GOM - yet another ditching
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You're right about Nigeria BB. Here it's not just that there's no quality media to get involved, but the AIB is completely hopeless and inefficient. It's to the advantage of the operating companies also as they hope these things will just go away and be forgotten.
Bristow also have another AIB investigation pending into the Citation XLS which they wrote off with a heap of Total management on board at DNPO.
In addition to the Bristow accidents you mentioned, nothing more seems to have been heard about the 2 OAS AS350 fatal accidents or the one with a privately registered Bell 407 which killed a child at Aba.
As for some of the near misses ..... the ACN S76C+ which was so over-torqued that the blades nearly came off (and the pilot reported no defects in the technical log
) and the Caverton SA365N which came back with part of the tail pylon missing and a length of power cable embedded in the leading edge of a main rotor blade - and the pilot reported that he felt no unusual vibrations. Believe me, there are a whole heap more out there that the operators don't want anyone to hear about 
Bristow also have another AIB investigation pending into the Citation XLS which they wrote off with a heap of Total management on board at DNPO.
In addition to the Bristow accidents you mentioned, nothing more seems to have been heard about the 2 OAS AS350 fatal accidents or the one with a privately registered Bell 407 which killed a child at Aba.
As for some of the near misses ..... the ACN S76C+ which was so over-torqued that the blades nearly came off (and the pilot reported no defects in the technical log
) and the Caverton SA365N which came back with part of the tail pylon missing and a length of power cable embedded in the leading edge of a main rotor blade - and the pilot reported that he felt no unusual vibrations. Believe me, there are a whole heap more out there that the operators don't want anyone to hear about
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NTSB Identification: CEN14FA286
Nonscheduled 14 CFR Part 135: Air Taxi & Commuter
Accident occurred Wednesday, June 11, 2014 in South Tim Bailier Platform, GM
Aircraft: BELL 206 L4, registration: N207MY
Injuries: 2 Fatal.
This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed. NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.Nonscheduled 14 CFR Part 135: Air Taxi & Commuter
Accident occurred Wednesday, June 11, 2014 in South Tim Bailier Platform, GM
Aircraft: BELL 206 L4, registration: N207MY
Injuries: 2 Fatal.
On June 11, 2014, about 1430 central daylight time, a Bell 206L4 helicopter, N207MY, impacted the waters in the Gulf of Mexico. The helicopter was registered to Coy Leasing LLC and operated by Westwind Helicopters, Inc., under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135. The commercial- rated pilot and passenger were fatally injured and the helicopter was destroyed. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and company flight following was in effect. The flight departed an oil platform at 1409, and was en route to the South Tim Bailier 317 platform.
A witness who was located on the oil platform reported that he heard the helicopter approach the platform. The helicopter was on a straight in approach to the platform, when the helicopter started to spin in a clockwise direction. The witness added that the helicopter spun 8-10 times, before the helicopter went silent and then dropped to the water.
The helicopter sank and was recovered from about a depth of 380 feet of water. Examination of the helicopter showed extensive damage to the cabin. The tail boom had separated from the main fuselage and was recovered from the surface of the water. One of the main rotor blades, which had separated about four feet from the mast was not recovered. Several sections of the helicopter were not recovered, and included the landing skids, cabin door, and floor.
The wreckage was retrained for further examination.
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IDENTIFICATION
Date: 11-NOV-14
Time: 20:15:00Z
Regis#: N373RL
Aircraft Make: BELL
Aircraft Model: 407
Event Type: Incident
Highest Injury: None
Aircraft Missing:
Damage: Unknown
LOCATION
City: NEW ORLEANS
State: Louisiana
Country:
DESCRIPTION
Description: N373RL BELL 407 ROTORCRAFT SHORTLY AFTER DEPARTURE FROM OIL PLATFORM DITCHED INTO THE WATER, NEAR LAKEFRONT, NEW ORLEANS, LA
Date: 11-NOV-14
Time: 20:15:00Z
Regis#: N373RL
Aircraft Make: BELL
Aircraft Model: 407
Event Type: Incident
Highest Injury: None
Aircraft Missing:
Damage: Unknown
LOCATION
City: NEW ORLEANS
State: Louisiana
Country:
DESCRIPTION
Description: N373RL BELL 407 ROTORCRAFT SHORTLY AFTER DEPARTURE FROM OIL PLATFORM DITCHED INTO THE WATER, NEAR LAKEFRONT, NEW ORLEANS, LA
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NTSB Identification: CEN15IA046
Nonscheduled 14 CFR Part 135: Air Taxi & Commuter
Incident occurred Tuesday, November 11, 2014 in VR 189, GM
Aircraft: BELL 407, registration: N373RL
Injuries: 4 Uninjured.
Nonscheduled 14 CFR Part 135: Air Taxi & Commuter
Incident occurred Tuesday, November 11, 2014 in VR 189, GM
Aircraft: BELL 407, registration: N373RL
Injuries: 4 Uninjured.
This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed. NTSB investigators used data provided by various sources and may not have traveled in support of this investigation to prepare this aircraft incident report.
On November 11, 2014, about 1355 central standard time, a Bell 407 helicopter, N373RL, was ditched on the Gulf of Mexico, Louisiana, following a loss of engine power. The pilot and three passengers were uninjured. The helicopter sustained no damage during the ditching. The helicopter was registered to and operated by Rotorcraft Leasing Company LLC, under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135, as a passenger flight. Day visual flight rules (VFR) conditions prevailed for the flight, which did not operate on a VFR flight plan. The flight was originating from VR189, an offshore drilling rig in the Gulf of Mexico.
At 1450, the recorded weather at the Houma-Terrebonne Airport, near Houma, Louisiana, was: Wind 190 degrees at 7 knots; visibility 7 statute miles; sky condition scattered clouds at 4,200 feet, broken clouds at 6,500 feet; temperature 26 degrees C; dew point 16 degrees C; altimeter 29.96 inches of mercury.
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Full details in the dockets contained here:
Accident ID CEN12FA250 Mode Aviation occurred on April 17, 2012 in Gulf of Mexico, LA United States Last Modified on December 01, 2014 07:12 Public Released on December 01, 2014 07:12 Total 36 document items
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Accident ID CEN12FA250 Mode Aviation occurred on April 17, 2012 in Gulf of Mexico, LA United States Last Modified on December 01, 2014 07:12 Public Released on December 01, 2014 07:12 Total 36 document items
HISTORY OF FLIGHT
On April 17, 2012, about 1155 central daylight time, a Sikorsky S-76B helicopter, N56RD, was substantially damaged during a forced landing in the Gulf of Mexico near the Joe Douglas oil drilling rig (Vermilion VR376A). The pilot, the airplane pilot-rated passenger in the copilot seat, and the five passengers seated in the cabin were not injured. The helicopter was registered to and operated by RDC Marine, Inc., under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91, as a business flight. Day visual meteorological conditions prevailed and no flight plan was filed. The flight departed at 1110 from Acadiana Regional Airport (ARA), New Iberia, Louisiana, and was destined for the Joe Douglas.
