Sikorsky S-92: From Design to Operations
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HC,
Lets look at progress: the S61 had a system that gave you two hours at Vy. The new regulations give you 30mins at Vy. I don't call that progress. Perhaps the regulations should have been less concerned with dry running and more with having a level of redundency in MGB lube systems which might get you home/safe landing site. 30 mins won't get you anywhere except wet most of the time offshore.
Lets look at progress: the S61 had a system that gave you two hours at Vy. The new regulations give you 30mins at Vy. I don't call that progress. Perhaps the regulations should have been less concerned with dry running and more with having a level of redundency in MGB lube systems which might get you home/safe landing site. 30 mins won't get you anywhere except wet most of the time offshore.
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Droopystop:
I agree about redundancy.
For Sikorsky to put two MGB oil pumps on the A/C and then say if one fails the other will barely get you down is ludicrous. Why even have two pumps if one won't do the job if the other fails? Isn't that the whole purpose of having two? That's like having two engines only so you have some choice as to where you would like to crash.
I agree about redundancy.
For Sikorsky to put two MGB oil pumps on the A/C and then say if one fails the other will barely get you down is ludicrous. Why even have two pumps if one won't do the job if the other fails? Isn't that the whole purpose of having two? That's like having two engines only so you have some choice as to where you would like to crash.
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The belly laugh over the operation of the S61 MGB when on extended Emergency Lube operation was more of a feeling of uncertainty, and of possible brown under pants and a nasty smell.
Lets look at progress: the S61 had a system that gave you two hours at Vy.
The latest Emergency AD from the FAA......
Emergency Airworthiness Directive: S-92A Main Gearbox Filter Bowl Assembly Mounting Stud - Replacement
Tuesday, March 24, 2009 - FAA
EMERGENCY AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE
Aircraft Certification Service
Washington, DC
Aircraft Safety Alerts
U.S. Department of Transportation
Federal Aviation Administration
DATE: March 23, 2009
AD #: 2009-07-53
This Emergency Airworthiness Directive (AD) is prompted by the failure of 2 main gearbox filter bowl assembly mounting studs (studs) that were found broken during a fatal accident investigation in Canada. Prior to the accident, the manufacturer was investigating a July 2008 incident that also involved broken studs. In both cases, the broken studs resulted in rapid loss of oil. The failures have been tied to fretting and galling of the original titanium studs; therefore, we are requiring the removal of all titanium studs and replacement with steel studs. We are issuing this EmergencyAD to prevent failure of a stud which could result in rapid loss of oil, failure of the main gearbox, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
We have reviewed Sikorsky Alert Service Bulletin No. 92-63-014A, Revision A, dated March 20, 2009, which describes procedures for removing the main gearbox bowl assembly titanium mounting studs and replacing them with steel mounting studs.
This unsafe condition is likely to exist or develop on other helicopters of the same type design. Therefore, this AD requires, before further flight, replacing titanium studs with steel studs. The actions must be accomplished by following specified portions of the alert service bulletin described previously.
This rule is issued under 49 U.S.C. Section 44701 pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, and is effective immediately upon receipt of this emergency AD.
2009-07-53 SIKORSKY AIRCRAFT CORPORATION: Directorate Identifier 2009-SW-08-AD.
Applicability: Model S-92A helicopters with a main gearbox housing assembly, part number (P/N) 92351-15110-042, -043, or -044, that is not marked with “TS-062-01” near the P/N, certificated in any category.
Compliance: Required before further flight, unless accomplished previously.
To prevent failure of a main gearbox filter bowl assembly mounting stud (stud), which could result in rapid loss of oil, failure of the main gearbox, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter, accomplish the following:
(a) Remove the titanium studs by following the Accomplishment Instructions in Sikorsky Alert Service Bulletin No. 92-63-014, Rev. A, dated March 20, 2009 (ASB), paragraph 3.A.
Note: Figure 1 of the ASB contains guidance for removal and installation of the studs.
(b) Visually inspect the tapped holes and the main gearbox housing lockring counterbore for damage. If you find damage in the tapped holes or in the main gearbox housing lockring counterbore, contact the Boston Aircraft Certification Office for an approved repair.
