Sikorsky S-92: From Design to Operations

[212man]

Yes, I know of that incident (KLM, EGSH?) and of course one of the crew, JB, is now a 92 pilot!

Another operator of many types, some of which had a history of spurious fire warnings, DID elect to add the clause about checking for continued signs of fire after the throttle had been brough to idle. It also depends on the type of fire detecetor of course - some are sensitive to hot gas leaks, some are not.

[outhouse]

Lots of really great stuff is being discussed and I wish that this type of exchange had been available when I was inexperienced and looking for advice and guidance, choose wisely though.
Thanks 212man, I have the opportunity to visit a S92 simulator in April on business and will have them demonstrate the new revised failure indications and demonstrate the procedural drills.
My main involvement just now is the AW139, two pumps and a common filter, same philosophy regarding redundancy, I have requested clarification re single pump failure, they have a 30 min run dry it seems, again requested clarification.
Thanks to all and enjoying the discussions.
Outhouse.

[212man]

Thanks 212man, I have the opportunity to visit a S92 simulator in April on business and will have them demonstrate the new revised failure indications and demonstrate the procedural drills.

The Simulator(s) does(do) not represent the current pump failure modes. that is not a criticism of the simulator providers - it is reality based on what they were told initially and the recent ASB.

However, I hope you enjoy you visit and I'm sure you'll learn alot. WPB, FAB or Lafayette?

[outhouse]

Thanks 212man; I understand the problems and limitations regarding the simulation programs. Not sure just yet but WPB is looking the favourite.
The 139 passed the 30 minute test, and apart from the odd chip CAS message shown no real problems in this area. Single pump loss=, lower pressure but no real worry I am told.

Many thanks outhouse

[HeliComparator]

Brian Abraham

In your first quote re: S92 dry run, Nick posts a Press Release, it was not his own words. Now when did we ever believe Press Releases? A press release is written by a sales team, checked by lawyers and then released. It doesn't go anywhere near the programme management or anyone else who actually knows anything about helicopters.

If you read through this (admittedly extensive) thread you will find a place where the debate between Nick and the nay-sayers hotted up. Nick was under a lot of pressure to say that the 92 had dry run time, but he could not bring himself to lie about it even though he dearly wished it did, and many times he avoided giving a direct answer to the question. He knew (at least by then) that it didn't have any certified dry run time because it failed the tests.

I have no doubt that the issue of dry running time will get a mention in the Cougar accident report, could I suggest that you consider the hazard to others you create by possibly spreading mis-information, and leave the certification issue alone for the time being, at least until you get a definitive answer from Sikorsky?

HC

[Vibetribe]

Rotor, Fueselage and some components recovered

A media quote,

Meanwhile, a chopper in the Cougar fleet has been flown in from the Gulf of Mexico. The S-61 is now on standby in St.John's for med-evac and search and rescue.

The Atlantic Osprey, the offshore vessel involved in the recovery of the downed Cougar helicopter , is going back out to sea. The vessel came into port yesterday with the main components, including the fuselage and rotor. The Osprey left port this morning and is tracking towards the crash site. The TSB's investigator in charge, Mike Cunningham, has said that the wreckage is in hundreds of pieces. The black box and the cockpit voice recorder were recovered earlier and shipped to Ottawa for analysis.

Pictures can be found http://www.vocm.com/viewgallery.asp?id=217

[Droopystop]

Much has been made of the latest incident concerning the Cougar S92 and its MGB. Yes we have been lead to believe that the aircraft turned around due to a MGP oil pressure problem. Is everyone just assuming that this caused the ditching or is known definitively that this is the case?

[Special 25]

Droopystop

All that is known for sure is that the aircraft was returning due to reported problems with the MGB Pressure

The exact cause of the crash is not known. Whether the Gear Box failed is speculation or they may have crashed trying to ditch in rough seas. The debris would indicate that the aircraft hit the water quite hard.

Investigators have retrieved the aircraft and data recorders so I believe a preliminary report could be out fairly soon - Perhaps a slightly clearer picture within days, so there isn't too much point in speculating much further, although I accept that many pilots, especially S-92 crews must be desperate for even just some initial findings.

[APC77Z]

FAA puts teeth into EASA SIB

The FAA has added a bit more urgency to EASA's warning on 17 March that Sikorsky's suggested changes to the HFM from an SSA in September NOT be followed. Here's the FAA's text:

SUBJ:

Sikorsky S92A Main Gearbox Emergency Procedures Date: March 19, 2009

This is information only. Recommendations aren’t mandatory.

Introduction

This Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin (SAIB) alerts owners and operators of Sikorsky S-92A helicopters to follow the current Sikorsky Rotorcraft Flight Manual.

