Super Puma down central North Sea Feb 2009
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Patience vs accuracy
All,
I have been keeping tabs on this post for the last few days and I can't help but be bemused by some of the posts on this thread.
On the one hand, we deplore the media and their rush to get a story (often at the expense of the truth) in order to satisfy the public's need to know straight away. On the other, some of us appear to have to know something (no matter what) in the interests of safety. DOUBLE BOGEY has been particularly vocal in this regard.
I do agree that it is rather odd that absolutely nothing has been released by way of a statement etc. However, I would rather hear nothing that just mere speculation. We already have that in this forum, courtesy of some very informed individuals and some not so informed. I have already made some (I hope) informed judgements on what may have occurred but am patient enough to wait for something more definitive.
DOUBLE BOGEY - for what's worth, I think you're being a little emotive. The investigation will reveal all in good time. The fact that nothing has come out as yet suggests that we can probably (please all note the use of the word probably) rule mechanical failure. But again, I choose to wait for official word. In the meantime, I don't expect us all to suddenly fall out of the sky.
And for the record, I fly both the 332 and the 225 and I am not sitting around more concerned for my safety as a result of this accident until the investigators prove I should be.
And here's the rub... it might take some time to prove such.
P68
I have been keeping tabs on this post for the last few days and I can't help but be bemused by some of the posts on this thread.
On the one hand, we deplore the media and their rush to get a story (often at the expense of the truth) in order to satisfy the public's need to know straight away. On the other, some of us appear to have to know something (no matter what) in the interests of safety. DOUBLE BOGEY has been particularly vocal in this regard.
I do agree that it is rather odd that absolutely nothing has been released by way of a statement etc. However, I would rather hear nothing that just mere speculation. We already have that in this forum, courtesy of some very informed individuals and some not so informed. I have already made some (I hope) informed judgements on what may have occurred but am patient enough to wait for something more definitive.
DOUBLE BOGEY - for what's worth, I think you're being a little emotive. The investigation will reveal all in good time. The fact that nothing has come out as yet suggests that we can probably (please all note the use of the word probably) rule mechanical failure. But again, I choose to wait for official word. In the meantime, I don't expect us all to suddenly fall out of the sky.
And for the record, I fly both the 332 and the 225 and I am not sitting around more concerned for my safety as a result of this accident until the investigators prove I should be.
And here's the rub... it might take some time to prove such.
P68
Last edited by papa68; 26th Feb 2009 at 22:45. Reason: syntax
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Any news likely today? I understand that Bond were briefing both Bristow and CHC management on the accident. I see the CAA cancelled G-REDU as PWFU yesterday (Permanently Withdrawn From use).
No official news yet but a little bird told me that the tail fell off after the crash because the a/c settled tail down and the boom filled with water.....the weight and wave motion then broke it off.
There has been a meeting today to discuss the cause of the accident. I wasn't able to attend unfortuntely, but I know there were reps from Bristow & CHC, then a meeting for the Bond pilots.
I know that the initial conclusion is pilot error, so Double Bogey and crowd can rest assured that as expected, the 225's / Super Pumas are fine. As to the actual detail, hopefully someone who was there can maybe fill in some of the blanks as to what the pilots did and why this approach went so badly wrong.
Were there any plans to change the ARA profile at night or any other changes suggested to eliminate this sort of accident happening again and to help the rest of us make safer approaches at night ??
I know that the initial conclusion is pilot error, so Double Bogey and crowd can rest assured that as expected, the 225's / Super Pumas are fine. As to the actual detail, hopefully someone who was there can maybe fill in some of the blanks as to what the pilots did and why this approach went so badly wrong.
Were there any plans to change the ARA profile at night or any other changes suggested to eliminate this sort of accident happening again and to help the rest of us make safer approaches at night ??
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I understand, Bond, invited Bristow and CHC Engineering reps on Wednesday for a meeting/briefing re this accident. Based on HUMS data ( I guess??)... the other two operators were reassured that before the accident"... all a/c systems were operating normally..!
Today's meeting was, I believe, for the Operations reps. Everyone throughout this period has been operating 332/225's normally. (except for BP).
Conclusions??
Can only assume that briefing papers/public statements for the parties involved are being scrutinised by the the legal beagles before anyone sticks their head above the parapet.
It's Friday afternoon ...... perhaps by Monday then?
