Super Puma down central North Sea Feb 2009
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I might be getting the regulations on the IFR to VFR "over water" cloud break procedure confused but aren't the day limits 600' cloud base, 4 km forward visibility with a minimum operating height of 500'?
Jim
I think most of the posters here are familiar with the limits you quote. The point is that there are holes in those limits - whilst my minima for an ARA might be deck height + 50 etc, once I am visual there are no limits. If at DH+50 or 300' at night, I can just see the bright lights of the installation through the mist, there is nothing to stop me descending further to get below the thin cloud base of 100', then running in and climbing up to the helideck. The visual sector is not really defined - it can't be because the deck might be at 50' - at some point I have to descend to 50' to land on it.
Ditto for an en-route descent. I might have 1200' and 5km at the bottom of my descent, but as you know, the met reporting from offshore is hit and miss, all the more so at night, and whilst I might have surface contact, its hard to know the forward visibility unless within 5km of the destination, which is probably too close to be still at 1200'. Once below 1200', in sight of the surface and on descent for landing (lets say to my 50' deck) there is no control over my height. I must be allowed to descend to 50' or I can't land, but does it say anywhere that I must even be visual with the destination at that point, never mind with good visual cues? I might think I have 1200' and 5kms, but can't be sure if I am more than 5kms from the installation. I will not see that fog bank that is lurking between me and the installation.
I might be above it at 200', looking down through only a few 100' or so, getting good visual with the destination, then I descend to 100' and now looking through 1/2 mile or so of the same mist - total loss of visual references.
In summary, I totally disagree with
- there has to be, otherwise I can't land on a low deck
All that said, I don't think that legislation is the way to fix this problem, its too complex. It has to be more to do with good SOPs, training and an understanding of the pitfalls.
Regarding the apparent sleight against the Authorities, and your statement
unfortunately that is no longer true. It was a big negative step when we were forced to align our Ops Manuals with JAR-OPS 3 paragraph by paragraph. In my opinion this was done to make it easy for the Authority to check that our manuals were compliant with Jar-Ops 3 - it was not done to make the manuals easy to interpret by flight crew. A lot of good stuff was lost from the manuals as a consequence and its less easy to read as a result.
Of course, but lets keep it to a minimum - use the automation until really close, when the visual references are reasonable and we are manually flying for the shortest time.
HC
I think most of the posters here are familiar with the limits you quote. The point is that there are holes in those limits - whilst my minima for an ARA might be deck height + 50 etc, once I am visual there are no limits. If at DH+50 or 300' at night, I can just see the bright lights of the installation through the mist, there is nothing to stop me descending further to get below the thin cloud base of 100', then running in and climbing up to the helideck. The visual sector is not really defined - it can't be because the deck might be at 50' - at some point I have to descend to 50' to land on it.
Ditto for an en-route descent. I might have 1200' and 5km at the bottom of my descent, but as you know, the met reporting from offshore is hit and miss, all the more so at night, and whilst I might have surface contact, its hard to know the forward visibility unless within 5km of the destination, which is probably too close to be still at 1200'. Once below 1200', in sight of the surface and on descent for landing (lets say to my 50' deck) there is no control over my height. I must be allowed to descend to 50' or I can't land, but does it say anywhere that I must even be visual with the destination at that point, never mind with good visual cues? I might think I have 1200' and 5kms, but can't be sure if I am more than 5kms from the installation. I will not see that fog bank that is lurking between me and the installation.
I might be above it at 200', looking down through only a few 100' or so, getting good visual with the destination, then I descend to 100' and now looking through 1/2 mile or so of the same mist - total loss of visual references.
In summary, I totally disagree with
There is no freedom to fly below the VFR limits.
All that said, I don't think that legislation is the way to fix this problem, its too complex. It has to be more to do with good SOPs, training and an understanding of the pitfalls.
Regarding the apparent sleight against the Authorities, and your statement
recognise that the Operator writes and owns the OM - not a faceless committee in Europe.
There will always be the need for competent handling skills in helicopters
HC
Last edited by HeliComparator; 28th Feb 2009 at 21:28.