Background

Sikorsky Aircraft issued Sikorsky Safety Advisory (SSA) SSA-S92-08-006, dated September 26, 2008. This SSA for the Sikorsky S92A helicopter suggested forthcoming FAA Rotorcraft Flight Manual (RFM) changes
pertaining to main gearbox Emergency Procedures. The FAA has not approved these changes.

A series of service difficulties including a recent fatal accident in Canada has highlighted these procedures
for review and possible revision. The information in the Sikorsky SSA was premature and may not be appropriate. The recommendations below reflect the best information as available to the FAA.

Recommendations

The relevant emergency procedures in the FAA Approved RFM should be observed. Therefore, the procedures proposed in the subject SSA should not guide S92A operations.

For Further Information Contact

Mike Schwetz, Aerospace Engineer, Boston Aircraft Certification Office, ANE-150; phone: [phone];
fax: [phone]; e-mail: [email protected]

For Related Service Information Contact

Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation, Attn: Manager, Commercial Technical Support, mailstop s581a, 6900 Main
Street, Stratford, CT, telephone [phone], e-mail address

[email protected], or at

http://www.sikorsky.com.

[Aser]

Where is the data from flightaware track coming from??? xpdr?
FlightAware > Live Flight Tracker > Track Log > CHI91 > 12-Mar-2009 > CYYT-CHIB

08:14AM 47.32 -51.47 133 9000 level Gander Center
08:15AM 47.32 -51.43 53 8800 descending Gander Center

I would like to know if the data is more or less reliable.

Regards
Aser

[maxwelg2]

Feedback on S92a from a St. John's PAX

To all

I lost many work colleagues 7 days ago. I am an engineer with nearly 18 years offshore experience both in the North Sea and over 5 years in Canada, so let's just say I have hands-on experience of the S-92a issues. I was on one that developed a "hydraulic leak" back on 15 November 2006, thankfully we found it during a refuel on a drilling rig and the machine was shut down until Cougar came out and patched it up. My work colleagues and your fellow pilots were not so lucky.

I cannot believe that the FAA and CAA has not grounded all S-92a's until the root cause of our recent tragedy has been identified and rectified. I appreciate this network's information sharing and now have a more thorough understanding of the S-92a MGB issues. Surely the number of incidents in CADORS should have prompted a more robust fault investigation by Sikorsky prior to this failure.

We all have a responsibility to do our jobs as safely as possible. If this means that no S-92s are allowed to fly until the MGBs are made more robust and/or other modifications are done such as a fifth blade to reduce the inherent vibration that these units have, then so be it.

Here is a summary of the S-92 CADORS logs, and this is just for the St. John's based units. It is worth noting that post-July 2006 MGB housing and vespel spline FAA AD "recalls" the number of CHIP incidents seem to have dropped. As you can see there have been other "teething" problems with this helo over here. Note that the Nov 15 2006 incident was not recorded...

Date 1/18/2006
CADORS Number 2006A0038
Event Declared emergency/priority
Owner COUGAR HELICOPTERS INC
Description TSB Update A06A0005: CHI21, a Cougar Helicopter Sikorsky S-92A, with 18 passengers and two flight crew on board, was enroute from St. John's, NL to the Terra Nova FPSO oil production vessel when the number two engine chip light illuminated. The crew elected to return to St. John's and, on the return flight, they had indications of an oil filter bypass, excessive turbine gas temperature, and reduced oil pressure on the same engine. The crew shut down and secured the engine (General Electric CT7-8A), declared an emergency, and landed safely at St. John's without further incident. Maintenance inspection revealed significant metal particles on the engine chip plug and the oil filter and sump. The engine is being replaced and shipped to the manufacturer for further analysis
Aircraft Model S92A
Aircraft Make SIKORSKY

Date 1/18/2006
CADORS Number 2006A0038
Event Diversion
Owner COUGAR HELICOPTERS INC
Description CHI21, Sikorsky S92A, enroute from St. John’s (CYYT) to Henry Goodridge Oil Rig, at 1459Z, declared an emergency due to an engine failure. Aircraft requested clearance back to CYYT. CHI21 landed safely at 1550Z. TSB Case Closed.
Aircraft Model S92A
Aircraft Make SIKORSKY

Date 2/3/2006
CADORS Number 2006A0073
Event Engine malfunction - other
Owner COUGAR HELICOPTERS INC
Description CHI22,S92, enroute St. John’s (CYYT) to – Henry Goodrich Oil Platform (CHEN) requested to return to CYYT due indication light at 1800Z, position 35NM southeast of CYYT(St. John's). Aircraft advised no emergency. At approximately time 1813Z flight requested ERS on arrival. Landed without further incident at time 1823Z. Pilot advised of engine chip light. TSB Case Closed
Aircraft Model S92A
Aircraft Make SIKORSKY

