GOM - yet another ditching
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the pilot recognized the symptoms of a settling with power event
That mysterious phenomenon that seems to happen to guys who fly a helicopter that lacks the power to hover OGE and the TR control authority to keep the nose pointed where it should be a high power setting . . . . . . . downwind.
Another one:
Chopper Makes Emergency Landing In Gulf - Dauphin Island Us Coast Guard Helicopter Crash - WKRG.com
Regards
Aser
Chopper Makes Emergency Landing In Gulf - Dauphin Island Us Coast Guard Helicopter Crash - WKRG.com
Published: Thu, June 11, 2009 - 11:12 pm Last Updated: Thu, June 11, 2009 - 11:19 pm
A crash and rescue Thursday night off the coast of Dauphin Island. The U.S. Coast Guard tells News 5 that a chopper carrying oil rig workers had to make an emergency landing in the gulf around 6:15 p.m. Several boaters helped the four passengers and took them to a platform. A Coast Guard crew finished the rescue. All of the passengers were taken to a New Orleans hospital to get checked out.
Here is the entire release from the U.S. Coast Guard:
The Coast Guard transported four passengers from an oil platform after their helicopter went down in the Gulf of Mexico approximately 57 miles south of Dauphin Island, Ala., Thursday, June 11, 2009.
The Coast Guard received a call from Rotorcraft Inc. at approximately 6:15 p.m., Thursday, reporting that the Bell Helicopter 206L-1 carrying four passengers had to make an emergency landing in the water due to mechanical failures. Several Good Samaritans assisted the four passengers to the Main Pass 265 platform, and the offshore supply vessel Lafayette placed the downed helicopter in tow.
The Coast Guard launched a MH-65C rescue helicopter and crew from Air Station New Orleans to transport the uninjured passengers to West Jefferson Hospital in New Orleans as a precautionary measure.
The National Transportation Safety Board will conduct an investigation.
A crash and rescue Thursday night off the coast of Dauphin Island. The U.S. Coast Guard tells News 5 that a chopper carrying oil rig workers had to make an emergency landing in the gulf around 6:15 p.m. Several boaters helped the four passengers and took them to a platform. A Coast Guard crew finished the rescue. All of the passengers were taken to a New Orleans hospital to get checked out.
Here is the entire release from the U.S. Coast Guard:
The Coast Guard transported four passengers from an oil platform after their helicopter went down in the Gulf of Mexico approximately 57 miles south of Dauphin Island, Ala., Thursday, June 11, 2009.
The Coast Guard received a call from Rotorcraft Inc. at approximately 6:15 p.m., Thursday, reporting that the Bell Helicopter 206L-1 carrying four passengers had to make an emergency landing in the water due to mechanical failures. Several Good Samaritans assisted the four passengers to the Main Pass 265 platform, and the offshore supply vessel Lafayette placed the downed helicopter in tow.
The Coast Guard launched a MH-65C rescue helicopter and crew from Air Station New Orleans to transport the uninjured passengers to West Jefferson Hospital in New Orleans as a precautionary measure.
The National Transportation Safety Board will conduct an investigation.