Today's meeting was, I believe, for the Operations reps. Everyone throughout this period has been operating 332/225's normally. (except for BP).
Conclusions??
Can only assume that briefing papers/public statements for the parties involved are being scrutinised by the the legal beagles before anyone sticks their head above the parapet.
It's Friday afternoon ...... perhaps by Monday then?
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Hi Special 25, assuming your post is correct that is good news from the helicopters point of view. Lets hope the investigation does not centre too much on blaming the crew and looks a little more closely at the procedures involved especially the use, or otherwsie, of the automatics an aspect of NS operations which I believe is not properly mandated for.
A good start would be some absolute minimum altitudes and speeds over the sea, at night, that cannot be breached until the crew "Call the Ball" (The rugby ball that is...or fat egg)...being the properly formed shape of the helideck lights confirmed by both crew before any further descent is initiated.
This simple provision would at least provide crews with a bit of air above the sea, and maintain the airspeed when manouvring in the initial stages of an approach.
There extreme optical illusions that we see at night in some conditions leading us to think at times the platform, at distance, can appear to be up amongst the stars.
Personally I would like to see the end of "visual manouvring" at night with all approaches conforming to the ARA template, with aboslute minimum altitudes and airspeeds applied until the very latter stages when "The Ball" is called - even when shuttling!! It takes a little more time but in my view is far safer.
The lack of these procedures and restrictions may ultimatley have led to the incident we have seen. I just hope that the Authority and Inverstigators realise that once a crew has elected to manouvre visually at night, which we are currently allowed to do, the first hole in the swiss cheese has already aligned itself!!
Ultimatley the crew may not be at fault at all and that the lack of adequate procedures, especially the interface with mandated automatics, should be blamed for these types of incident!!
I wish all involved the very best of luck and hope for honest and sound judegment on behalf of the investigators.
A good start would be some absolute minimum altitudes and speeds over the sea, at night, that cannot be breached until the crew "Call the Ball" (The rugby ball that is...or fat egg)...being the properly formed shape of the helideck lights confirmed by both crew before any further descent is initiated.
This simple provision would at least provide crews with a bit of air above the sea, and maintain the airspeed when manouvring in the initial stages of an approach.
There extreme optical illusions that we see at night in some conditions leading us to think at times the platform, at distance, can appear to be up amongst the stars.
Personally I would like to see the end of "visual manouvring" at night with all approaches conforming to the ARA template, with aboslute minimum altitudes and airspeeds applied until the very latter stages when "The Ball" is called - even when shuttling!! It takes a little more time but in my view is far safer.
The lack of these procedures and restrictions may ultimatley have led to the incident we have seen. I just hope that the Authority and Inverstigators realise that once a crew has elected to manouvre visually at night, which we are currently allowed to do, the first hole in the swiss cheese has already aligned itself!!
Ultimatley the crew may not be at fault at all and that the lack of adequate procedures, especially the interface with mandated automatics, should be blamed for these types of incident!!
I wish all involved the very best of luck and hope for honest and sound judegment on behalf of the investigators.
I know that the initial conclusion is pilot error
HC
DB
Generally I agree with what you say, for the 225 the best way to operate at night is to keep the automatics engaged, slow right down if not much wind (min coupled IAS 30kts) until you have the site picture (your rugby ball), only then disengage and fly the last bit manually - by then you are close to the destination so the visual references are better. That's what I teach.
But I wouldn't go so far as to say "no turning" - there is nothing wrong with turning either in heading hold, or with manual cyclic input, provided you are coupled in ALT and IAS.
But with no guidance from the manufacturer or the CAA, each Operator will have different procedures, some might be better than others.
Since Bond have both L2s (OK but not brilliant autopilot) and 225s and I think the crews are dual rated (?), perhaps they decided to have a common policy for use of the automatics, which would be less than optimised to the 225. One good reason why I have always maintained that dual rating on the various AS332L family members is not the safest way to do things, its only the most commercially expedient way.
HC
Generally I agree with what you say, for the 225 the best way to operate at night is to keep the automatics engaged, slow right down if not much wind (min coupled IAS 30kts) until you have the site picture (your rugby ball), only then disengage and fly the last bit manually - by then you are close to the destination so the visual references are better. That's what I teach.