(c) Install steel studs and mark the main gearbox housing as “TS-062-01” near the P/N by following the Accomplishment Instructions in the ASB, paragraph 3.C.
(d) To request a different method of compliance or a different compliance time for this AD, follow the procedures in 14 CFR 39.19. Contact the Manager, Boston Aircraft Certification Office, Engine and Propeller Directorate, FAA, ATTN: Kirk Gustafson, Aviation Safety Engineer, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, MA 01803, telephone (781) 238-7190, fax (781) 238-7170, for information about previously approved alternative methods of compliance.
(e) Special flight permits will not be issued.
(f) Copies of the applicable service information may be obtained from Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation, Attn: Manager, Commercial Technical Support, mailstop s581a, 6900 Main Street, Stratford, CT, telephone (203) 383-4866, e-mail address [email protected], or at Home.
(g) Emergency AD 2009-07-53, issued March 23, 2009, becomes effective upon receipt.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Kirk Gustafson, Aviation Safety Engineer, Boston Aircraft Certification Office, Engine and Propeller Directorate, FAA, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, MA 01803, telephone (781) 238-7190, fax (781) 238-7170.
Issued in Fort Worth, Texas, on March 23, 2009.
Mark R. Schilling,
Acting Manager, Rotorcraft Directorate,
Aircraft Certification Service.
Tuesday, March 24, 2009 - FAA
EMERGENCY AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE
Aircraft Certification Service
Washington, DC
Aircraft Safety Alerts
U.S. Department of Transportation
Federal Aviation Administration
DATE: March 23, 2009
AD #: 2009-07-53
This Emergency Airworthiness Directive (AD) is prompted by the failure of 2 main gearbox filter bowl assembly mounting studs (studs) that were found broken during a fatal accident investigation in Canada. Prior to the accident, the manufacturer was investigating a July 2008 incident that also involved broken studs. In both cases, the broken studs resulted in rapid loss of oil. The failures have been tied to fretting and galling of the original titanium studs; therefore, we are requiring the removal of all titanium studs and replacement with steel studs. We are issuing this EmergencyAD to prevent failure of a stud which could result in rapid loss of oil, failure of the main gearbox, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
We have reviewed Sikorsky Alert Service Bulletin No. 92-63-014A, Revision A, dated March 20, 2009, which describes procedures for removing the main gearbox bowl assembly titanium mounting studs and replacing them with steel mounting studs.
This unsafe condition is likely to exist or develop on other helicopters of the same type design. Therefore, this AD requires, before further flight, replacing titanium studs with steel studs. The actions must be accomplished by following specified portions of the alert service bulletin described previously.
This rule is issued under 49 U.S.C. Section 44701 pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, and is effective immediately upon receipt of this emergency AD.
2009-07-53 SIKORSKY AIRCRAFT CORPORATION: Directorate Identifier 2009-SW-08-AD.
Applicability: Model S-92A helicopters with a main gearbox housing assembly, part number (P/N) 92351-15110-042, -043, or -044, that is not marked with “TS-062-01” near the P/N, certificated in any category.
Compliance: Required before further flight, unless accomplished previously.
To prevent failure of a main gearbox filter bowl assembly mounting stud (stud), which could result in rapid loss of oil, failure of the main gearbox, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter, accomplish the following:
(a) Remove the titanium studs by following the Accomplishment Instructions in Sikorsky Alert Service Bulletin No. 92-63-014, Rev. A, dated March 20, 2009 (ASB), paragraph 3.A.
Note: Figure 1 of the ASB contains guidance for removal and installation of the studs.
(b) Visually inspect the tapped holes and the main gearbox housing lockring counterbore for damage. If you find damage in the tapped holes or in the main gearbox housing lockring counterbore, contact the Boston Aircraft Certification Office for an approved repair.
(c) Install steel studs and mark the main gearbox housing as “TS-062-01” near the P/N by following the Accomplishment Instructions in the ASB, paragraph 3.C.