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IDENTIFICATION
Regis#: 518RL Make/Model: B206 Description: BELL 206B HELICOPTER
Date: 06/11/2009 Time: 1800
Event Type: Accident Highest Injury: None Mid Air: N Missing: N
Damage: Unknown
LOCATION
City: BATON ROUGE State: LA Country: US
DESCRIPTION
HELICOPTER RPM STARTED TO DECAY, PILOT ADDED POWER BUT COULD NOT STOP
DECAY, INITIATED AN AUTOROTATION AND LANDED IN WATER, GULF OF MEXICO
INJURY DATA Total Fatal: 0
# Crew: 1 Fat: 0 Ser: 0 Min: 0 Unk:
# Pass: 3 Fat: 0 Ser: 0 Min: 0 Unk:
# Grnd: Fat: 0 Ser: 0 Min: 0 Unk:
WEATHER: UNKNOWN
OTHER DATA
Activity: Business Phase: Cruise Operation: Air Carrier
FAA FSDO: BATON ROUGE, LA (SW03) Entry date: 06/12/2009
Actually:
Model: 206L-1 Year built: 1978
Construction Number (C/N): 45183
Regis#: 518RL Make/Model: B206 Description: BELL 206B HELICOPTER
Date: 06/11/2009 Time: 1800
Event Type: Accident Highest Injury: None Mid Air: N Missing: N
Damage: Unknown
LOCATION
City: BATON ROUGE State: LA Country: US
DESCRIPTION
HELICOPTER RPM STARTED TO DECAY, PILOT ADDED POWER BUT COULD NOT STOP
DECAY, INITIATED AN AUTOROTATION AND LANDED IN WATER, GULF OF MEXICO
INJURY DATA Total Fatal: 0
# Crew: 1 Fat: 0 Ser: 0 Min: 0 Unk:
# Pass: 3 Fat: 0 Ser: 0 Min: 0 Unk:
# Grnd: Fat: 0 Ser: 0 Min: 0 Unk:
WEATHER: UNKNOWN
OTHER DATA
Activity: Business Phase: Cruise Operation: Air Carrier
FAA FSDO: BATON ROUGE, LA (SW03) Entry date: 06/12/2009
Actually:
Model: 206L-1 Year built: 1978
Construction Number (C/N): 45183
Curious description - how do you "add power" in a 206 to regain RPM? You could "take away" power by lowering the collective, and eventually end up in an autorotation, which he did.
Malabo,
You are talking about the FAA here.....they have been known to make a few mistakes in the wording of these things....and dates...locations...aircraft types....etc.
You are talking about the FAA here.....they have been known to make a few mistakes in the wording of these things....and dates...locations...aircraft types....etc.
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This is worth a read for offshore pilots/operators - salutary lessons to be learnt.
Look particularly at the highlighted section - this has always provided astonishment in Europe. This is a good example of a chain of events leading to a fatality - it might have been avoided if any of the links had been broken.
NTSB Identification: DFW08FA053
Nonscheduled 14 CFR Part 135: Air Taxi & Commuter
Accident occurred Saturday, December 29, 2007 in Venice, LA
Probable Cause Approval Date: 7/15/2009
Aircraft: Bell 206L1, registration: N211EL
Injuries: 1 Fatal, 1 Serious, 2 Minor.
According to an interview with the pilot, while en route to an unmanned offshore platform South Pass 38 in the Gulf of Mexico, the cloud ceilings were about 500 feet and the visibility was about 5 miles. However, as the helicopter neared the destination platform, the flight entered deteriorating weather. The pilot estimated that the cloud ceiling was about 300 feet and that the visibility was about 1 mile when he began circling to land on the platform. Although the weather conditions did not meet Air Logistics’ operating minimums, which required a 500 foot cloud ceiling and 3 miles of visibility, the pilot decided to continue to the destination platform, despite having the option to divert to another station.
About 1 mile from the platform, as the pilot was maneuvering in an attempt to reduce the airspeed, the helicopter began an inadvertent descent and then entered an aerodynamic buffet that hindered the pilot’s ability to maintain straight and level flight. The buffet was most likely caused by the helicopter entering transverse flow effect (unequal lift vectors between the front and rear portions of the rotor disc) and by a reduction in lift vectors, which resulted from the tailwind that was present. After encountering the buffet, the pilot was unable to maintain control of the helicopter or to stop the helicopter’s descent before it impacted the water.
The accident helicopter was equipped with externally mounted floats, which could have been deployed by actuating a trigger mounted on the cyclic. The helicopter was also equipped with two externally mounted liferafts that could have been deployed either by pulling an interior T-handle near the pilot’s left leg or by pulling one of the two externally mounted T-handles on the helicopter’s skid cross bar. According to a supplemental type certificate for the helicopter, a placard was only mounted near the interior T-handle.
According to a pilot interview and a written statement obtained by Air Logistics, the pilot did not attempt to activate the helicopter’s flotation system or liferafts before water impact because he was preoccupied with recovering from the buffet. The accident pilot provided no indication why he did not deploy the external liferafts using the internal T-handle when the helicopter entered the water, even though he had received training on external liferaft deployments. Air Logistics’ training program and operating manual expected company pilots to deploy the floats before water impact but did not address pilot expectations in the event of water impact without floats deployed. Lacking additional guidance, the pilot reverted to his water survival training and immediately exited the helicopter.
