. TSB officials stayed with the families for more than four hours, answering their questions.

Chynn said one thing missing from the briefing was an opportunity to hear the publicly released portion of communications between the Flight 491 pilots and Gander air traffic control.

“They provided a very good, safe place to come and go and ask questions. Why did they not provide the same opportunity with that?”

“Why weren’t we given the opportunity to hear this, if we wanted to?”

She would have preferred to hear what was released before it aired on television.

“I wasn’t expecting this to come on the news and when it did it really unnerved me,” she said. “It was an awful feeling to hear. It was very haunting.”

But it doesn’t change her mind about the cause of the crash.

“I believe the pilots did the best that they could. They wanted to come home to their families, too.”

The TSB said two of three titanium studs failed in flight, resulting in a complete loss of oil from the main gearbox that powers the helicopter.

Since the crash, Sikorsky S-92 helicopters use stronger steel studs, and six studs now secure the oil filter bowl to the main gearbox.

The TSB report outlined what it called a complex web of 16 factors that contributed to the crash. And agency officials said taking one or two of those factors out of the web might have prevented the crash.

Chynn sees it a little differently.

The detailed TSB report clarified many things, but she isn’t entirely satisfied with it. She doesn’t see all 16 contributing factors as equal.

“I just feel that there wasn’t enough emphasis put on the root cause … the studs,” she said. “That’s the cause of the accident.”

Chynn said the TSB report did help her understand the notion of a 30-minute run dry capability for helicopters — a test the Sikorsky S-92 failed during certification by the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).

Dry run refers to how long a helicopter can continue to fly after losing all oil from its main gearbox.

U.S. regulations require 30 minutes of flying time unless failure of the oil lubricating system is shown to be “extremely remote” — as was the case with the S-92.

The TSB report recommended that aviation regulators — FAA, Transport Canada and the European Aviation Safety Agency — reconsider the way they certify helicopters.

It recommended the FAA remove the “extremely remote” provision from the 30-minute run dry rule.

The TSB also said 30 minutes may not be sufficient when flying long distances over water — recommending regulators review its adequacy.

Chynn believes the S-92 should be thoroughly evaluated to make sure it’s up to the job of safely transporting people to and from the province’s oilfields.

“Is this the right helicopter to be going over the North Atlantic?
“The bottom line here is, safety for offshore workers — the same as safety for any worker.

“We need to learn from this how to make our offshore workers safer — bottom line — at whatever cost.

“I don’t ever want any other family to have to go through this … the recommendations need to be followed through.

“Whatever has to be done has to be done.”


mbaird at thetelegram.com
zalt is offline  
Old 22nd Feb 2011, 13:47
  #931 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Jan 2003
Location: CYQS
Age: 49
Posts: 336
Received 2 Likes on 2 Posts
Not to diminish the voice of the widow, but was not the same things said about the S-61 in the early 70's??

I lost my godfather to the one crash in Norway in 76 (Might have been 77) that Killed all aboard. That was the 3rd accident of its kind too, loss of one blade. The 61 is now renowned for its safety...

SK never wanted this to happen, and they are working on it, and hopefully they will find a solution (I.e. dry run), but it has to be said, that systems knowledge might have helped.

Regards
Hagar.
Winnie is offline  
Old 22nd Feb 2011, 15:24
  #932 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Aug 2009
Location: Texas
Age: 64
Posts: 7,131
Received 319 Likes on 204 Posts
Response to chw.
Blaming the pilot for not understanding the aircraft's MGB pressure system is a disservice to the industry, maybe the presentation on the MFD is the problem .
I don't think you understand, and it has nothing to do with "the industry" being offered a disservice. And it's the lubrication system that the board felt the pilots may not have understood thoroughly enough, not just oil pressure and pumping.

Aside: Your maybe has been addressed in some detail in the report, and in the discussion for the last few pages on this forum. Maybe, and maybe not, on the MFD being where one addresses this problem. If you have not read this thread since its inception, you have missed some bickering, but also some very thoughtful input from experienced pilots on pros and cons of S-92 operations, and over water operations.

