Senior Australian army pilots accused of being cowboys
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Senior Australian army pilots accused of being cowboys
Headline - Defence chief demands end to helicopter 'cowboy' culture
Tom Allard National Security Editor
June 30, 2008
A CULTURE of risk-taking and sloppy safety standards exists in the army's elite helicopter squadron, according to a damning report by a military inquiry into the fatal crash of a Black Hawk helicopter off Fiji in 2006.
The scathing assessment of the Sydney-based 171 Squadron was in part based on evidence of a number of similar incidents, including the crash of a Black Hawk in East Timor last year that was kept under wraps by Defence because it was "not newsworthy".
June 30, 2008
A CULTURE of risk-taking and sloppy safety standards exists in the army's elite helicopter squadron, according to a damning report by a military inquiry into the fatal crash of a Black Hawk helicopter off Fiji in 2006.
The scathing assessment of the Sydney-based 171 Squadron was in part based on evidence of a number of similar incidents, including the crash of a Black Hawk in East Timor last year that was kept under wraps by Defence because it was "not newsworthy".
do you hide the crash of a $20 million Black Hawk?
Headed by the former Supreme Court judge David Levine, QC, the board of inquiry was convened last year to examine the crash of Black Hawk 221, which smashed into the deck of HMAS Kanimbla before tumbling into the Pacific Ocean and sinking on November 29, 2006.
The pilot, Captain Mark Bingley, and SAS Trooper Joshua Porter died in the accident.
The final report of the inquiry was handed to the Chief of Defence Force, Air Chief Marshal Angus Houston - a decorated helicopter pilot - six months ago.
He is said to have been appalled by its revelations. The Herald understands that, after reading it, he dubbed senior pilots from 171 Squadron "cowboys" and launched an audit of all of Defence's helicopter fleets to ascertain if the problems were more widespread.
Sources familiar with the report say it finds that senior pilots in 171 Squadron, while highly trained, had a culture of aggressive flying and a tendency to needlessly "push the envelope".
Safety procedures were slack and the reporting of incidents involving engine failures and other safety breaches was haphazard, it says.
The pilot, Captain Mark Bingley, and SAS Trooper Joshua Porter died in the accident.
The final report of the inquiry was handed to the Chief of Defence Force, Air Chief Marshal Angus Houston - a decorated helicopter pilot - six months ago.
He is said to have been appalled by its revelations. The Herald understands that, after reading it, he dubbed senior pilots from 171 Squadron "cowboys" and launched an audit of all of Defence's helicopter fleets to ascertain if the problems were more widespread.
Sources familiar with the report say it finds that senior pilots in 171 Squadron, while highly trained, had a culture of aggressive flying and a tendency to needlessly "push the envelope".
Safety procedures were slack and the reporting of incidents involving engine failures and other safety breaches was haphazard, it says.
The crash on HMAS Kanimbla occurred while Australian troops were stationed off Fiji preparing to remove Australians if the civil unrest there worsened. They undertook training exercises while they waited for a possible call to action.
In a helicopter packed with Special Air Service soldiers, Captain Bingley was attempting a special operations assault drill, flying at high speed before suddenly turning and "flaring" into a hover above the ship, with the helicopter's nose up, so soldiers could descend by rope or fire weapons.
The inquiry concluded that the exercise was highly dangerous, given the tailwind, the heavy cargo, HMAS Kanimbla's drift in the sea and the fact that it had not been rehearsed at a slower pace.
The report finds that Captain Bingley misjudged the strength of the tailwind.
The crash resulted from an overstressed engine losing power, leading to catastrophic "main rotor droop", a dramatic slowing of the rotor's blades.
However, the inquiry found that Australia's Black Hawks did not contain a "digital electronic control unit" that reduced the risk of rotor droop. Moreover, incidents of rotor droop were quite common but not always reported.
In a helicopter packed with Special Air Service soldiers, Captain Bingley was attempting a special operations assault drill, flying at high speed before suddenly turning and "flaring" into a hover above the ship, with the helicopter's nose up, so soldiers could descend by rope or fire weapons.