Date 2/3/2006
CADORS Number 2006A0073
Event Engine malfunction - other
Owner COUGAR HELICOPTERS INC
Description UPDATE Maintenance & Manufacturing: This is the third CT7-8A engine in a S92 that has had this bearing fail, two of them in Cougar Helicopters aircraft. General Electric (GE) representatives have determined the first engine malfunction to be from external contamination of aluminum oxide left behind from the manufacturing process. They suspect and are quite confident the engines involved in the Cougar incidents were contaminated in the same way, but the lab reports are pending. General Electric has a full team investigating this problem. They have already modified their cleaning and flushing procedure. General Electric has implemented a 50 hour inspection of the mag plugs, which Cougar Helicopters have added to their inspection program, as well as adding a daily mag plug check for the next 100 hours and for 100 hours after any new engine install.
Aircraft Model S92A
Aircraft Make SIKORSKY

Date 2/3/2006
CADORS Number 2006A0073
Event Engine malfunction - other
Owner COUGAR HELICOPTERS INC
Description UPDATE : TSB A06A0010: CHI22, a Cougar Helicopters Sikorsky S-92A, with 19 passengers and two flight crew onboard, was enroute from St. John's, NL to the Henry Goodrich oil platform and was approximately 35 NM Southeast of St. John's when the number two engine chip light illuminated (General Electric CT7-8A). The crew followed checklist procedures and reduced the #2 engine power to idle and elected to return to St. John's. The crew did not initially declare an emergency, however, ten minutes prior to landing requested ERS. The aircraft landed without further incident. After the aircraft landed, maintenance inspected the chip plug on the #2 engine and in consultation with the engine manufacturer, it was felt that the metal found on the chip plug was from the #3 bearing. This engine had a total of 42.2 hrs time in service since new. The engine was replaced with a new engine before the aircraft was returned to service.
Aircraft Model S92A
Aircraft Make SIKORSKY

Date 7/25/2006
CADORS Number 2006A0549
Event Declared emergency/priority
Owner COUGAR HELICOPTERS INC
Description UPDATE TSB: The number 2 engine had not failed rather a chip light had illuminated resulting in the flight crew reducing power for that engine.
Aircraft Model S92A
Aircraft Make SIKORSKY

Date 7/25/2006
CADORS Number 2006A0549
Event Declared emergency/priority
Owner COUGAR HELICOPTERS INC
Description UPDATE TSB: A06A0071: Cougar 33 (C-GSCH), a Sikorsky S-92, was outbound from St. John's to Hibernia. At approximately 75 nm from St. Johns the INPUT CHIP 2 light came on. The crew followed the checklist, reduced No.2 engine to IDLE, descended to 500 feet, and joined Route B back to St. John's airport. Once level at 500 feet the crew briefed the passengers and ATC. Approximately 5 minutes after the INPUT CHIP 2 indication the INPUT CHIP 1 also illuminated. The crew declared a "PAN" and continued in to St. John's at 500 feet. A Cormorant on exercises in the area (OUTCAST 903) joined the aircraft and escorted the flight in to St. John's airport. The crew flew a running landing onto Runway 02, then shut down the aircraft on the runway to prevent damage to the gearbox inputs. Upon inspection, the chip plugs in the main transmission and in the associated accessory modules were found to be contaminated. The affected components will be changed out, and the company and manufacturer are investigating the cause of the chip lights.
Aircraft Model S92A
Aircraft Make SIKORSKY

Date 7/25/2006
CADORS Number 2006A0549
Event Declared emergency/priority
Owner COUGAR HELICOPTERS INC
Description UPDATE TSB: A06A0071: Cougar 33 (C-GSCH), a Sikorsky S-92, was outbound from St. John's to Hibernia. At approximately 75 nm from St. Johns the INPUT CHIP 2 light came on. The crew followed the checklist, reduced No.2 engine to IDLE, descended to 500 feet, and joined Route B back to St. John's airport. Once level at 500 feet the crew briefed the passengers and ATC. Approximately 5 minutes after the INPUT CHIP 2 indication the INPUT CHIP 1 also illuminated. The crew declared a "PAN" and continued in to St. John's at 500 feet. A Cormorant on exercises in the area (OUTCAST 903) joined the aircraft and escorted the flight in to St. John's airport. The crew flew a running landing onto Runway 02, then shut down the aircraft on the runway to prevent damage to the gearbox inputs. Upon inspection, the chip plugs in the main transmission and in the associated accessory modules were found to be contaminated. The affected components will be changed out, and the company and manufacturer are investigating the cause of the chip lights.
Aircraft Model S92A
Aircraft Make SIKORSKY

