Super Puma down central North Sea Feb 2009
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Use of coupler
Last time I looked the CAA (UK) OPC/LPC regime did not permit the use of coupled modes during a licence related check flight. This IMHO has been a constant and glaring shortcoming in our UK operating philosophy for it leads to the training being oriented towards uncoupled flight which in turn leads to a lack of knowledge and experience using the coupled modes. This creates a lack of confidence that is not helpful when the chips are down.
Rather interestingly I have just had the opportunity to play a little with the AW139 4-axis (enhanced) AP. The hover mode is excellent and offers the possibility of flying a coupled approach using rad height. You can beep the height down to the MDA at the right time and then beep the speed back to 60-65 kts, which the hover mode can just cope with (60 kts the AP will drop out and 65kts is the max for the hover engagement). Once hover mode is engaged the aircraft will slowly decel to achieve a hover. The exact point at which the hover is achieved can be adjusted using the cyclic beep trim with a graphic display on the HSI to assist (pity there is no corresponding symbol on the radar). Its early days but given the opportunity to practice it could prove a usefull tool 'in extremis'.
G
Rather interestingly I have just had the opportunity to play a little with the AW139 4-axis (enhanced) AP. The hover mode is excellent and offers the possibility of flying a coupled approach using rad height. You can beep the height down to the MDA at the right time and then beep the speed back to 60-65 kts, which the hover mode can just cope with (60 kts the AP will drop out and 65kts is the max for the hover engagement). Once hover mode is engaged the aircraft will slowly decel to achieve a hover. The exact point at which the hover is achieved can be adjusted using the cyclic beep trim with a graphic display on the HSI to assist (pity there is no corresponding symbol on the radar). Its early days but given the opportunity to practice it could prove a usefull tool 'in extremis'.
G
"Until the full AAIB report is out on this accident i dont think anything will be done".
I'm afraid I thought the same thing just after the Morecombe Bay accident. Waited patiently for the AAIB report to be produced, only to find that the findings were that two experienced and good pilots got disorientated at night and flew into the water. The recommendations ............. More simulator time and pilots to wear brighter immersion suits to help find them in the dark water. I seem to remember that point was also raised in the conclusion of the Cormorant Alpha crash 15 years before.
As to how to resolve these problems, I think the best way is to approach the oil companies. Or, better still the oil workers - If they knew the risks they were being placed under, and the difference between day and night landings, the pressure bearing down on the oil companies and helicopter operators to change the schedules should yield to a sensible conclusion.
There does seem to be a weight of feeling amongst many pilots, I think it just needs a few voices from offshore, the safety bodies and offshore workers to build up a bit of momentum.
I'm afraid I thought the same thing just after the Morecombe Bay accident. Waited patiently for the AAIB report to be produced, only to find that the findings were that two experienced and good pilots got disorientated at night and flew into the water. The recommendations ............. More simulator time and pilots to wear brighter immersion suits to help find them in the dark water. I seem to remember that point was also raised in the conclusion of the Cormorant Alpha crash 15 years before.
As to how to resolve these problems, I think the best way is to approach the oil companies. Or, better still the oil workers - If they knew the risks they were being placed under, and the difference between day and night landings, the pressure bearing down on the oil companies and helicopter operators to change the schedules should yield to a sensible conclusion.
There does seem to be a weight of feeling amongst many pilots, I think it just needs a few voices from offshore, the safety bodies and offshore workers to build up a bit of momentum.
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SASLess;
The EC line are bloody good, however there are very few APs which will be happy to use coupled modes below VY. I learned the art of offshore with JimL and a lot of other guys on S61s with just a SAS and no AP at all. The 332L and L2 were a huge relief, but still carried major gotchas. No matter what we as pilots demand in the current climate our employers will still get away without updating fleets on economic grounds, and we will accept it or go jobless)
I left the NS 10 years ago after some 5000 hours many at night (half my NS career was down south) much of what DB has been advocating we were doing in the late '80s and then into the '90s. we just didn't have all the automatics. Where has all that training and experience gone? This crew appear to have done something I and many others will have come close to. Approach gate and speed control are utterly vital, even more so on a calm night with no periferal references. The trouble is our hard won experience seems to have been ignored in the interests of saving the odd flying minute here and there. I still meet guys from the NS Iworked with and from what they tell me things have changed for the worse.
Wait until they start bringing in cost factors and economics to a captain's record as so many FW companies do. I'm glad I left now.
The EC line are bloody good, however there are very few APs which will be happy to use coupled modes below VY. I learned the art of offshore with JimL and a lot of other guys on S61s with just a SAS and no AP at all. The 332L and L2 were a huge relief, but still carried major gotchas. No matter what we as pilots demand in the current climate our employers will still get away without updating fleets on economic grounds, and we will accept it or go jobless)
I left the NS 10 years ago after some 5000 hours many at night (half my NS career was down south) much of what DB has been advocating we were doing in the late '80s and then into the '90s. we just didn't have all the automatics. Where has all that training and experience gone? This crew appear to have done something I and many others will have come close to. Approach gate and speed control are utterly vital, even more so on a calm night with no periferal references. The trouble is our hard won experience seems to have been ignored in the interests of saving the odd flying minute here and there. I still meet guys from the NS Iworked with and from what they tell me things have changed for the worse.