Background Information
The pilot reported that on Friday, April 13, 2012, he was flying the accident helicopter from an oil platform to Port Fourchon, Louisiana, when the helicopter had an apparent loss of power from the No. 2 engine during cruise flight. The pilot described the event as an engine rollback, but he was unsure about how much reduction in power the engine actually experienced. The autopilot was on when the loss of power occurred. The pilot noticed that the No. 1 torque needle was going into the One Engine Inoperative (OEI) range, so he disengaged the autopilot and lowered the collective to keep the engine out of the OEI range and prevent a temperature exceedance. He reported that there was no torque indicated on the No. 2 engine. He reported that the No. 2 engine was still operating because the N1 speed indicator (gas producer turbine) indicated that the engine was operating, but the pilot was unsure what the N1 needle read. He thought it might have been in the idle range, but he was not certain. The pilot switched back and forth on the load sharing switch between torque and T5 (engine temperature), but it did not seem to have any effect. The red engine out light and the blue manual reversion light did not illuminate. He reported that the No. 2 engine came back on line by itself. When it did, the No. 1 engine had a decrease in power, and the torque and temperature gauges matched up. He reported that the entire event lasted 10 to 20 seconds. After that, the No. 2 engine worked normally during the flight back to Port Fourchon.
Once at Port Fourchon, the pilot shut down the helicopter and checked for any electronic engine control (EEC) system fault codes that might have been recorded when the loss of engine power occurred. The pilot reported that there were no EEC fault codes recorded. He restarted the helicopter and performed hover and power checks. The helicopter appeared to be operating normally, so the pilot decided to continue with scheduled missions, which involved two more flights out to the oil rigs. The pilot overnighted in Patterson, Louisiana. The pilot telephoned the mechanic and left a message about the loss of power to the No. 2 engine. The mechanic was gone for the weekend and did not check his phone messages until Sunday night. The pilot flew three flights out to the oil rigs on Saturday before returning to Hobby Airport (HOU), Houston, Texas, where the helicopter was based. The pilot reported no anomalies occurred on Saturday.
The helicopter did not fly on Sunday. On Monday, the mechanic checked the EEC fault codes but there were none recorded. He checked the torque sensor cannon plugs and sprayed them with corrosion preventative. No engine runs or test flights were performed. No entries were made in the engine or airframe logbooks concerning the intermittent loss of power on April 13, 2012.
Accident Flight
On Tuesday, April 17, 2012, the pilot reported that he arrived at HOU about 0600 to prepare for the flight. The flight departed about 0700 with six passengers and full fuel en route to ARA, which took about one hour and forty minutes. The helicopter was refueled at ARA before departing for the Joe Douglas oil platform, which was located about 117 nautical miles away on a 180 heading. The helicopter arrived at the Joe Douglas platform about 45 minutes later.
The pilot reported that he made a visual approach on a 190 degree heading to the landing platform. He reported that the wind was from 220 degrees at 5 to 6 knots, according to the Garmin 500 GPS that was installed in the helicopter. He was flying directly towards the platform while decelerating from 60 to 45 knots while maintaining a 12 degree approach angle. The helicopter was about 60 feet from the landing pad and about 15 to 20 feet higher than the landing pad with a nose high attitude in the flare when a loss of engine power occurred. The pilot was unsure which engine had the loss of power. With the loss of power, the pilot reported that the trajectory of the helicopter would place it short of the landing pad. The pilot reported that the helicopter was going to hit the platform, so he pulled collective pitch, banked aft and to the left to avoid contact with the platform. Once clear of the platform, he attempted to lower the collective and gain airspeed, but the helicopter was in a high rate of descent with low airspeed. He pulled collective pitch and flared the helicopter before water impact. The pilot reported about 3 to 4 seconds transpired from the time he tried to avoid hitting the platform to when the helicopter impacted the water. After impacting the water, the helicopter remained on top of the surface as the pilot kept engine power on the helicopter to keep it from sinking. He deployed the emergency floatation bags and attempted to water taxi toward the oil platform, but there was no directional control since the tailboom was partially separated from the fuselage.
The pilot continued to keep engine power on the helicopter as a rescue pod from the Joe Douglas was lowered to the water. The passengers in the cabin were preparing to deploy the life rafts as the rescue pod was being launched. When the rescue pod was near the helicopter, the pilot shut down the engines. The passengers deployed the life rafts as the helicopter began to list to the left. All six passengers and the pilot got into the rafts, and then transferred into the rescue pod, which was then winched back up to the deck of the platform. None of the occupants reported any injuries.
Sometime after the occupants egressed, the helicopter inverted in the water with the four floatation bags keeping it from sinking. However, the bags were compromised during the initial recovery effort and the helicopter later sank in about 310 feet of water. The helicopter was recovered on April 25, 2012, and taken to Port Fourchon where it was examined on April 27, 2012.
PERSONNEL INFORMATION
The pilot held an airline transport certificate with helicopter and single-engine land ratings. He held helicopter and airplane instrument ratings, and was a flight instructor with helicopter, airplane single-engine, airplane multi-engine, instrument helicopter, and instrument airplane ratings. He held a first class medical certificate that was issued on April 16, 2012, with a limitation for corrective lenses. The pilot reported that he had a total flight time of 16,000 hours with 677 hours in Sikorsky S-76B helicopters. He had 36 years of flying experience, with 23 years as a pilot for the operator.
The airplane pilot-rated passenger held an airline transport certificate and was an airplane pilot for the operator. He reported he had about 13,000 hours of total flight hours. He had no formal training in helicopters, but he had about 25 hours of "left seat" time in helicopters. He had flown once before with the accident pilot.
On April 17, 2012, about 1155 central daylight time, a Sikorsky S-76B helicopter, N56RD, was substantially damaged during a forced landing in the Gulf of Mexico near the Joe Douglas oil drilling rig (Vermilion VR376A). The pilot, the airplane pilot-rated passenger in the copilot seat, and the five passengers seated in the cabin were not injured. The helicopter was registered to and operated by RDC Marine, Inc., under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91, as a business flight. Day visual meteorological conditions prevailed and no flight plan was filed. The flight departed at 1110 from Acadiana Regional Airport (ARA), New Iberia, Louisiana, and was destined for the Joe Douglas.