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HC said
Are you shi**ting me!
I've never flown with any trainer, Line or otherwise, who has interpreted the latter stage of an ARA in that way or that would condone a stunt like that.
Heavens forbid.
The only one thing that will stop that kind of stunt is good airmanship.
Are you telling me that you can't land to a 50ft deck from a run in at 200ft by day or 300ft by night?
There should never be a need to climb back up to deck height. ****, just go home and try again another day!
"Failed to demonstrate" may come up in the debrief if someone tried that with me on a line check.
If at DH+50 or 300' at night, I can just see the bright lights of the installation through the mist, there is nothing to stop me descending further to get below the thin cloud base of 100', then running in and climbing up to the helideck.
I've never flown with any trainer, Line or otherwise, who has interpreted the latter stage of an ARA in that way or that would condone a stunt like that.
Heavens forbid.
The only one thing that will stop that kind of stunt is good airmanship.
Are you telling me that you can't land to a 50ft deck from a run in at 200ft by day or 300ft by night?
There should never be a need to climb back up to deck height. ****, just go home and try again another day!
"Failed to demonstrate" may come up in the debrief if someone tried that with me on a line check.
RWB
Of course I am not suggesting that is the right way to do things - that was the point of the post. But I am suggesting that there is nothing in JAR-OPS 3 to forbid it.
HC
Of course I am not suggesting that is the right way to do things - that was the point of the post. But I am suggesting that there is nothing in JAR-OPS 3 to forbid it.
HC
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JimL,
I am really sory but you have utterley missed the entire point of this debate.
What you are describing is the minima for an ARA for continued onward descent. We are not thick, we know that if we are not visual at the prescribed minima a continued descent is not acceptable. That is why, as far as I am aware, there has not been one single incident of descent below minima and subsequnt CFIT diuring an ARA. The discipline of the IFR procedure producing a stable approach.
What we are talikng about in this forum is the issue WHEN THE CREW ARE VMC - how low can they go then, what minima is in place - answer ZIP.
Rule 5 does not apply and OM limitations are non existant as they have all been written to conform to JAR.
The issue here to be clear, is what exactly constitutes the required visual references. By day, at 3/4 Nm sight of the platform and a discernable horizon, would seem sufficient.
By night, it is a whole different ball game. The only references acceptable to permit a controlled final descent VISUALLY is the fully formed "Rugby Ball" to permit a sight picture approach. What I have chosen to define as the CTB.
JAR and the ANO make no references to this point in space and the only MDAs specified are for the ARA, Ie no further descent unless visual by, 300 feet or 50 ADH. The question which you seem to missed entirely....is when is that further descent supposed to take place.
I am dissapointed that already, a regulators voice leaps in with the note of caution and the implied tone of the post that we are suppoesed to "proffessional" pilots. What the hell do you think we are posting for!!
Most of us on this forum are advocating increased limits and better procedures. If you want to argue against that there are not many who would agree with you.
If you want to try and defend a Regulatory Authority who for the most part behaves like a toothless tiger...bring it on.
In any case. This is an issue for the crews that operate offshore and despite the inertia of the Regulators, maliase of the operators and determination of the customers, most of us want to go home at the end of our shift.
A really dissapointed DB.
I am really sory but you have utterley missed the entire point of this debate.
What you are describing is the minima for an ARA for continued onward descent. We are not thick, we know that if we are not visual at the prescribed minima a continued descent is not acceptable. That is why, as far as I am aware, there has not been one single incident of descent below minima and subsequnt CFIT diuring an ARA. The discipline of the IFR procedure producing a stable approach.
What we are talikng about in this forum is the issue WHEN THE CREW ARE VMC - how low can they go then, what minima is in place - answer ZIP.
Rule 5 does not apply and OM limitations are non existant as they have all been written to conform to JAR.
The issue here to be clear, is what exactly constitutes the required visual references. By day, at 3/4 Nm sight of the platform and a discernable horizon, would seem sufficient.