Wait until they start bringing in cost factors and economics to a captain's record as so many FW companies do. I'm glad I left now.
Geoffers,
The CAA seem to have been forced into the latter end of the 20th century at last if they wish to adopt some of the latest JAR amendments!! If you have a look at the latest version of DOC 28, specifically Appendix H it says;
"During the LST, an instrument-rated pilotwill be required to the precision instrument approach using raw data, uncoupled from any autopilot or FMS, and where possible, without the use of a flight director."
"Further instrument approaches on the LST and all instrument approaches on an LPC/OPC may be flown using the full suite of avionics available to the pilot"
"In FMS equipped helicopters, the examiner must be satisfied that the candidate is able to demonstrate an appropriate level of understanding of the helicopter system and is able to enter and execute routes, procedures and holds as necessary. Although not a mandatory test item, the hold of course may be examined and it may be sufficient for the candidate merely to demonstrate his ability to correctly programme the FMS to achieve the exercise."
So the only time you actually have to demonstrate you raw IF ability is during the initial LST. The rest can be done fully coupled and the hold done by merely programming the FMS.
The CAA seem to have been forced into the latter end of the 20th century at last if they wish to adopt some of the latest JAR amendments!! If you have a look at the latest version of DOC 28, specifically Appendix H it says;
"During the LST, an instrument-rated pilotwill be required to the precision instrument approach using raw data, uncoupled from any autopilot or FMS, and where possible, without the use of a flight director."
"Further instrument approaches on the LST and all instrument approaches on an LPC/OPC may be flown using the full suite of avionics available to the pilot"
"In FMS equipped helicopters, the examiner must be satisfied that the candidate is able to demonstrate an appropriate level of understanding of the helicopter system and is able to enter and execute routes, procedures and holds as necessary. Although not a mandatory test item, the hold of course may be examined and it may be sufficient for the candidate merely to demonstrate his ability to correctly programme the FMS to achieve the exercise."
So the only time you actually have to demonstrate you raw IF ability is during the initial LST. The rest can be done fully coupled and the hold done by merely programming the FMS.
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Hi guys
Check the last post
- Linha da Frente Forums-viewtopic-Helicóptero com 18 pessoas cai no Mar do Norte
Regards
VSOP
Check the last post
- Linha da Frente Forums-viewtopic-Helicóptero com 18 pessoas cai no Mar do Norte
Regards
VSOP
This summary is releasable.
1. Bond have delayed publishing information until now because they wanted to inform their own workforce (including those offshore) first.
2. Although the CVFDR, HUMS DFDAU and FDM card have been recovered and are at AAIB, they have not yet been downloaded. There is a technical problem with the FDR, and the FDM card is being "dried out". However, AAIB anticipate having some data within a couple of days.
3. The event history as briefed is based on the interviews with the aircraft Commander (who was PF). The copilot has not yet been interviewed as he is still in shock and under medical supervision by his AME.
4. The flight was scheduled for a mid-morning departure to the ETAP (about 125 nm east south east of Aberdeen) but was delayed until 1740 due to offshore weather (low cloud and poor visibility). Offshore weather reporting is a factor in that the conditions were rather worse than passed by the rig. A morning flight to the same destination only just got on despite reported weather close to VFR.
5. The transit out was at FL 55, VMC on top, and was uneventful. ATC cleared the aircraft direct to the ETAP. A weather update was received with 80 nm to run which suggested slight deterioration, and the crew discussed the option of an ARA, but the Commander elected to delay a decision until closer to the rig.
6. The aircraft started the descent at 100 nm from ADN and descended through some thin stratiform layers to 1500 feet. At this point, just under 20 nm from destination, the crew could see two fixed platforms (ETAP, the destination, and probably the Arbroath which was about 12 nm closer but slightly north of track).
7. As they approached the rig, they descended towards 500 feet, but went into some patchy cloud, so climbed up again. A short while afterwards, they were visual with the sea and descended to and maintained 300 feet. They were still visual with the destination.
8. There was a layer of cloud just above the flare. At this point the rig gave a further update on the weather with an estimated visibility of half a mile due to patchy fog/stratus. However, the crew could still see the rig and were happy to continue visually. Wind was light northwesterly (less than 5 kt) and the sea was "like a millpond".
9. The crew flew through their target gate at 0.75 nm downwind of the rig at 300 feet and 80 kt, heading just south of east (ie maintaining the outbound heading). Up to this point the aircraft had been fully coupled in 4 axes (airspeed and baralt holds). PF then decoupled and turned towards the rig for an into-wind visual approach.
10. As he rolled out of the turn, he "was surprised to see the rig a lot closer than he anticipated". He asked PNF (who was monitoring the instruments) twice to confirm he could still see the helideck, to which PNF replied that yes he could.
11. Supposition (because not confirmed by FDR or FDM data) is that PF pulled back on the cyclic to decelerate and lowered the collective to maintain height.