The inquiry concluded that the exercise was highly dangerous, given the tailwind, the heavy cargo, HMAS Kanimbla's drift in the sea and the fact that it had not been rehearsed at a slower pace.
The report finds that Captain Bingley misjudged the strength of the tailwind.
The crash resulted from an overstressed engine losing power, leading to catastrophic "main rotor droop", a dramatic slowing of the rotor's blades.
However, the inquiry found that Australia's Black Hawks did not contain a "digital electronic control unit" that reduced the risk of rotor droop. Moreover, incidents of rotor droop were quite common but not always reported.
Why wouldn't you just avoid drooping the rotor in the first place i.e. during a hover to offload pax I reckon Nr would be pretty handy to have?
No idea about special forces tactics but I'm sure someone can enlighten me.
Indeed, late in the inquiry's deliberations it emerged that a Black Hawk undertaking a similar drill to Black Hawk 221 in East Timor had crashed.
No one was seriously injured but the helicopter was badly damaged and has yet to be repaired, the Herald has learned. The accident, which happened on June 21 last year, was never made public, even though it occurred when there was intense interest in helicopter safety.
Not only was the Black Hawk 221 inquiry underway, the damning report into the crash of a Sea King on Nias, Indonesia, in 2005, that killed nine Australian servicemen and women, had been released two days before the crash in East Timor. A Defence spokesman told the Herald the East Timor incident was not publicly announced as it was deemed "not newsworthy".
No one was seriously injured but the helicopter was badly damaged and has yet to be repaired, the Herald has learned. The accident, which happened on June 21 last year, was never made public, even though it occurred when there was intense interest in helicopter safety.
Not only was the Black Hawk 221 inquiry underway, the damning report into the crash of a Sea King on Nias, Indonesia, in 2005, that killed nine Australian servicemen and women, had been released two days before the crash in East Timor. A Defence spokesman told the Herald the East Timor incident was not publicly announced as it was deemed "not newsworthy".
The Herald understands testimony from the aviation safety officer at the US Army's special operations command, Warrant Officer (5th Class) Charles King, was particularly influential during the inquiry into the Black Hawk 221 crash.
He described its flight plan as "an aggressive approach that had very small margin for error". After reviewing some of the training techniques of 171 Squadron, he said there was poor guidance about when a pilot should pull out of a manoeuvre.
He also said the presence of special forces troops in a helicopter often encouraged pilots to take more risks and regard any joint training exercise as a "no fail" proposition.
He described its flight plan as "an aggressive approach that had very small margin for error". After reviewing some of the training techniques of 171 Squadron, he said there was poor guidance about when a pilot should pull out of a manoeuvre.
He also said the presence of special forces troops in a helicopter often encouraged pilots to take more risks and regard any joint training exercise as a "no fail" proposition.
The inquiry's report and the results of Air Chief Marshal Houston's audit are expected to be published in the next fortnight.
This story was found at: Defence chief demands end to helicopter 'cowboy' culture - National - smh.com.au
This story was found at: Defence chief demands end to helicopter 'cowboy' culture - National - smh.com.au
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Yeah, let them fly straight and level, starch flightsuits, and under any circumstances exceed 85% torque... only when someone gets killed in combat they'll ask what was their training. It's the whole "western" world like that, not only Australia.
Maybe a few thousand hours of mustering/Ag/Shooting/long-lining instead of ILS approaches would be better training for a pilot who is pushing the envelope of an aircrafts' capabilities in VFR conditions? Just a thought, but it seems from the outside looking in that the root cause of most ADF accidents would get the average bush pilot sacked. As an example, a few years ago a Blackhawk hit a tree near Amberely while conducting low-level training & the vision on the news clearly showed that it was the only tree in a 10 acre paddock!