Background Information
The pilot reported that on Friday, April 13, 2012, he was flying the accident helicopter from an oil platform to Port Fourchon, Louisiana, when the helicopter had an apparent loss of power from the No. 2 engine during cruise flight. The pilot described the event as an engine rollback, but he was unsure about how much reduction in power the engine actually experienced. The autopilot was on when the loss of power occurred. The pilot noticed that the No. 1 torque needle was going into the One Engine Inoperative (OEI) range, so he disengaged the autopilot and lowered the collective to keep the engine out of the OEI range and prevent a temperature exceedance. He reported that there was no torque indicated on the No. 2 engine. He reported that the No. 2 engine was still operating because the N1 speed indicator (gas producer turbine) indicated that the engine was operating, but the pilot was unsure what the N1 needle read. He thought it might have been in the idle range, but he was not certain. The pilot switched back and forth on the load sharing switch between torque and T5 (engine temperature), but it did not seem to have any effect. The red engine out light and the blue manual reversion light did not illuminate. He reported that the No. 2 engine came back on line by itself. When it did, the No. 1 engine had a decrease in power, and the torque and temperature gauges matched up. He reported that the entire event lasted 10 to 20 seconds. After that, the No. 2 engine worked normally during the flight back to Port Fourchon.
Once at Port Fourchon, the pilot shut down the helicopter and checked for any electronic engine control (EEC) system fault codes that might have been recorded when the loss of engine power occurred. The pilot reported that there were no EEC fault codes recorded. He restarted the helicopter and performed hover and power checks. The helicopter appeared to be operating normally, so the pilot decided to continue with scheduled missions, which involved two more flights out to the oil rigs. The pilot overnighted in Patterson, Louisiana. The pilot telephoned the mechanic and left a message about the loss of power to the No. 2 engine. The mechanic was gone for the weekend and did not check his phone messages until Sunday night. The pilot flew three flights out to the oil rigs on Saturday before returning to Hobby Airport (HOU), Houston, Texas, where the helicopter was based. The pilot reported no anomalies occurred on Saturday.
The helicopter did not fly on Sunday. On Monday, the mechanic checked the EEC fault codes but there were none recorded. He checked the torque sensor cannon plugs and sprayed them with corrosion preventative. No engine runs or test flights were performed. No entries were made in the engine or airframe logbooks concerning the intermittent loss of power on April 13, 2012.
Accident Flight
On Tuesday, April 17, 2012, the pilot reported that he arrived at HOU about 0600 to prepare for the flight. The flight departed about 0700 with six passengers and full fuel en route to ARA, which took about one hour and forty minutes. The helicopter was refueled at ARA before departing for the Joe Douglas oil platform, which was located about 117 nautical miles away on a 180 heading. The helicopter arrived at the Joe Douglas platform about 45 minutes later.
The pilot reported that he made a visual approach on a 190 degree heading to the landing platform. He reported that the wind was from 220 degrees at 5 to 6 knots, according to the Garmin 500 GPS that was installed in the helicopter. He was flying directly towards the platform while decelerating from 60 to 45 knots while maintaining a 12 degree approach angle. The helicopter was about 60 feet from the landing pad and about 15 to 20 feet higher than the landing pad with a nose high attitude in the flare when a loss of engine power occurred. The pilot was unsure which engine had the loss of power. With the loss of power, the pilot reported that the trajectory of the helicopter would place it short of the landing pad. The pilot reported that the helicopter was going to hit the platform, so he pulled collective pitch, banked aft and to the left to avoid contact with the platform. Once clear of the platform, he attempted to lower the collective and gain airspeed, but the helicopter was in a high rate of descent with low airspeed. He pulled collective pitch and flared the helicopter before water impact. The pilot reported about 3 to 4 seconds transpired from the time he tried to avoid hitting the platform to when the helicopter impacted the water. After impacting the water, the helicopter remained on top of the surface as the pilot kept engine power on the helicopter to keep it from sinking. He deployed the emergency floatation bags and attempted to water taxi toward the oil platform, but there was no directional control since the tailboom was partially separated from the fuselage.
The pilot continued to keep engine power on the helicopter as a rescue pod from the Joe Douglas was lowered to the water. The passengers in the cabin were preparing to deploy the life rafts as the rescue pod was being launched. When the rescue pod was near the helicopter, the pilot shut down the engines. The passengers deployed the life rafts as the helicopter began to list to the left. All six passengers and the pilot got into the rafts, and then transferred into the rescue pod, which was then winched back up to the deck of the platform. None of the occupants reported any injuries.
Sometime after the occupants egressed, the helicopter inverted in the water with the four floatation bags keeping it from sinking. However, the bags were compromised during the initial recovery effort and the helicopter later sank in about 310 feet of water. The helicopter was recovered on April 25, 2012, and taken to Port Fourchon where it was examined on April 27, 2012.
PERSONNEL INFORMATION
The pilot held an airline transport certificate with helicopter and single-engine land ratings. He held helicopter and airplane instrument ratings, and was a flight instructor with helicopter, airplane single-engine, airplane multi-engine, instrument helicopter, and instrument airplane ratings. He held a first class medical certificate that was issued on April 16, 2012, with a limitation for corrective lenses. The pilot reported that he had a total flight time of 16,000 hours with 677 hours in Sikorsky S-76B helicopters. He had 36 years of flying experience, with 23 years as a pilot for the operator.
The airplane pilot-rated passenger held an airline transport certificate and was an airplane pilot for the operator. He reported he had about 13,000 hours of total flight hours. He had no formal training in helicopters, but he had about 25 hours of "left seat" time in helicopters. He had flown once before with the accident pilot.
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AIRCRAFT INFORMATION
The helicopter was a Sikorsky S-76B, serial number 760368, manufactured in 1991. It was powered by two Pratt and Whitney PT6B-36A gas turbine engines rated at 1,033 shaft horsepower. The S-76B's Rotorcraft Flight Manual (RFM) lists the maximum gross weight as 11,700 pounds. The helicopter was configured with pilot and copilot seats with seating for five in the cabin. The last maintenance inspection was conducted on April 5, 2012, using the manufacturer's approved inspection program. The total airframe hours at the time of the inspection were 4,376 hours. The helicopter had 4,385.9 hours before the first flight on the day of the accident, which was 10.2 hours since the last maintenance inspection.
The pilot and mechanic reported that the Weight and Balance (W&B) form that showed the last time the helicopter had been weighed was in the helicopter at the time of the accident. The W&B form was not found in the helicopter after it was recovered, so the exact W&B for the helicopter at the time of the accident is not known. The pilot and mechanic did not know the empty weight of the helicopter.