All of the occupants survived the impact, exited the helicopter, and inflated their lifejackets. The pilot was unable to reach the external liferaft T-handles on the skids and attempted to direct the passengers to deploy the liferafts. However, because the pilot had not conducted a passenger briefing (including instructions on how to deploy the liferaft system), the passengers did not know that liferafts were available externally and did not understand how to deploy the liferafts using the external T-handles before the helicopter sank. Under 14 CFR 135.117, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) requires pilots to ensure that, before flight, all passengers on flights involving extended overwater operations are orally briefed on ditching procedures and the use of required flotation equipment; however, the accident flight did not meet the 14 CFR 1.1 definition of an extended overwater operation because it was operating within 50 nautical miles of the shoreline.
Per the Air Logistics flight operations manual (FOM), a passenger briefing was required that would have included the location of emergency equipment, such as seat belts, exits, lifejackets, and fire extinguishers. The FOM did not specify that liferaft locations were to be part of the briefing.[2] Regardless, no passenger safety briefing was provided before departure. Air Logistics passenger briefing cards, which were stowed in a pouch on the cabin sidewall for each passenger seat, provided directions on how to operate different emergency equipment; however, the briefing cards did not provide guidance on which equipment was installed on the helicopter. In addition, at the time of the accident, there were no placards to aid in recognition of the external liferaft activation handles.
The passengers and the pilot attempted to swim to the platform, which was about 100 yards from the impact location, but were separated by high waves and were moved away from the platform by the current. About 1551, an Air Logistics radio operator mistakenly recorded the helicopter as “landed” in the company’s flight-following database. Because the helicopter was placed in the “landed” status, the flight-tracking program did not trigger any overdue notifications. About 34 minutes later (1 hour after the crash), the error was discovered by the Air Logistics base manager in Venice, Louisiana, because the pilot had not reported his status before sunset. As a result, the company diverted a field boat toward the offshore platform to search for the helicopter; however, the field boat was too far away to aid the survivors.
The weather conditions precluded the launch of another helicopter to assist in the search. About 1 hour 15 minutes after the crash, the crewmembers of a shrimp trawler contacted the U.S. Coast Guard to report that they had retrieved two survivors and a deceased passenger from the water. The water temperature near the accident location was about 49 degrees Fahrenheit, and the passenger died of hypothermia secondary to asphyxia from drowning. A Coast Guard ship rescued the severely hypothermic pilot more than 4 hours after the estimated time of the crash.
The pilot did not report engine power loss or control malfunction. The passengers did not report seeing any warning lights or hearing any aural warnings before the accident. An examination of the airframe and engine did not reveal any anomalies that would have precluded safe flight or the production of engine power.
On October 20, 2008, the NTSB issued two recommendations pertaining to this accident. Safety Recommendation A-08-83 asked for the installation of a placard for each external T handle on turbine-powered helicopters with externally mounted liferafts that clearly identifies the location of and provides activation instructions for the handle. Safety Recommendation A 08-84 recommended that all operators of turbine-powered helicopters be required to include information about the location and activation of internal or external liferafts in pilot preflight safety briefings to passengers before each takeoff. Both recommendations are classified “Open—Response Received.”
Safety Recommendation A-07-88, which the NTSB issued on October 19, 2007, also applies to this accident. In the recommendation, the NTSB asked the FAA to require that all offshore helicopter operators in the Gulf of Mexico provide their flight crews with beacon-equipped personal flotation devices; Safety Recommendation A-07-88 is currently classified “Open—Acceptable Response,” based on the FAA’s plan to consult with operators on the best ways to increase the chance of survival in a ditching and the issuance of an information for operators that describes recommendations to mitigate the risks and hazards for helicopters that may have to ditch in the Gulf. As a result of the accident, Air Logistics has initiated a program requiring that each pilot be provided a lifejacket equipped with a 406-megahertz emergency position indicating radio beacon that has full two-way voice capability and that is waterproof to 10 meters. This program requirement is consistent with the intent of the recommendation even without the FAA requiring it.
Additionally, personal locator beacons (without two-way voice capability) have been installed in Air Logistics liferafts. Air Logistics also has started installing water-activated switches on the flotation system and liferafts for its Bell 407 helicopters; the switches are being installed during each helicopter’s next maintenance or inspection visit. Placards have also been placed on the underside of aircraft showing the mechanism for manual deployment of liferafts when the aircraft is upside down in the water. To standardize the briefing information given to passengers, the preflight briefing checklist, passenger briefing cards, and passenger briefing tapes have been revised to include information on the location and operation of liferafts.