It's a shame for the mil pilots sake, but I don't think any pilot can get good at his/her profession while flying approx.100hrs/year as one ppruner from Nowra quoted last year. As a tax payer in both Canada & Australia I'd be happy to fork out a bit more to give them more time in the hot seat. Maybe an exchange program with commercial operators could help? Maybe, like any other operator in the world, have minimum experience levels which must be met before they are let loose in a multimillion dollar helicopter which belongs to the tax payer? Although mil pilots will no doubt be offended by my post, I don't mean to be patronising, just looking for ideas. After all, lots of "bush pilots" have flown into the ground in the dark, but I don't think the mil boys have for a while!!
It's a shame for the mil pilots sake, but I don't think any pilot can get good at his/her profession while flying approx.100hrs/year as one ppruner from Nowra quoted last year. As a tax payer in both Canada & Australia I'd be happy to fork out a bit more to give them more time in the hot seat. Maybe an exchange program with commercial operators could help? Maybe, like any other operator in the world, have minimum experience levels which must be met before they are let loose in a multimillion dollar helicopter which belongs to the tax payer? Although mil pilots will no doubt be offended by my post, I don't mean to be patronising, just looking for ideas. After all, lots of "bush pilots" have flown into the ground in the dark, but I don't think the mil boys have for a while!!
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"What does the digital electronic control unit actually do? Is it a digital FCU?
Why wouldn't you just avoid drooping the rotor in the first place i.e. during a hover to offload pax I reckon Nr would be pretty handy to have? No idea about special forces tactics but I'm sure someone can enlighten me."
A model blackhawks, and the Aussie blackhawks, use an ECU instead of a DEC on the -700 series engines. L models and others with the -701C engines have the DEC. The ECU relies much more on mechanical means to control engine power than the DEC does... and the biggest nasty that bites back is the dreaded transient rotor droop that was a factor in the Fiji accident. It's not hard to avoid getting transient droop, but when you fly to the capabilities of the aircraft, such as in combat operations, its very easy to find. When the collective is on the floor and the engines are at a very low power setting, pulling in power in anything but a very gradual pace will cause the engines to "lag" coming back on-line and RPM to drop. The -700 engines have a mechanical "anticipator" linkage that tries to keep the engines ahead of the game, but it does a sorry job when it comes to rapid power changes. US Army guys are taught to "lead with power" when in a low torque situation, but I've seen it many many times where it's just too slow catching up and rotor droop is the result. Bam, there goes the buckets of power a -60 pilot is so used to having, and thats when a tailwind or high gross situation will really bite you in the arse.
As for being cowboys... Those kind of manuvers are REQUIRED at times when in combat, and thinking that the only time they should be performed is during an actual guns-a-blazing situation is rediculous. It's sad when accidents happen, but insinuating that the ceasing of aggressive training will lower accident rates is absolutley wrong... the crashes will happen more frequently, and during the real thing, which will have far larger ramifications.
Mike
Why wouldn't you just avoid drooping the rotor in the first place i.e. during a hover to offload pax I reckon Nr would be pretty handy to have? No idea about special forces tactics but I'm sure someone can enlighten me."
A model blackhawks, and the Aussie blackhawks, use an ECU instead of a DEC on the -700 series engines. L models and others with the -701C engines have the DEC. The ECU relies much more on mechanical means to control engine power than the DEC does... and the biggest nasty that bites back is the dreaded transient rotor droop that was a factor in the Fiji accident. It's not hard to avoid getting transient droop, but when you fly to the capabilities of the aircraft, such as in combat operations, its very easy to find. When the collective is on the floor and the engines are at a very low power setting, pulling in power in anything but a very gradual pace will cause the engines to "lag" coming back on-line and RPM to drop. The -700 engines have a mechanical "anticipator" linkage that tries to keep the engines ahead of the game, but it does a sorry job when it comes to rapid power changes. US Army guys are taught to "lead with power" when in a low torque situation, but I've seen it many many times where it's just too slow catching up and rotor droop is the result. Bam, there goes the buckets of power a -60 pilot is so used to having, and thats when a tailwind or high gross situation will really bite you in the arse.