The previous W&B form for the helicopter that was available in the helicopter's maintenance records showed that the helicopter's W&B was conducted on December 14, 2004. It indicated that the empty weight of the helicopter was 8,699 pounds. Using the December 14, 2004 W&B information, the postaccident approximate calculated takeoff weight of the helicopter on the accident flight was the following:
1. Takeoff from ARA
Basic Empty Weight: 8,699 lbs
Pilots: 401 lbs
Row 1 Pax: 345 lbs
Row 2 Pax: 658 lbs
Baggage: 140 lbs
Fuel: 1,912 lbs
Life Rafts (2): 60 lbs
Gross Weight: 12,215 lbs (About 515 lbs over maximum gross weight)
2. Approach to the Joe Douglas platform
Basic Empty Weight: 8,699 lbs
Pilots: 401lbs
Row 1 Pax: 345 lbs
Row 2 Pax: 658 lbs
Baggage (20 lbs per person): 140 lbs
Fuel: 1,342 lbs
Lift Rafts (2): 60 lbs
Gross Weight: 11,645 lbs (About 55 lbs under maximum gross weight)
The S-76B RFM states the following regarding a Category B approach to an elevated platform:
The elevated helideck approach and landing profile with scheduled dropdown is shown diagrammatically in Figure 5-8 The landing procedure employs an approach path offset at least one rotor radius to the side of the helideck to permit an un-obstructed go around path in case of engine failure.
SINGLE ENGINE FAILURE DURING APPROACH TO AN ELEVATED HELIDECK
The Landing Decision Point (LDP) is defined as a point 25 feet above, 25 feet to the left or right of, and 150 feet (3 helicopter lengths) short of the helideck in level flight at 30 KIAS, the point at which the pilot begins the sidestep maneuver toward the helideck. If an engine failure occurs prior to beginning the sidestep maneuver, the pilot must perform a "Go Around". If the engine failure occurs after beginning the sidestep maneuver, the aircraft is committed to a landing and the approach must continue to touchdown.
METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION
At 1115, the surface weather observation obtained from the stationary oil platform KVQT, which was located about 21nm from the Joe Douglas platform on a 301 degree bearing, was wind 080 degrees at 8 knots, visibility 8 miles, scattered clouds at 2,000 feet, broken ceiling at 2,400 feet, overcast 4,800 feet, temperature 25 degrees Celsius (C), dew point 21 degrees C, and altimeter 30.09 inches-of-mercury.
At 1155, the surface weather observation at KVQT was wind 070 degrees at 5 knots, visibility 8 miles, sky clear below 12,000 feet, temperature 26 degrees C, dew point 21 degrees C, and altimeter 30.10 inches-of-mercury.
At 1215, the surface weather observation at KVQT was wind 070 degrees at 5 knots, visibility 9 miles, sky clear, temperature 27 degrees C, dew point 21 degrees C, and altimeter 30.09 inches of mercury.
A National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) weather specialist reported that the National Weather Surface Analysis Chart for 1000 indicated a cold front moving across the area. Observations from KVQT appear to be prefrontal reports with consistent northeasterly flow with the front moving through at 1335 with a wind shift to the north and northwest.
The weather at the Joe Douglas was recorded daily around 1730 and not on an hourly basis. The recorded weather from the Joe Douglas logbook for April 17, 2012, was: winds north, speed 10 mph, seas 4 to 5 feet, temperature 68 degrees Fahrenheit.
TESTS AND RESEARCH
On April 27, 2012, the helicopter wreckage was examined at Port Fourchon, Louisiana. The tailboom, main rotor blades, and right side cabin door were not recovered from the Gulf of Mexico. A visual examination of the cockpit, cabin, main transmission and main rotor head, and engines was conducted.
The engine's N1 probes and channel A and B torque probes were removed from the helicopter and sent to manufacturer, Pratt and Whitney Canada, (P&WC), for testing. The results of the tests indicated that the corrosion due to the salt water immersion made the test results unreliable.
The No. 1 engine's EEC module A and B and the No. 2 engine's EEC module A and B were removed from the helicopter and sent to the manufacturer, Hamilton Sundstrand, for examination. There was moisture, mud, and sand on both the outside and inside of all four units. The memory chips were removed from the units and downloaded for decoding. The No. 1 engine EEC channel A and B had no faults recorded. The No. 2 engine EEC channel A and B exhibited damaged files which provided no useful information concerning fault codes.
The helicopter wreckage was transported to Air Salvage of Dallas for further examination on May 30 – 31, 2012. Under NTSB supervision, PW&C and Sikorsky technical representatives examined the airframe and engines. Engine teardowns were conducted on both engines, and there were no indications of preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. The No.1 engine's fuel control (hydraulic metering unit (HMU)) and the No. 2 engine's fuel control were sent to Hamilton Sundstrand for examination. Three collective position transducers were sent to Sikorsky for further examination.
The examination of the collective position transducers at Sikorsky revealed external and internal corrosion on all three transducers. Due to the corrosion, none of the transducers were functional.
The examination of the fuel controls at Hamilton Sundstrand on June 26 – 27, 2012, focused primarily on these two components: 1) the stepper motor, and 2) the dual rotary linear transformer (RDVT).
The examination of the No. 1 and No. 2 RDVTs revealed that they exhibited physical binding and anomalies due to salt water immersion. The RDVTs were shipped to the manufacturer, Kearfott Corporation, for further examination.
The Hamilton Sundstrand publication "JFC132-1 Stepper Motor CMM Operation" provides the following information concerning the function of the stepper motor:
"The stepper motor gives the EEC fuel metering authority by opening and closing a flapper valve. This valve in conjunction with orifices in the power lever valve and P3 servo valve set the pressure drop across the metered fuel flow paths in the [fuel] control. The stepper motor converts electrical impulses from the EEC into discrete mechanical rotational movements which rotate the flapper valve nut. Mechanical stops limit rotation to approximately 100 degrees. As the nut is rotated, flapper gap area is varied. Should an electronics failure occur, the stepper motor position remains."
The No.1 stepper motor, serial number 0232, was examined for physical binding and none was observed. The unit was functionally tested by providing electrical signals to the stepper motor and the appropriate rotational movements (steps) were observed.
The No. 2 stepper motor, serial number 0105, was examined and there were no visual indications of damage or corrosion. The inspection of the stepper motor gear head indicated some binding. There was no initial movement of the stepper motor gear head lever. After several attempts some movement was achieved. There was still a ratcheting condition in place. The unit was functionally tested by providing electrical signals to the stepper motor, which provided the following results:
1. Five steps were issued with no stepper motor lever movement. This indicated the stepper motor was missing steps.
2. Five steps were issued and the stator motor tried to rotate. No lever movement was observed.
3. Five steps were issued and the stator tried to rotate. No lever movement was observed.
4. Five steps were issued and the lever started to move. It moved less than the 5 commanded steps.
The Hamilton Sundstrand examination report indicated that the anomalies that were evident in the No. 2 stepper motor supported a finding of intermittent operation and a fixed or "stuck" position that would be perceived as a minor roll back [in engine power], but not for a large magnitude roll back [in engine power]. A fixed or "stuck" stepper motor would keep the fuel flow at a fixed position when power is commanded.