In addition, the company produced an initial and recurrent training video to include more detailed information on how to deploy the flotation system and liferafts installed on its helicopters, including footage of an actual deployment, and has revamped its aircraft type-specific briefing videos for passengers. The training and briefing videos are shown to all first-time passengers before they depart their shore base. Air Logistics also has a separate video specifically on raft and float deployment, which includes manual deployment from outside the aircraft; according to the company, this video usually runs continually in the waiting rooms at the shore base. Thus far, Air Logistics pilots and passengers have given positive feedback on the training and briefing videos.
To address the problem of misreporting helicopter status, a senior company pilot now assists the radio operator with oversight of helicopters, and helicopter pilots are required to provide position reports every 30 minutes, regardless of whether their helicopter is airborne or has landed. The radio operator and the senior pilot monitor any pilot who requests a longer delay to eat lunch or take a restroom break, for example. Also, to eliminate inadvertent changes in helicopter status, an additional keystroke has been added to confirm that a helicopter has landed.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:
The pilot’s decision to continue to the destination landing platform in weather conditions below the company’s weather minimums and his failure to maintain aircraft control during the approach. Contributing to the passenger fatality and the severity of the occupant injuries were the lack of a passenger briefing on how to deploy the liferaft, which was required by the company but not by the Federal Aviation Administration because this flight was not an extended overwater operation; the pilot’s failure to deploy the liferafts; and the company radio operator’s misreporting of the helicopter’s “landed” status, which delayed the rescue response.
Look particularly at the highlighted section - this has always provided astonishment in Europe. This is a good example of a chain of events leading to a fatality - it might have been avoided if any of the links had been broken.
NTSB Identification: DFW08FA053
Nonscheduled 14 CFR Part 135: Air Taxi & Commuter
Accident occurred Saturday, December 29, 2007 in Venice, LA
Probable Cause Approval Date: 7/15/2009
Aircraft: Bell 206L1, registration: N211EL
Injuries: 1 Fatal, 1 Serious, 2 Minor.
According to an interview with the pilot, while en route to an unmanned offshore platform South Pass 38 in the Gulf of Mexico, the cloud ceilings were about 500 feet and the visibility was about 5 miles. However, as the helicopter neared the destination platform, the flight entered deteriorating weather. The pilot estimated that the cloud ceiling was about 300 feet and that the visibility was about 1 mile when he began circling to land on the platform. Although the weather conditions did not meet Air Logistics’ operating minimums, which required a 500 foot cloud ceiling and 3 miles of visibility, the pilot decided to continue to the destination platform, despite having the option to divert to another station.
About 1 mile from the platform, as the pilot was maneuvering in an attempt to reduce the airspeed, the helicopter began an inadvertent descent and then entered an aerodynamic buffet that hindered the pilot’s ability to maintain straight and level flight. The buffet was most likely caused by the helicopter entering transverse flow effect (unequal lift vectors between the front and rear portions of the rotor disc) and by a reduction in lift vectors, which resulted from the tailwind that was present. After encountering the buffet, the pilot was unable to maintain control of the helicopter or to stop the helicopter’s descent before it impacted the water.
The accident helicopter was equipped with externally mounted floats, which could have been deployed by actuating a trigger mounted on the cyclic. The helicopter was also equipped with two externally mounted liferafts that could have been deployed either by pulling an interior T-handle near the pilot’s left leg or by pulling one of the two externally mounted T-handles on the helicopter’s skid cross bar. According to a supplemental type certificate for the helicopter, a placard was only mounted near the interior T-handle.
According to a pilot interview and a written statement obtained by Air Logistics, the pilot did not attempt to activate the helicopter’s flotation system or liferafts before water impact because he was preoccupied with recovering from the buffet. The accident pilot provided no indication why he did not deploy the external liferafts using the internal T-handle when the helicopter entered the water, even though he had received training on external liferaft deployments. Air Logistics’ training program and operating manual expected company pilots to deploy the floats before water impact but did not address pilot expectations in the event of water impact without floats deployed. Lacking additional guidance, the pilot reverted to his water survival training and immediately exited the helicopter.