As for being cowboys... Those kind of manuvers are REQUIRED at times when in combat, and thinking that the only time they should be performed is during an actual guns-a-blazing situation is rediculous. It's sad when accidents happen, but insinuating that the ceasing of aggressive training will lower accident rates is absolutley wrong... the crashes will happen more frequently, and during the real thing, which will have far larger ramifications.
Mike
As for being cowboys...if (as reported) the Chief of the Australian Defence Force has said that, and bearing in mind he is a distinguished military fast jet pilot, is quite a remarkable statement. Given he has the investigation report and full resources of the Defence Force available to him, his opinion here must carry considerable weight. Who's to say otherwise?
From the outside looking in, and being someone who was once on the inside looking in, I can't see the point of entering into a training regime that is so likely to result in an accident simply because you might have to do that on operations. No training is so important that a safe way to do it can't be found.
I think it is agreed that a mistake was made here, compounded by systematic deficiencies, and an accident resulted. Certainly the pilot didn't set out that day to have a prang or imperil the aircraft.
From the outside looking in, and being someone who was once on the inside looking in, I can't see the point of entering into a training regime that is so likely to result in an accident simply because you might have to do that on operations. No training is so important that a safe way to do it can't be found.
I think it is agreed that a mistake was made here, compounded by systematic deficiencies, and an accident resulted. Certainly the pilot didn't set out that day to have a prang or imperil the aircraft.
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Macchi and Strikemaster not quite "fast" jet, think you will find Angus more Helicopter driver than anything else.
Chief of the Defence Force
Chief of the Defence Force
Angus was one of the first pilots to be endorsed on the Black hawk in Australia , he was my boss as CO of 9 sqn RAAF and OC A Sqn 5Avn Regt (yep Airforce boss of an Army unit) , he was the Boss in the early days of the Black hawk and was involved in assault and spec ops work if he calls someone a cowboy in particular a helo pilot i'd believe him ,he would not come out with a statement like that lightly, if he was a fastjet pilot his coments may have been taken lightly but his whole career has been in the Army support tactical role, Huey's, Blackhawks,C-130's etc.
And when i've talked to US Army exchange pilots with 160th experiance they have even been amazed as to why the Australian Army pushed there Black hawks so hard when there was no real need to,
or Sikorsky tech reps who said the same thing, our Black hawks had structural cracks at almost half the hours other operators got them.
of the 39 Black hawks delivered 7 have been crashed ,2 in crashes near Oakey ,2 in the High Range accident near Townsville, the Fiji accident and the Timor incident , 6 right offs and 1 cat 4 crash and all pilot error.
And when i've talked to US Army exchange pilots with 160th experiance they have even been amazed as to why the Australian Army pushed there Black hawks so hard when there was no real need to,
or Sikorsky tech reps who said the same thing, our Black hawks had structural cracks at almost half the hours other operators got them.
of the 39 Black hawks delivered 7 have been crashed ,2 in crashes near Oakey ,2 in the High Range accident near Townsville, the Fiji accident and the Timor incident , 6 right offs and 1 cat 4 crash and all pilot error.
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The gentleman seems to have some credentials in the helicoper and instructional areas.
Why then as big chief number one, he who has had ample opportunity to review the selection, training and recurrency training standards of his helicopter pilots for so long is he now coming out and making grandiose statements like that?
IMO, not an incredibly intelligent thing to do. Politically speaking, I reckon his boss needs to fire him.
Why then as big chief number one, he who has had ample opportunity to review the selection, training and recurrency training standards of his helicopter pilots for so long is he now coming out and making grandiose statements like that?
IMO, not an incredibly intelligent thing to do. Politically speaking, I reckon his boss needs to fire him.
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Heliduck,
I would avoid making sweeping statements about an accident that you probably do not know about - have the read the accident report? There was a lot more involved than just hitting the only tree in the field.
HLC
I would avoid making sweeping statements about an accident that you probably do not know about - have the read the accident report? There was a lot more involved than just hitting the only tree in the field.
