Helicopter crash off the coast of Newfoundland - 18 aboard, March 2009
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SASless brings up a good point with SAR coverage, in the copy of the Q&A's between the rig workers, Cougar and Transport Canada I saw, the rig workers said they were not happy with the SAR time of the rescue S-92 , most people i've talked to thought it was pretty quick and Cougar should be congratulated to launch a helo so quick...... at least they had a rescue helo on standby, the UK sector of the north sea has RAF and RN Seakings and Coastguard S-92's and the Norwegian sector RNoAF Seakings and Canada has the EH-101's and backup 92's, in Australia there is practically nothing most bases do there own SAR (pretty hard with only one a/c at the base) and when you get bases hundreds of Kilometres apart help is a long way away (Karratha to Broome 650km, Broome to Truscott 615 km, Truscott to Darwin 510 km), years ago oil companies payed for SAR backup, a 214ST or S.Puma offshore machine with a 212 or 412 as SAR backup but not anymore .....cost cutting , bases may have multiple machines as tech backup or medivac backup but no hoist equiped helos for hundreds of km's, would these same Canadian oil workers who said it took to long to have a rescue helo overhead put up with the situation in Australia?
Albatross,
So may we conclude from your statement that the concern of a delayed SAR recovery of folks in the water would not be an issue in the crew's decision making that day? They were not that far offshore when the decision to return to land was made.
Remember....I am not being critical of the crew but rather am trying to narrow down the factors they would have to considered while talking to Cougar Ops about what they should do.
This is CRM at its best....pilots seeking advice from outside the cockpit.
So may we conclude from your statement that the concern of a delayed SAR recovery of folks in the water would not be an issue in the crew's decision making that day? They were not that far offshore when the decision to return to land was made.
Remember....I am not being critical of the crew but rather am trying to narrow down the factors they would have to considered while talking to Cougar Ops about what they should do.
This is CRM at its best....pilots seeking advice from outside the cockpit.
The crew had told ops they were preparing to ditch and requested "the boys come and get us" (or words very close to that.). There is no question that they were not planning to ditch rather than try for land - the problem is they ran out of time in the process. 
What was the content of the discussion between OPS and the Crew? Anything said there that delayed the decision to ditch after the oil pressure dropped below 5PSI? As I recall the pressure dropped below the limit during the early part of the descent and well before they leveled off.
SASLess sorry if I was not clear:
12:26:26 St. John's radar records the last radar return of CHI91 at 300 feet.
12:26 Gander ACC advises search and rescue that CHI91 has ditched. Cougar dispatch confirms the ditching with search and rescue, and advises that they will launch Cougar 61 as a rescue helicopter.
12:42 A Provincial Airlines patrol aircraft arrives at crash site and observes two people in orange immersion suits in the water.
13:07 Cougar rescue helicopter departs St. John's.
13:25 Cougar rescue helicopter arrives at crash site and spots two people (one of whom is later confirmed dead), two rafts and helicopter debris.
13:33 Cougar rescue helicopter lowers a rescue person toward the people in the water.
A/C overhead 16 minutes after impact.
Rescue helicopter overhead 59 minutes after impact
Rescue swimmer lowered 1:07 minutes after impact.
In my opinion that is very fast crash response in Canada or the US. Big countries.
In many parts of Canada you are advised not expect rescue for at least 24 Hours. They do everything possible to get there sooner but sometimes the nearest asset is thousands of miles away.
Of course I believe the concern of a delayed SAR recovery of folks in the water would be an issue in the crew's decision.
What I am disagreeing with the rig workers saying that they were not happy with the SAR time of the rescue S-92.
To be on scene any sooner there would have had to be a SAR machine just about running on the ground.
Of course we would like to have a helicopter overhead immediately and for all to be rescued.
12:26:26 St. John's radar records the last radar return of CHI91 at 300 feet.
12:26 Gander ACC advises search and rescue that CHI91 has ditched. Cougar dispatch confirms the ditching with search and rescue, and advises that they will launch Cougar 61 as a rescue helicopter.