12. The next thing either pilot (or the passengers) knew was that the aircraft hit the water, at slight nose up attitude (tail first) but with low rate of descent and low forward speed. One passenger was quoted as saying he felt the landing and fully expected the HLO to open the door, until water started to enter the cabin.
13. The impact point was about 500 metres south of the destination on a projected track that would have passed south west of the rig. It was seen by the helideck crew who raised the alarm.
14. The impact stopped the tail rotor. the drive sheared round about the transport joint (Frame 9900). The forward section of the sheared driveshaft flailed inside the housing, cutting through the fuselage (and getting the tiedown strops wrapped round it) and causing the tail boom attachment to fail and the tail boom to come off and sink.
15. The cabin doors were jettisoned and both liferafts were operated. Most passengers entered the left raft (probably because they always use the left door for entry and exit to all Puma variants). About the only person who got slightly wet was the copilot, who jumped from the forward LH float into the LH raft. Both rafts were tied together and the subsequent rescue went well.
16 The aircraft was (eventually) recovered (that is a separate story) and is at AAIB.
17. Bond have reviewed their operating procedures and were happy to receive input from both Bristow and CHC. Many of the changes they are making are already in, or in the process of going in, to CHC manuals, as a result of the Blackpool accident.
Initial weather reports given to the crew prior to departure from Aberdeen indicated 8Km Vis and a cloud base of 800-1000ft with a light (10kt) easterly wind.
On departure the crew elected to climb to FL55 and were VMC (Visual) on top.
Enroute an updated weather report indicated deterioration to Vis 2-3Nm and a cloud base of 600ft.
The crew decided to wait as to whether they would carry out an ARA (Radar) Approach. They commenced an early descent and at approx 13Nm from the Etap again called for a further update in the weather. The report they received showed further deterioration now down to 0.5Nm vis and a cloud base of 500ft approx (top of Flare). During the descent at 2000ft they were visual with two platforms (assume the Etap and Arbroath) and so at 1500 ft elected to carry on with a visual approach. As such they continued descent to 500ft and at 6Nm continued down to 300ft, however at this point they went into cloud and so climbed back up to 500ft to remain visual which they did. Once clear of the cloud again dropped down to 300ft. This was to set them up for their Visual Gate Point of 300ft 0.75Nm and 80Kts as published in their company Operations manual.
As they approached the Etap they were on a left base approach, the Captain (handling Pilot) asked if the Co-Pilot was visual with the Helideck and he replied yes. The Captain then disengaged the coupled modes of the autopilot and flew the aircraft manually and initiated the left turn onto finals. Again during the turn the Captain asked for confirmation that the Co still had sight of the helideck and received a positive answer.
On roll out from the turn the Captain saw what he thought was the helideck/platform much closer than anticipated and thus thought that he had positioned too close and too high which resulted with him pulling back on the cyclic to raise the nose and reduce speed and drop the collective to reduce power and height.
The next thing they knew was that they were in the water 500m from the Etap. We do not know what he saw or why and is open to supposition.
1. Bond have delayed publishing information until now because they wanted to inform their own workforce (including those offshore) first.
2. Although the CVFDR, HUMS DFDAU and FDM card have been recovered and are at AAIB, they have not yet been downloaded. There is a technical problem with the FDR, and the FDM card is being "dried out". However, AAIB anticipate having some data within a couple of days.
3. The event history as briefed is based on the interviews with the aircraft Commander (who was PF). The copilot has not yet been interviewed as he is still in shock and under medical supervision by his AME.
4. The flight was scheduled for a mid-morning departure to the ETAP (about 125 nm east south east of Aberdeen) but was delayed until 1740 due to offshore weather (low cloud and poor visibility). Offshore weather reporting is a factor in that the conditions were rather worse than passed by the rig. A morning flight to the same destination only just got on despite reported weather close to VFR.
5. The transit out was at FL 55, VMC on top, and was uneventful. ATC cleared the aircraft direct to the ETAP. A weather update was received with 80 nm to run which suggested slight deterioration, and the crew discussed the option of an ARA, but the Commander elected to delay a decision until closer to the rig.
6. The aircraft started the descent at 100 nm from ADN and descended through some thin stratiform layers to 1500 feet. At this point, just under 20 nm from destination, the crew could see two fixed platforms (ETAP, the destination, and probably the Arbroath which was about 12 nm closer but slightly north of track).
7. As they approached the rig, they descended towards 500 feet, but went into some patchy cloud, so climbed up again. A short while afterwards, they were visual with the sea and descended to and maintained 300 feet. They were still visual with the destination.
8. There was a layer of cloud just above the flare. At this point the rig gave a further update on the weather with an estimated visibility of half a mile due to patchy fog/stratus. However, the crew could still see the rig and were happy to continue visually. Wind was light northwesterly (less than 5 kt) and the sea was "like a millpond".
9. The crew flew through their target gate at 0.75 nm downwind of the rig at 300 feet and 80 kt, heading just south of east (ie maintaining the outbound heading). Up to this point the aircraft had been fully coupled in 4 axes (airspeed and baralt holds). PF then decoupled and turned towards the rig for an into-wind visual approach.