The No.1 and No. 2 stepper motors were shipped to the manufacturer, Kearfott Corporation, for further examination.
The (2) RDVTs and (2) stepper motors were examined at Kearfott Corporation on November 13-14, 2012. The examination of the RDVTs showed that both units exhibited severe corrosion due to salt water immersion. Neither of the rotors would rotate due to the corrosion, and no further testing was performed.
The examination of the No. 2 stepper motor revealed that normal electrical testing was not possible due to the extent of the corrosion. The output shaft had a significant crack extending across the diameter of the shaft. In order to complete the teardown examination of the stepper motor, the flapper valve lever on the output shaft was removed by cutting the pin that held the lever on the shaft. The housing material of the stepper motor was removed and corrosion was found throughout the electrical section of the stepper motor.
The electric motor section was separated from the gear head section of the stepper motor. The gear head section of the stepper motor was self-enclosed with seals that prevented salt water from contaminating the gear head section. All the gears were removed from the gear head. Binding was observed between the output shaft bearing and the cracked output shaft. Run out of the output shaft was measured at 0.0048 inch. The drawing for the gear shaft limits the run out to 0.0003 inch maximum. Enough force had been applied to the output gear shaft to bend the shaft as exhibited by the run out being 0.0045 inch above the high limits. Debris was observed on the flat part of the gear teeth.
The Kearfott examination report stated that, "It was apparent that a force was applied to the external lever that was sufficient to both crack and bend the output shaft. This increased the run out on the shaft of the unit. Kearfott does not manufacture or install this lever."
The examination of the No. 1 stepper motor revealed no preaccident anomalies that would have precluded normal operation.
The No. 1 and No. 2 stepper motors and the (2) RDVT's were sent to the NTSB Materials laboratory for further examination.
The NTSB Material laboratory's examination of the No. 2 stepper motor revealed that end of the output gearshaft exhibited at least five cracks nearly parallel to each other. The character of these cracks was not consistent with progressive cracking, which typically exhibits branched rather than parallel cracks. Examination of the fracture surfaces revealed that approximately 90 percent of the fracture surface exhibited dimple rupture fracture features, indicative of tensile overstress in ductile materials. The fracture surface area closest to the gearshaft exterior exhibited a faceted morphology indicative of a cleavage fracture, which is consistent with a fracture in case hardened steel. The examination of the output front bearing that surrounds the output gearshaft revealed that is was able to freely spin about the inner race when force was placed on the outer race. No indications of external corrosion or mechanical damage were observed.
The maintenance records indicated that the last overhaul of the No. 2 fuel control and the No. 2 stepper motor was conducted on December 10, 2004, at P&WC. During the overhaul of the stepper motors, a pin was pressed into the output shaft of the stepper motor to attach a lever. This lever engaged a flapper valve which was then turned by the stepper motor. No records of the overhaul for these units were found at P&WC due to an internal computer records system not migrating them to the current system.
Hamilton Sundstrand confirmed that this failure mode of the stepper motor output gearshaft was not common, and there were no records at Hamilton Sundstrand of any similar occurrence.
Hamilton Sundstrand provided an explanation of the JFC132-1 stepper motor fault codes. The explanation stated the following:
1. The EEC incorporated open circuit detection logic to verify the electrical integrity of the stepper motor and drive system. A fault detected would produce a fault code of 15 or 35.
2. There is no fault code for the stepper motor performance. No position feedback of the stepper motor, fuel flow requirement, or control logic was built into the design. There was no requirement to track expected engine performance within the EEC to specifically detect a "stuck" stepper motor.
3. The only fault codes associated with a stepper motor are those generated by the open circuit detection logic.
4. There are several failures within the stepper motor system that can result in a "stuck stepper motor" that are not detected by the EEC. These include the stepper motor gearbox, shaft, etc. and metering valve failures.
5. A "stuck stepper motor" effectively creates a fail freeze condition consistent with the use of a stepper motor with engine power modulation retained through the power lever and rotor speed modulation maintained by the opposite engine.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
The Rowan Company representative to the investigation provided the NTSB a schematic of the Rowan "Joe Douglas" Vermilion 376A oil platform as it was positioned on the day of the accident. It also showed direction of the Joe Douglas and the helicopter approach angles as they existed on the day of the accident.
The schematic showed that the helicopter landing pad was located on the north side of the oil platform. An approach heading of 190 degrees, as reported by the accident pilot, put the approach path aiming for the center of the oil platform super structure. This approach angle provided limited clearance for a go-around. Likewise, an approach angle between about 160 to 220 degrees heading provided limited clearance for a go-around due to the location of the super structure. An approach path heading from about 060 to 140 degrees, or from about 230 to 320 degrees, would have provided good go-around capability since there was no super structure behind the landing platform on those headings.
According to the Rowan Company representative, over the last 25 years, Rowan has operated a fleet of approximately 12 airplanes including a Convair 580, a King Air, a Lear jet, a DC-3, a Pilatus PC-12 and a Gulfstream IV and six helicopters ranging from a Bell 206 to a Sikorsky S-76. The high point for Rowan's fleet was the late 1990s at which time Rowan operated approximately five airplanes and three helicopters and employed approximately six pilots and six mechanics on a full-time basis. Since the late 1990s, Rowan sold several of its corporate aircraft. At the time of the Sikorsky S-76 incident, in addition to the helicopter, the company owned and operated a Pilatus PC-12 and a Gulfstream IV. Rowan currently owns no helicopters and just one Gulfstream IV airplane.
The helicopter was a Sikorsky S-76B, serial number 760368, manufactured in 1991. It was powered by two Pratt and Whitney PT6B-36A gas turbine engines rated at 1,033 shaft horsepower. The S-76B's Rotorcraft Flight Manual (RFM) lists the maximum gross weight as 11,700 pounds. The helicopter was configured with pilot and copilot seats with seating for five in the cabin. The last maintenance inspection was conducted on April 5, 2012, using the manufacturer's approved inspection program. The total airframe hours at the time of the inspection were 4,376 hours. The helicopter had 4,385.9 hours before the first flight on the day of the accident, which was 10.2 hours since the last maintenance inspection.
The pilot and mechanic reported that the Weight and Balance (W&B) form that showed the last time the helicopter had been weighed was in the helicopter at the time of the accident. The W&B form was not found in the helicopter after it was recovered, so the exact W&B for the helicopter at the time of the accident is not known. The pilot and mechanic did not know the empty weight of the helicopter.