All of the occupants survived the impact, exited the helicopter, and inflated their lifejackets. The pilot was unable to reach the external liferaft T-handles on the skids and attempted to direct the passengers to deploy the liferafts. However, because the pilot had not conducted a passenger briefing (including instructions on how to deploy the liferaft system), the passengers did not know that liferafts were available externally and did not understand how to deploy the liferafts using the external T-handles before the helicopter sank. Under 14 CFR 135.117, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) requires pilots to ensure that, before flight, all passengers on flights involving extended overwater operations are orally briefed on ditching procedures and the use of required flotation equipment; however, the accident flight did not meet the 14 CFR 1.1 definition of an extended overwater operation because it was operating within 50 nautical miles of the shoreline.
Per the Air Logistics flight operations manual (FOM), a passenger briefing was required that would have included the location of emergency equipment, such as seat belts, exits, lifejackets, and fire extinguishers. The FOM did not specify that liferaft locations were to be part of the briefing.[2] Regardless, no passenger safety briefing was provided before departure. Air Logistics passenger briefing cards, which were stowed in a pouch on the cabin sidewall for each passenger seat, provided directions on how to operate different emergency equipment; however, the briefing cards did not provide guidance on which equipment was installed on the helicopter. In addition, at the time of the accident, there were no placards to aid in recognition of the external liferaft activation handles.
The passengers and the pilot attempted to swim to the platform, which was about 100 yards from the impact location, but were separated by high waves and were moved away from the platform by the current. About 1551, an Air Logistics radio operator mistakenly recorded the helicopter as “landed” in the company’s flight-following database. Because the helicopter was placed in the “landed” status, the flight-tracking program did not trigger any overdue notifications. About 34 minutes later (1 hour after the crash), the error was discovered by the Air Logistics base manager in Venice, Louisiana, because the pilot had not reported his status before sunset. As a result, the company diverted a field boat toward the offshore platform to search for the helicopter; however, the field boat was too far away to aid the survivors.
The weather conditions precluded the launch of another helicopter to assist in the search. About 1 hour 15 minutes after the crash, the crewmembers of a shrimp trawler contacted the U.S. Coast Guard to report that they had retrieved two survivors and a deceased passenger from the water. The water temperature near the accident location was about 49 degrees Fahrenheit, and the passenger died of hypothermia secondary to asphyxia from drowning. A Coast Guard ship rescued the severely hypothermic pilot more than 4 hours after the estimated time of the crash.
The pilot did not report engine power loss or control malfunction. The passengers did not report seeing any warning lights or hearing any aural warnings before the accident. An examination of the airframe and engine did not reveal any anomalies that would have precluded safe flight or the production of engine power.
On October 20, 2008, the NTSB issued two recommendations pertaining to this accident. Safety Recommendation A-08-83 asked for the installation of a placard for each external T handle on turbine-powered helicopters with externally mounted liferafts that clearly identifies the location of and provides activation instructions for the handle. Safety Recommendation A 08-84 recommended that all operators of turbine-powered helicopters be required to include information about the location and activation of internal or external liferafts in pilot preflight safety briefings to passengers before each takeoff. Both recommendations are classified “Open—Response Received.”
Safety Recommendation A-07-88, which the NTSB issued on October 19, 2007, also applies to this accident. In the recommendation, the NTSB asked the FAA to require that all offshore helicopter operators in the Gulf of Mexico provide their flight crews with beacon-equipped personal flotation devices; Safety Recommendation A-07-88 is currently classified “Open—Acceptable Response,” based on the FAA’s plan to consult with operators on the best ways to increase the chance of survival in a ditching and the issuance of an information for operators that describes recommendations to mitigate the risks and hazards for helicopters that may have to ditch in the Gulf. As a result of the accident, Air Logistics has initiated a program requiring that each pilot be provided a lifejacket equipped with a 406-megahertz emergency position indicating radio beacon that has full two-way voice capability and that is waterproof to 10 meters. This program requirement is consistent with the intent of the recommendation even without the FAA requiring it.
Additionally, personal locator beacons (without two-way voice capability) have been installed in Air Logistics liferafts. Air Logistics also has started installing water-activated switches on the flotation system and liferafts for its Bell 407 helicopters; the switches are being installed during each helicopter’s next maintenance or inspection visit. Placards have also been placed on the underside of aircraft showing the mechanism for manual deployment of liferafts when the aircraft is upside down in the water. To standardize the briefing information given to passengers, the preflight briefing checklist, passenger briefing cards, and passenger briefing tapes have been revised to include information on the location and operation of liferafts.