12:42 A Provincial Airlines patrol aircraft arrives at crash site and observes two people in orange immersion suits in the water.
13:07 Cougar rescue helicopter departs St. John's.
13:25 Cougar rescue helicopter arrives at crash site and spots two people (one of whom is later confirmed dead), two rafts and helicopter debris.
13:33 Cougar rescue helicopter lowers a rescue person toward the people in the water.
A/C overhead 16 minutes after impact.
Rescue helicopter overhead 59 minutes after impact
Rescue swimmer lowered 1:07 minutes after impact.
In my opinion that is very fast crash response in Canada or the US. Big countries.
In many parts of Canada you are advised not expect rescue for at least 24 Hours. They do everything possible to get there sooner but sometimes the nearest asset is thousands of miles away.
Of course I believe the concern of a delayed SAR recovery of folks in the water would be an issue in the crew's decision.
What I am disagreeing with the rig workers saying that they were not happy with the SAR time of the rescue S-92.
To be on scene any sooner there would have had to be a SAR machine just about running on the ground.
Of course we would like to have a helicopter overhead immediately and for all to be rescued.
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What I am disagreeing with the rig workers saying that they were not happy with the SAR time of the rescue S-92.
The issue is not the SAR response time IMO, it's the suits and the fact that this helo should have ditched immediately upon loss of MGB oil pressure below 5 psi. We need a decent survival suit and the chance to use it via a controlled landing. If this means tighter restrictions of weather/sea state conditions then so be it.
As to the events of 491, we are still waiting for the final TSB findings to explain the root cause failure of the titanium studs, and explanation on the other areas of concern raised in the report such as the activated flotation bags not inflating and the leakage of fuel, suspected to be from the sponson tanks. Still a lot of questions to be answered...
Alabatross,
The SAR effort was very good.....not saying anything derrogatory about the actual response time itself.
My question could have been better stated.
I will try again so you can understand where I am headed with the question.
The day of the crash, the goverment dedicated SAR machine was away for training.
That information was known ahead of time.
That required Cougar to be their own SAR unit.
That is a standard practice as I understand it.
Did Cougar have a 92, SAR equipped, manned, and on standby ready for launch?
Or....did they have an aircraft available with access to SAR qualified crews and upon callout....then prepare the aircraft for the SAR mission by outfitting the aircraft with the SAR mission equipment and removing a few seats?
That is the only interest I have by asking the question I did.
I know for a fact without any reservation.....that when told of your friends, fellows, and "family" being the reason for your SAR mission....anyone would turn Heaven and Earth to get out there and help them anyway you can. I know that was what happend that day and as it should have.
The only question is was the aircraft loaded and cocked before the call?
The SAR effort was very good.....not saying anything derrogatory about the actual response time itself.
My question could have been better stated.
I will try again so you can understand where I am headed with the question.
The day of the crash, the goverment dedicated SAR machine was away for training.
That information was known ahead of time.
That required Cougar to be their own SAR unit.
That is a standard practice as I understand it.
Did Cougar have a 92, SAR equipped, manned, and on standby ready for launch?
Or....did they have an aircraft available with access to SAR qualified crews and upon callout....then prepare the aircraft for the SAR mission by outfitting the aircraft with the SAR mission equipment and removing a few seats?
That is the only interest I have by asking the question I did.
I know for a fact without any reservation.....that when told of your friends, fellows, and "family" being the reason for your SAR mission....anyone would turn Heaven and Earth to get out there and help them anyway you can. I know that was what happend that day and as it should have.
The only question is was the aircraft loaded and cocked before the call?
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SASless;
I think you must understand by this point in time that some people are upset with your seemingly relentless drive for intimate details in a fatal accident. Give it up numbnuts. What is done is done. All the conversation to this point has cumulative value to prevent this happening again. It really upsets me to see an old fart pusrsue details of an accident that is investigated by a national body, the safety standards of which sets precedents in the world. When Transport Canada is ready for information release they will let us know, in the meantime, curb your comments. I have faith in the system.