The blame for what is presented in the report as pilot unfamiliarity with how the lubrication system works, and thus the estimate of the impact this had on the trouble shooting and decision making by the crew, is a correctly pointed finger at the training manuals and flight manuals, and thus overall the pilot training program that influenced this crew.

Please go up a bit and see where I posted a (roughly) twenty year old warning from the Seahawk NATOPS manual that explicitly points out the wet bulb temp may not be telling you the truth is you lose your oil. I understand from this extended discussion that the Hawk transmissions and the S-92 transmission have that feature in common. Therefore, for this feature of a system to not be addressed in training is either a dumbing down of training, an oversight, or something even worse: an attempt to train helicopter pilots to be Pavlovian dogs (respond to the light!) rather than aviators who know their aircraft inside and out.

I was taught at a very early stage in my flying career that you have to know your aircraft inside and out ... as I began to fly helicopters, that requirement was made with even greater emphasis. Saved me life, it did.
It appears that Cougar spent lots of money on training they're crews so why did the crew lack understanding? Should the SK provide manuals be reviewed.
See above. It isn't the money, per se, it is how it's spent. I have some questions about your familiarity with pilot training. How much experience do you have as an instructor or trainer of aviators?
You Just do not land a Helicopter in the Atlantic with out a clear indication.
I find the less glib explanation of the board superior to your soundbyte, and your "Pavlov's Dog" attitude in re pilots. However, I tend to agree with your general idea that ditching is not to be casually approached, particularly in the dangerous seas confronting that crew. You go from one dangerous situation to another.
The emphases in the report is on survival after a successfully landing on the Atlantic Ocean not on avoiding it.
Really? Given that
the operational environment of that mishap was powerfully influenced by the hostile sea, rather than the calm, warm waters of the Caribbean (for example)
and that
Canada has coastal operations in very dangerous and cold waters,
maybe their investigation into "are we addressing the environmental risks of our operations (collectively)" is precisely what the Canadian aviation community would hope to have them address in some depth ... as well as some of their other points raised in re material and crew issues.
It does you no good to survive the crash and then die in the environment, I think you'll agree. I was taught that rather forecefully in the US Navy training I got.
Is it not that the Crash has been caused by design engineering practice of saving weight at the wrong place ( a few grams), than after the design we load the aircraft up with safety equipment (300.000 gram +) that has not been needed for 30 + years and at the end only saved one person. All other offshore crashes on the east coast did not needed any of the safety equipment other than the raft.
Incoherent, what do you actually mean by this? The person saved is grateful, I am sure, as is his family.
Howe much super cold oil do we need to inject in to the XMSN to keep flying until the helicopter can be landed at a better place than the Atlantic Ocean.
How much weight do you want to add to the transmission deck? Why do you want to refrigerate the oil? How much time have you spent flying helicopters? Your question makes little sense to me.
Is a twin rotor helicopter a inherently safer design, no tail rotor 25 % of power not wasted, power shared by two transmissions , does it have a less critical CG?
Where does your 25% figure come from?
Is it your opinion that no helicopter should have a tail rotor?
Lonewolf_50 is offline  
Old 23rd Feb 2011, 11:27
  #933 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Aug 2000
Location: UK
Posts: 3,680
Likes: 0
Received 1 Like on 1 Post
Interestingly, the investigators deemed it appropriate to comment thus:

1.18.6 Social Media
The internet has greatly increased opportunities for individuals to interact and exchange information and viewpoints. Internet forums, a form of social media,139 have become a widely popular source of information exchange. On one such internet forum, the S-92A generated an enormous amount of discussion. Starting in March 2000, before the S-92A went into commercial use, website visitors engaged in discussions about the introduction of the S-92A. Many of the individuals who posted on this website chose to remain anonymous. However, others such as one of Sikorsky's senior managers for the S-92A program, who was a regular contributor to the online discussion, chose to identify themselves. Over the course of several years, the subject of the S-92A's compliance with Part 29 was discussed at length among members of this internet forum. From these online discussions, it was evident that those involved understood that the S-92A did not have a run dry capability.

It was determined during the TSB investigation that at least one senior manager, and several other pilots at Cougar Helicopters periodically reviewed the material posted on the above mentioned internet forum.