The previous W&B form for the helicopter that was available in the helicopter's maintenance records showed that the helicopter's W&B was conducted on December 14, 2004. It indicated that the empty weight of the helicopter was 8,699 pounds. Using the December 14, 2004 W&B information, the postaccident approximate calculated takeoff weight of the helicopter on the accident flight was the following:
1. Takeoff from ARA
Basic Empty Weight: 8,699 lbs
Pilots: 401 lbs
Row 1 Pax: 345 lbs
Row 2 Pax: 658 lbs
Baggage: 140 lbs
Fuel: 1,912 lbs
Life Rafts (2): 60 lbs
Gross Weight: 12,215 lbs (About 515 lbs over maximum gross weight)
2. Approach to the Joe Douglas platform
Basic Empty Weight: 8,699 lbs
Pilots: 401lbs
Row 1 Pax: 345 lbs
Row 2 Pax: 658 lbs
Baggage (20 lbs per person): 140 lbs
Fuel: 1,342 lbs
Lift Rafts (2): 60 lbs
Gross Weight: 11,645 lbs (About 55 lbs under maximum gross weight)
The S-76B RFM states the following regarding a Category B approach to an elevated platform:
The elevated helideck approach and landing profile with scheduled dropdown is shown diagrammatically in Figure 5-8 The landing procedure employs an approach path offset at least one rotor radius to the side of the helideck to permit an un-obstructed go around path in case of engine failure.
SINGLE ENGINE FAILURE DURING APPROACH TO AN ELEVATED HELIDECK
The Landing Decision Point (LDP) is defined as a point 25 feet above, 25 feet to the left or right of, and 150 feet (3 helicopter lengths) short of the helideck in level flight at 30 KIAS, the point at which the pilot begins the sidestep maneuver toward the helideck. If an engine failure occurs prior to beginning the sidestep maneuver, the pilot must perform a "Go Around". If the engine failure occurs after beginning the sidestep maneuver, the aircraft is committed to a landing and the approach must continue to touchdown.
METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION
At 1115, the surface weather observation obtained from the stationary oil platform KVQT, which was located about 21nm from the Joe Douglas platform on a 301 degree bearing, was wind 080 degrees at 8 knots, visibility 8 miles, scattered clouds at 2,000 feet, broken ceiling at 2,400 feet, overcast 4,800 feet, temperature 25 degrees Celsius (C), dew point 21 degrees C, and altimeter 30.09 inches-of-mercury.
At 1155, the surface weather observation at KVQT was wind 070 degrees at 5 knots, visibility 8 miles, sky clear below 12,000 feet, temperature 26 degrees C, dew point 21 degrees C, and altimeter 30.10 inches-of-mercury.
At 1215, the surface weather observation at KVQT was wind 070 degrees at 5 knots, visibility 9 miles, sky clear, temperature 27 degrees C, dew point 21 degrees C, and altimeter 30.09 inches of mercury.
A National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) weather specialist reported that the National Weather Surface Analysis Chart for 1000 indicated a cold front moving across the area. Observations from KVQT appear to be prefrontal reports with consistent northeasterly flow with the front moving through at 1335 with a wind shift to the north and northwest.
The weather at the Joe Douglas was recorded daily around 1730 and not on an hourly basis. The recorded weather from the Joe Douglas logbook for April 17, 2012, was: winds north, speed 10 mph, seas 4 to 5 feet, temperature 68 degrees Fahrenheit.
TESTS AND RESEARCH
On April 27, 2012, the helicopter wreckage was examined at Port Fourchon, Louisiana. The tailboom, main rotor blades, and right side cabin door were not recovered from the Gulf of Mexico. A visual examination of the cockpit, cabin, main transmission and main rotor head, and engines was conducted.
The engine's N1 probes and channel A and B torque probes were removed from the helicopter and sent to manufacturer, Pratt and Whitney Canada, (P&WC), for testing. The results of the tests indicated that the corrosion due to the salt water immersion made the test results unreliable.
The No. 1 engine's EEC module A and B and the No. 2 engine's EEC module A and B were removed from the helicopter and sent to the manufacturer, Hamilton Sundstrand, for examination. There was moisture, mud, and sand on both the outside and inside of all four units. The memory chips were removed from the units and downloaded for decoding. The No. 1 engine EEC channel A and B had no faults recorded. The No. 2 engine EEC channel A and B exhibited damaged files which provided no useful information concerning fault codes.
The helicopter wreckage was transported to Air Salvage of Dallas for further examination on May 30 – 31, 2012. Under NTSB supervision, PW&C and Sikorsky technical representatives examined the airframe and engines. Engine teardowns were conducted on both engines, and there were no indications of preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. The No.1 engine's fuel control (hydraulic metering unit (HMU)) and the No. 2 engine's fuel control were sent to Hamilton Sundstrand for examination. Three collective position transducers were sent to Sikorsky for further examination.
The examination of the collective position transducers at Sikorsky revealed external and internal corrosion on all three transducers. Due to the corrosion, none of the transducers were functional.
The examination of the fuel controls at Hamilton Sundstrand on June 26 – 27, 2012, focused primarily on these two components: 1) the stepper motor, and 2) the dual rotary linear transformer (RDVT).
The examination of the No. 1 and No. 2 RDVTs revealed that they exhibited physical binding and anomalies due to salt water immersion. The RDVTs were shipped to the manufacturer, Kearfott Corporation, for further examination.
The Hamilton Sundstrand publication "JFC132-1 Stepper Motor CMM Operation" provides the following information concerning the function of the stepper motor:
"The stepper motor gives the EEC fuel metering authority by opening and closing a flapper valve. This valve in conjunction with orifices in the power lever valve and P3 servo valve set the pressure drop across the metered fuel flow paths in the [fuel] control. The stepper motor converts electrical impulses from the EEC into discrete mechanical rotational movements which rotate the flapper valve nut. Mechanical stops limit rotation to approximately 100 degrees. As the nut is rotated, flapper gap area is varied. Should an electronics failure occur, the stepper motor position remains."
The No.1 stepper motor, serial number 0232, was examined for physical binding and none was observed. The unit was functionally tested by providing electrical signals to the stepper motor and the appropriate rotational movements (steps) were observed.
The No. 2 stepper motor, serial number 0105, was examined and there were no visual indications of damage or corrosion. The inspection of the stepper motor gear head indicated some binding. There was no initial movement of the stepper motor gear head lever. After several attempts some movement was achieved. There was still a ratcheting condition in place. The unit was functionally tested by providing electrical signals to the stepper motor, which provided the following results:
1. Five steps were issued with no stepper motor lever movement. This indicated the stepper motor was missing steps.
2. Five steps were issued and the stator motor tried to rotate. No lever movement was observed.
3. Five steps were issued and the stator tried to rotate. No lever movement was observed.
4. Five steps were issued and the lever started to move. It moved less than the 5 commanded steps.
The Hamilton Sundstrand examination report indicated that the anomalies that were evident in the No. 2 stepper motor supported a finding of intermittent operation and a fixed or "stuck" position that would be perceived as a minor roll back [in engine power], but not for a large magnitude roll back [in engine power]. A fixed or "stuck" stepper motor would keep the fuel flow at a fixed position when power is commanded.