By night, it is a whole different ball game. The only references acceptable to permit a controlled final descent VISUALLY is the fully formed "Rugby Ball" to permit a sight picture approach. What I have chosen to define as the CTB.
JAR and the ANO make no references to this point in space and the only MDAs specified are for the ARA, Ie no further descent unless visual by, 300 feet or 50 ADH. The question which you seem to missed entirely....is when is that further descent supposed to take place.
I am dissapointed that already, a regulators voice leaps in with the note of caution and the implied tone of the post that we are suppoesed to "proffessional" pilots. What the hell do you think we are posting for!!
Most of us on this forum are advocating increased limits and better procedures. If you want to argue against that there are not many who would agree with you.
If you want to try and defend a Regulatory Authority who for the most part behaves like a toothless tiger...bring it on.
In any case. This is an issue for the crews that operate offshore and despite the inertia of the Regulators, maliase of the operators and determination of the customers, most of us want to go home at the end of our shift.
A really dissapointed DB.
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"The only one thing that will stop that kind of stunt is good airmanship"
I rest my case entirely on RW&B statement. (well trousered Sir, even though you know not what you wrote).
I rest my case entirely on RW&B statement. (well trousered Sir, even though you know not what you wrote).
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JimL, just a few more points with your post
If this so called committee were so experienced and you seem to think that the procedures they prodcued work......why so many CFIT(W) over the past decade.
If you really read the posts on this forum properly you would see that your ill defined flight path at 3 degrees from 3/4 Nm "may require a period of level flight" (from where-to where) is the whole, the entire and the complete point of the argument.
Taken in its most simple form, surely even you must agree that the higher you are above the deck, the earlier the fully formed sight picture will appear and the more time you have to shed speed (from IR stable) with minimum pitch up attutude to reduce speed in the final stages, leading to a more stable the approach.
Allied to this principle is the requirement to produce definitive intervention policies for when the approach is going wrong. This can only be done by clearly defining the approach parameters from the outset.
Before you launch into another lecture about what we already know remember we are talking about Night VMC (Hate that phrase) and not an ARA. 8/8 black if you like.
If this so called committee were so experienced and you seem to think that the procedures they prodcued work......why so many CFIT(W) over the past decade.
If you really read the posts on this forum properly you would see that your ill defined flight path at 3 degrees from 3/4 Nm "may require a period of level flight" (from where-to where) is the whole, the entire and the complete point of the argument.
Taken in its most simple form, surely even you must agree that the higher you are above the deck, the earlier the fully formed sight picture will appear and the more time you have to shed speed (from IR stable) with minimum pitch up attutude to reduce speed in the final stages, leading to a more stable the approach.
Allied to this principle is the requirement to produce definitive intervention policies for when the approach is going wrong. This can only be done by clearly defining the approach parameters from the outset.
Before you launch into another lecture about what we already know remember we are talking about Night VMC (Hate that phrase) and not an ARA. 8/8 black if you like.
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are we missing the point
A fascinating debate gentlemen but are we missing the point. The poor old Wasp pilot I mentioned earlier was on his own and therefore had a good excuse to screw up the transition from the dials to visual flight but surely, no matter what procedure you design to get you to that change-over point one simple SOP MUST be followed ..... and if it is followed then you stay out of the drink.
ONE SET OF EYES IN AND ONE SET OF EYES OUT
Now we can have an argument about which set of eyes these should be, for the decision is now one of,
'does the Captain fly and the CoP make that all important call or the other way around'.
or
'does the pilot who will fly the landing have eyes out and make the "visual" call' ................ it could be the CoP ...... and this is where the skipper can get himself in the poo because if he does not trust his CoP 100% he will try and peek and loose his way at that vital moment.
I hate this focus on regulations (which focus on the MINIMUM standards) when we should be looking at BEST PRACTICE.
Trouble is that when the inter-company rivalry starts we get a pissing contest on who can get in and who can't.
Get the BEST PRACTICE into your SOPs........train for them ...... which we can do very well in the box ....... and ...... apply them fully.