Social media content such as internet forums can also be useful in judging cultural beliefs within a specific group such as helicopter pilots. For instance, some visitors indicated that the discussions mentioned above caused them to review the run dry capabilities, if any, of the helicopters they were flying. The online discussions also seemed to indicate that the typical offshore pilot would continue flight toward shore rather than ditching, no matter what the checklist said, until they were confronted with secondary indications that the transmission was about to fail catastrophically.
------------------

The report raises a lot of heartache for those responsible for the cause of the crash, aircraft manufacturers, operators, aircrew.
It is absolutely essential that the content of this report is not lost in time and that everyone who is a shareholder in the industry, inwardly digests and learns from such a tragedy, so that we minimise future losses.

That, perhaps, is the beauty of Pprune............
Thomas coupling is offline  
Old 24th Feb 2011, 20:25
  #934 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Mar 2002
Location: Canada
Posts: 690
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
TSB gave short shrift to key info

Has TSB failednto analyse tehcrew decision probably.

TSB gave short shrift to key infoBy LOUIS DESJARDINS

Cougar Helicopters Flight 91 lost oil pressure during a flight from St. John's to the Hibernia SeaRose oil platform almost two years ago. The Sikorsky S-92 (a version of which is on order for our armed forces) was approximately 20 minutes from shore when the pilot turned back. Tragically, 17 people died when the chopper crashed into the Atlantic Ocean some 11 minutes later.

Cougar launched a lawsuit against Sikorsky Aircraft in part because they had advertised that the S-92 was able to continue operating for half an hour after losing oil pressure.

However, our Transportation Safety Board's review of the accident said that neither the pilot nor the co-pilot would have thought this to be the case because they did not "make a comment" to that effect while trying to determine their best course of action.

But would they have found it necessary to comment on something if both believed it were so? Is it not just as likely that their decision on whether to ditch or head for shore was influenced by Sikorsky marketing's original claim that the craft could operate for 30 minutes on residual oil?

Or perhaps the claim, after tests showed that the first claim was untrue, that a feature of the S-92 was "thirty minutes safe operation following an oil leak"? The TSB gave very short shrift to what may well have been a very large factor in the calamity...
TSB gave short shrift to key info - Belleville Intelligencer - Ontario, CA
zalt is offline  
Old 24th Feb 2011, 21:40
  #935 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Aug 2008
Location: KOLM and KBVS
Age: 52
Posts: 272
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
I disagree. The copilot made multiple attempts to convince the captain that they were at the ditching point of the checklist. It seems to me that if the captain was truly under the impression that he had a 30 minute window, he would have said something along those lines to refute the copilot's assertion that it was time to ready the ship for water. If the copilot, who seemed the more verbose of the two, thought they had a 30 minute window, I'd have to think HE would have said something about it.

I'm not sure what Mr. Desjardins is really after here.
Hedge36 is offline  
Old 24th Feb 2011, 21:51
  #936 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Mar 2002
Location: Canada
Posts: 690
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
The co-pilot was not verbose - look at the graph is the TSB report.
http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-re...6_figure_9.gif

Last edited by zalt; 24th Feb 2011 at 22:26.
zalt is offline  
Old 24th Feb 2011, 22:14
  #937 (permalink)  
Moderator
 
Join Date: Aug 2006
Location: Ontario, Canada
Age: 63
Posts: 5,609
Received 57 Likes on 41 Posts
In reviewing a number of helicopter flight manuals, and considering what I would do under the various circumstances, I recall the two written phrases: "Land immediately" relative to "Land as soon as possible". One flight manual defined "Land as soon as possible" but referred to "Land immediately" as being "self evident". I'm no so sure I agree....

"Land" suggests the pilot is to take action which would result in returning to earth both safely, and with the expectation of little or no damage to the helicopter. Isn't anything less, a "Crash", as compared to a "Landing"? I have not seen a flight manual which says: "Crash immediately"....

I think that a pilot has the right to expect that his aircraft is not likely to further deteriorate during his attempt to get down with little damage or risk, "land". Yes, the worst can happen, but the design standards do define a number of intended safeguards, to give that margin of safety and time. A 30 minute run dry sound like one to me.