10. As he rolled out of the turn, he "was surprised to see the rig a lot closer than he anticipated". He asked PNF (who was monitoring the instruments) twice to confirm he could still see the helideck, to which PNF replied that yes he could.
11. Supposition (because not confirmed by FDR or FDM data) is that PF pulled back on the cyclic to decelerate and lowered the collective to maintain height.
12. The next thing either pilot (or the passengers) knew was that the aircraft hit the water, at slight nose up attitude (tail first) but with low rate of descent and low forward speed. One passenger was quoted as saying he felt the landing and fully expected the HLO to open the door, until water started to enter the cabin.
13. The impact point was about 500 metres south of the destination on a projected track that would have passed south west of the rig. It was seen by the helideck crew who raised the alarm.
14. The impact stopped the tail rotor. the drive sheared round about the transport joint (Frame 9900). The forward section of the sheared driveshaft flailed inside the housing, cutting through the fuselage (and getting the tiedown strops wrapped round it) and causing the tail boom attachment to fail and the tail boom to come off and sink.
15. The cabin doors were jettisoned and both liferafts were operated. Most passengers entered the left raft (probably because they always use the left door for entry and exit to all Puma variants). About the only person who got slightly wet was the copilot, who jumped from the forward LH float into the LH raft. Both rafts were tied together and the subsequent rescue went well.
16 The aircraft was (eventually) recovered (that is a separate story) and is at AAIB.
17. Bond have reviewed their operating procedures and were happy to receive input from both Bristow and CHC. Many of the changes they are making are already in, or in the process of going in, to CHC manuals, as a result of the Blackpool accident.
Initial weather reports given to the crew prior to departure from Aberdeen indicated 8Km Vis and a cloud base of 800-1000ft with a light (10kt) easterly wind.
On departure the crew elected to climb to FL55 and were VMC (Visual) on top.
Enroute an updated weather report indicated deterioration to Vis 2-3Nm and a cloud base of 600ft.
The crew decided to wait as to whether they would carry out an ARA (Radar) Approach. They commenced an early descent and at approx 13Nm from the Etap again called for a further update in the weather. The report they received showed further deterioration now down to 0.5Nm vis and a cloud base of 500ft approx (top of Flare). During the descent at 2000ft they were visual with two platforms (assume the Etap and Arbroath) and so at 1500 ft elected to carry on with a visual approach. As such they continued descent to 500ft and at 6Nm continued down to 300ft, however at this point they went into cloud and so climbed back up to 500ft to remain visual which they did. Once clear of the cloud again dropped down to 300ft. This was to set them up for their Visual Gate Point of 300ft 0.75Nm and 80Kts as published in their company Operations manual.
As they approached the Etap they were on a left base approach, the Captain (handling Pilot) asked if the Co-Pilot was visual with the Helideck and he replied yes. The Captain then disengaged the coupled modes of the autopilot and flew the aircraft manually and initiated the left turn onto finals. Again during the turn the Captain asked for confirmation that the Co still had sight of the helideck and received a positive answer.
On roll out from the turn the Captain saw what he thought was the helideck/platform much closer than anticipated and thus thought that he had positioned too close and too high which resulted with him pulling back on the cyclic to raise the nose and reduce speed and drop the collective to reduce power and height.
The next thing they knew was that they were in the water 500m from the Etap. We do not know what he saw or why and is open to supposition.
A.Agincourt
I don't know if you are a NS pilot but what you say about seeing a reflection is fanciful.
For those that don't know the ETAP rig it is one of the biggest in the NS. Geoffers video is a good example of the smaller SNS rigs but is not really relevant to something the size of ETAP.
The rig is split into 2 main structures, production and accommodation. The production area is a huge cube with its upper deck about 300ft amsl and surmounted by a flare top about 500ft amsl.
The accommodation has a large helideck on top at a height of about 170ft amsl. The deck is well lit with modern green lighting.
There has obviously been a lot of discussion and theories bounced around NS crewrooms based on the information released so far but we will wait and learn from the AAIB report and not speculate in public.
There will be a whole string of events that led up to this accident any one of which, if changed, would have stopped the accident. It is up to us as professional pilots to break the chain before the final link is in place.
The RAF had a very good Flight Safety film demonstrating this, based on a real accident.
HF
I don't know if you are a NS pilot but what you say about seeing a reflection is fanciful.
For those that don't know the ETAP rig it is one of the biggest in the NS. Geoffers video is a good example of the smaller SNS rigs but is not really relevant to something the size of ETAP.
The rig is split into 2 main structures, production and accommodation. The production area is a huge cube with its upper deck about 300ft amsl and surmounted by a flare top about 500ft amsl.
The accommodation has a large helideck on top at a height of about 170ft amsl. The deck is well lit with modern green lighting.
There has obviously been a lot of discussion and theories bounced around NS crewrooms based on the information released so far but we will wait and learn from the AAIB report and not speculate in public.