G
ONE SET OF EYES IN AND ONE SET OF EYES OUT
Now we can have an argument about which set of eyes these should be, for the decision is now one of,
'does the Captain fly and the CoP make that all important call or the other way around'.
or
'does the pilot who will fly the landing have eyes out and make the "visual" call' ................ it could be the CoP ...... and this is where the skipper can get himself in the poo because if he does not trust his CoP 100% he will try and peek and loose his way at that vital moment.
I hate this focus on regulations (which focus on the MINIMUM standards) when we should be looking at BEST PRACTICE.
Trouble is that when the inter-company rivalry starts we get a pissing contest on who can get in and who can't.
Get the BEST PRACTICE into your SOPs........train for them ...... which we can do very well in the box ....... and ...... apply them fully.
G
Surely it has to be landing pilot with 'eyes out' - That is the whole point - To avoid one pilot going from an instrument environment to a visual one, and trying to interpret all that information in just a few seconds whilst trying to land. I accept your point though - I do (incorrectly) often look out through the windscreen as part of my scan and I guess that is the control freak in most of us.
I don't want us to get into the whole co-pilot / Captain issue. I suppose it is fair to say that an inexperienced co-pilot is generally more likely to be unfamiliar with what they see and potentially make mistakes, but it is important to recognise that any of us can misinterpret visual cues and make a mistake. Captains fly into the water too.
I don't want us to get into the whole co-pilot / Captain issue. I suppose it is fair to say that an inexperienced co-pilot is generally more likely to be unfamiliar with what they see and potentially make mistakes, but it is important to recognise that any of us can misinterpret visual cues and make a mistake. Captains fly into the water too.
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could somebody just confirm, was the flight making an approach off of an ARA, were they between rigs or had they decended VMC and making a visual approach. If it was the later then how did they get VMC with an enroute decent if the weather that was reported was so cr#ppy. At night minimum you can decend to for the purposes of regaining visual flight is 1000'?
T4
T4
T4
It was an en-route descent. The weather was very patchy - fine where they made that descent, very poor at the installation with I suspect layers of thin cloud/fog
HC
It was an en-route descent. The weather was very patchy - fine where they made that descent, very poor at the installation with I suspect layers of thin cloud/fog
HC
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T4
If you in a NS Company you will see a statement from Bond in your Company on Monday.
The statement we states: that they considered an ARA, but the Commander deferred the decision till later. The WX they got from the rig led them to descent to get VMC en-route.
The text goes on to say, that at one stage they were VMC at 300 feet, but encountered some low cloud and climbed back up to 500 feet.
As they appraoched the rig downwind, they wer both visula with it, as they truned into wind they were "surprised" how close it was and the next thing they knew they had hit the sea.
MONITORING
I agree with all the posts about one pilot flying and one monitoring, but the wider issue is at the moment, when VMC at night, what exactly is the NHP monitoring against. There must be a template procedure for VMC at night which provides the monitoring pilot with clear intervention policies.
If you in a NS Company you will see a statement from Bond in your Company on Monday.
The statement we states: that they considered an ARA, but the Commander deferred the decision till later. The WX they got from the rig led them to descent to get VMC en-route.
The text goes on to say, that at one stage they were VMC at 300 feet, but encountered some low cloud and climbed back up to 500 feet.
As they appraoched the rig downwind, they wer both visula with it, as they truned into wind they were "surprised" how close it was and the next thing they knew they had hit the sea.
MONITORING
I agree with all the posts about one pilot flying and one monitoring, but the wider issue is at the moment, when VMC at night, what exactly is the NHP monitoring against. There must be a template procedure for VMC at night which provides the monitoring pilot with clear intervention policies.
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... a clear policy on intervention...
Double Bogey
That's exactly my point. Work out the (best practice) SOP. Train for it using all conditions and have the discipline and the mutual trust to use them properly.
Try to get away from the kind of thinking that's 'inside the box' that the regs have formed and think 'Airmanship' and what I call 'Educated Common Sense'. When you have designed what you hope is the perfect solution THEN check it against the regs and if in doubt ask for a derogation under 'equivalent level of risk management' if you are confident that it is right. Of course you would have checked it thoroughly in the sim first.