HLC
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Reread:
The Herald understands that, after reading it, he dubbed senior pilots from 171 Squadron "cowboys"
So thats 'allegedly he dubbed them cowboys'. I thought no one on PPRuNe believed what a journo writes!
Having said that if there is a safety culture problem - its down to the leadership of the people at the top surely. This is a good read:http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/84989...ournal2008.pdf, especially the Target Zero article.
The Herald understands that, after reading it, he dubbed senior pilots from 171 Squadron "cowboys"
So thats 'allegedly he dubbed them cowboys'. I thought no one on PPRuNe believed what a journo writes!
Having said that if there is a safety culture problem - its down to the leadership of the people at the top surely. This is a good read:http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/84989...ournal2008.pdf, especially the Target Zero article.
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Topendtorque, I'm not sure that it's fair to say that the Chief of the Defence Force should have to be responsible for the selection, training and recurrency training of a squadron of pilots. He is, after all, responsible for the Army, Navy and Air Force (about 85000 people) and has a bunch of other people who actually have the hands-on responsibility.
He probably has responsibility though to take action once he discovers a problem which it sounds as though he is doing, having apparently commissioned an inquiry into his helicopter operations following his receipt of the BOI report.
He probably has responsibility though to take action once he discovers a problem which it sounds as though he is doing, having apparently commissioned an inquiry into his helicopter operations following his receipt of the BOI report.
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Can the big cheese be responsible for anything that justifies their wages and rank if they have to wait for an accident or two to find out there is a problem? Surely that puts him on no better par than his fellow ozzie tax payers? Ooops the other taxpayers weren't told about one of the accidents!
All the Army people on this forum probably know that there have been many more unreported incidents and accidents over the years. Sometimes 'cowboy' flying has been to blame (eg. CAPT "Death" from many years ago) and sometimes operational requirements have pushed personell beyond their limits (both air and gnd crew).
There is a tendency to push the envolope in all areas of the Army, not just aviation. How many LR110s and Mogs have been rolled, injuring and killing people because the drivers wanted to show off their 'skill'. How many UDs and NDs occur due to gung-ho weapons handling in peace time and how many maintenence mistakes have been made on helicopters due to fatigue or other pressures on peacetime EX or non-warlike operations.
When completing the old Army Y12 cse, an aviation (maintenence) WO2 told me that they had no duty time/fatigue limitations. He said they could be put in a gun pit all night and then expected to work on helos the next day, without any sleep. I don't know if this is true but this would represent an unnesessary safety risk in peacetime.
Army culture, and an effective aviation safety culture, seem to be at odds with each other. I realise I am about to be rubished by those who believe we should "harden up" and fly into battle with bayonets between our teeth but I am speaking from experience. I have had friends and collegues killed while serving in the Army and Navy, including in helo crashes, none of them due to enemy fire.
There is a tendency to push the envolope in all areas of the Army, not just aviation. How many LR110s and Mogs have been rolled, injuring and killing people because the drivers wanted to show off their 'skill'. How many UDs and NDs occur due to gung-ho weapons handling in peace time and how many maintenence mistakes have been made on helicopters due to fatigue or other pressures on peacetime EX or non-warlike operations.
When completing the old Army Y12 cse, an aviation (maintenence) WO2 told me that they had no duty time/fatigue limitations. He said they could be put in a gun pit all night and then expected to work on helos the next day, without any sleep. I don't know if this is true but this would represent an unnesessary safety risk in peacetime.
Army culture, and an effective aviation safety culture, seem to be at odds with each other. I realise I am about to be rubished by those who believe we should "harden up" and fly into battle with bayonets between our teeth but I am speaking from experience. I have had friends and collegues killed while serving in the Army and Navy, including in helo crashes, none of them due to enemy fire.
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Once again football tonight was particularly enjoyable with Queensland taking home the State of Origin decider.