Now, this should give you hours of fun for rebuttal.
Personally, you remind me of a guy that had a bad career and has to somehow justify it by adding endless comments about bull**** on this forum.
I fly helicopters for a living and realize the danger as do most other guys on this forum so tell me again, what is your point??
Do you think by exposing manufacturer's weaknesses this is going to improve the economic outlook??
Hard line is boys, if you feel scared, don't fly. That goes for the pilots and the people they fly. Accept the risk and make the big money, I don't hear any hard stories about that.
Bunch of hypocrites if you ask me.
I think you must understand by this point in time that some people are upset with your seemingly relentless drive for intimate details in a fatal accident. Give it up numbnuts. What is done is done. All the conversation to this point has cumulative value to prevent this happening again. It really upsets me to see an old fart pusrsue details of an accident that is investigated by a national body, the safety standards of which sets precedents in the world. When Transport Canada is ready for information release they will let us know, in the meantime, curb your comments. I have faith in the system.
Now, this should give you hours of fun for rebuttal.
Personally, you remind me of a guy that had a bad career and has to somehow justify it by adding endless comments about bull**** on this forum.
I fly helicopters for a living and realize the danger as do most other guys on this forum so tell me again, what is your point??
Do you think by exposing manufacturer's weaknesses this is going to improve the economic outlook??
Hard line is boys, if you feel scared, don't fly. That goes for the pilots and the people they fly. Accept the risk and make the big money, I don't hear any hard stories about that.
Bunch of hypocrites if you ask me.
Iceberg,
Questionable approach to helicopter safety you seem to have.
Am I correct in assuming you feel there is no value in discussing safety issues before, during, or after flight....to include incidents, accidents, injuires, and deathes that result from them.
Is it you resent the questions, the answers, lack of answers, or the fact one must confront such issues at all when you object?
Tragedies such as this one should be mined for all the positive value we can find as otherwise it would be a real waste of money and people if we did not. It is the lessons we learn from these events that help prevent future tragedies. That can only be done by a fair, reasonable, objective discussion of all the factors and issues that pertain to the event.
As to pointing out anyone's weaknesses.....is that not what a proper safety program is all about? Does it matter whose ox gets gored if the outcome is an improvement in the operational safety for those of us who are flying the line and living with the inherent risks of our occupation.
The key is to be able to live long enough to become an old Fart and retire. I did that....with an accident/incident free career. Perhaps in time you might do so as well although the odds might be against you if you really feel the way you suggest about cowboying up and damn the risks.
The goal is to minimize risks by identifying those that exist and mitigating the ones that can be eliminated, cured, or reduced. That requires and open, free, objective discussion of the issues.
I have been criticized before for being a strong advocate for safety....but then I have seen way too many friends killed as a result of safety failures during my flying career that started in 1967. I see posing questions as a way of soliciting information or generating a discussion. If that offends you then you will have to get used to it.
Questionable approach to helicopter safety you seem to have.
Am I correct in assuming you feel there is no value in discussing safety issues before, during, or after flight....to include incidents, accidents, injuires, and deathes that result from them.
Is it you resent the questions, the answers, lack of answers, or the fact one must confront such issues at all when you object?
Tragedies such as this one should be mined for all the positive value we can find as otherwise it would be a real waste of money and people if we did not. It is the lessons we learn from these events that help prevent future tragedies. That can only be done by a fair, reasonable, objective discussion of all the factors and issues that pertain to the event.
As to pointing out anyone's weaknesses.....is that not what a proper safety program is all about? Does it matter whose ox gets gored if the outcome is an improvement in the operational safety for those of us who are flying the line and living with the inherent risks of our occupation.
The key is to be able to live long enough to become an old Fart and retire. I did that....with an accident/incident free career. Perhaps in time you might do so as well although the odds might be against you if you really feel the way you suggest about cowboying up and damn the risks.