G
That's exactly my point. Work out the (best practice) SOP. Train for it using all conditions and have the discipline and the mutual trust to use them properly.
Try to get away from the kind of thinking that's 'inside the box' that the regs have formed and think 'Airmanship' and what I call 'Educated Common Sense'. When you have designed what you hope is the perfect solution THEN check it against the regs and if in doubt ask for a derogation under 'equivalent level of risk management' if you are confident that it is right. Of course you would have checked it thoroughly in the sim first.
G
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Thanks,
so as has been discussed, the problem is the VMC handling at night, having to make a decision close to a platform, when the weather is marginal is not the easiest decision to make. So take away the issue.
At night all approaches to offshore installations made using an ARA profile. Takes the decision making out of it. Added with the previous post i made about night ARA's to 500' 1 nm and a set ground speed this should giv you the sight picture that the PNF would need to see when they become visual and a constant approach every time. coupled with a day VMC approach with the same gate of 1 nm 500' and G/S fixed then you would get the same sight picture day or night.
thoughts
so as has been discussed, the problem is the VMC handling at night, having to make a decision close to a platform, when the weather is marginal is not the easiest decision to make. So take away the issue.
At night all approaches to offshore installations made using an ARA profile. Takes the decision making out of it. Added with the previous post i made about night ARA's to 500' 1 nm and a set ground speed this should giv you the sight picture that the PNF would need to see when they become visual and a constant approach every time. coupled with a day VMC approach with the same gate of 1 nm 500' and G/S fixed then you would get the same sight picture day or night.
thoughts
Sounds sensible.
If we take the 'Gate Position' method of 1nm, 500ft as being a safe approach method, a basic weather minima of 2nm 700ft would seem appropriate. Any weather below 5km 1,200 ft requiring an ARA, and of course crews may elect to carry out an ARA approach no matter how good the weather.
This should ensure that crews have a visual 90 second 'level sector' at 500ft in order to obtain good visual references before reaching the 'gate'. After the gate you would still expect a further few seconds level flight before descending on the sight picture, rugby ball, CTB or whatever you want to call it.
We still have to overcome the fact (as perhaps in the Etap incident) where imminent local weather is not always visible to the crew until you fly into it. There is also the difficulty in flying and monitoring that last 20 seconds as you transition back to the hover and position over the deck. Not to mention the question ............. Do the oil companies really require these crew change flights at night or would it be considerably safer just to move them to the weekend where there is plenty of spare capacity.
If we take the 'Gate Position' method of 1nm, 500ft as being a safe approach method, a basic weather minima of 2nm 700ft would seem appropriate. Any weather below 5km 1,200 ft requiring an ARA, and of course crews may elect to carry out an ARA approach no matter how good the weather.
This should ensure that crews have a visual 90 second 'level sector' at 500ft in order to obtain good visual references before reaching the 'gate'. After the gate you would still expect a further few seconds level flight before descending on the sight picture, rugby ball, CTB or whatever you want to call it.
We still have to overcome the fact (as perhaps in the Etap incident) where imminent local weather is not always visible to the crew until you fly into it. There is also the difficulty in flying and monitoring that last 20 seconds as you transition back to the hover and position over the deck. Not to mention the question ............. Do the oil companies really require these crew change flights at night or would it be considerably safer just to move them to the weekend where there is plenty of spare capacity.
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Monitoring
DB
You question what the NHP should be monitoring against if there are no set parameters for night VMC approach. Surely they should be monitoring against what the HP has briefed for that segment of the flight. If, for example, they have briefed to fly at 300' and then deviate from that significantly, the NHP should bring that to their attention.
You question what the NHP should be monitoring against if there are no set parameters for night VMC approach. Surely they should be monitoring against what the HP has briefed for that segment of the flight. If, for example, they have briefed to fly at 300' and then deviate from that significantly, the NHP should bring that to their attention.
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training and currency
Ive not seen any report about the puma incident, so these comments are just in general terms, and not specific to the incident.