Tibbsy, I think i am saying that this guy has as his field of expertise, training and helicopters. Surely he must have been taking a keen interest in watching his main support group, or more bluntly, defence, I.E. the one line that he knows.
I reckon he took his eye off the ball, and is now trying to scapegoat his actions by criticising his troops.
That is inexcusable.
As big cheese he gets to march at least two paces in the lead, with his sword drawn, and the bayonets behind, usually are at the shoulder.
I think he has tripped.
I've spent a bit of time discussing the selection criteria for the military vs the mustering type, with those that should know. For sure in both areas flair and personal endeavour is a requirement, not to be confused with ego, which like euphoria, doesn't count for much when the chips are down. a fact which crudd is finding out.
Those qualities make excellent pilots with the right mentoring.
Lets not forget that this guy is at the top, and can control. His team are made of people, good people. Any team will be as good as the people in it, saw that tonight at footy.
Does he have the capacity to nurture and cultivate those people, or does he lead by quashing the personal initiative of those behind who may represent competition?
Thus leaving the lead exponents in the field to a lack of direction when they are exposed to something beyond the ability of the big cheese.
I could also say that in private enterprise that many, when they get to the top, usually put their stamp on the "type" of person they want to run their show for them.
At the other end of the scale if you get elected to a position of leader where you have no control over the others elected as your team, you damm well get out there and open the right gates first day before the rest get out of bed.
his promotion lies in the middle of those scenarios, no excuses.
Tibbsy, I think i am saying that this guy has as his field of expertise, training and helicopters. Surely he must have been taking a keen interest in watching his main support group, or more bluntly, defence, I.E. the one line that he knows.
I reckon he took his eye off the ball, and is now trying to scapegoat his actions by criticising his troops.
That is inexcusable.
As big cheese he gets to march at least two paces in the lead, with his sword drawn, and the bayonets behind, usually are at the shoulder.
I think he has tripped.
I've spent a bit of time discussing the selection criteria for the military vs the mustering type, with those that should know. For sure in both areas flair and personal endeavour is a requirement, not to be confused with ego, which like euphoria, doesn't count for much when the chips are down. a fact which crudd is finding out.
Those qualities make excellent pilots with the right mentoring.
Lets not forget that this guy is at the top, and can control. His team are made of people, good people. Any team will be as good as the people in it, saw that tonight at footy.
Does he have the capacity to nurture and cultivate those people, or does he lead by quashing the personal initiative of those behind who may represent competition?
Thus leaving the lead exponents in the field to a lack of direction when they are exposed to something beyond the ability of the big cheese.
I could also say that in private enterprise that many, when they get to the top, usually put their stamp on the "type" of person they want to run their show for them.
At the other end of the scale if you get elected to a position of leader where you have no control over the others elected as your team, you damm well get out there and open the right gates first day before the rest get out of bed.
his promotion lies in the middle of those scenarios, no excuses.
You lay blind in a perfect world. The reality is that in such a large organisation that intimate knowledge of all goings on is not possible. Nor is it sometimes appropriate. One man can only manage so many moving parts and his competent commanders must take responsibility for the lower echelon. The micro management required to look into the crew rooms of different Squadrons from your office in Canberra would be unwelcome and completely inappropriate.
The fact that an 'all is well message' is too often passed from the lower echelon through to command does not help the situation. Junior commanders are often reticent to send distress signals through to higher as this implies failure on their part.
Too many short sited individuals that are too worried about their next job and not concerned with the one they are in currently. It is all about the right impression and the Army is completely bound by the human condition and our quest for more. (Promotion / Status / Money.)
Houston is doing his level best to better a situation that he was blindsided into. The commanders of the offending Squadron were the largest perpetrators of the 'Cowboy" tendancies. If your commanders give you information you must trust their integrity. If that is in doubt then the game is lost. In this case there was some unthruths and there was some individuals that were blind to the dangers they were putting themselves in.