The goal is to minimize risks by identifying those that exist and mitigating the ones that can be eliminated, cured, or reduced. That requires and open, free, objective discussion of the issues.
I have been criticized before for being a strong advocate for safety....but then I have seen way too many friends killed as a result of safety failures during my flying career that started in 1967. I see posing questions as a way of soliciting information or generating a discussion. If that offends you then you will have to get used to it.
Chief Bottle Washer
iceberglead,
I have deleted the last 4 posts of yours, as they are not wanted on this thread. If you have an issue with SASless on a personal level, keep it outside this Forum.
I have deleted the last 4 posts of yours, as they are not wanted on this thread. If you have an issue with SASless on a personal level, keep it outside this Forum.
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I fly helicopters for a living and realize the danger as do most other guys on this forum so tell me again, what is your point??
I truly feel sorry for you, please do not attempt to comment on an industry which you do not understand/appreciate and obviously do not operate within, where we are all trying to improve helo safety and PAX confidence. Your negative comments are not appreciated.
I hope that you never have to say goodbye to personal friends and colleagues due to compromises in helo safety like we have had to.
Max
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Families drop lawsuit, no other details.
Families of passengers on downed N.L. chopper 'voluntarily discontinue' lawsuit - Yahoo! Canada News
carholme
Families of passengers on downed N.L. chopper 'voluntarily discontinue' lawsuit - Yahoo! Canada News
carholme
If the MGB goes, or is gonna go ...
Also, if you are going to ignore the RFM and keep trying for land, knowing your gearbox could be on the way out 30 minute run dry or not, would you fly it at 130kts ??? or at 800ft???? a fall from 800ft, with no forward motion is still going to hurt, A LOT. ive spoken with s92 pilots on the matter including one who has survived a tail rotor failure of the s92. he said "30-40ft above the sea, and crawled in!" thats what the cougar guys should have done. i dont want to speak ill of the dead and they did pay with thier lives, but is this or is this not, the reason for the outcome in this case? thats not to say that lessons cant be learned, but lets stay focused.
I realize the S-92 isn't the Seahawk/Blackhawk, but I do recall that if you are trying to make it to the ship and your MGB has chips/secondaries/out of oil, the profile you were given in the NATOPS manual was fifty feet and fifty knots. Granted, that guaranteed nothing. It put you into an envelope where the next symptom of "it all going wrong" allowed you a quick drop-flare-ditch to egress and swim away with your lives.
The discussion here on the risk management challenge the aircrew faced has been sobering.
"Yeah, I can ditch, but will likely freeze to death once I do." Thanks, I'll not sign up for a bowl of that soup, given a choice.
However, if that's how you read the situation, I understand why an aircrew would choose a course of action to avoid a ditch as long as practical, and hedge against possible TR thust loss.
Did the TR drive failure catch them by surprise? Likely. Might have been looking for a failure in the main and had a delayed reaction to the TR drive loss.
But back to the decision to get as close to land as soon as could be done. Something conservative like fifty-fifty gets you there slow. If the crew believes in a 30 min "mulligan" for this hole, it barely gets you where 130kt/800' does in terms of "we will likely freeze to death" as an alternate assessment.
As noted above, when the TR stops doing its work, you auto.
So, to answer your question: why choose 130 kts?
130 knots looks a little like the kind of airspeed we were taught to fly if we had a TR drive failure in a Seahawk (around 125 kts actually), hadn't lost energy/nose into the wind configuration, and were trying to keep the nose streamlined into the wind. (Can't recall if anyone ever successfully pulled that off for long enough to find a place to auto ... memory foggy)
The crew might have been anticipating a lost TR, and thus had the helicopter at an airspeed that would keep the nose from cocking/tucking right, and creating the nightmare "one quarter turn broadside to the wind that commits you to the auto." That quick tuck/massive drag problem got a guy I knew killed in San Diego, TR drive failure, back in '89.