(d) To request a different method of compliance or a different compliance time for this AD, follow the procedures in 14 CFR 39.19. Contact the Manager, Boston Aircraft Certification Office, Engine and Propeller Directorate, FAA, ATTN: Kirk Gustafson, Aviation Safety Engineer, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, MA 01803, telephone (781) 238-7190, fax (781) 238-7170, for information about previously approved alternative methods of compliance.
(e) Special flight permits will not be issued.
(f) Copies of the applicable service information may be obtained from Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation, Attn: Manager, Commercial Technical Support, mailstop s581a, 6900 Main Street, Stratford, CT, telephone (203) 383-4866, e-mail address [email protected], or at Home.
(g) Emergency AD 2009-07-53, issued March 23, 2009, becomes effective upon receipt.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Kirk Gustafson, Aviation Safety Engineer, Boston Aircraft Certification Office, Engine and Propeller Directorate, FAA, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, MA 01803, telephone (781) 238-7190, fax (781) 238-7170.
Issued in Fort Worth, Texas, on March 23, 2009.
Mark R. Schilling,
Acting Manager, Rotorcraft Directorate,
Aircraft Certification Service.
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Outwest, I did think that I put HC rather than Ow still have edited and noted reason for editing so hope that will satisfy.
O
O
Last edited by outhouse; 24th Mar 2009 at 19:57.
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No dry-run capability.
No ELS.
Still no confirmed root cause failure from the TSB for flight 491, and yet after this AD it's supposedly OK to be safe to fly again. Absolutely unbelievable.
Main use offshore transferring PAX on long-haul flights.
Safest helo in the world, I think not...how many more MGB component failures are required before CS 29.927 "extremely remote" classification cannot be used as a feeble excuse?
FAA should be taken to court for certifying this helo for offshore use in the first place. Ditching in any sea state is not a preferred option, but with no auto-rotate reliability becomes impossible. Take a look at the state of the fuselage and you'll see that this helo hit the water really hard, say 500 feet/minute.
Transportation Safety Board of Canada | | A09A0016 | Sikorsky S92-A
When will the manufacturer assume accountability for this design error and rectify? How many more S-92s must break down before something positive will get done. Learning by fatalities should not have to happen, that's why we are meant to have the highest safety standards and rigorous certification procedures in this industry.
This is 2009, technology and safety standards are meant to advance, not retard. All pilots and PAX should refuse to fly these helos until the MGB is upgraded to provide the minimum safety standards. In the real world this won't happen, but try telling that to the relatives of the victims of flight 491.
No ELS.
Still no confirmed root cause failure from the TSB for flight 491, and yet after this AD it's supposedly OK to be safe to fly again. Absolutely unbelievable.
Main use offshore transferring PAX on long-haul flights.
Safest helo in the world, I think not...how many more MGB component failures are required before CS 29.927 "extremely remote" classification cannot be used as a feeble excuse?
FAA should be taken to court for certifying this helo for offshore use in the first place. Ditching in any sea state is not a preferred option, but with no auto-rotate reliability becomes impossible. Take a look at the state of the fuselage and you'll see that this helo hit the water really hard, say 500 feet/minute.
Transportation Safety Board of Canada | | A09A0016 | Sikorsky S92-A
When will the manufacturer assume accountability for this design error and rectify? How many more S-92s must break down before something positive will get done. Learning by fatalities should not have to happen, that's why we are meant to have the highest safety standards and rigorous certification procedures in this industry.
This is 2009, technology and safety standards are meant to advance, not retard. All pilots and PAX should refuse to fly these helos until the MGB is upgraded to provide the minimum safety standards. In the real world this won't happen, but try telling that to the relatives of the victims of flight 491.
Perhaps we should run a poll.
In a PM conversation with a very senior Gulf of Mexico pilot who flies S-92's it became apparant he and his colleagues had the same mindset a lot of us did. That being as long as the aircraft is flying we will try to get to someplace dry to land. We all agreed we would announce our problems, get help coming, as we headed to the water....then we would fly low and slow....very low....and slow....until we sensed any change for the worst then ditch.
We all developed this concept for some reason....not much of which is based upon empirical data but more on the concept of trying to stay out of the water and getting the occupants and the helicopter to a safe "dry" landing.
