What's New In W. Africa (Nigeria)

[SASless]

Competition is good for business.....provided it is fair competition and the Scale not tipped by the weight of some Brown Envelopes! Nigeria has always been a place where Money Talks!

[MamaPut]

Many indigenous companies in Nigeria are not renowned for their ethical business practices while many companies with European and North American partners, which formerly may have also conducted their business by the use of 'brown envelopes', are now unable to do so because of the threat of prosecution at home.

[pohm1]

Reports of a Nigerian Air Force Hind crashing on the runway at NAF Base, PH.

P1

[Phone Wind]

The reports of a Nigerian Air Force Hind crashing at NAF Base, Port Harcourt are true. Most companies are evacuating their staff because of the danger from exploding munitions and all flights suspended for now.

[xtremalsound]

This is true, I was around there. Almost of the flights diverted to PH international.
The helicopter was a MI-24 ( I think) and they were doing some training around NAF Base. It looks like the helicopter landed and before take off it started to burn. The crew are safe because they jumped out!
Good Luck

[soggyboxers]

All the crew of the NAF Hind crash are thankfully reported to have survived.

extremal,

I think you'll find that the Nigerian Air Force Hinds are the Mi-35P export versions of the Mi-24P (Hind-F)

[212man]

Soggy - you beat me to it! I'll get my anorak.......

Presumably that means they are down to 4 airframes now, or did they order anymore after the original 6 (one of which was destroyed at Osubi ) ?

[highfinal]

Eket/Port Harcourt

Afternoon all,
How are the living/travel/security conditions in PH and Eket these days? How many pilots/engineers in each base, what's the social life/recreational facilities like etc? Considering a move to one of them but nothing set in stone just yet, if someone could take the time to fill me in I'd appreciate it.
Thanks

[griffothefog]

PH..

HF,

If you would kindly furnish me with your bank account details, I will fill you in on all your missing data

Ask all the Q's & A's you like, but you will only really know the secret to heavens gate by signing on the line and taking the mosquito bite to the arse

[highfinal]

Hi Griffo,

Already well acquainted with the beautiful Naija delta, moving within the same organisation, just wanted to know how the living side of things compares with where I'm at right now. Want to make sure the colour of the grass on the other side of the fence is at least the same shade of brown!

Thanks

[Phone Wind]

highfinal,

It really depends how long ago you were here if you want to know how things have changed. Some years ago the main threat was perceived to come from MEND and associated groups within the Niger Delta. Whilst there is still a threat from former MEND militants, with Dokubo Asari, the Ijaw Youth Council leader threatening a resumption of hostilities if President Goodluck Jonathan is not allowed to run for election again in 2015, the main threats at the moment would seem to be from factions of Al Qaeda in the Islmaic Maghreb (AQIM), in particular Boko Haram and Ansaru, the latter with the stated aims of killing and kidnapping expatriates. Since the Libyan 'liberation' (which mainly seems to have resulted in large quantities of first-world weaponry and munitions being liberated into the hands of AQIM and its supporters) the threat of an Ansaru group staging a 'spectacular' in the south of Nigeria has to be taken seriously. If you're going to Port Harcourt you may wish to ponder on the fact that to my jaundiced eye, Bristow accommodation now does not seem as secure as it was this time last year, and Aero, Caverton and OAS don't seem to take it very seriously at all .

After 9/11 the Combating Terrorism center was set up at West Point and every month publishes 'The Sentinel', an independent publication that highlights what it considers the contemporary threats posed by terrorism and other forms of political violence. The following articles from that journal may give you and some of the others working in Nigeria, some background to the escalating campaign of violence and terror which until now the government seems powerless to stop

Boko Haram: Reversals and Retrenchment

Apr 29, 2013


Author: David Cook


During the period of June 2012 to April 2013, Nigeria’s Boko Haram militant group has suffered some significant reversals and setbacks. It has changed its tactics in accord with the rise and collapse of Ansar Eddine in neighboring Mali and the decrease in its own ability to project force inside Nigeria. After much indecisiveness during 2010-2012, the Nigerian government and armed forces have to some extent developed a policy of containment with regard to Boko Haram by employing a classic stick and carrot approach. Nigerian security forces employed blunt force attacks on the group’s bases and safe houses throughout the north—resulting in the killings of substantial numbers of militants, as well as causing high civilian casualties—while also offering an amnesty, which was rejected.