Granted, I freely admit that I am applying a bit of apples and oranges here. I base that estimation on the S-92 being a bit of a Blackhawk/Seahawk on steroids. (yes, a gross estimate.) If any of the S-92 drivers can tell me how close my guess is, in terms of
"Can you keep xxx knots up and prevent the nose from breaking right with te TR losing drive"
I'd appreciate it.
It is very sad to read of mishaps like this, when the choices between the devil and the deep blue sea plays out so tragically for those in peril in the air.
Vaya con Dios, amigos
The crew might have been anticipating a lost TR, and thus had the helicopter at an airspeed that would keep the nose from cocking/tucking right
"Can you keep xxx knots up and prevent the nose from breaking right with te TR losing drive"
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LW50,
While the blackhawk/seahawk has a tail rotor vertical fin with aerodynamic properties that offsets tail rotor thrust , almost completely at around 120 KIAS, the S92 does not.
In the BH/SH you do not have to enter auto if you lose tail rotor drive in forward flight because of the aerodynamic properties of the vertical fin, in the S92 you have to enter auto because the vertical pylon does not stop you from spinning.
Not sure why they did not incorporate the vertical fin into the S92, it just makes sense to me.
TalkSpike.
While the blackhawk/seahawk has a tail rotor vertical fin with aerodynamic properties that offsets tail rotor thrust , almost completely at around 120 KIAS, the S92 does not.
In the BH/SH you do not have to enter auto if you lose tail rotor drive in forward flight because of the aerodynamic properties of the vertical fin, in the S92 you have to enter auto because the vertical pylon does not stop you from spinning.
Not sure why they did not incorporate the vertical fin into the S92, it just makes sense to me.
TalkSpike.
Hawk T/R Thrust Loss
Wish it were true, Tail Spike, but the S-70 family will not maintain level flight in this situation, even at a large slip angle.
The original US Army requirement was for the UTTAS to be able to accomplish this, with no more than a 20 degree slip angle at max endurance speed ( ~80 KIAS ). Thus the huge, and highly cambered, original tail that was flown on the prototypes for most of 1974. Someone will ask about why we didn't use a fenestron in order to meet this requirement ( we had already flown a large fenstron made by Hamilton Standard on the S-67 original Blackhawk ), but there were a number of factors at play:
In spite of a few very elegant pieces of aerodynamic structure* , instrumentation and data analysis wizardry, and after a lot of flying, we could never satisfy ourselves ( not to mention anyone else ) that we had achieved the goal. On top of that, that original tail brought on terrible, speed related, directional control trim change requirements for the pilot and in themselves, a violation of the US Army handling requirement specification.
* The UTTAS competition had a fixed schedule, with a head to head fly-off with Boeing. So anything that was suggested to fix problems brought with it heated discussions about risk to making the fly-off on time . One of the suggested tail changes to meet this requirement/problem was an entirely new vertical tail with a triple slotted arrangement ( new tail structure from the intermediate gearbox up ). Talk about sophisticated aerodynamics! The manufacturing director told us that if this was the answer, he would have to build not one, but three, one for each of the competition aircraft. Approval was granted and he had three totally new tails built. I likened the effort to that which I've read existed at Supermarine in coming up with Spitfire advances in the middle of a war ( see the Jeffrey Quill book " Test Pilot" ). Anyhow, we finally received and installed the first one and went out and flew it.....one time. None of the aero predictions were accomplished and we stacked all three brand new tails in a corner of the hangar.
So, faced with taking possibly two spec non-compliances, and being hardly certain of the zero tail rotor thrust results with the big tail, we changed the vertical tail to its present geometry, solved the trim issue, and took the deviation on the other issue.
There was no lack of effort, though.