The culture had shifted within the unit to a point where these factors (droop, close calls, non-reporting to protect mates) had become accepted. The bonds and Esprit de Corp are very solid within this unit, mates looking after mates and this is very important to the job they do. It is risky and they do it well. They work hard for us all, it costs them their time, often their marriages and too often their mates. They are to be respected for that, but a time comes when outside mediation, controls need to be inforced. When you become insular, as they had, you become exposed to a shift in your acceptance of risk.
This cultural shift that was not checked by the commanders, but fuelled, led to accidents and incidents that should not have happened. The grief felt by the family that is this group of people is unmentionable. They are good pilots and good people who work to do their best at a great cost.
It is a shame that there is no one with the time or fortitude to stand up and slow it all down occassionally within the over taxed Army aviation capability. They are over tasked, undermanned, and getting more inexperienced as time goes on. The shift in civil industry is worsening this situation and I for one can't see a way forward for the capability.
The fact that an 'all is well message' is too often passed from the lower echelon through to command does not help the situation. Junior commanders are often reticent to send distress signals through to higher as this implies failure on their part.
Too many short sited individuals that are too worried about their next job and not concerned with the one they are in currently. It is all about the right impression and the Army is completely bound by the human condition and our quest for more. (Promotion / Status / Money.)
Houston is doing his level best to better a situation that he was blindsided into. The commanders of the offending Squadron were the largest perpetrators of the 'Cowboy" tendancies. If your commanders give you information you must trust their integrity. If that is in doubt then the game is lost. In this case there was some unthruths and there was some individuals that were blind to the dangers they were putting themselves in.
The culture had shifted within the unit to a point where these factors (droop, close calls, non-reporting to protect mates) had become accepted. The bonds and Esprit de Corp are very solid within this unit, mates looking after mates and this is very important to the job they do. It is risky and they do it well. They work hard for us all, it costs them their time, often their marriages and too often their mates. They are to be respected for that, but a time comes when outside mediation, controls need to be inforced. When you become insular, as they had, you become exposed to a shift in your acceptance of risk.
This cultural shift that was not checked by the commanders, but fuelled, led to accidents and incidents that should not have happened. The grief felt by the family that is this group of people is unmentionable. They are good pilots and good people who work to do their best at a great cost.
It is a shame that there is no one with the time or fortitude to stand up and slow it all down occassionally within the over taxed Army aviation capability. They are over tasked, undermanned, and getting more inexperienced as time goes on. The shift in civil industry is worsening this situation and I for one can't see a way forward for the capability.
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Didn't the training of Oz mil helicopter pilots go to the cheapest bidder in the early 90s, only for the system to founder? Then, with it all around their ears, instead of paying more for a better job, did they not re-award the contract to the same institution?
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Trojan1981,
Let us try to be fair and balanced.
"All the Army people on this forum probably know that there have been many more unreported incidents and accidents over the years."
- I bet that all the Air Force people can probably say the same thing. I could real off a number of Air Force issues that either were under reported. And Air Force has its fair share of cowboys (-ve G in a C130 anyone?)...
"When completing the old Army Y12 cse, an aviation (maintenence) WO2 told me that they had no duty time/fatigue limitations."
- I don't know when you did the course, but there are documented limitations. Army is rather progressive when it comes to reporting maintenance human factors issues. And I know that Air Force techos are under significant pressure to support operations overseas that they sometimes bend the rules to get an aircraft in the air.
I have nothing against what you are trying to say, but this is a public forum and bashing one service does no one any good. This is a systemic issue across the ADF, not just Army. CDF does have responsibility. He was CAF when the tri -ervice Directorate of Flying Safety was diluted with the addition of the Directorate of Air Force Safety a few years ago. What should have been a unit that identified risks within the Defence aviation community prior to an accident was sufficiently diluted so that it became a toothless tiger.
Igor13,
I agree with nearly all of your post. Army Aviation is over-taxed and over-tasked. It is also over-scrutinized, more so since this accident. Your comment that no one has the fortitude to stand up is correct, but those that did stand up in the past were quite unceremoniously and sometimes publicly dismissed.