In addition, the company produced an initial and recurrent training video to include more detailed information on how to deploy the flotation system and liferafts installed on its helicopters, including footage of an actual deployment, and has revamped its aircraft type-specific briefing videos for passengers. The training and briefing videos are shown to all first-time passengers before they depart their shore base. Air Logistics also has a separate video specifically on raft and float deployment, which includes manual deployment from outside the aircraft; according to the company, this video usually runs continually in the waiting rooms at the shore base. Thus far, Air Logistics pilots and passengers have given positive feedback on the training and briefing videos.
To address the problem of misreporting helicopter status, a senior company pilot now assists the radio operator with oversight of helicopters, and helicopter pilots are required to provide position reports every 30 minutes, regardless of whether their helicopter is airborne or has landed. The radio operator and the senior pilot monitor any pilot who requests a longer delay to eat lunch or take a restroom break, for example. Also, to eliminate inadvertent changes in helicopter status, an additional keystroke has been added to confirm that a helicopter has landed.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:
The pilot’s decision to continue to the destination landing platform in weather conditions below the company’s weather minimums and his failure to maintain aircraft control during the approach. Contributing to the passenger fatality and the severity of the occupant injuries were the lack of a passenger briefing on how to deploy the liferaft, which was required by the company but not by the Federal Aviation Administration because this flight was not an extended overwater operation; the pilot’s failure to deploy the liferafts; and the company radio operator’s misreporting of the helicopter’s “landed” status, which delayed the rescue response.
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More than 50 miles from the shoreline is only half of it. It's also more than 50 miles from any offshore platform. In the GOM, that covers almost the entire offshore area, out to well beyond 100 NM. That said, I know of no operator or oil company that allows any offshore flights without wearing lifejackets and having rafts onboard, and requiring passenger briefings. This is usually included in the operations manual, which is regulatory, and/or in the ops specs. CFR 14 is written to cover broad areas, and is as unrestrictive as possible, in accordance with the historic US philosophy. Just because it allows something, that doesn't necessarily mean that all operations are that permissive. Many restrictions are covered under ops specs, not just the general regulations.
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Another one:
2 hurt in chopper crash in Gulf off Galveston | AP Texas News | Chron.com - Houston Chronicle
GALVESTON, Texas — A helicopter crash on takeoff from a platform in the Gulf of Mexico left two men injured and the aircraft in the water.
A spokesman for Broussard, La.,-based Rotorcraft Leasing Co., which serves the oil and gas industry, said Monday the cause of the crash is sought.
Operations director Gerry Golden told The Associated Press that the accident site is about 75 miles southeast of Galveston.
Golden says the helicopter was bound for another platform and people nearby witnessed the crash Sunday morning. He says the chopper's floats deployed and a boat helped rescue the pilot and the passenger.
A Coast Guard helicopter was dispatched to transport the pair to the University of Texas Medical Branch for treatment of back injuries.
Golden says both men sustained non-life threatening injuries and remained hospitalized for observation.
GALVESTON, Texas — A helicopter crash on takeoff from a platform in the Gulf of Mexico left two men injured and the aircraft in the water.
A spokesman for Broussard, La.,-based Rotorcraft Leasing Co., which serves the oil and gas industry, said Monday the cause of the crash is sought.
Operations director Gerry Golden told The Associated Press that the accident site is about 75 miles southeast of Galveston.
Golden says the helicopter was bound for another platform and people nearby witnessed the crash Sunday morning. He says the chopper's floats deployed and a boat helped rescue the pilot and the passenger.
A Coast Guard helicopter was dispatched to transport the pair to the University of Texas Medical Branch for treatment of back injuries.
Golden says both men sustained non-life threatening injuries and remained hospitalized for observation.
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Rotorcraft leasing put in the water just after taking fuel. Apparently they did not get far from the platform as shown in the pictures... which i only wish i new how to post.
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Here is a pic of that last one . . . .
I heard that Airlog had just sold it to RLC and it was one of the first flights with RLC. Maybe next time Airlog will at least put it in the contract that the color scheme needs to be changed before the new owners fly it!!!