During this period, Boko Haram has for the first time demonstrated verifiable connections with radical groups in northern Mali—al-Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) and Ansar Eddine—and has spawned what appears to be a break-off Salafi-jihadi organization of more globalist tendencies, Jama`at Ansar al-Muslimin fi Bilad al-Sudan (known as Ansaru). Unlike Boko Haram, which is based in northeastern Nigeria, Ansaru has operated in and around Kano, the heartland of the Hausa-Fulani, in north-central Nigeria. The genesis of Ansaru is likely connected with the paradigmatic suicide attacks Boko Haram employed throughout the north and central regions, which killed many Muslims during the fall of 2011 and spring of 2012. In June 2012, for example, Ansaru leader Abu Usmatul al-Ansari stated: “Islam forbids [the] killing of innocent people including non-Muslims. This is our belief and we stand for it.”

This article analyzes Boko Haram’s patterns of operation, and the likelihood of whether the group collapses, accepts an amnesty or assimilates into mainstream society.

Patterns of Operation
Boko Haram’s opponents are three-fold: the Nigerian government, army and police; the Muslim political and religious elites in northern Nigeria; and the Christian (largely Igbo) minorities in the north and central regions of the country. During the period June 2012-April 2013, Boko Haram has struck repeatedly at all three targets; however, it has not claimed responsibility for a suicide attack since December 22, 2012.

Since the beginning of June 2012, Boko Haram’s geographic pattern of operations has shifted. Of the group’s 29 claimed operations since June 2012, 15 of these operations were in its home region of Borno and Yobe states (northeastern Nigeria), while five were in Kano, and four in Kaduna and Zaria. All of the Kaduna and Zaria operations (all attacks against churches), however, occurred prior to November 25, 2012. Of these 29 operations, 19 were directed against Christians—including massacres of Christian villagers throughout northern Nigeria, suicide attacks and other gun and machete attacks against churches, Christian gatherings, or Christian neighborhoods. Boko Haram’s leader Abubakar Shekau stated: “We are also at war with Christians because the whole world knows what they did to us,” adding that “the group’s successes in killing innocent civilians indicates they [i.e., Boko Haram] are on the right path.”

It is worth noting, however, that a number of the targets chosen by Boko Haram have been secular in nature and relate to the group’s adherence to “enjoining the right and forbidding the wrong” . These operations include: attacks against polio inoculation workers on February 8, 2013; the murders and beheadings of three North Korean doctors on February 10, 2013; attacks against park rangers in Sambisa Park (possibly because they threatened Boko Haram’s base in the area); a campaign against sellers of bush meat in Maiduguri in January 2013, in which 23 people were killed; and a suicide campaign against the telephone companies of Kano (Airtel and MTN) on December 22, 2012. True to the group’s primary opposition to secular non-Islamic education, some of its operations against Christians have been directed against schools or universities, in which the Christian students have been singled out for execution.

The types of weapons used by Boko Haram are also revealing: the spring, summer and fall of 2012 were all characterized by heavy use of suicide attacks (a total of seven recorded suicide attacks during this period, in addition to those utilized previously), but there have been no suicide attacks since the attack on the phone system in Kano on December 22, 2012. Perhaps this change in tactics has resulted from the discovery of a bomb-making factory by the Nigerian authorities in early December 2012. Alternatively, the appearance of Ansaru could have made the use of suicide attacks doctrinally problematic (because of their indiscriminate nature). Ansaru, for example, claims that it is against the killing of civilians, as opposed to Boko Haram’s more indiscriminate targeting selection.

One should also note the parallels to Ansaru in the use of kidnappings. Ansaru kidnapped seven foreigners on February 16, 2013, and executed them on March 9, while Boko Haram then kidnapped a French family of seven (including four children) in Cameroon on February 19, 2013, and then transported them to Nigeria, where they were freed on April 18. In both cases, the kidnappings were directed at the outer world and not at Nigerian targets. Ansaru stated that the executions were revenge for “atrocities done to the religion of Allah by the European countries in many places such as Afghanistan and Mali.” Boko Haram said that the kidnapping of the French family was in revenge for the French invasion of northern Mali.

The most striking conclusions from Boko Haram’s operations during the period June 2012-April 2013 is the inability (or unwillingness) of the group to carry out the paradigmatic suicide operations that characterized its rise during the period 2010-2012. To a large extent, Boko Haram has been confined to the region of Borno and Yobe states (northeastern Nigeria), with occasional operations in Kano (north central Nigeria). There have been none of the major operations that regularly occurred in Abuja or Jos (which is largely Christian, and is a flashpoint for Muslim-Christian tension). While Boko Haram retains the ability to carry out deadly operations in its home base region, it appears to have been cut off from the rest of the country.

Also indicative of the transition in Boko Haram is that approximately a third of its major operations are now utilizing machetes and knives (six out of 29 incidents) rather than gun attacks (11 out of 29 incidents), explosives or suicide attacks (seven out of 29 incidents). Increasingly, Boko Haram appears to be utilizing more low-tech methods of killing rather than continuing on a trajectory of ever more complex operations.