How many of us held that view prior to this accident?
How many of us hold that view after this accident?
The discussion shows there is some ambiguity in our knowledge of how long the 92 MGB could run without lubrication....which means we have the same problem with other Gearbox's on other aircraft and their "dry run" times.
Is this a topic that needs to be addressed industry wide and across the board for helicopters of all types and makes?
In a PM conversation with a very senior Gulf of Mexico pilot who flies S-92's it became apparant he and his colleagues had the same mindset a lot of us did. That being as long as the aircraft is flying we will try to get to someplace dry to land. We all agreed we would announce our problems, get help coming, as we headed to the water....then we would fly low and slow....very low....and slow....until we sensed any change for the worst then ditch.
We all developed this concept for some reason....not much of which is based upon empirical data but more on the concept of trying to stay out of the water and getting the occupants and the helicopter to a safe "dry" landing.
How many of us held that view prior to this accident?
How many of us hold that view after this accident?
The discussion shows there is some ambiguity in our knowledge of how long the 92 MGB could run without lubrication....which means we have the same problem with other Gearbox's on other aircraft and their "dry run" times.
Is this a topic that needs to be addressed industry wide and across the board for helicopters of all types and makes?
So do you think the OGP fatality rate will increase or decrease in future years as a result of an increasing number of voluntary ditchings following this accident?
Imagine all the helicopters that were flown by pilots with the same mindset as your senior GOM buddy, which I think is just about all of us - crawl it for the beach. And take all those instances where the lawyer-guided RFM said "land or ditch immediately", like gauge indications, fire warnings that wouldn't go out after firing two bottles into them, chip indications, etc.
If in every one of those cases the pilots had ditched, with the probable 20% loss of life, how many hundreds of pilots and passengers would have perished as a result? As an industry we've left a lot of judgment and final decision making up to the captains in these circumstances. Do we take that away?
Those four bars feeling a little heavy on your shoulders?
Imagine all the helicopters that were flown by pilots with the same mindset as your senior GOM buddy, which I think is just about all of us - crawl it for the beach. And take all those instances where the lawyer-guided RFM said "land or ditch immediately", like gauge indications, fire warnings that wouldn't go out after firing two bottles into them, chip indications, etc.
If in every one of those cases the pilots had ditched, with the probable 20% loss of life, how many hundreds of pilots and passengers would have perished as a result? As an industry we've left a lot of judgment and final decision making up to the captains in these circumstances. Do we take that away?
Those four bars feeling a little heavy on your shoulders?
Last edited by malabo; 25th Mar 2009 at 20:20.
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Oil pumps
You could have 4 oil pumps. when there is no oil to pump it dosen't matter. It's the same with the S-61 if a broken oil line pumps all the oil out it just a matter of time and not a lot of time.
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The ambiguous information (according to some in this thread) currently available, which could probably aid and assist Captains in their judgement and final decision making, is perhaps due in part to the ambiguos wording in the Regulations.
The questions should go back to the OEM and the Regulatory Authority -
1) under exactly what loss of MGB lubricant conditions will this a/c ensure 30 minutes of continued flight
2) what failure modes causing loss of lubricant, other than external cooler/line failure have been considered
answer to 1) will probably answer 2)
The questions should go back to the OEM and the Regulatory Authority -
1) under exactly what loss of MGB lubricant conditions will this a/c ensure 30 minutes of continued flight
2) what failure modes causing loss of lubricant, other than external cooler/line failure have been considered
answer to 1) will probably answer 2)
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The question of how long the MGB in any helicopter will last without oil is a problem we've all discussed over the years. I once had an ST start puking transmission oil sitting on the deck of a drill ship about 180 miles south of the Louisiana coast. Apparently one of the hydraulic servos became loose and pivoted into the transmission oil cooler line. If you've ever watched the transmission in an ST at idle bounce around because of the elastrometric bearings you know it only takes a few seconds to gouge a nice hole. We lost about 3 gallons of oil in 2-3 minutes.