Date 7/25/2006
CADORS Number 2006A0549
Event Engine malfunction - other
Owner COUGAR HELICOPTERS INC
Description At 20:20Z, CHI33, S92, enroute from St. John’s (CYYT) to the Hibernia Oil Platform, advised that the number 2 engine was out and that they were canceling IFR to return to St. John’s VFR. No emergency declared or assistance required. At 20:38Z, the pilot declared an emergency as the #1 engine indicated a malfunction as well. The aircraft landed safely at 21:02Z without further incident. TSB Case Closed.
Aircraft Model S92A
Aircraft Make SIKORSKY

Date 7/25/2006
CADORS Number 2006A0549
Event Engine malfunction - other
Owner COUGAR HELICOPTERS INC
Description UPDATE TSB: The number 2 engine had not failed rather a chip light had illuminated resulting in the flight crew reducing power for that engine.
Aircraft Model S92A
Aircraft Make SIKORSKY

Date 7/25/2006
CADORS Number 2006A0549
Event Declared emergency/priority
Owner COUGAR HELICOPTERS INC
Description At 20:20Z, CHI33, S92, enroute from St. John’s (CYYT) to the Hibernia Oil Platform, advised that the number 2 engine was out and that they were canceling IFR to return to St. John’s VFR. No emergency declared or assistance required. At 20:38Z, the pilot declared an emergency as the #1 engine indicated a malfunction as well. The aircraft landed safely at 21:02Z without further incident. TSB Case Closed.
Aircraft Model S92A
Aircraft Make SIKORSKY

Date 7/25/2006
CADORS Number 2006A0549
Event Diversion
Owner COUGAR HELICOPTERS INC
Description At 20:20Z, CHI33, S92, enroute from St. John’s (CYYT) to the Hibernia Oil Platform, advised that the number 2 engine was out and that they were canceling IFR to return to St. John’s VFR. No emergency declared or assistance required. At 20:38Z, the pilot declared an emergency as the #1 engine indicated a malfunction as well. The aircraft landed safely at 21:02Z without further incident. TSB Case Closed.
Aircraft Model S92A
Aircraft Make SIKORSKY

Date 7/25/2006
CADORS Number 2006A0549
Event Diversion
Owner COUGAR HELICOPTERS INC
Description UPDATE TSB: A06A0071: Cougar 33 (C-GSCH), a Sikorsky S-92, was outbound from St. John's to Hibernia. At approximately 75 nm from St. Johns the INPUT CHIP 2 light came on. The crew followed the checklist, reduced No.2 engine to IDLE, descended to 500 feet, and joined Route B back to St. John's airport. Once level at 500 feet the crew briefed the passengers and ATC. Approximately 5 minutes after the INPUT CHIP 2 indication the INPUT CHIP 1 also illuminated. The crew declared a "PAN" and continued in to St. John's at 500 feet. A Cormorant on exercises in the area (OUTCAST 903) joined the aircraft and escorted the flight in to St. John's airport. The crew flew a running landing onto Runway 02, then shut down the aircraft on the runway to prevent damage to the gearbox inputs. Upon inspection, the chip plugs in the main transmission and in the associated accessory modules were found to be contaminated. The affected components will be changed out, and the company and manufacturer are investigating the cause of the chip lights.
Aircraft Model S92A
Aircraft Make SIKORSKY

Date 7/25/2006
CADORS Number 2006A0549
Event Diversion
Owner COUGAR HELICOPTERS INC
Description UPDATE TSB: The number 2 engine had not failed rather a chip light had illuminated resulting in the flight crew reducing power for that engine.
Aircraft Model S92A
Aircraft Make SIKORSKY

Date 8/8/2006
CADORS Number 2006A0599
Event Diversion
Owner COUGAR HELICOPTERS INC
Description CHI91, S92, enroute from St. John’s (CYYT) to the Sea Rose Drilling Platform, departed IFR at 17:05Z and at 17:08Z the crew cancelled IFR and returned to St. John's due to a mechanical issue. No emergency was declared and the aircraft landed at 17:13Z without further incident. Nil TSB.
Aircraft Model S92A
Aircraft Make SIKORSKY

Date 12/13/2006
CADORS Number 2006A1052
Event Engine oil problem
Owner COUGAR HELICOPTERS INC
Description CHI21, Sikorsky S92A, enroute from St. John’s (CYYT) to the Terra Nova Platform, aborted takeoff due to a low oil pressure indication. No assistance was required. Nil TSB.
Aircraft Model S92A
Aircraft Make SIKORSKY