Collapse, Amnesty or Assimilation?
The prognosis for Boko Haram within Nigeria remains difficult to determine. For Boko Haram, the evidence suggests that the group’s appeal has dwindled, and it cannot carry out major operations outside of its home base. Nigeria’s increased policing of money transfers has taken its toll on Boko Haram’s financial support, compounded by the fall in popular support (most likely due to the suicide attacks it executed in 2012 against Muslim targets).

Looking at the larger strategic picture, the future for Boko Haram is not bright. For most of 2012 until the French invasion of Mali in January 2013, Boko Haram’s publicity was negated by the successes of Ansar Eddine in Mali (with effects also in Algeria, Niger and Mauritania). While Boko Haram has only been able to execute guerrilla attacks, Ansar Eddine was able to hold a significant piece of northern Mali, including important local cities such as Timbuktu and Gao, for a period of almost a year. While Ansar Eddine benefits from close connections with the larger world of radical Islam (including at least a nominal tie to al-Qa`ida), Boko Haram was likely bereft of such connections at least until 2012.

Nevertheless, signs that Boko Haram is developing close connections with the larger field of radical Islam have grown during this recent period. For the first time, on November 29, 2012, Abubakar Shekau issued a video in Arabic; all of his previous videos had been in Hausa. When Boko Haram was temporarily squeezed in February 2013, Shekau is believed to have briefly sought refuge with Ansar Eddine in northern Mali; it is possible that with his return to Nigeria, he brought more of a mainstreaming of Boko Haram within worldwide Salafi-jihadism. Additionally, the kidnapping of the French family from Cameroon signals the willingness of Boko Haram to operate outside of Nigeria’s boundaries for the first time, and to execute attacks for the cause of Ansar Eddine or AQIM.

Conclusion
Boko Haram has been contained to a large extent within northeastern Nigeria. Although it remains extremely deadly in that region—especially to the Christian population—it does not seem to have broadened its appeal during the past year. Indeed, northern Muslim politicians who were suspected of supporting Boko Haram during 2011-2012 have carefully distanced themselves from the group, especially as Boko Haram’s message has become more toxic within the context of Nigerian politics. The closest parallel to Boko Haram’s trajectory is that of the Abu Sayyaf Group in the Philippines—originally also a jihadist organization which has now developed into more of a criminal element (with Islamic rationales for operations).

Such a trajectory raises the question of whether the amnesty offered by the Nigerian government—effective with regard to the Niger Delta militants in southern Nigeria—will have any effect on Boko Haram. Most likely it will not because Boko Haram has developed a sufficiently hardened group of supporters who are willing to continue their operations even if (hypothetically) the leadership were to accept an amnesty. In developing ties to Ansar Eddine and other West and North African radicals, Boko Haram sees the future—after the French withdrawal from Mali—as being favorable for the continued success of Salafi-jihadism. As a result, Boko Haram likely sees no reason to surrender at this time.

Dr. David Cook is associate professor of religious studies at Rice University. He completed his undergraduate degrees at Hebrew University in Jerusalem, and received his Ph.D. from the University of Chicago in 2001. His first book, Studies in Muslim Apocalyptic, was published by Darwin Press in the series Studies in Late Antiquity and Early Islam. Two further books, Understanding Jihad and Contemporary Muslim Apocalyptic Literature were published during 2005, and Martyrdom in Islam as well as Understanding and Addressing Suicide Attacks (with Olivia Allison) have been completed recently.

[Phone Wind]

An earlier article from the Combating Terrorism Center publication CTC Sentinel, also has much interesting insight into Ansaru and the nature of its links with Boko Haram

Cooperation or Competition: Boko Haram and Ansaru After the Mali Intervention

Mar 27, 2013


Author: Jacob Zenn


Since the Nigerian militant group Boko Haram launched its first attack in northern Nigeria in September 2010, it has carried out more than 700 attacks that have killed more than 3,000 people. Boko Haram primarily targets Nigerian government officials and security officers, traditional and secular Muslim leaders, and Christians. It has also attacked schools, churches, cell phone towers, media houses, and government facilities, including border posts, police stations and prisons. Since January 2012, however, a new militant group has attracted more attention in northern Nigeria due to its threat to foreign interests. Jama`at Ansar al-Muslimin fi Bilad al-Sudan (commonly known as Ansaru) announced that it split from Boko Haram in January 2012, claiming that Boko Haram was “inhuman” for killing innocent Muslims as well as for targeting defectors. Ansaru’s almost exclusive focus on foreign targets may also explain why the two groups could not coexist.