The No.1 and No. 2 stepper motors were shipped to the manufacturer, Kearfott Corporation, for further examination.
The (2) RDVTs and (2) stepper motors were examined at Kearfott Corporation on November 13-14, 2012. The examination of the RDVTs showed that both units exhibited severe corrosion due to salt water immersion. Neither of the rotors would rotate due to the corrosion, and no further testing was performed.
The examination of the No. 2 stepper motor revealed that normal electrical testing was not possible due to the extent of the corrosion. The output shaft had a significant crack extending across the diameter of the shaft. In order to complete the teardown examination of the stepper motor, the flapper valve lever on the output shaft was removed by cutting the pin that held the lever on the shaft. The housing material of the stepper motor was removed and corrosion was found throughout the electrical section of the stepper motor.
The electric motor section was separated from the gear head section of the stepper motor. The gear head section of the stepper motor was self-enclosed with seals that prevented salt water from contaminating the gear head section. All the gears were removed from the gear head. Binding was observed between the output shaft bearing and the cracked output shaft. Run out of the output shaft was measured at 0.0048 inch. The drawing for the gear shaft limits the run out to 0.0003 inch maximum. Enough force had been applied to the output gear shaft to bend the shaft as exhibited by the run out being 0.0045 inch above the high limits. Debris was observed on the flat part of the gear teeth.
The Kearfott examination report stated that, "It was apparent that a force was applied to the external lever that was sufficient to both crack and bend the output shaft. This increased the run out on the shaft of the unit. Kearfott does not manufacture or install this lever."
The examination of the No. 1 stepper motor revealed no preaccident anomalies that would have precluded normal operation.
The No. 1 and No. 2 stepper motors and the (2) RDVT's were sent to the NTSB Materials laboratory for further examination.
The NTSB Material laboratory's examination of the No. 2 stepper motor revealed that end of the output gearshaft exhibited at least five cracks nearly parallel to each other. The character of these cracks was not consistent with progressive cracking, which typically exhibits branched rather than parallel cracks. Examination of the fracture surfaces revealed that approximately 90 percent of the fracture surface exhibited dimple rupture fracture features, indicative of tensile overstress in ductile materials. The fracture surface area closest to the gearshaft exterior exhibited a faceted morphology indicative of a cleavage fracture, which is consistent with a fracture in case hardened steel. The examination of the output front bearing that surrounds the output gearshaft revealed that is was able to freely spin about the inner race when force was placed on the outer race. No indications of external corrosion or mechanical damage were observed.
The maintenance records indicated that the last overhaul of the No. 2 fuel control and the No. 2 stepper motor was conducted on December 10, 2004, at P&WC. During the overhaul of the stepper motors, a pin was pressed into the output shaft of the stepper motor to attach a lever. This lever engaged a flapper valve which was then turned by the stepper motor. No records of the overhaul for these units were found at P&WC due to an internal computer records system not migrating them to the current system.
Hamilton Sundstrand confirmed that this failure mode of the stepper motor output gearshaft was not common, and there were no records at Hamilton Sundstrand of any similar occurrence.
Hamilton Sundstrand provided an explanation of the JFC132-1 stepper motor fault codes. The explanation stated the following:
1. The EEC incorporated open circuit detection logic to verify the electrical integrity of the stepper motor and drive system. A fault detected would produce a fault code of 15 or 35.
2. There is no fault code for the stepper motor performance. No position feedback of the stepper motor, fuel flow requirement, or control logic was built into the design. There was no requirement to track expected engine performance within the EEC to specifically detect a "stuck" stepper motor.
3. The only fault codes associated with a stepper motor are those generated by the open circuit detection logic.
4. There are several failures within the stepper motor system that can result in a "stuck stepper motor" that are not detected by the EEC. These include the stepper motor gearbox, shaft, etc. and metering valve failures.
5. A "stuck stepper motor" effectively creates a fail freeze condition consistent with the use of a stepper motor with engine power modulation retained through the power lever and rotor speed modulation maintained by the opposite engine.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
The Rowan Company representative to the investigation provided the NTSB a schematic of the Rowan "Joe Douglas" Vermilion 376A oil platform as it was positioned on the day of the accident. It also showed direction of the Joe Douglas and the helicopter approach angles as they existed on the day of the accident.
The schematic showed that the helicopter landing pad was located on the north side of the oil platform. An approach heading of 190 degrees, as reported by the accident pilot, put the approach path aiming for the center of the oil platform super structure. This approach angle provided limited clearance for a go-around. Likewise, an approach angle between about 160 to 220 degrees heading provided limited clearance for a go-around due to the location of the super structure. An approach path heading from about 060 to 140 degrees, or from about 230 to 320 degrees, would have provided good go-around capability since there was no super structure behind the landing platform on those headings.
According to the Rowan Company representative, over the last 25 years, Rowan has operated a fleet of approximately 12 airplanes including a Convair 580, a King Air, a Lear jet, a DC-3, a Pilatus PC-12 and a Gulfstream IV and six helicopters ranging from a Bell 206 to a Sikorsky S-76. The high point for Rowan's fleet was the late 1990s at which time Rowan operated approximately five airplanes and three helicopters and employed approximately six pilots and six mechanics on a full-time basis. Since the late 1990s, Rowan sold several of its corporate aircraft. At the time of the Sikorsky S-76 incident, in addition to the helicopter, the company owned and operated a Pilatus PC-12 and a Gulfstream IV. Rowan currently owns no helicopters and just one Gulfstream IV airplane.
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There is a good illustrated summary of the NTSB report online.
S-76B N56RD looks like it was neither in a fit state to watertaxi...
...or in a fit state for offshore passenger operation in the first place.
S-76B N56RD looks like it was neither in a fit state to watertaxi...
...or in a fit state for offshore passenger operation in the first place.
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Sad but true...
... but during the course of recurrent training it is depressing to find out how many pilots do not understand the need to calculate the mass of the helicopter at the pref-flight panning stage.
The pilot did a good job in getting everyone on board back safe and well, including the 'fixed wing' co pilot (gee you Americans??) However, if he's been flying that S76B overweight on a regular basis then that is doubly unforgivable. If he had arrived at the platform with HOGE mass he may well have gotten away without a ditching. (HOGE is a good target mass if you have no Cat A offshore profile data to work with. Not perfect but better than arriving close to MCGW with no account taken of the ambient conditions).
Will anything change ? Na... don't be silly Geoffrey.
PS. I wonder if that was one of the KLM-ERA ships that Rowan inherited in 1998 when they pulled out of the European market.