I opine that the flight manual statement "Land immediately" should be ammended to also say "... and crash if you have to", if that's the reality of the situation. Let's call it what is is!

If things are still turning under power, and control is still available, it is really asking a lot of the pilot to give up the possibility of a "landing", to just crash. It's hard to explain that to the boss - "the X light flickered, so I crashed your umpteen million dollar helicopter". I equate it to ejecting. I have never been trained to eject, or otherwise give up on flying. I have been trained to land - normally, precautionary, or forced, as the case may be. I accept that some military aircraft are well served by the provision for the crew to eject. I do not think that civil use aircraft would benefit from this provision.

I think our industry must provide aircraft, which can be "landed" under all but the most dire circumstances. We then need to train pilots when they must "land". "Immediately", should not be a part of that. Unless you're on approach to the perfect surface, you should feel confident that you can use some judgement, and have a few minutes, to select a place where you might land, rather than crash. If the helicopter is going to crash, because the turning has stopped, or control is impossible, the pilot just became a passenger, and is relieved of the responsibility of flying, otherwise, he should get to fly....
Pilot DAR is online now  
Old 24th Feb 2011, 22:28
  #938 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Mar 2002
Location: Canada
Posts: 690
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
I opine that the flight manual statement "Land immediately" should be ammended to also say "... and crash if you have to", if that's the reality of the situation. Let's call it what is is!
Land doesn't mean on land...

From the TSB:

In helicopter operations, "land immediately" is considered the highest priority emergency situation, and it is generally accepted as representing imminent danger to the crew and passengers. To illustrate, two definitions are provided from similar-sized military helicopters operated off the East and West coasts of Canada.

CH-124 Sea King:

Land immediately - an immediate landing/ditching is mandatory. The consequences of continued flight are more hazardous than those of landing at a site normally considered unsuitable.

CH-149 Cormorant:

Land Immediately - Imminent danger exists. An immediate landing/ditching shall be made in order to prevent loss of life.

In the S-92A RFM and Pilot Checklist utilized by Cougar Helicopters, "land as soon as possible" and "land immediately" are defined as follows:

Land As Soon As Possible - Land at the nearest site where a safe landing can be accomplished.

Land Immediately - Continued flight may not be possible. Ditching or landing in hazardous terrain is preferable to continuing flight.
zalt is offline  
Old 25th Feb 2011, 01:52
  #939 (permalink)  
Moderator
 
Join Date: Aug 2006
Location: Ontario, Canada
Age: 63
Posts: 5,609
Received 57 Likes on 41 Posts
I stand informed. Those definitions seem unambiguous, and that's great. I have not had the occasion to fly such larger helicopters. Hopefully lighter helicopters will adopt those seemingly appropriate definitions in the future.

I will always recall doing my confined area training in the SW300, and getting the inevitable caution light from the instructor as I picked up. He seemed surprized when I did not put it right back down in the area, but rather continued back to base a mile away. I explained when questioned that I dicided on the spur of the moment, that on a perfect flying day, I could make it the mile with an unserviceable alternator, rather than shut down in a hole, and hike out. Next time he pressed the transmission chip warning light instead....
Pilot DAR is online now  
Old 25th Feb 2011, 04:24
  #940 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Aug 2003
Location: Sale, Australia
Age: 80
Posts: 3,832
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
Land Immediately - Continued flight may not be possible. Ditching or landing in hazardous terrain is preferable to continuing flight.
zalt, to me the 92 seems to suggest by the use of the words may and preferable that the crew may have some scope for using judgment. ie
Continued flight may not be possible
Continued flight may be possible then? The wording is a little wishy washy to me, completely unlike your Sea King and Cormorant examples, as in,
an immediate landing/ditching is mandatory.
and
Imminent danger exists. An immediate landing/ditching shall be made in order to prevent loss of life.
No scope there for any doubt what is being said. Perhaps it's just me, but offer up the suggestion for the forums consideration.
Brian Abraham is offline  

Thread Tools
Search this Thread

Contact Us - Archive - Advertising - Cookie Policy - Privacy Statement - Terms of Service

Copyright © 2024 MH Sub I, LLC dba Internet Brands. All rights reserved. Use of this site indicates your consent to the Terms of Use.