Boko Haram seeks revenge against the Nigerian government and security forces for killing its founder Muhammad Yusuf and 1,000 of his followers during a four-day series of clashes in July 2009. Ansaru fights to restore the “lost dignity” of the Sokoto Caliphate, which was founded in 1804 by the Fulani shaykh Usman dan Fodio in northern Cameroon, northern Nigeria, and southern Niger, and lasted until the United Kingdom and France colonized the region and introduced Western education and Christianity in the 19th century.

This article reviews Ansaru’s attacks on foreign interests in Nigeria, the possible role of al-Qa`ida operative Mokhtar Belmokhtar in steering Ansaru toward kidnapping foreigners despite Boko Haram’s rejection of the tactic, and why al-Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) chose to collaborate more with Ansaru than Boko Haram. Finally, the article assesses the future of Ansaru and Boko Haram now that the French-led military intervention has driven AQIM from northern Mali and potentially killed Belmokhtar.

Ansaru’s Rise
To date, Ansaru may have executed six major attacks. Only the four operations carried out after Ansaru announced its formation on January 26, 2012, however, can be confidently attributed to the group.

First Operation
Ansaru may have carried out its first operation in May 2011 when Chris McManus and Franco Lamolinara—a British and Italian engineer of an Italian construction company—were kidnapped near the border with Niger in Kebbi State, northwest Nigeria. A previously unknown group called “al-Qa`ida in the Lands Beyond the Sahel” took responsibility in a proof-of-life video showing the two hostages blindfolded and kneeling in front of three veiled militants. The video was sent to Mauritania’s Agence Nouakchott d’Information (ANI), which usually receives AQIM videos. Employing the same Mauritanian negotiator that AQIM used in several previous kidnappings, the militants reportedly demanded $6 million and the release of prisoners in West Africa in return for the two hostages.

On March 7, 2012, Nigerian security forces broke up a Boko Haram Shura Council meeting in Kaduna led by Abu Muhammed, who defected from Boko Haram due to disagreements with Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau. The security forces determined from phone call logs and interrogations of the Shura Council members that Abu Muhammed was responsible for the British and Italian hostages and that the hostages were transferred to a house in Sokoto, north of Kebbi State. On March 8, 2012, the captors shot both hostages when they saw helicopters of the UK Special Boat Service carrying out surveillance on the house. Soon after, UK and Nigerian forces killed eight of the captors and detained eight others in a late effort to free the hostages. The detained captors confessed that they had “standing orders to kill the hostages immediately on sight of security agents, since we were not sure of surviving an encounter with the security men.” This established a precedent that any attempt to free hostages would lead to their immediate deaths.

In June 2012, a Boko Haram informant alleged long-time AQIM member Khalid al-Barnawi coordinated the kidnappings of the British and Italian hostages with Abu Muhammed, and that Abu Muhammed had trained under al-Barnawi at an AQIM-run camp in Algeria. That same month, the U.S. government designated al-Barnawi a “global terrorist” along with two other militants, Abubakar Adam Kambar, who trained under al-Barnawi at the AQIM camp in Algeria, and Boko Haram’s leader, Abubakar Shekau. Nigerian security sources reported that members of Shekau’s faction tipped off Nigerian intelligence about Abu Muhammed and other “traitorous” cells in northwestern Nigeria that broke from Shekau and did not focus on fighting the Nigerian government. Shekau’s spokesman also denied that Boko Haram carried out the kidnapping on the day after the hostages were killed, and said, “We have never been involved in hostage-taking, and we never ask for ransom.”

Although Ansaru did not yet exist as a formal organization at the time of the kidnapping, some suspect that Khalid al-Barnawi later formed Ansaru. Additionally, when speaking before the UK House of Commons in November 2012, Home Office Minister Mark Harper said that Ansaru is “also believed to be responsible for the murder of British national Christopher McManus and his Italian co-worker Franco Lamolinara in March 2012.”

Second Operation
On January 26, 2012, the same day Ansaru announced its split from Boko Haram by circulating flyers in Kano, a German engineer was kidnapped in Kano. In March 2012, AQIM’s official media wing, al-Andalus, took credit for the kidnapping and demanded in a video sent to ANI in Mauritania that Germany release from prison a Turkish-born female jihadist website administrator whose German husband fought with the Taliban in Afghanistan and was arrested in 2007 while planning to bomb Ramstein Air Base. AQIM also reminded Germany about the “recent lesson taught to the UK [Special Boat Service] by the mujahidin,” referring to the British and Italian hostages killed in Sokoto on March 8, 2012.

On March 26, 2012, Nigerian security forces raided a shop in Kano and detained the kidnapping cell’s leader, a Mauritanian, and three Nigerian accomplices, who used the Mauritanian’s shop as a base. Documents in the Mauritanian’s laptop, including an AQIM operations manual, led Nigerian special forces to carry out a rescue operation of the German engineer in May 2012, but the captors shot the hostage immediately. AQIM warned European countries not to engage in “foolishness” during future hostage negotiations and for Germany to stop violating Muslims and their holy sites.