Thanks,
John Dixson
The original US Army requirement was for the UTTAS to be able to accomplish this, with no more than a 20 degree slip angle at max endurance speed ( ~80 KIAS ). Thus the huge, and highly cambered, original tail that was flown on the prototypes for most of 1974. Someone will ask about why we didn't use a fenestron in order to meet this requirement ( we had already flown a large fenstron made by Hamilton Standard on the S-67 original Blackhawk ), but there were a number of factors at play:
- The T-700 engines were already selected by the Army so the power available was a fixed number.
- The Army had a vertical climb requirement stemming from UH-1 issues in Vietnam, and everyone knew that this requirement had to be met or exceeded.
- The cabin size, crashworthy structural requirements, fuel/range requirements etc pretty much sized the machine.
- The Army had strong directional control thrust requirements.
In spite of a few very elegant pieces of aerodynamic structure* , instrumentation and data analysis wizardry, and after a lot of flying, we could never satisfy ourselves ( not to mention anyone else ) that we had achieved the goal. On top of that, that original tail brought on terrible, speed related, directional control trim change requirements for the pilot and in themselves, a violation of the US Army handling requirement specification.
* The UTTAS competition had a fixed schedule, with a head to head fly-off with Boeing. So anything that was suggested to fix problems brought with it heated discussions about risk to making the fly-off on time . One of the suggested tail changes to meet this requirement/problem was an entirely new vertical tail with a triple slotted arrangement ( new tail structure from the intermediate gearbox up ). Talk about sophisticated aerodynamics! The manufacturing director told us that if this was the answer, he would have to build not one, but three, one for each of the competition aircraft. Approval was granted and he had three totally new tails built. I likened the effort to that which I've read existed at Supermarine in coming up with Spitfire advances in the middle of a war ( see the Jeffrey Quill book " Test Pilot" ). Anyhow, we finally received and installed the first one and went out and flew it.....one time. None of the aero predictions were accomplished and we stacked all three brand new tails in a corner of the hangar.
So, faced with taking possibly two spec non-compliances, and being hardly certain of the zero tail rotor thrust results with the big tail, we changed the vertical tail to its present geometry, solved the trim issue, and took the deviation on the other issue.
There was no lack of effort, though.
Thanks,
John Dixson
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JD,
Having a quick look through by BH notes, the emerg proc for insufficient tail rotor thrust in flight has two options:
1. if continued flight is not possible........
2. If continued flight is possible........
In this emerg the S92 has one option:
1. Enter autorotation.
The one flight control coupling that the BH has that the S92 does not is collective airspeed to yaw, an electrical coupling provided through the trim. Due to the camber of the tail rotor pylon (not present in the S92) trim inputs are used to counter left yaw produced due to lack of airflow over the pylon. The trim input is slowly washed out until the IAS reaches approx 120KIAS.
Could be wrong but it is my belief the reason you may still be able to maintain continued flight in the event insufficient TR thrust in the BH is due to the properties of the tail rotor pylon. Personally never tried it myself and maybe it would only work with partial loss of thrust?
Anyway I'm sure there is a good reason this coupling and the properties of the tail rotor pylon were left out of the S92, maybe someone else can answer that question.
TalkSpike.
Having a quick look through by BH notes, the emerg proc for insufficient tail rotor thrust in flight has two options:
1. if continued flight is not possible........
2. If continued flight is possible........
In this emerg the S92 has one option:
1. Enter autorotation.
The one flight control coupling that the BH has that the S92 does not is collective airspeed to yaw, an electrical coupling provided through the trim. Due to the camber of the tail rotor pylon (not present in the S92) trim inputs are used to counter left yaw produced due to lack of airflow over the pylon. The trim input is slowly washed out until the IAS reaches approx 120KIAS.
Could be wrong but it is my belief the reason you may still be able to maintain continued flight in the event insufficient TR thrust in the BH is due to the properties of the tail rotor pylon. Personally never tried it myself and maybe it would only work with partial loss of thrust?
Anyway I'm sure there is a good reason this coupling and the properties of the tail rotor pylon were left out of the S92, maybe someone else can answer that question.
TalkSpike.