After shutting down and watching the HLO crew clean up the mess, I was asked what would have happened had we been airborne when this happened. Looking at all the oil on the deck I told them we would have probably had to ditch as the nearest rig was 80 miles to the north. Wouldn't you know it, that comment went up the major oil company chain of command and back down to me. I told them, I was asked and I was straight with the people I fly. Figured it was probably a good thing to have an oil company vp actually have to confront reality, if for only a short while.
Now that I'm in the 92, the same considerations apply. 5psi and above and low and slow with options - fairly quick options. One of the little exercises I think about is how far in front and how far off to the side of that freighter or tanker (one good thing about our area of the Gulf is there are major shipping lanes) do I shoot for in just that situation. I also have a number of platforms that are rated at 17500lbs that are in the FMS just in case.
Afterall its not just the MGB. Tail rotor gear boxes, drive shafts, fires - all kinds of things mean get your ass on the ground.
After shutting down and watching the HLO crew clean up the mess, I was asked what would have happened had we been airborne when this happened. Looking at all the oil on the deck I told them we would have probably had to ditch as the nearest rig was 80 miles to the north. Wouldn't you know it, that comment went up the major oil company chain of command and back down to me. I told them, I was asked and I was straight with the people I fly. Figured it was probably a good thing to have an oil company vp actually have to confront reality, if for only a short while.
Now that I'm in the 92, the same considerations apply. 5psi and above and low and slow with options - fairly quick options. One of the little exercises I think about is how far in front and how far off to the side of that freighter or tanker (one good thing about our area of the Gulf is there are major shipping lanes) do I shoot for in just that situation. I also have a number of platforms that are rated at 17500lbs that are in the FMS just in case.
Afterall its not just the MGB. Tail rotor gear boxes, drive shafts, fires - all kinds of things mean get your ass on the ground.
Droopystop / Outwest
You are a little confused. S61 can run for 2 hrs with some oil still in the sump, using the emergency pump. So can the 225. However, following complete loss of oil from the sump, the S61 is Land Immediately, the 225 is 30 mins. That is the progress
HC
You are a little confused. S61 can run for 2 hrs with some oil still in the sump, using the emergency pump. So can the 225. However, following complete loss of oil from the sump, the S61 is Land Immediately, the 225 is 30 mins. That is the progress
HC
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HC,
Correct me if I am wrong (it's been a long time), but the inlet for the ELS was below the intake for the main pump, so even if the main pump poured all the oil it could pump out, the ELS could still operate.
OK a hole in the bottom of the sump would mean ditching.
I think requiring a 30 minute dry run capability is not stimulating progress of offshore helicopter design. 30 mins is only of use to onshore work. As oil fields are found further offshore, we are looking at longer ranges and therefore higher exposure during "land as soon as possible"/"nursing it home" scenarios. We are a long way from a dry gearbox which would be the ideal solution - no oil, nothing to leak, no pumps to fail. In the mean time, the regulators should be requiring the manufacturers to develope a means of making sure we can make a safe landing/get home in the event of failure of an oil system component. I.E. relate the regulation to the range of the aircraft. Something along the lines of providing a supply and/or emergency supply of oil that cannot leak by gravity and cannot be pumped out of the gearbox by the pumps. Of course there is a problem of cooling, but since heat is a measure of inefficiency, there will be incentive to design more efficient transmission systems.
Correct me if I am wrong (it's been a long time), but the inlet for the ELS was below the intake for the main pump, so even if the main pump poured all the oil it could pump out, the ELS could still operate.
OK a hole in the bottom of the sump would mean ditching.
I think requiring a 30 minute dry run capability is not stimulating progress of offshore helicopter design. 30 mins is only of use to onshore work. As oil fields are found further offshore, we are looking at longer ranges and therefore higher exposure during "land as soon as possible"/"nursing it home" scenarios. We are a long way from a dry gearbox which would be the ideal solution - no oil, nothing to leak, no pumps to fail. In the mean time, the regulators should be requiring the manufacturers to develope a means of making sure we can make a safe landing/get home in the event of failure of an oil system component. I.E. relate the regulation to the range of the aircraft. Something along the lines of providing a supply and/or emergency supply of oil that cannot leak by gravity and cannot be pumped out of the gearbox by the pumps. Of course there is a problem of cooling, but since heat is a measure of inefficiency, there will be incentive to design more efficient transmission systems.