G
The pilot did a good job in getting everyone on board back safe and well, including the 'fixed wing' co pilot (gee you Americans??) However, if he's been flying that S76B overweight on a regular basis then that is doubly unforgivable. If he had arrived at the platform with HOGE mass he may well have gotten away without a ditching. (HOGE is a good target mass if you have no Cat A offshore profile data to work with. Not perfect but better than arriving close to MCGW with no account taken of the ambient conditions).
Will anything change ? Na... don't be silly Geoffrey.
PS. I wonder if that was one of the KLM-ERA ships that Rowan inherited in 1998 when they pulled out of the European market.
G
Last edited by Geoffersincornwall; 11th Jan 2015 at 00:24. Reason: Add Post Script
PS
Geoff,
According Rotorspot only N- registrations .
So not KLM but could still be an ERA machine?
N-56RD
Before the S76B Rowan was using a Bell 222 under the same reg. nr.
So it looks they were trying to catch up with the required payload curve
SLB
According Rotorspot only N- registrations .
So not KLM but could still be an ERA machine?
N-56RD
Before the S76B Rowan was using a Bell 222 under the same reg. nr.
So it looks they were trying to catch up with the required payload curve
SLB
no ERA
I did some more websearches on the previous reg. nrs.
Appears it flew for Boeing as corporate shuttle N368BA
and for Time Warner N265L
and Warner Communications N80RP
So no posh ERA machine
SLB
Appears it flew for Boeing as corporate shuttle N368BA
and for Time Warner N265L
and Warner Communications N80RP
So no posh ERA machine
SLB
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Would it be very unfair to observe the Commander was hopelessly complacent (for example not seemingly knowing the aircraft mass / considering load and not following up the earlier power loss) but set up to fail by having unqualified ballast rostered into the Left Hand seat?
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NTSB Identification: CEN15LA265
Nonscheduled 14 CFR Part 135: Air Taxi & Commuter
Accident occurred Monday, June 08, 2015 in Pecan Island, LA
Aircraft: BELL 407, registration: N501PH
Injuries: 5 Uninjured.
This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed. NTSB investigators may not have traveled in support of this investigation and used data provided by various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.
On June 8, 2015, at 1432 central daylight time, a Bell 407 helicopter, N501PH, made an autorotation to the ground near Pecan Island, Louisiana. The pilot and four passengers were not injured. The helicopter sustained substantial damage. The helicopter was registered to and operated by PHI Inc., Lafayette, Louisiana, under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 as an air taxi flight. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident and a company flight plan was filed. The flight originated from Vermilion Block 256-E in the Gulf of Mexico and was en route to Pecan Island.
According to the operator, the helicopter was in cruise flight about 1,000 feet above ground level when the pilot felt a "thud" and a slight vibration. The vibration worsened and the helicopter began a slow right turn so the pilot entered an autorotation. With the floats inflated, the pilot made a hard forced landing into a marsh with tall grass. During the landing, the tail rotor gear box separated from the helicopter and was located in the marsh.
At 14:53, the automated weather observation at the Acadiana Regional Airport, located 35 miles northeast of the accident site, reported wind from 140 degrees at 8 knots, 10 miles visibility, scattered clouds at 10,000 feet, temperature 84° F, dew point 73° F, and altimeter 29.98 inches of mercury.
The helicopter has been retained for further examination.
Nonscheduled 14 CFR Part 135: Air Taxi & Commuter
Accident occurred Monday, June 08, 2015 in Pecan Island, LA
Aircraft: BELL 407, registration: N501PH
Injuries: 5 Uninjured.
This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed. NTSB investigators may not have traveled in support of this investigation and used data provided by various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.
On June 8, 2015, at 1432 central daylight time, a Bell 407 helicopter, N501PH, made an autorotation to the ground near Pecan Island, Louisiana. The pilot and four passengers were not injured. The helicopter sustained substantial damage. The helicopter was registered to and operated by PHI Inc., Lafayette, Louisiana, under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 as an air taxi flight. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident and a company flight plan was filed. The flight originated from Vermilion Block 256-E in the Gulf of Mexico and was en route to Pecan Island.
According to the operator, the helicopter was in cruise flight about 1,000 feet above ground level when the pilot felt a "thud" and a slight vibration. The vibration worsened and the helicopter began a slow right turn so the pilot entered an autorotation. With the floats inflated, the pilot made a hard forced landing into a marsh with tall grass. During the landing, the tail rotor gear box separated from the helicopter and was located in the marsh.
At 14:53, the automated weather observation at the Acadiana Regional Airport, located 35 miles northeast of the accident site, reported wind from 140 degrees at 8 knots, 10 miles visibility, scattered clouds at 10,000 feet, temperature 84° F, dew point 73° F, and altimeter 29.98 inches of mercury.
The helicopter has been retained for further examination.
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28-JUN-15
Time: 15:00:00Z
Regis#: N311RL
Aircraft Make: BELL
Aircraft Model: 407
Event Type: Incident
Highest Injury: Minor
Aircraft Missing:
Damage: Unknown
LOCATION
City: BATON ROUGE
State: Louisiana
Country:
DESCRIPTION
Description: N311RL BELL 407 ROTORCRAFT, DURING SPOOL UP, WAS BLOWN OFF THE SIDE OF THE PLATFORM, GULF OF MEXICO PLATFORM 127, NEAR BATON ROUGE, LA
Time: 15:00:00Z
Regis#: N311RL
Aircraft Make: BELL
Aircraft Model: 407
Event Type: Incident
Highest Injury: Minor
Aircraft Missing:
Damage: Unknown
LOCATION
City: BATON ROUGE
State: Louisiana
Country:
DESCRIPTION
Description: N311RL BELL 407 ROTORCRAFT, DURING SPOOL UP, WAS BLOWN OFF THE SIDE OF THE PLATFORM, GULF OF MEXICO PLATFORM 127, NEAR BATON ROUGE, LA
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The report is out on 11 November 2014 RLC ditching: Bell 407 Power Loss GOM Ditching: NTSB NTSB disagree with RLC but are unable to pinpoint a cause.
There is also an article on cold weather fatalities (another RLC accident from 11 December 2008): So You Think The GOM is Non-Hostile? Just how cold does the GOM get in winter?
There is also an article on cold weather fatalities (another RLC accident from 11 December 2008): So You Think The GOM is Non-Hostile? Just how cold does the GOM get in winter?
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The water temp in the GOM can get down into the 60F range. Not that often, but once in awhile. The air temperature near Galveston, TX was above 80F yesterday, not a lot lower today. I've seen ice and snow out there, but it's really rare. The closer to the beach you get, the colder it will be during a cold snap, both air and water temps, and close to the beach the water temp can get pretty cold, but never near freezing. But I've been as cold out there as anywhere in the world, with rain blowing in a 40-knot wind. The damp, and not being clothed for really cold weather made it really uncomfortable.