This kidnapping was claimed by AQIM and carried out by an AQIM member and local militants. Evidence uncovered from Kaduna, where Abu Muhammed was arrested, reportedly provided leads about the cell, and AQIM referred to the first operation in Sokoto in its claim. As AQIM was not known to operate in Nigeria and Boko Haram did not engage in kidnapping operations at this time, it is plausible that Ansaru played a role in the kidnapping, especially since it followed the group’s modus operandi.

Third Operation
Starting in June 2012, Ansaru sent a series of e-mails to the Kaduna-based Desert Herald newspaper and released English- and Hausa-language YouTube videos affirming that Ansaru disapproved of Boko Haram’s killing of Muslims. In these communications, Ansaru said they would target the citizens and interests of “foreign Christian enemies in all parts of Africa,” but that Ansaru’s and Boko Haram’s missions were otherwise the same. Then, on November 26, 2012, 40 Ansaru militants attacked the Special Anti-Robbery Squad prison in Abuja with the “assistance of internal collaborators,” according to the military and police. The attack freed senior Boko Haram commanders and was praised in a YouTube video from Boko Haram leader Shekau, which was addressed to the “Soldiers of God in the Islamic State of Mali.” Ansaru’s freeing of Boko Haram prisoners and Shekau’s video statement suggested that despite the circumstances surrounding Ansaru’s formation, the two groups were capable of supporting each other’s mutual objectives.

This operation in Abuja marked the first time Ansaru formally claimed responsibility for an attack.

Fourth Operation
On December 19, 2012, 30 Ansaru militants kidnapped a Frenchman from the compound of an energy company near the border with Niger in Katsina State, northwestern Nigeria. According to the Katsina police commissioner, the “coordination, speed, and expertise” of the operation suggested that employees of the company were involved in an “inside job.” Ansaru claimed the kidnapping and said that it would continue to kidnap French citizens until France ended its ban on the Islamic veil for women and abandoned its plans to intervene militarily in northern Mali.

Fifth Operation
On January 19, 2013, Ansaru militants, possibly acting on a tip, ambushed a convoy of three buses carrying 180 Nigerian soldiers through Okene, Kogi State, en route to Mali, killing two soldiers. Ansaru claimed the troops “were aiming to demolish the Islamic Empire of Mali” and warned African countries to “stop helping Western countries fight Muslims.” The attack revealed that Ansaru was able to operate in Kogi State, which is considered a “staging point” for attacking southern Nigeria because it has direct road links to all three of Nigeria’s southern zones.

Sixth Operation
On February 16, 2013, Ansaru assaulted a prison and then kidnapped seven foreign engineers from a construction site in northeastern Nigeria’s Bauchi State. Ansaru warned that any attempt to free the hostages would result in the “same happenings” as the previous rescue attempts in Sokoto and Kano, and said that the kidnappings were in response to European “atrocities” in Afghanistan and Mali. On March 9, 2013, Ansaru announced that it killed the “seven Christian foreigners” in an online statement with a photo and an accompanying video of an armed and camouflaged militant standing over four corpses. Ansaru said it executed the hostages because of Nigerian media reports that British “jet fighters, soldiers, and intelligence” landed in Abuja to prepare for a rescue mission and that UK and Nigerian security forces had killed Muslims in previous attempts to rescue “Christian hostages.”

Belmokhtar’s Role in Ansaru
Since the formation of AQIM in 2006-2007, AQIM’s Arab-Algerian southern zone commanders, such as Mokhtar Belmokhtar, sought to expand their operations from southern Algeria southwards into Mali, Chad, Niger, Burkina Faso, and Nigeria to target the increasing number of foreigners and energy and mining companies in the Sahel. One factor constraining AQIM, however, was that its northern African members did not master the southern Sahel’s physical and human terrain as well as the Tuaregs and sub-Saharan Africans from the region. As a result, AQIM “coached” sub-Saharan Africans—such as Khalid al-Barnawi, Abu Muhammed and Abubakar Adam Kambar—in kidnappings and criminal activities and used sub-Saharan recruits as couriers between AQIM and local Islamist militant groups such as Boko Haram. An example of this strategy’s effectiveness was the January 7, 2011, kidnapping of two Frenchmen from a restaurant in the French and Hausa-speaking capital city of Niamey, Niger. The two men were scouted by a Nigerian Boko Haram member who provided their location to other Hausa, Arabic and French-speaking members of Belmokhtar’s Veiled Brigades. The hostages were both killed the following day when French military helicopters fired on the kidnappers as their vehicle convoy approached the Malian border. Boko Haram never claimed responsibility for the kidnapping, even though one of its members was reportedly involved.