But I wouldn't go so far as to say "no turning" - there is nothing wrong with turning either in heading hold, or with manual cyclic input, provided you are coupled in ALT and IAS.
But with no guidance from the manufacturer or the CAA, each Operator will have different procedures, some might be better than others.
Since Bond have both L2s (OK but not brilliant autopilot) and 225s and I think the crews are dual rated (?), perhaps they decided to have a common policy for use of the automatics, which would be less than optimised to the 225. One good reason why I have always maintained that dual rating on the various AS332L family members is not the safest way to do things, its only the most commercially expedient way.
HC
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Personally I would like to see the end of "visual manouvring" at night with all approaches conforming to the ARA template, with aboslute minimum altitudes and airspeeds applied until the very latter stages when "The Ball" is called - even when shuttling!! It takes a little more time but in my view is far safer.
Agreed and fair point. Believe me, I am the last one to be pointing any finger of blame on the crew, and whilst I guess a lot of crew room discussion over the past week or so has been along the 'Human Factors' line, I don't think I've heard a word of criticism.
We all know that night flying is a very complicated and difficult task, and my personal opinions on the subject are well documented on this forum. I don't know the full details of exactly how this accident occurred so I am concerned about speaking out of turn, but I gather that the crew were not conducting the approach as an ARA, but were making a visual approach. So the weather wasn't quite as bad as the 'complete fog' indicated by some, unfortunately drawing the crew into a visual approach when fog patches in the area were not visible. I believe as they got closer they started to lose visual references.
Surely someone present at the meeting can give a better synopsis of what was said, now that it is 'technically' public knowledge. Either way, I hope that we can all learn from the full facts when they are finally released by the AAIB and am encouraged by the apparent 'meeting of minds' between the three companies. Hopefully together they can work towards improving the operating procedures at night to make for a safer North Sea. Or, better still, cease with night operations offshore which still seem to be accounting for a disproportionate number of incidents, accidents and tragedies.
We all know that night flying is a very complicated and difficult task, and my personal opinions on the subject are well documented on this forum. I don't know the full details of exactly how this accident occurred so I am concerned about speaking out of turn, but I gather that the crew were not conducting the approach as an ARA, but were making a visual approach. So the weather wasn't quite as bad as the 'complete fog' indicated by some, unfortunately drawing the crew into a visual approach when fog patches in the area were not visible. I believe as they got closer they started to lose visual references.
Surely someone present at the meeting can give a better synopsis of what was said, now that it is 'technically' public knowledge. Either way, I hope that we can all learn from the full facts when they are finally released by the AAIB and am encouraged by the apparent 'meeting of minds' between the three companies. Hopefully together they can work towards improving the operating procedures at night to make for a safer North Sea. Or, better still, cease with night operations offshore which still seem to be accounting for a disproportionate number of incidents, accidents and tragedies.
That's Life!!
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cease with night operations offshore
When on NS night operations I always placed myself at a 'gate' of 500', 1 NM and 60 KIAS, no matter if that was at the start of the 'winter' or the end, used to help me during the summer night standby ops when casevacing heart attack victims at 0330! We STILL don't know what the circumstances leading to this accident were, can we wait until some form of confirmation from a reliable/informed source?
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Perhaps we can expect an AAIB preliminary notice next week.
Certainly the British system is better than in the Netherlands where our semi royal Safety Board Chairmen now appears to have said things that got 'misqouted' about the 737 accident.
Certainly the British system is better than in the Netherlands where our semi royal Safety Board Chairmen now appears to have said things that got 'misqouted' about the 737 accident.
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The "ball"
We have had a full account of incident published to us. As it is in thepublic domain I do not want to "splurge" it acroiss this page, suffice to say the aircraft was intact when it hit the sea whilst the crew were manouvring visually for the approach to ETAP. The first the crew were aware they had an incident was when they hit the sea.
CFIT(W) for the TLA freaks.
The time must surely have come to put an end to "visual" manouvring over the sea.
In my view ALL night approaches should be conducted as full ARAs using the stabilised approach technique until the required visual references are identified by both pilots. If this takes more time so be it. Rather a bigger flying bill for the Oil Operator than more events like this one.
To my knowledge there ahve been 7 CFIT(W) in the offshore environment. Some people have actually flown into the sea, and simply taken back off again, and got away with it.
Not one of this incidents occurred during an ARA. All of them occurred whilst visual manouvring.