I heard that Airlog had just sold it to RLC and it was one of the first flights with RLC. Maybe next time Airlog will at least put it in the contract that the color scheme needs to be changed before the new owners fly it!!!
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NTSB Identification: CEN10LA036
Nonscheduled 14 CFR Part 135: Air Taxi & Commuter
Accident occurred Sunday, November 01, 2009 in High Island A-442A, GM
Aircraft: BELL 206, registration: N272M
Injuries: 1 Serious, 1 Minor.
Nonscheduled 14 CFR Part 135: Air Taxi & Commuter
Accident occurred Sunday, November 01, 2009 in High Island A-442A, GM
Aircraft: BELL 206, registration: N272M
Injuries: 1 Serious, 1 Minor.
This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.
On November 1, 2009, approximately 1040 central standard time, a Bell 206L-1, N272M, registered to and operated by Rotorcraft Leasing Company LLC, was substantially damaged when it impacted water following a loss of engine power shortly after lifting off from an oil drilling platform. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. The non-scheduled domestic passenger flight was being conducted under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 135. The pilot was seriously injured and the passenger received minor injuries. The flight had just originated from platform High Island A442A, and was en route to platform High Island A515, both in the Gulf of Mexico.
According to the company, the helicopter had landed on the platform and was refueled. It then took off with one passenger. Shortly after lifting off, the engine lost power and the pilot made a forced landing in the water. Just before touching down, the pilot inflated the pontoons. The helicopter settled in the water and rolled inverted.
The helicopter was later recovered and taken to the operator's base in Broussard, Louisiana, for examination. Preliminary information indicates the Pc line was loose.
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Once a heliciopter gets flooded with salt water as in the picture in the above post is it a total write off or can it be flushed out with fresh water and placed back into service?
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They're refurbished all the time. If properly treated beforehand with CorrosionX or similar, there will be minimal corrosion. Without treatment, I've seen aircraft that just had blown spray on them corrode very quickly. IME, most helicopters that go into the water are recovered and refurbished. As the old saying goes, as long as you have a data plate, you have a viable aircraft.
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transverse flow
About 1 mile from the platform, as the pilot was maneuvering in an attempt to reduce the airspeed, the helicopter began an inadvertent descent and then entered an aerodynamic buffet that hindered the pilot’s ability to maintain straight and level flight. The buffet was most likely caused by the helicopter entering transverse flow effect (unequal lift vectors between the front and rear portions of the rotor disc) and by a reduction in lift vectors, which resulted from the tailwind that was present. After encountering the buffet, the pilot was unable to maintain control of the helicopter or to stop the helicopter’s descent before it impacted the water.
Must admit though I never would have thought of that aspect of this accident pilot slowing down into that airspeed area leading to buffeting. Buffeting makes me think of "settling with power". But perhaps it is a combination of more than just settling with power. So slowing down into a state of transverse flow, the opposite of take-off, also contributed to the buffeting this poor pilot experienced?
Rightly or wrongly, I see transverse flow as a gradual, smooth phenomenon. I don't think I'd put buffeting on top of the list of observable symptoms.
Dammit, I do all this stuff and I've quit thinking about it. My brain hurts already.
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An opportunity to display a 'just culture'
The cause of the crash on 1 Nov of the Rotorcraft Leasing Bell 206 LongRanger appears to be confirmed as the 'PC line' on the engine being loose. See the excerpt from AIN below.
As it is such a well documented cause of failure and it is fairly well covered in the maintenance requirement I hope someone is going to get 'their bottom smacked'. We cannot have pilots and passengers repeatedly hurt by inadequate engineering standards and continue to talk about a 'just culture'.
Does anyone know if the maintenance organisation has taken any disciplinary action as a direct result of this accident? What about the insurers are they really going to pay the claim? And dare I be so naive as to ask what the FAA will do about it?