In 2011, AQIM may have moved from recruiting sub-Saharan Africans to overseeing them form their own groups with indigenous ideologies that appealed to sub-Saharan Africans in a way that AQIM’s ideology did not. The two sub-Saharan African groups, Ansaru and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), likely conducted their first kidnapping operations in May 2011 and October 2011, respectively, while MUJAO announced its formation in a video statement in December 2011 and Ansaru through flyers distributed in Kano in January 2012. The two groups were independent of AQIM in name, but MUJAO’s military commander was long-time AQIM kidnapping mastermind Oumar Ould Hamaha, an Arab from northern Mali and a relative of Belmokhtar’s, and Ansaru is suspected of being led by Khalid al-Barnawi, who fought under Belmokhtar in Mauritania and Algeria in the mid-2000s and carried out kidnappings in Niger. Both Ansaru and MUJAO adopted names reflecting their desired areas of operations, Biladis Sudan (Black Africa) and Gharb Afriqqiya (West Africa), respectively, and considered themselves to be the “ideological descendants” of Usman dan Fodio and other pre-colonial West African Islamic leaders who “fought the colonial invaders,” although in practice Ansaru operated in northern Nigeria and MUJAO operated in Mali, Senegal, Algeria and Mauritania.

Evidence suggests that Ansaru and MUJAO may have been among the elite units Belmokhtar trained for attacking Western interests in the Sahel. Ansaru, for example, followed Belmokhtar’s kidnapping style by infiltrating foreign energy companies and targeting European employees whose countries were susceptible to ransoms and political demands.

If not for the French-led military operation in northern Mali, the relationship between Belmokhtar and the two sub-Saharan groups would likely have continued, although both groups may have become more independent with the development of their own media wings, ideologies, and in Ansaru’s case leadership in Nigeria outside of AQIM’s area of operations. According to Nigerian intelligence documents, an “Algerian terrorist group” and Boko Haram had a “long-term partnership,” whereby the Algerian group would provide Boko Haram with installments of $250,000 and select Boko Haram members for training in kidnapping and bomb-making so the Boko Haram members could kidnap “white” expatriates in Nigeria and transfer the hostages to hideouts in the desert in exchange for more money and arms from the Algerians. These Boko Haram members may have been Abu Muhammed and other Nigerians involved in the kidnappings in Kebbi in May 2011 and the Algerian group may have been Belmokhtar’s men.

The discovery that hundreds of Nigerian militants were in northern Mali and that Ansaru flyers were found in Belmokhtar’s compound in Gao the day after he fled the city suggests that Belmokhtar’s connection to Ansaru was still strong at the time of the French-led military intervention in February 2013.

Why Ansaru, Not Boko Haram?
AQIM leader Abdelmalek Droukdel offered “consolation” to Boko Haram after the clashes with Nigerian security forces in July 2009 left Boko Haram founder Muhammad Yusuf and 1,000 of his followers dead. In February 2010, Droukdel also offered to provide Boko Haram with “men, arms and ammunition” to “defend” Nigerian Muslims against the “Christian minority” in Nigeria. In July 2010, before the one year anniversary of the July 2009 clashes, Yusuf’s former deputy, Abubakar Shekau, emerged from hiding and “sent condolences” from the mujahidin in Nigeria to key al-Qa`ida leaders, including Usama bin Ladin, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and the amir of AQIM, and warned the United States that “jihad has just begun.” This and subsequent statements from Shekau showed that Boko Haram identified with al-Qa`ida’s ideology, but that Boko Haram was “waging jihad in the country called Nigeria.”

From July 2009 until Boko Haram launched its first attack in September 2010, many Boko Haram members retreated to Nigeria’s borderlands with Niger, Chad, and Cameroon, and solicited, according to one report, as much as 40%[59] of their funding from abroad. From September 2010 until August 2011, Boko Haram attacks escalated as President Goodluck Jonathan, a Christian from the south, was inaugurated in Abuja in April 2011, and with Boko Haram’s first vehicle-borne suicide bombings at the Federal Police Headquarters and UN Headquarters in Abuja in June and August 2011. In August 2011, Nigeria and Niger confirmed that increasing numbers of Boko Haram members were receiving weapons from AQIM and traveling to Niger for training with AQIM.

AQIM’s support may have helped Boko Haram evolve from a Taliban-inspired religious movement under Yusuf into a full-fledged militant movement under Shekau. There were several factors, however, that likely compelled AQIM to coordinate kidnapping operations in Nigeria with Ansaru, rather than with Boko Haram.

First, Boko Haram has always said that it does not carry out kidnappings and, at least until February 2013, did not carry out kidnappings or target Western personnel or institutions—with the exception of the attack on the UN Headquarters in Abuja in August 2011. This would have made it difficult for Belmokhtar to coordinate with Boko Haram since his operations almost exclusively targeted Western personnel and facilities.