Date 1/14/2007
CADORS Number 2007A0035
Event Diversion
Owner COUGAR HELICOPTERS INC
Description UPDATE TSB: A07A0004: CHI21, a Cougar Helicopters Sikorsky S-92, was en route from St. John's NL to the Henry Goodridge oil production platform when the flight crew noticed that the number one engine fuel pressure caution light had illuminated. The crew advised ATC that they were returning to St. John's and requested that the ARFF be on standby. The aircraft landed safely at St. John's without further incident. Maintenance inspection revealed that the cause of the incident was a defective fuel pressure switch. The switch has been replaced and the aircraft has since been returned to service.
Aircraft Model S92A
Aircraft Make SIKORSKY

Date 1/14/2007
CADORS Number 2007A0035
Event Engine oil problem
Owner COUGAR HELICOPTERS INC
Description UPDATE TSB: A07A0004: CHI21, a Cougar Helicopters Sikorsky S-92, was en route from St. John's NL to the Henry Goodridge oil production platform when the flight crew noticed that the number one engine fuel pressure caution light had illuminated. The crew advised ATC that they were returning to St. John's and requested that the ARFF be on standby. The aircraft landed safely at St. John's without further incident. Maintenance inspection revealed that the cause of the incident was a defective fuel pressure switch. The switch has been replaced and the aircraft has since been returned to service.
Aircraft Model S92A
Aircraft Make SIKORSKY

Date 3/22/2007
CADORS Number 2007A0211
Event Landing gear
Owner COUGAR HELICOPTERS INC
Description CHI31, Sikorsky S92A, enroute from St. John’s (CYYT) to the Hibernia Oil Platform, departed St. John’s at 12:04Z and was unable to retract the landing gear. The flight returned to St. John’s VFR and landed without incident at 12:51Z. Nil TSB.
Aircraft Model S92A
Aircraft Make SIKORSKY

Date 6/13/2007
CADORS Number 2007A0519
Event Diversion
Owner COUGAR HELICOPTERS INC.
Description A Canadian registered Sikorsky S92A, after departure from St. John’s (CYYT), requested to return to the airport due to an input chip light indication. The aircraft landed without further incident at 11:12Z. Nil TSB.
Aircraft Model S92A
Aircraft Make SIKORSKY

Date 2/11/2008
CADORS Number 2008A0187
Event Flight instrument failure
Owner COUGAR HELICOPTERS INC.
Description UPDATE TSB: The aircraft powered down and then back up. The malfunction did not reappear.
Aircraft Model S92A
Aircraft Make SIKORSKY

Date 2/11/2008
CADORS Number 2008A0187
Event Flight instrument failure
Owner COUGAR HELICOPTERS INC.
Description CHI51, Sikorsky S92A, enroute from St. John’s (CYYT) to the Glomar Oil Rig, departed St. John’s at 11:48Z. At 12:04, approximately 38 nautical miles southeast of St. John’s, the flight requested clearance to return to St. John’s. Pilot advised reason for return as "Computer Failure". No emergency declared and no assistance was required. The flight landed safely at 12:27Z. Nil TSB.
Aircraft Model S92A
Aircraft Make SIKORSKY

Date 4/24/2008
CADORS Number 2008A0501
Event Declared emergency/priority
Owner COUGAR HELICOPTERS INC.
Description CHI91, Sikorsky S92A, enroute from the Sea Rose Oil Platform to St. John’s (CYYT), declared an emergency due to an engine failure. The flight was 100 nautical miles southeast of St. John’s. The Rescue Coordination Centre (RCC) was advised. The flight landed safely at 15:03Z. TSB Case Closed.
Aircraft Model S92A
Aircraft Make SIKORSKY

Date 4/24/2008
CADORS Number 2008A0501
Event Engine failure
Owner COUGAR HELICOPTERS INC.
Description UPDATE TSB: A08A0059: The Cougar Helicopters Sikorsky-S92A , operating as CHI91, was in cruise flight en route from the Hibernia Gravity Based Platform to St. John's Intl. When the helicopter was approximately 100 NM SE of St. John's, NL the crew contacted Gander ACC to advise they were declaring an emergency and had shutdown engine #1 (GE CT7-8A). The engine shutdown was required due to a Gear Box chip light. The helicopter landed uneventfully at 12:35 NDT while ARFF were standing by. Maintenance determined the chip light was due to an accumulation of "nuisance fuzz" in the form of a "sliver" on a recently installed Main Gearbox accessory input.
Aircraft Model S92A
Aircraft Make SIKORSKY