There will be a whole string of events that led up to this accident any one of which, if changed, would have stopped the accident. It is up to us as professional pilots to break the chain before the final link is in place.
The RAF had a very good Flight Safety film demonstrating this, based on a real accident.
HF
Humming,
If your suggestion is true....that the ETAP being "large" prevents a mirror image being seen as it reflects off the water....how can we get those wonderful photos of Mount Adams reflected off Takalak Lake just north of Babyshoe Pass in Washington State? The mountain is just over 12.000 high.
If you can see a complete mirror image of the stars and Moon it follows the platforms/rigs can be reflected as well. It is most confusing to look out and see stars below you.....and to look out while in a turn....see two platforms growing from a common point.
If your suggestion is true....that the ETAP being "large" prevents a mirror image being seen as it reflects off the water....how can we get those wonderful photos of Mount Adams reflected off Takalak Lake just north of Babyshoe Pass in Washington State? The mountain is just over 12.000 high.
If you can see a complete mirror image of the stars and Moon it follows the platforms/rigs can be reflected as well. It is most confusing to look out and see stars below you.....and to look out while in a turn....see two platforms growing from a common point.
Last edited by SASless; 8th Mar 2009 at 15:09.
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SASless: Precisely the point i was trying to make. Thank you. I did not think it necessary to spell it out so clearly. I was clearly wrong.
Best Wishes
Best Wishes
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And still this . . .
"4. The flight was scheduled for a mid-morning departure to the ETAP (about 125 nm east south east of Aberdeen) but was delayed until 1740 due to offshore weather (low cloud and poor visibility). Offshore weather reporting is a factor in that the conditions were rather worse than passed by the rig. A morning flight to the same destination only just got on despite reported weather close to VFR. "
"good weather cap" . . .
"4. The flight was scheduled for a mid-morning departure to the ETAP (about 125 nm east south east of Aberdeen) but was delayed until 1740 due to offshore weather (low cloud and poor visibility). Offshore weather reporting is a factor in that the conditions were rather worse than passed by the rig. A morning flight to the same destination only just got on despite reported weather close to VFR. "
"good weather cap" . . .
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Mr Hummingfrog, I think Mr A.Agincourt has spent the better part of his life on the NS (And he is rather Senior) So I think his points are worth taking on board!!!! And he is also my boss so I have to be nice!! Most importantly he has a moustache like a Privet Hedge.
The size of the structure as unimportant and may in itself lead to additional optical illusions.
Maybe you simply do not want to accept the fact that this can happen to any of us, in a serviceable machine!!!
SASless - very nice piccy of a mountain. Not sure I would like to meet that over the North Sea at Night. If you know where it is please have it removed before we bump into it!!!
The size of the structure as unimportant and may in itself lead to additional optical illusions.
Maybe you simply do not want to accept the fact that this can happen to any of us, in a serviceable machine!!!
SASless - very nice piccy of a mountain. Not sure I would like to meet that over the North Sea at Night. If you know where it is please have it removed before we bump into it!!!
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At night, in poor visibility, when the top half of the destination platform is obscured by low cloud the reflection of the rig lights can give the false impression that you are looking at the whole rig. The sea does not have to be flat calm for this to happen, obviously, the lower the sea state the more enhanced the illusion will be.
I've seen these 'Rig Reflections' myself, but have never seen the North Sea calm enough to see a mirror image of the stars, maybe I wasn't flying that night.
I'm not going to theorise if this was a contributory factor in this incident, I'll wait for the AAIB report for that. Like most of us I have my own views on the subject but don't wish to discuss them here just with my colleagues in the crew room at work.
I've seen these 'Rig Reflections' myself, but have never seen the North Sea calm enough to see a mirror image of the stars, maybe I wasn't flying that night.
I'm not going to theorise if this was a contributory factor in this incident, I'll wait for the AAIB report for that. Like most of us I have my own views on the subject but don't wish to discuss them here just with my colleagues in the crew room at work.
It's interesting to note that (BAR)ALT hold was used - this seems to indicate a negative crossover in AP use from the L2, which has a very unforgiving 'Fly Up' mode when RADALT is coupled, leading to its use being discouraged. The EC225, on the other hand, does not have the same logic and the use of RADALT hold would seem more sensible offshore - what do the other 225 users advocate? Similarly, the IAS can remain coupled to 30 KIAS, so in reality the aircraft can be manouevred to a point pretty much coincident with a commital point, depending on wind speed of course.
Both EC and SAC are looking at developing GNSS based offshore approaches to very low minima (1/4 -1/8 of a mile) with appropriately modified AP software to allow the aircraft to remain coupled until 'LDP' (manufacturers's term.) The abilities of the AFCSs will be more akin to a SAR AFCS than the conventional current systems, with velocity hold and 'beepable' velocity vectors. It would seem that although the intended use of such procedures is to improve the current ARA for IFR ops, specifically to utilise EGNOS and WAAS, in reality the enhanced functionality required of the AFCSs would lend itself perfectly to night operations too, and I hope the regulators take note when considering such systems approval.