The required visual references in this context being the fully developed "Rugby Ball" afforded by the helideck lights, a point from beyond which, inadvertant descent, below helideck height, is almost impossible.
Hence the phrase "Calling the Ball".
In addition the use of automatics, when available, should be mandatory and procedures developed to facilitate this.
I fully expect this forum to be "swamped" with cynics and die hards who will want to continue flying manually, visually and with complete freedom to do what they like and resist at any cost (including more incidents like this one) the winds of change that must be surely about to blow.
The crew that night, (and I hope they are reading this) are in my view gulity of nothing other than being sucked into the current culture where sensible a safe procedures are almost non existant.
The only people who really understand the Night Offshore environment is the crews who fly in it. It therefore follows that we, the crews, are the only people who can drive and effect change for the better.
For those of you, whoose only reaction to this, is to reach for your keyboard and howl in anguish at the mere suggestion that more tighter procedures and lmitations for Night VMC are required, you are part of the problem.
CFIT(W) for the TLA freaks.
The time must surely have come to put an end to "visual" manouvring over the sea.
In my view ALL night approaches should be conducted as full ARAs using the stabilised approach technique until the required visual references are identified by both pilots. If this takes more time so be it. Rather a bigger flying bill for the Oil Operator than more events like this one.
To my knowledge there ahve been 7 CFIT(W) in the offshore environment. Some people have actually flown into the sea, and simply taken back off again, and got away with it.
Not one of this incidents occurred during an ARA. All of them occurred whilst visual manouvring.
The required visual references in this context being the fully developed "Rugby Ball" afforded by the helideck lights, a point from beyond which, inadvertant descent, below helideck height, is almost impossible.
Hence the phrase "Calling the Ball".
In addition the use of automatics, when available, should be mandatory and procedures developed to facilitate this.
I fully expect this forum to be "swamped" with cynics and die hards who will want to continue flying manually, visually and with complete freedom to do what they like and resist at any cost (including more incidents like this one) the winds of change that must be surely about to blow.
The crew that night, (and I hope they are reading this) are in my view gulity of nothing other than being sucked into the current culture where sensible a safe procedures are almost non existant.
The only people who really understand the Night Offshore environment is the crews who fly in it. It therefore follows that we, the crews, are the only people who can drive and effect change for the better.
For those of you, whoose only reaction to this, is to reach for your keyboard and howl in anguish at the mere suggestion that more tighter procedures and lmitations for Night VMC are required, you are part of the problem.
I don't want to get into the whole night landings debate here - Thats for a different thread.
As to this incident, yes, will wait for a full clarification of the circumstances from someone who knows better. But a good discussion as to procedures offshore at night is essential, and I for one would encourage your 'gate position' approach. I think someone earlier said that maybe all night approaches should be of an ARA type. An approach that will spit you out at the right height, direction and speed to enable you to take over manually to complete the landing visually. I personally think that is over-kill on some nights, but then maybe we need that regulation to ensure that we aren't sucked into approaches with limited visual references that originally looked quite good.
I can confirm that Bond do indeed dual rate on the 332L2 and EC225 and not aware of any previous problem with that. I believe that CHC and Bristow do not. And whilst debate on the L2 and 225 operations are good, remember that some of us are still flying 332's, as well as Dauphins and S-76 A's.
As to this incident, yes, will wait for a full clarification of the circumstances from someone who knows better. But a good discussion as to procedures offshore at night is essential, and I for one would encourage your 'gate position' approach. I think someone earlier said that maybe all night approaches should be of an ARA type. An approach that will spit you out at the right height, direction and speed to enable you to take over manually to complete the landing visually. I personally think that is over-kill on some nights, but then maybe we need that regulation to ensure that we aren't sucked into approaches with limited visual references that originally looked quite good.
I can confirm that Bond do indeed dual rate on the 332L2 and EC225 and not aware of any previous problem with that. I believe that CHC and Bristow do not. And whilst debate on the L2 and 225 operations are good, remember that some of us are still flying 332's, as well as Dauphins and S-76 A's.
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One thing that would help immensley and I miss from the SAR S61's is a rad hold. A height hold based on the radalt, and it could hold the height (off the top of my head) of plus/minus 10 feet. VERY handy when manouvering low and in poor vis, or even DARK night with good vis.