Date 4/24/2008
CADORS Number 2008A0501
Event Engine failure
Owner COUGAR HELICOPTERS INC.
Description UPDATE Maintenance & Manufacturing: This incident is a follow on a ground chip light occurrence of April 16, 2008. The MGB Input Module was replaced on April 22, 2008 as a result of the April 16th chip light indication. This incident flight was the first offshore flight since the ground run and test flight after input module replacement. The MGB oil and filters have been replaced since this incident.
Aircraft Model S92A
Aircraft Make SIKORSKY

Date 6/30/2008
CADORS Number 2008A0787
Event Diversion
Owner COUGAR HELICOPTERS INC.
Description Shortly after departure from St. John’s (CYYT), CHI21, Sikorsky S92A, requested to return due to a minor mechanical problem with an anti-icing failure on Engine Number Two. No assistance was requested and the aircraft landed at 10:53Z.
Aircraft Model S92A
Aircraft Make SIKORSKY

Date 9/6/2008
CADORS Number 2008A1126
Event Door/canopy openings indications
Owner COUGAR HELICOPTERS INC.
Description CHI71, Sikorsky S92, aborted the departure due to a cargo door indication. No assistance was required.
Aircraft Model S92A
Aircraft Make SIKORSKY

Date 9/24/2008
CADORS Number 2008A1220
Event Declared emergency/priority
Owner COUGAR HELICOPTERS INC.
Description While inbound to St. John’s (CYYT) (70 nautical miles east of St. John's), a Canadian registered Sikorsky S92A, enroute from the Glomar Oil Rig, declared PAN PAN PAN due to a fire indication in the number-two engine. Crash Fire Rescue (CFR) was requested at destination and was standing by. The aircraft landed without further incident at 15:06Z.
Aircraft Model S92A
Aircraft Make SIKORSKY

Date 9/24/2008
CADORS Number 2008A1220
Event Declared emergency/priority
Owner COUGAR HELICOPTERS INC.
Description UPDATE Maintenance & Manufacturing: Cougar maintenance investigated the incident and found no engine contributing factors or obvious fire indication system problems. Due to the reliability history of the engine flame detectors, both detectors were replaced for precautionary reasons. There have been no reports of engine fire detection problems since the detector replacement and the situation is being monitored by management.
Aircraft Model S92A
Aircraft Make SIKORSKY

Date 9/24/2008
CADORS Number 2008A1220
Event False warning - engine fire
Owner COUGAR HELICOPTERS INC.
Description While inbound to St. John’s (CYYT) (70 nautical miles east of St. John's), a Canadian registered Sikorsky S92A, enroute from the Glomar Oil Rig, declared PAN PAN PAN due to a fire indication in the number-two engine. Crash Fire Rescue (CFR) was requested at destination and was standing by. The aircraft landed without further incident at 15:06Z.
Aircraft Model S92A
Aircraft Make SIKORSKY

Date 10/21/2008
CADORS Number 2008A1314
Event Rejected take-off
Owner COUGAR HELICOPTERS INC.
Description CHI21, Sikorsky S92, rejected take-off in St. John’s (CYYT) due to a cockpit indication and taxied back to the ramp. There was no operational impact.
Aircraft Model S92A
Aircraft Make SIKORSKY

Date 12/4/2008
CADORS Number 2008A1485
Event Diversion
Owner COUGAR HELICOPTERS INC.
Description UPDATE Maintenance & Manufacturing: Shortly after departure the crew had two indications of low fuel, the Segment Caution panel indicated Low Fuel and the Engine Instrument Caution Advisory System (ICAS) indicated Fuel 2 Low, a third indicator the Fuel Totalizer did not show a low fuel situation. The Fuel Totalizer showed 2,400 lbs. At this point the crew made the decision to return to St Johns. Upon landing a visual inspection revealed that the right hand fuel tank had enough fuel in to be visually inspected. The ensuing investigation revealed that the aircraft was left outside the night before, in heavy rain. The rain may have been a factor causing electrical anomalies however the investigation is ongoing and more details will follow.
Aircraft Model S92A
Aircraft Make SIKORSKY

Date 1/16/2009
CADORS Number 2009A0054
Event Rejected take-off
Owner COUGAR HELICOPTERS INC.
Description CHI91, Sikorsky S92A, enroute from St. John’s (CYYT) to the Searose Oil Platform, rejected takeoff from Runway 34 due to an instrument action problem. No assistance was required.
Aircraft Model S92A
Aircraft Make SIKORSKY

[wrencheli]

Maxwelg, condolences to you and your coworkers, as well as anybody else touched by this tragedy.