DB, please can we stop using this 'Call The Ball' expression? Its sounds like something from a hollywood movie However, I fully support your general sentiments about stabilised approaches etc
Both EC and SAC are looking at developing GNSS based offshore approaches to very low minima (1/4 -1/8 of a mile) with appropriately modified AP software to allow the aircraft to remain coupled until 'LDP' (manufacturers's term.) The abilities of the AFCSs will be more akin to a SAR AFCS than the conventional current systems, with velocity hold and 'beepable' velocity vectors. It would seem that although the intended use of such procedures is to improve the current ARA for IFR ops, specifically to utilise EGNOS and WAAS, in reality the enhanced functionality required of the AFCSs would lend itself perfectly to night operations too, and I hope the regulators take note when considering such systems approval.
DB, please can we stop using this 'Call The Ball' expression? Its sounds like something from a hollywood movie
However, I fully support your general sentiments about stabilised approaches etc
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212 I think you will find somewhere on here that HC mentioned that they use the (BAR)ALT hold, corrected against RADALT, as is holds the height more firmly than does the (RAD)ALT hold. The (RAD)ALT hold is "softer" as otherwise it would follow the waves and jump over boats passing underneath etc.
Not a negative crossover from the 'old' tech L2, more a carefully thought out practice.
When are you dropping by here for refreshments?
Not a negative crossover from the 'old' tech L2, more a carefully thought out practice.
When are you dropping by here for refreshments?
Presumably they weren't using either height hold if they managed to fly into the sea! No doubt there is a manoeuvre facility on the height holds so that would imply that the button was pressed whilst the aircraft was being positioned - hence the loss of height protection.
Our Bar alt hold is good but nothing like as tight as the rad alt hold - it has a smoother circuit to take out some wave motion but it is still the weapon of choice for over water work, especially at night.
Our Bar alt hold is good but nothing like as tight as the rad alt hold - it has a smoother circuit to take out some wave motion but it is still the weapon of choice for over water work, especially at night.
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I’ve lurked in rotor heads for long time with only a few posts and I’ve watched this thread with interest since the accident. I don’t want to discuss the ditching but as the thread now is mostly about night flying offshore and its inherent problems I’ll throw my ten penny worth in.
I’ve been flying offshore Uk for the past 30 years (both north and south) Started in the late 70’s with BO105’s based offshore in the east Shetland basin and now driving the all swinging all powerful 139 in the southern NS.. About 15% of the past 3 decades has been at night and as a choice I prefer flying at night. I actually enjoy it...at least most of the time!
From single pilot IFR with no radalt and a stability system that was a joke.... to now..a machine with a pretty good autopilot. Sit back and enjoy type flying!
The flying up north wasn’t as bad as it seemed as most places had massive gas flares and the structures were pretty huge. Lots of visual cues seen through cracked Perspex at the time, though landing on a pitching tethered tanker at night had its moments.
In the south the night flying is a lot more demanding with tiny unmanned platforms, and very few visual cues to help you.
My point (at last) is that whatever you fly and however you fly...to land you need to be able to hand fly this machine on to the deck....to recognise the visual cues you are seeing and to convert instrument flying into visual flight...progressively.
Sounds simple...but it needs (current) practice....and training. Though I enjoy night flying...it’s always treated with respect ‘cos it can bite your head off!
How much time do we spend practicing for that “engine failure” Most of our profiles and much of the required testing of pilots..is concentrated on that. In 30 years I’ve never had a mechanical engine failure. (one icing)
Yet how much time is spent training and keeping current in night approaches?
And when we do train...it’s normally in pretty good weather.
Simulators...simulators you may shout.
..........as far as that last minute or two where (if we have one) we disengage our auto pilots and hand fly the aircraft onto the deck in the dark is concerned...they are as useless as a snooze button on a smoke alarm.
Great for procedures, and CRM training but the graphics and aircraft handling are awful.
This is a cry to the sim manufacturers to give us a simple dedicated helicopter sim...that does what it says on the tin.
Maybe a night landing sim with no axis movement? ’cos surely the graphics can’t be that hard...???
It’s about practicing on something that has very few visual cues...just shapes and lights . certainly they can do that...can’t they?
Safe night flying offshore is all about practice and training and we...in the industry are in danger of not getting enough of it. A good sim. on every base must be the answer...but someone has to build one!
I’ve been flying offshore Uk for the past 30 years (both north and south) Started in the late 70’s with BO105’s based offshore in the east Shetland basin and now driving the all swinging all powerful 139 in the southern NS.. About 15% of the past 3 decades has been at night and as a choice I prefer flying at night. I actually enjoy it...at least most of the time!
From single pilot IFR with no radalt and a stability system that was a joke.... to now..a machine with a pretty good autopilot. Sit back and enjoy type flying!
The flying up north wasn’t as bad as it seemed as most places had massive gas flares and the structures were pretty huge. Lots of visual cues seen through cracked Perspex at the time, though landing on a pitching tethered tanker at night had its moments.
In the south the night flying is a lot more demanding with tiny unmanned platforms, and very few visual cues to help you.