Second, Boko Haram was based in northeastern Nigeria’s Borno State, which borders Niger but is more than 1,000 miles from northern Mali, where some of AQIM’s brigades were based. In contrast, Ansaru was based in northwestern Nigeria, which is only 300 miles from Mali. This suggests that Ansaru was in closer operational range to AQIM and Belmokhtar’s militants. Ansaru may have also avoided establishing cells in northeastern Nigeria because Boko Haram threatened to kill defectors.

Third, even when Boko Haram targeted churches and government offices, the casualties often included more Muslim civilians than Christians or government employees. This may have alienated AQIM’s leadership, which broke away from the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) in Algeria in the late 1990s because it killed many Algerian civilians during the country’s civil war. Instead, AQIM’s leadership focused on targeting the Algerian government and security forces in rural areas and international interests, including the United Nations, and kidnapping Westerners.

Finally, AQIM leader Abdelmalek Droukdel reportedly dismissed Belmokhtar as a result of him “straying from the right path,” in the words of one Malian official, and focusing on criminal activities and kidnappings. This may have facilitated Belmokhtar’s support of Khalid al-Barnawi—who also feuded with members of AQIM in Algeria over kidnappings in Nigeria—at the expense of Shekau, who had a closer historical connection to Droukdel.

Conclusion
Even if France and its West African allies have driven AQIM out of northern Mali, Ansaru and Boko Haram are likely self-sustainable and able to continue attacks. Ansaru relies mostly on its proven kidnapping expertise, and Boko Haram on assassinations and attacks on soft targets. Both Ansaru and Boko Haram will also likely recruit militants who fought and obtained new skills from warfare in Mali. The Boko Haram attack on an army barracks in Monguno, Borno State, on March 3, 2013, in which the militants mounted weapons on four-wheel-drive vehicles, and the discovery of improvised fighting vehicles in a raid on a Boko Haram hideout in Maiduguri, Borno State, on March 9, 2012, suggest that Boko Haram has already learned new methods of fighting from the Islamist militants in Mali.

An increase in the number of recruits from other West African countries or Nigerians with experience in Mali could also enable Ansaru and Boko Haram to carry out attacks or kidnappings in southern Nigeria or in Nigeria’s neighboring countries of Benin, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon in revenge for these countries’ support of the French-led intervention. Shekau’s personal exposure to the war in Mali or, if he did not take refuge in Gao, his contacts to militants who returned to Nigeria from Mali could cause him to adopt a more regional view of the insurgency. Shekau’s approval of a Boko Haram cell’s kidnapping of a seven-member French family in northern Cameroon on February 19, 2013, shows that Shekau no longer prohibits targeting foreign interests and that some Boko Haram cells are shifting toward Ansaru’s strategy. Moreover, Shekau’s warning that Boko Haram will attack Cameroon if it continues to arrest Boko Haram members could signify an expansion of the insurgency while also deterring other countries, such as Niger and Chad, from cracking down on Boko Haram cells operating on their territory.

Finally, if Ansaru and Boko Haram are strained for resources as a result of AQIM’s retreat from northern Mali, the two groups may look past their differences and cooperate. Since Ansaru announced its formation in January 2012, Boko Haram has tried to distance itself from the perception that it kills Muslim civilians. Ansaru and Boko Haram still revere Boko Haram founder Muhammad Yusuf, and their members may move fluidly between groups and form partnerships to target mutual enemies: the Nigerian government, France and the West. They may also collaborate on refining their tactics as well as expanding their areas of operations to locate new targets and eliminate Western and Christian influence from Nigeria and the region.

Jacob Zenn is an analyst of African and Eurasian affairs for The Jamestown Foundation, and is a Senior Regional Analyst of Courage Services, INC. He authored “Northern Nigeria’s Boko Haram: The Prize in al-Qaeda’s Africa Strategy,” which was published by The Jamestown Foundation in November 2012, and conducted field research in Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon in June 2012. He speaks Arabic, French and Swahili.

The Jamestown Foundation also publishes articles on global terrorism and is worth monitoring on the terror threats in the Sahel.

The Jamestown Foundation

[Phone Wind]

Mobile phone networks cut as state of emergency declared in 3 states

Earlier this week, President Goodluck Jonathan declared a state of emergency in 3 northern states, Adamawa, Borno and Yobe. On Wednesday alrge numbers of troops started deploying to the area and now mobile phone limnks have been cut as troops move in to seal the country's borders, attack suspevcted training camps and supposedly root out religious extremists and foreign mercenaries.