Here is a quote from the CADOR's website:

"the information within should be treated as preliminary, unsubstantiated and subject to change"

The problem with CADOR's is it updated by several different agencies often simultaneously. This is why your post contains many duplicate entries for the same event. They are often entered by persons with second hand information with limited knowledge of the actual event. Unfortunately the media and laypersons get a hold of these and read more into them than they are worth.

If you take a thorough look at the occurances there is 16 +/- specific events.

3 and possibly a couple more are related to the GE engine for which Sikorsky is not responsible.

2 are unkown/unreported problems so that leaves at most 11 occurances related to the airframe. This is for Cougar's 6 S92's the first starting operations 4 years ago in 2005.

Many of the problems were false indications/warnings which are everyday occurances in aviation. Although they have to be treated seriously which it appears they were in every case.

There are a couple that were serious defects that could affect safety if not corrected. Interestingly the CADOR on 12/18/2006 involved low oil pressure but it does not specify which part of the machine.

I am not saying the 92 has no known problems, and hopefully the investigation results in improved safety and reliability.

I hope this helps put the CADOR's in perspective.

A much more reliable source of aircraft defects are the Transport Canada and FAA Service Difficulty Reporting system (SDR). These are required by law and entered by the company involved, usually by the Director of Maintenance or Quality Assurance. This is what the manufacture's and regulatory authorities use to identify problem areas with aircraft.

[Brian Abraham]

could I suggest that you consider the hazard to others you create by possibly spreading mis-information

HC, I'm sorry you see it that way, truely. I would have thought by raising the point that no one now can be left in any doubt (Ppruners at least) as to what the information really means. I call it education, but you obviously beg to differ, and thats OK. Ppruners will no doubt draw their own conclusions - as they should.
My final post.

[JimL]

maxwelg2,

Although not apparently a cause of this accident, perhaps your mind can be set at rest when it comes to events in the CADORS data-base that are concerned with engine-failure.

It might be of interest to know that all (world-wide) engine failures are tracked as a result of the JAR-OPS 3 requirement to establish engine reliability. Each Type Certificate Holder (TCH - engine and airframe) is required to log and investigate all in-flight-shut-downs (IFSD) - commanded (perhaps as a result of a chip warning) and uncommanded (when the engine power drops below a defined level). The requirement for analysis is contained in Appendix 1 to JAR-OPS 3.517(a) with methods of compliance in ACJ-1 to Appendix 1 to JAR-OPS 3.517(a).

Each IFSD is investigated by the appropriate TCH and an applicability (to reliability) factor is assigned; as you can imagine, failures that are due to (say) FOD are not considered to have a high relevance but those which result from failure of some (part of a) unit are. For each of these events there is a corrective action (and/or comments); each of these corrective actions is assessed for 'efficiency of corrective action' which can then be applied to the reliability index. (No failure escapes this analysis.)

The subsequent reliability index must be within a target (set in the regulations mentioned above) before that aircraft can be approved for use by operators in certain types of operation - flight over hostile environments like the North Atlantic or the North Sea for example.

Each airframe manufacturer is required to assess its airframe/engine combinations yearly and provide the results of this analysis - the index to operators (in the form of an AOL) and analyses to the Authority of the State of the Operator. In order that the index is smoothed, a moving statistical window of five years is used.

Sikorsky released the latest result of this analysis to operators, in the last month. The latest (five year) index was below (better than) the target set in the regulation.

Jim

[Geoffersincornwall]

Self Policing - A good idea?

The UK government have today admitted that they based their assessment of the strength of the asset/debt ratio by Northern Rock Bank on it's own internal figures. ie. the NRB told the government
Don't worry about a thing, we have checked the numbers and everything is OK
We now know it was crap and my tax is now propping them up.

Why should we trust the analysis of the Manufacturer, whose vested interest is undoubted. I just cannot imagine Sikorky, EC or any manufacturer going to the market place with the bad news 'sorry chaps, all you 92,225,139,L1,L2,365,155 operators have got to stop operating your machines in PC2e and no flights over hostile environments are now permitted'. Can you imagine the chaos...... friightening.

Tell me it's not so Jim. Tell me you guys have your finger on all the stats and they cannot snow us with 'factored index adjustments'.

G

[JimL]

Geoff,

I am not an apologist for Sikorsky (as you know); I have objective views on this subject because I was around at the introduction of the reliability analysis and have watched it progress/improve over the years in the face of opposition from a number of parties.

The response is exactly what was expected (perhaps not from you); you need to read the ACJ referred to in my post above.