My point (at last) is that whatever you fly and however you fly...to land you need to be able to hand fly this machine on to the deck....to recognise the visual cues you are seeing and to convert instrument flying into visual flight...progressively.
Sounds simple...but it needs (current) practice....and training. Though I enjoy night flying...it’s always treated with respect ‘cos it can bite your head off!
How much time do we spend practicing for that “engine failure” Most of our profiles and much of the required testing of pilots..is concentrated on that. In 30 years I’ve never had a mechanical engine failure. (one icing)
Yet how much time is spent training and keeping current in night approaches?
And when we do train...it’s normally in pretty good weather.
Simulators...simulators you may shout.
..........as far as that last minute or two where (if we have one) we disengage our auto pilots and hand fly the aircraft onto the deck in the dark is concerned...they are as useless as a snooze button on a smoke alarm.Great for procedures, and CRM training but the graphics and aircraft handling are awful.
This is a cry to the sim manufacturers to give us a simple dedicated helicopter sim...that does what it says on the tin.
Maybe a night landing sim with no axis movement? ’cos surely the graphics can’t be that hard...???
It’s about practicing on something that has very few visual cues...just shapes and lights . certainly they can do that...can’t they?
Safe night flying offshore is all about practice and training and we...in the industry are in danger of not getting enough of it. A good sim. on every base must be the answer...but someone has to build one!
Last edited by Deck Clear; 9th Mar 2009 at 10:28.
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Deck Clear,
(All about Practise and Training) I hear you 5 x 5 - the question is - WHAT ARE YOU GOING TO TRAIN TO DO and WHAT WILL YOU PRACTISE.
You will appreciate that the only acceptable visual refrences at night, which all offshore pilots have little trouble getting on the deck thereafter, is the Rugby Ball shape of the deck lights.
CONSIDER THIS:
At the bottom of an ILS we are only allowed down to 200 feet AGL (Absolute minimum) - and yet when we get there (day or night) the required visual refernces are very easy to interpret, lead in lights, horizon afforded by airport infrastructure, runway lights etc - BUT MOST IMPORTANT OF ALL we have a gazzilion yards of tarmac in which to bring our sensible stable flight speed (80 KIAS) to a gentle stop.
Compare that to a Night ARA at minimums. MDH is Deck + 50 feet.
Perf Class 2 says Deck + 40 Feet for the ideal Committal.
We now have effectively a decision height of 50 feet at the point that the only acceptable visual refernces are present, ie the Rugby Ball.
80 KIAS at the point where the references are avialable to us is simply not an option- Try 25 KIAS Max!!!! That might just work.
Oh and you only have 10 feet of space to fly in as the Committal must be 40 foot above the deck. (The f****in Puma is nearly 25 feet high)
I fully agree with all you say, but, when a Pilot (without a fully formed rugby ball in his windscreen) elects to de-couple and fly manually to try and find the deck, he is the last piece of swiss cheese in a very long list of cheeses. He better be up to it cos history has proven that at least 8 of our bretheren have proven otherwise.
Time has come to get some common sense back into our flying at night.
Simply by moving the point in space, where the only acceptable visual references are availabale (The CTB) further back, and higher up is the only way we can stay speed stable until the CTB.
1. MDH for all Night approaches should be 400 feet or Deck + 200 feet.
2. No descent allowed AT ALL below MDH - until the CTB is reached.
3. Speed parameters TYPE SPECIFIC defined.
4. Intervention parameters DEFINED
5. Intervention policies - MANDATED
6. Automatics - MANDATED
If we are going to train and practise we should be doing it with procedures that actually have a cat in hells chance of working.
At the moment training more and practising more simply reduces the chances of the very last cheese hole (ie ME!!!) in the accident chain from lining up and IN DOING SO consigns the entire fate of the crew and passengers into solely human hands in an environment which humans are very fallable, using procedures and minima which all too often now have allowed that fallability to be exploited.
Time for some real changes - for the better I think.
(All about Practise and Training) I hear you 5 x 5 - the question is - WHAT ARE YOU GOING TO TRAIN TO DO and WHAT WILL YOU PRACTISE.
You will appreciate that the only acceptable visual refrences at night, which all offshore pilots have little trouble getting on the deck thereafter, is the Rugby Ball shape of the deck lights.
CONSIDER THIS:
At the bottom of an ILS we are only allowed down to 200 feet AGL (Absolute minimum) - and yet when we get there (day or night) the required visual refernces are very easy to interpret, lead in lights, horizon afforded by airport infrastructure, runway lights etc - BUT MOST IMPORTANT OF ALL we have a gazzilion yards of tarmac in which to bring our sensible stable flight speed (80 KIAS) to a gentle stop.
Compare that to a Night ARA at minimums. MDH is Deck + 50 feet.
Perf Class 2 says Deck + 40 Feet for the ideal Committal.
We now have effectively a decision height of 50 feet at the point that the only acceptable visual refernces are present, ie the Rugby Ball.
80 KIAS at the point where the references are avialable to us is simply not an option- Try 25 KIAS Max!!!! That might just work.