However, the seeds for these types of accidents were sown many years ago. The squadron in question was a second tour posting a few years ago. To be a co-pilot was 1000 hours. Taking pilots straight off course and exposing them to the tempo/flight regimes/pressure was unfair. How is a 300hr pilot sitting next to a very experienced captain express his/her concerns about the flight profile. Yes, CRM/Aviation Team Training should mean that the co-pilot has the opportunity to speak up, but be realistic.
HLC
Let us try to be fair and balanced.
"All the Army people on this forum probably know that there have been many more unreported incidents and accidents over the years."
- I bet that all the Air Force people can probably say the same thing. I could real off a number of Air Force issues that either were under reported. And Air Force has its fair share of cowboys (-ve G in a C130 anyone?)...
"When completing the old Army Y12 cse, an aviation (maintenence) WO2 told me that they had no duty time/fatigue limitations."
- I don't know when you did the course, but there are documented limitations. Army is rather progressive when it comes to reporting maintenance human factors issues. And I know that Air Force techos are under significant pressure to support operations overseas that they sometimes bend the rules to get an aircraft in the air.
I have nothing against what you are trying to say, but this is a public forum and bashing one service does no one any good. This is a systemic issue across the ADF, not just Army. CDF does have responsibility. He was CAF when the tri -ervice Directorate of Flying Safety was diluted with the addition of the Directorate of Air Force Safety a few years ago. What should have been a unit that identified risks within the Defence aviation community prior to an accident was sufficiently diluted so that it became a toothless tiger.
Igor13,
I agree with nearly all of your post. Army Aviation is over-taxed and over-tasked. It is also over-scrutinized, more so since this accident. Your comment that no one has the fortitude to stand up is correct, but those that did stand up in the past were quite unceremoniously and sometimes publicly dismissed.
However, the seeds for these types of accidents were sown many years ago. The squadron in question was a second tour posting a few years ago. To be a co-pilot was 1000 hours. Taking pilots straight off course and exposing them to the tempo/flight regimes/pressure was unfair. How is a 300hr pilot sitting next to a very experienced captain express his/her concerns about the flight profile. Yes, CRM/Aviation Team Training should mean that the co-pilot has the opportunity to speak up, but be realistic.
HLC
Fair comment.
I don't intend to single out the Army. I served in the Army so its the service I know best. I haven't seen this type of thing in the RAAF, thats not to say it doesn't happen. An old friend of mine died on Nias so I know it has happened in the RAN as well.
The comment on maintenence duty hours was made to me by an Army WO2 AME about five years ago, he went on to say that the RAAF does have strict limitations on duty hours and stated that he thought they were "soft".
"Might as well be civillians" he said. I am out now and don't know what the directive says so I can't verify wether his comments are valid.
Are there any current or former RAN pilots out there? Is it unusual to approach a Ships helo deck downwind?
Agreed
I don't intend to single out the Army. I served in the Army so its the service I know best. I haven't seen this type of thing in the RAAF, thats not to say it doesn't happen. An old friend of mine died on Nias so I know it has happened in the RAN as well.
The comment on maintenence duty hours was made to me by an Army WO2 AME about five years ago, he went on to say that the RAAF does have strict limitations on duty hours and stated that he thought they were "soft".
"Might as well be civillians" he said. I am out now and don't know what the directive says so I can't verify wether his comments are valid.
Are there any current or former RAN pilots out there? Is it unusual to approach a Ships helo deck downwind?
This is a systemic issue across the ADF, not just Army. CDF does have responsibility. He was CAF when the tri -ervice Directorate of Flying Safety was diluted with the addition of the Directorate of Air Force Safety a few years ago. What should have been a unit that identified risks within the Defence aviation community prior to an accident was sufficiently diluted so that it became a toothless tiger.
Didn't the training of Oz mil helicopter pilots go to the cheapest bidder in the early 90s, only for the system to founder? Then, with it all around their ears, instead of paying more for a better job, did they not re-award the contract to the same institution?