Whether we go the route of pushing for a change in regime as per DB's thoughts or not, a rad hold would be a welcome addition for me. Although I don't know if 225's etc have a rad hold as I fly the 332 still.
Si
Whether we go the route of pushing for a change in regime as per DB's thoughts or not, a rad hold would be a welcome addition for me. Although I don't know if 225's etc have a rad hold as I fly the 332 still.
Si
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I am sure that most if not all of the N/sea guys on here and most other rotory pilots have found themselves in a compromised position where with skill luck and judgment they have " got away" with it. Unfortunately the crew of this particular flight did not have luck, other than the fact that everybody survived, on their side that evening.
Night deck landings have to be probably the most difficult aspect of N/Sea flying and i hope that from the subsiquent enquiry that we are all able to learn from the events of that evening.
As technology improves the human race will struggle to keep up and human factors will now become more of an issue than that of reliability of the A/C.
T4
Night deck landings have to be probably the most difficult aspect of N/Sea flying and i hope that from the subsiquent enquiry that we are all able to learn from the events of that evening.
As technology improves the human race will struggle to keep up and human factors will now become more of an issue than that of reliability of the A/C.
T4
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Sailor,
Ideal gate in of 1 nm 500' 80 kts ground speed but what do you do when you come of an ARA at 300' and .75 mile?
you are already below your gate and 15 degrees off from straight in.....
Ideal gate in of 1 nm 500' 80 kts ground speed but what do you do when you come of an ARA at 300' and .75 mile?
you are already below your gate and 15 degrees off from straight in.....
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T4 Risen,
That is the whole point of what I have been saying, you remain couplerd up (if you haveone) and remains at 300 feet gradually redcuing airspeed to min 50 KIAS, until the "Ball" is called and confirmed by both crew, (this being the point where the visual refs from the deck are so strong that the chances subsequent inadvertant descent below the helideck is alsmost erradicated).
Both 332L2 and 225 have radalt Coupler functions to maintain height automatically. In my Company, we do not use the RADALT coupler as it has the potential to pull (in 4 axis mode) more power than permitted through the MGB.
Instead we use BARALT Coupler mode and adjust to QFF to match the radalt indications. None of this is either presrcibed or mandated in our procedures.
Most pilots try to use the coupler and fly an approach at night in a stabilsed fashion, and there are many different versions of Cat s Skin. This needs to be formally addressed and translated into sensible mandated procedure.
The reason for mandating procedures is to provide the monitoring pilot with clear guidance as to when intervention (either verbal warning or taking control) is necessary. This intervention should also be mandatory.
The lack of a clear mandate to do so, in extermis when the cockpit gradient is steep (new P2 - hairy old P1), is the direct contributing factor in the subsequent de-stabilistion of night approachs.
Most of the crews I flight with, and I am sure most of them that have not flown with, have had a bad experience at night that subsequently leads them to adopting greater discipline in the night flying techniques.
What needs to be done now is generate a collective will to make NS flying at night safe.
That is the whole point of what I have been saying, you remain couplerd up (if you haveone) and remains at 300 feet gradually redcuing airspeed to min 50 KIAS, until the "Ball" is called and confirmed by both crew, (this being the point where the visual refs from the deck are so strong that the chances subsequent inadvertant descent below the helideck is alsmost erradicated).
Both 332L2 and 225 have radalt Coupler functions to maintain height automatically. In my Company, we do not use the RADALT coupler as it has the potential to pull (in 4 axis mode) more power than permitted through the MGB.
Instead we use BARALT Coupler mode and adjust to QFF to match the radalt indications. None of this is either presrcibed or mandated in our procedures.
Most pilots try to use the coupler and fly an approach at night in a stabilsed fashion, and there are many different versions of Cat s Skin. This needs to be formally addressed and translated into sensible mandated procedure.
The reason for mandating procedures is to provide the monitoring pilot with clear guidance as to when intervention (either verbal warning or taking control) is necessary. This intervention should also be mandatory.
The lack of a clear mandate to do so, in extermis when the cockpit gradient is steep (new P2 - hairy old P1), is the direct contributing factor in the subsequent de-stabilistion of night approachs.
Most of the crews I flight with, and I am sure most of them that have not flown with, have had a bad experience at night that subsequently leads them to adopting greater discipline in the night flying techniques.
What needs to be done now is generate a collective will to make NS flying at night safe.