Oh and you only have 10 feet of space to fly in as the Committal must be 40 foot above the deck. (The f****in Puma is nearly 25 feet high)
I fully agree with all you say, but, when a Pilot (without a fully formed rugby ball in his windscreen) elects to de-couple and fly manually to try and find the deck, he is the last piece of swiss cheese in a very long list of cheeses. He better be up to it cos history has proven that at least 8 of our bretheren have proven otherwise.
Time has come to get some common sense back into our flying at night.
Simply by moving the point in space, where the only acceptable visual references are availabale (The CTB) further back, and higher up is the only way we can stay speed stable until the CTB.
1. MDH for all Night approaches should be 400 feet or Deck + 200 feet.
2. No descent allowed AT ALL below MDH - until the CTB is reached.
3. Speed parameters TYPE SPECIFIC defined.
4. Intervention parameters DEFINED
5. Intervention policies - MANDATED
6. Automatics - MANDATED
If we are going to train and practise we should be doing it with procedures that actually have a cat in hells chance of working.
At the moment training more and practising more simply reduces the chances of the very last cheese hole (ie ME!!!) in the accident chain from lining up and IN DOING SO consigns the entire fate of the crew and passengers into solely human hands in an environment which humans are very fallable, using procedures and minima which all too often now have allowed that fallability to be exploited.
Time for some real changes - for the better I think.
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(The f****in Puma is nearly 25 feet high)
Yeah, in the hover, maybe.
4.95m is a little over 16', the pilot eyeline at about 8'.
You're trying to mandate and change procedures when you don't actually know what caused this incident.
It could be an inherent fault with the procedures.
It could be a failure to follow procedures.
Let's find out what caused it, and then mandate and change procedures (assuming that it was these that were at fault), as necessary.
If you really think that the procedures used are causing an inherent risk, are you going to stop flying using them?
Respect to anyone that has the balls to stand by their convictions.
Getting back in my box now.
Yeah, in the hover, maybe.
4.95m is a little over 16', the pilot eyeline at about 8'.
You're trying to mandate and change procedures when you don't actually know what caused this incident.
It could be an inherent fault with the procedures.
It could be a failure to follow procedures.
Let's find out what caused it, and then mandate and change procedures (assuming that it was these that were at fault), as necessary.
If you really think that the procedures used are causing an inherent risk, are you going to stop flying using them?
Respect to anyone that has the balls to stand by their convictions.
Getting back in my box now.
DB,
I just made a post at the Night VFR thread and posed the following question.
Are the rules such that we are allowed to operate VFR in IMC conditions when reported weather is at or above VFR minimums but due to the lack of external visual reference we are forced to fly on instruments and thus in fact are in Instrument conditions despite the favorable weather conditions.
Visibility can be 5KM's and if there is nothing to be seen within that distance....there is no external reference....as on a cloudy night with dense clouds and no starlight, Moon, or surface lights.
Are we not setting ourselves up for CFIT by continuing into Instrument conditions while flying VFR?
I just made a post at the Night VFR thread and posed the following question.
Are the rules such that we are allowed to operate VFR in IMC conditions when reported weather is at or above VFR minimums but due to the lack of external visual reference we are forced to fly on instruments and thus in fact are in Instrument conditions despite the favorable weather conditions.
Visibility can be 5KM's and if there is nothing to be seen within that distance....there is no external reference....as on a cloudy night with dense clouds and no starlight, Moon, or surface lights.
Are we not setting ourselves up for CFIT by continuing into Instrument conditions while flying VFR?
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SAS,
This is precisley my point. The only acceptable visual references at night is the Deck Lighting affording the "Rugby Ball" shape. Prior to that, you must fly by sole reference to the Instruments otherwise the result is as we have just witnessed.
The failure of any regulatory authority and Company procedures to recognise this as the CRUX of a night approach is the inherent fault in the procedures.
Add to that, an MDH which is not a "Not Below" only when still in cloud is the second fualt in the procedures.
Maybe my "estimate" of the height of a Puma is a bit out, but as the last poster suggested, with an eye hieght of 8 feet........and 10 feet to play in. Got to be bollocks really!!!!!
Or maybe we should wait another year for the AAIB report, when everyone has forgotten AGAIN...and just carry on until the next time.
We are averaging 2 CFIT(W) per decade at present. Is that really acceptable!!!
This is precisley my point. The only acceptable visual references at night is the Deck Lighting affording the "Rugby Ball" shape. Prior to that, you must fly by sole reference to the Instruments otherwise the result is as we have just witnessed.
The failure of any regulatory authority and Company procedures to recognise this as the CRUX of a night approach is the inherent fault in the procedures.
Add to that, an MDH which is not a "Not Below" only when still in cloud is the second fualt in the procedures.
Maybe my "estimate" of the height of a Puma is a bit out, but as the last poster suggested, with an eye hieght of 8 feet........and 10 feet to play in. Got to be bollocks really!!!!!
Or maybe we should wait another year for the AAIB report, when everyone has forgotten AGAIN...and just carry on until the next time.
We are averaging 2 CFIT(W) per decade at present. Is that really acceptable!!!