I think it's more an issue of lack of regularity and specific training with the night approaches rather than DB's suggestion of totally tearing up the procedures and starting from scratch. I think that for the large part, we have adequate procedures and guidance in place for both ARA's (i know DB was only referring to night VMC landings, but he did bring in the ARA minimums) and visual appraoches. At night time for short shuttle work (less than 10nm sector) we have 500 foot minimum for visual contact flight (300 foot day time), and this combined with a 500 foot minimum for night circling ARAs (300 foot day) seems to me to be fairly strong guidance that at night time be established on final at 500 foot - ie no big heading changes below 500 foot (300 foot day). I realise this is not stated as an absolute rule, but feel the guidance is there for us to ignore at our peril. The exception to this is the night time non-circling ARA, when at minimums we would be at 300 feet, 15 degrees off track, and .75 nm from the rig - a reasonably large visual manouvre in bad weather and at night.
If you speak to the guys who flew the forties shuttle, or the Blackpool guys, in general i think that they are a lot more comfortable with night off-shore flying than the northern north sea pilots. This is purely due to the vast number of night landings these bases involve (when i moved from Aberdeen to train at Blackpool i logged more landings in 3 days than i had in my final 2 months in Aberdeen).
I'm not sure how to address this issue, but would suggest that the focus should be on using the procedures we have in place (with a very few exceptions) and finding some way of improving the training and regularity of crews to fly night approaches.
Andy
I think it's more an issue of lack of regularity and specific training with the night approaches rather than DB's suggestion of totally tearing up the procedures and starting from scratch. I think that for the large part, we have adequate procedures and guidance in place for both ARA's (i know DB was only referring to night VMC landings, but he did bring in the ARA minimums) and visual appraoches. At night time for short shuttle work (less than 10nm sector) we have 500 foot minimum for visual contact flight (300 foot day time), and this combined with a 500 foot minimum for night circling ARAs (300 foot day) seems to me to be fairly strong guidance that at night time be established on final at 500 foot - ie no big heading changes below 500 foot (300 foot day). I realise this is not stated as an absolute rule, but feel the guidance is there for us to ignore at our peril. The exception to this is the night time non-circling ARA, when at minimums we would be at 300 feet, 15 degrees off track, and .75 nm from the rig - a reasonably large visual manouvre in bad weather and at night.
If you speak to the guys who flew the forties shuttle, or the Blackpool guys, in general i think that they are a lot more comfortable with night off-shore flying than the northern north sea pilots. This is purely due to the vast number of night landings these bases involve (when i moved from Aberdeen to train at Blackpool i logged more landings in 3 days than i had in my final 2 months in Aberdeen).
I'm not sure how to address this issue, but would suggest that the focus should be on using the procedures we have in place (with a very few exceptions) and finding some way of improving the training and regularity of crews to fly night approaches.
Andy
"the Blackpool guys, in general i think that they are a lot more comfortable with night off-shore flying than the northern north sea pilots"
That is my concern - Two years ago 7 people died when one of the Blackpool machines crashed at night. Good, experienced Captain, flying within the rules. Without getting into too much depth with that accident, if he can get it wrong, anyone can.
That is my concern - Two years ago 7 people died when one of the Blackpool machines crashed at night. Good, experienced Captain, flying within the rules. Without getting into too much depth with that accident, if he can get it wrong, anyone can.
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Blackpool
Absolutely agree with you - i flew with Steve Potton a couple of times (never knew the co-pilot) and found him very capable, careful and consistent. If it can happen to him, i'm not in any doubt that any of us - myself included - could be caught out.
Very sadly accidents will happen. I think the way to minimse this risk though, isn't to change our procedures in their entirety, but to improve our training with the procedures which are all ready in place (again with a few exceptions).
The only way to take the risk entirely out of night off-shore ops, is to stop night flying - which i don't think is commercially viable, or necessary.
Very sadly accidents will happen. I think the way to minimse this risk though, isn't to change our procedures in their entirety, but to improve our training with the procedures which are all ready in place (again with a few exceptions).
The only way to take the risk entirely out of night off-shore ops, is to stop night flying - which i don't think is commercially viable, or necessary.