How's one to know there is naught left in the MGB?
When do I start the clock from the last drop dripping from the leaky spot?
Let's be type specific here....212/412/61/76/92/332/225/155?
When do I start the clock from the last drop dripping from the leaky spot?
Let's be type specific here....212/412/61/76/92/332/225/155?
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You are a little confused. S61 can run for 2 hrs with some oil still in the sump, using the emergency pump. So can the 225.
I am not confused. What you don't seem to understand, or neglected to grasp from my previous post, is that the S61 has a SEPARATE sump DEDICATED to the ELS. So as mentioned by droopystop, baring a hole from a gunshot, if the oil from the main sump is pumped overboard for any reason, there will always be oil available to the ELS.
the 225 is 30 mins.
What most people are missing here is the fact that the ELS on the S61 only supplies oil to the babbitt bearings. the MGB itself has true run dry capability, not so in your beloved "new technology" 225.
I just fail to see how you consider a seperate glycol system which is subject to failure and a seperate ELS oil system also subject to failure, to be progress.
Progress to me would be, as in the 139, true run-dry capability, not requiring any input from another system or the crew.
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I'm not sure if it has already been mentioned in this thread so I figured I would throw it out there. I remember back when working on the Apache that it also had a 30 min run dry capability. This was not because things could live without lubrication and didn't get overheated in that amount of time but by use of an oil wicking system. I don't remember all the details but there was supposed to be some felt like material attached to some of the rotating bits in just the right spot that under normal operation would soak up oil. If you took a round through the case and had a total loss of oil this wicking system would, through cetrifugal force, sling out the oil it had soaked up which would keep you going long enough to make it out of a hot area and on the deck. I don't know if this type system could be made to work over a longer period of time and become useful in the off shore arena but I'm sure it would take a major if not complete redesign of a MGB to incorporate so the point is moot.
It does beg the question though...why do we carry our oil in a big metal tub at the bottom of the gear box? Could we not use some sort of oil absorbent material to soak up the oil and release it at a rate which would be sufficient to lube the gears and bearings in an emergency but keep enough of it that one should not lose all the oil in a very short time from a leak. I guess you could think of it as a high tech sponge in the oil sump. When you are full of oil it is saturated and the excess is used to lube the box but if there is a leak the oil drains out of the sponge via gravity (or even at a higher rate due to heat if it could be so designed) and allows continued lubrication for some amount of time.
Just thinking out loud here but it seemed pertinent to the conversation.
Max
It does beg the question though...why do we carry our oil in a big metal tub at the bottom of the gear box? Could we not use some sort of oil absorbent material to soak up the oil and release it at a rate which would be sufficient to lube the gears and bearings in an emergency but keep enough of it that one should not lose all the oil in a very short time from a leak. I guess you could think of it as a high tech sponge in the oil sump. When you are full of oil it is saturated and the excess is used to lube the box but if there is a leak the oil drains out of the sponge via gravity (or even at a higher rate due to heat if it could be so designed) and allows continued lubrication for some amount of time.
Just thinking out loud here but it seemed pertinent to the conversation.
Max
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Maxtork,
I like your thinking, but;
Anything that is lubricated by a fluid will need this arrangement.
A very good thing when done, as even if it becomes approved for only 30 minutes, that's 30 minutes closer to land/rig/island/rescue.
It also shows that the solutions are out there, requiring only the desire to implement them - and no I'm not suggesting that an authority should mandate a specific system, simply give the standard and let the creativity of engineering decide.
I like your thinking, but;
Anything that is lubricated by a fluid will need this arrangement.
A very good thing when done, as even if it becomes approved for only 30 minutes, that's 30 minutes closer to land/rig/island/rescue.
It also shows that the solutions are out there, requiring only the desire to implement them - and no I'm not suggesting that an authority should mandate a specific system, simply give the standard and let the creativity of engineering decide.