The methodology used for the Sikorsky reliability assessment is exactly as prescribed in the method of compliance; all IFSDs are included in the analysis; the corrective actions are there for all Authorities to see; the efficacy of the corrective actions are evident in the absence of failures (for those causes) once they have been applied; all fixes are mandatory for JAR-OPS operators.

I would not have posted if I did not have a positive view about this process and the results; as I said earlier, all failures have to be included in the analysis (and, I have been assured that they are). The efficacy of the corrective actions is a matter of further assessment - we shall see. The application of the methodology to provide the index is compliant.

What more would you like me to say?

Jim

[Geoffersincornwall]

The Index

Jim

I am reassured - to a certain extent - by what you have said but I still wonder about the way engine failures are analysed and categorised. My previous work has brought me into contact with parts of the world where poor maintenance has been a major contribution to the IFSD rate. How are such regional deviations from the norm handled? I know of one region that would never pass the test. Would that region lose it's PC2e 'licence' or would the whole world be affected by one area's poor performance?

It might be possible for the engine manufacturer to 'bury' maintenance problems by asigning a low index to such events because they can argue such failures are 'one -off'........ but if the engine is problematic to service, for example is prone to the effects of the slightest fuel contamination, might it not be argued that this is partly to do with poor design as much as poor husbandry.

I know it's a touch of thread-creep but it is a very interesting point and I bet I am not alone in considering it very very unlikely that we would ever see a PC2e clearance 'pulled'. There would always be a way of fudging the figures to allow the very necessary 'get-out' clause. It would be catastrophic to the industry if one of the major players had it's worldwide fleet unable to operate PC2e. Out of interest does anybody envisage such an event in their 'contingency planning' ? What could the Plan B be? PC2?


G

[JimL]

Geoff (no thread creep, this is the S92 not the accident)

For extremely good reasons (the necessity to avoid the skewing of results), analysis is done on world-wide data. In one of the original texts we had a clause that incidents/trends of a local nature would attract the attention of the operator and the Authority. For some regions, this would have had some effect (if for example they were clustered around the North Sea - just like lightning strikes) but not for others. When it comes to individual States and Operators, the skewing effect of reasonably probable events is too damaging to be of much use. I'm not sure what the latest figures are but the last time I saw any world-wide figures (August 2008) for the S92 they were at about 200,000hrs (some would argue statistically insignificant).

Maintenance faults are really an anomaly; for example if someone does not correctly refit a B-Nut should that effect the reliability analysis? Yes, it would attract some rectification action (probably a memo to field) but under the current guidance, it would not be counted in the index -the same is true for FOD (although they would both figure in the analysis). When the system was first mooted, it was suggested that such failures should not even be contained in the system/report; common sense prevailed of course as one of the significant reasons for the system was to provide confidence through transparency - not just the reliability analysis and index.

Maintenance faults might be seen as a weakness in the system but they are part of the oversight regime of a State and should be addressed by the appropriate Authority. The manufacturer can assist with this by analysing procedures to ensure that they are not too complex and intervention is warranted (improves safety and does not reduce it).

If you read the regulations, you will see that, whilst there is an absolute reliability figure 1x10^-5; there is the ability to consider a worse rate if it is associate with an improving trend. If for example there were to be a couple of failures caused by a bad batch of spur gears, fleet-wide replacement of the offending gears (and monitoring of the resulting efficacy) would provide the ability to re-assess reliability.

The benefit of this system is that we can now see all occurrences of engine-failures and each State (region) can make a judgement about the resulting analysis and reliability assessment. Before this, it was just a finger-in-the-air. We have to be pleased at the introduction of this system because, as you well know, 'we cannot manage it unless we can count it'.

In some sense one of the dangers of having raw data - such a CADORS - presented to us is that it causes the stomach to knot. Just removing the duplications would have made it appear less threatening.

Jim

[Geoffersincornwall]

Data collection

Thanks Jim. Feel a bit happier now. You are right to say that we should all be thankful that the data is out in the open whereas previously it was a closely guarded secret.

G

[SASless]

Someone in the know sort me out please!

The S-92 builds upon the UH-60 Blackhawk successful design.

Does the UH-60 use a "jellied" type MGB lubricant....rather than a standard type oil? Does not the S-92 use a standard type liquid lubricant? Would the jellied type cause problems in colder climates such as the North Sea as compared to say Nigeria where it is "hot"?

As a change in oil temp would be considered a secondary indication of MGB loss of pressure or loss of lubrication......does the location (currently) of the oil temp sensor(s) play a role in preventing such an indication by the current procedures. (Operating the by-pass within 5 Seconds for example?)

Simply put....is the oil temp sensor in the best position within the system?