NTSB Data Show Loose Line a Common Crash Cause
On November 1, a Bell LongRanger operated by Rotorcraft Leasing was taking off from oil-drilling platform High Island A442A in the Gulf of Mexico en route to another platform when the engine lost power and the pilot inflated the pontoons and landed in the water. The helicopter rolled inverted after touchdown, according to the NTSB. The pilot was seriously injured and the passenger suffered minor injuries. The occupants were rescued by a nearby offshore supply vessel, then a U.S. Coast Guard MH-65C Dolphin helicopter from Coast Guard Air Station Houston transported them to the University of Texas Medical Branch at Galveston, Texas. According to the NTSB preliminary report, after investigators recovered the LongRanger and moved it to Rotorcraft Leasing’s base in Broussard, La., the Rolls-Royce 250 engine’s “Pc line was found loose.” In a search of the NTSB accident database, AIN found five helicopter accidents since 2000 involving loose Pc (compressor discharge pressure) lines. A Rolls-Royce Alert Service Letter revised in 2007 notes that “Rolls-Royce continues to be involved in investigations of aircraft accidents and incidents which are attributed to improper alignment, clamping and torquing of engine tubing during installation.
On November 1, a Bell LongRanger operated by Rotorcraft Leasing was taking off from oil-drilling platform High Island A442A in the Gulf of Mexico en route to another platform when the engine lost power and the pilot inflated the pontoons and landed in the water. The helicopter rolled inverted after touchdown, according to the NTSB. The pilot was seriously injured and the passenger suffered minor injuries. The occupants were rescued by a nearby offshore supply vessel, then a U.S. Coast Guard MH-65C Dolphin helicopter from Coast Guard Air Station Houston transported them to the University of Texas Medical Branch at Galveston, Texas. According to the NTSB preliminary report, after investigators recovered the LongRanger and moved it to Rotorcraft Leasing’s base in Broussard, La., the Rolls-Royce 250 engine’s “Pc line was found loose.” In a search of the NTSB accident database, AIN found five helicopter accidents since 2000 involving loose Pc (compressor discharge pressure) lines. A Rolls-Royce Alert Service Letter revised in 2007 notes that “Rolls-Royce continues to be involved in investigations of aircraft accidents and incidents which are attributed to improper alignment, clamping and torquing of engine tubing during installation.
Does anyone know if the maintenance organisation has taken any disciplinary action as a direct result of this accident? What about the insurers are they really going to pay the claim? And dare I be so naive as to ask what the FAA will do about it?
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************************************************************ ********************
** Report created 6/18/2010 Record 1 **
************************************************************ ********************
IDENTIFICATION
Regis#: 108PH Make/Model: B206 Description: BELL 206B HELICOPTER
Date: 06/10/2010 Time: 1634
Event Type: Accident Highest Injury: None Mid Air: N Missing: N
Damage: Substantial
LOCATION
City: PORT O'CONNER State: TX Country: US
DESCRIPTION
N108PH, BELL 206L-3 ROTORCRAFT, DITCHED INTO THE GULF OF MEXICO, NEAR PORT
O'CONNER, TX
INJURY DATA Total Fatal: 0
# Crew: 2 Fat: 0 Ser: 0 Min: 0 Unk:
# Pass: 0 Fat: 0 Ser: 0 Min: 0 Unk:
# Grnd: Fat: 0 Ser: 0 Min: 0 Unk:
WEATHER: CLEAR
OTHER DATA
Activity: Business Phase: Unknown Operation: OTHER
FAA FSDO: HOUSTON, TX (SW09) Entry date: 06/18/2010
** Report created 6/18/2010 Record 1 **
************************************************************ ********************
IDENTIFICATION
Regis#: 108PH Make/Model: B206 Description: BELL 206B HELICOPTER
Date: 06/10/2010 Time: 1634
Event Type: Accident Highest Injury: None Mid Air: N Missing: N
Damage: Substantial
LOCATION
City: PORT O'CONNER State: TX Country: US
DESCRIPTION
N108PH, BELL 206L-3 ROTORCRAFT, DITCHED INTO THE GULF OF MEXICO, NEAR PORT
O'CONNER, TX
INJURY DATA Total Fatal: 0
# Crew: 2 Fat: 0 Ser: 0 Min: 0 Unk:
# Pass: 0 Fat: 0 Ser: 0 Min: 0 Unk:
# Grnd: Fat: 0 Ser: 0 Min: 0 Unk:
WEATHER: CLEAR
OTHER DATA
Activity: Business Phase: Unknown Operation: OTHER
FAA FSDO: HOUSTON, TX (SW09) Entry date: 06/18/2010
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When will they learn that this sort of accident is inevitable with singles?