This may seem a long way from the area where most of the Rotorheads members normally work, but things like this have a nasty habit of spawning violence where it's not necessarily expected, so it would be a good idea to be extra vigilant anywhere in Nigeria over the next few weeks.

Warplanes, troops in NE Nigeria; mobile phones cut

Mobile phone service was cut off Thursday in areas of northeast Nigeria as jet fighters streaked through the sky and more soldiers were deployed to fight Islamic extremists waging a brutal insurgency.

Witnesses saw low-flying Nigerian jet fighters over Yola, the capital of Adamawa state, which President Goodluck Jonathan placed under emergency rule on Tuesday along with Borno and Yobe states. However, soldiers have met "no resistance" yet from extremists who have taken over villages and small towns in this region approaching the Sahara Desert, a military spokesman said.

An Associated Press journalist in Maiduguri, the capital of Borno state, found cell-phone services unavailable since early Thursday morning on all of the country's major mobile phone carriers. Mobile phone numbers belonging to government officials and military officials there and in neighboring Yobe state could not be reached.

Mobile phones have become the only real communication device in Nigeria for both voice calls and the Internet, as the state-run telephone company collapsed years ago. By cutting off service at towers, the military could stop extremists from receiving warnings or intelligence ahead of their operations. Authorities said they had no information about the service cutoff or refused to comment.

Nigeria's military and security forces have tracked fighters by their mobile phone signals in the past as well, prompting extremists from the radical Islamic network known as Boko Haram to attack mobile phone towers in the region.

Under the president's directive, soldiers have ultimate control over security matters in the three states, though his order allows civilian governments to remain in place. Over the last few days, witnesses and AP journalists have seen convoys of soldiers in trucks and buses moving through the region, as well as trucks carrying armored personnel carriers.

Nigeria's military has promised a "massive deployment of men and resources" but has declined to specify the numbers involved.

Brig. Gen. Chris Olukolade, a military spokesman based in Nigeria's capital, Abuja, said more soldiers were en route to the region Thursday. Any assaults by ground forces also could be backed up by attack helicopters and jet fighter bombings, Olukolade said, though soldiers have yet to have a serious firefight with insurgents.

"The progress has been met with no resistance," Olukolade told The Associated Press.

This new military campaign comes on top of a previous massive deployment of soldiers and police to the region. That deployment failed to stop violence by Islamic extremists, who have killed more than 1,600 people since 2010, according to an AP count.

Nigeria's military has said Islamic fighters now use anti-aircraft guns mounted on trucks to fight the nation's soldiers, raising the possibility that the country's already overstretched security forces are becoming outgunned. With some soldiers sent to assist in the French-led anti-jihadist operation in Mali, and others serving elsewhere in Nigeria dealing with other security challenges, the 76,000-man force is creaking under the pressure, said former U.S. Ambassador to Nigeria John Campbell.

"While the Islamist insurgents do not offer a viable political alternative and remain divided among themselves, the threat they pose to Nigeria's political and economic future are significant, as Jonathan's state of emergency recognizes," Campbell wrote in an analysis published Wednesday by the Council on Foreign Relations.

Soldiers will now try to control an arid region of some 155,000 square kilometers (60,000 square miles), with powers to arrest anyone and take over any building.

That also has led to worries about the military abusing and potentially killing civilians, which has happened repeatedly in the past and during the country's current struggle with the Islamic insurgents. Asked about what soldiers would do to prevent the death of civilians, Olukolade said the troops had been "fully briefed" on the rules of engagement, without offering any other details.

In Adamawa state on Thursday, the military announced a 6 p.m. to 6 a.m. curfew across the entire state. Life otherwise was calm, though heavily armed soldiers had taken over for police officers on the streets of the state capital, searching vehicles and questioning drivers.

But mobile phones remained without service for some in the region as Thursday night fell. Olukolade said that extremists might have sabotaged the lines. When asked whether the military or government could have ordered the lines to be turned off, the general said he "wasn't aware of that."

Reuben Mouka, a spokesman for the Nigerian Communications Commission, which oversees mobile phone carriers in Africa's most populous nation, said he did not know about the services being cut off.

Funmilayo Omogbenigun, a spokeswoman for Nigeria's dominant carrier, South Africa's MTN Group Ltd., would only say "no comment" when asked if the government told her company to turn off service in the area. And Emeka Oparah, a spokesman for Bharti Airtel Ltd.'s operation in Nigeria, said he had no immediate information about the service cut.

[Phone Wind]

Briton's Wife Kidnapped in Port Harcourt

News Report today:Gunmen have kidnapped Mrs. Grace Dickson, wife of the owner of Bougainvillea Hotel in the new Government Reservation Area (GRA), Port Harcourt, Rivers State.
The kidnap of the Briton’s wife took place around 11 pm on Sunday, when she drove to the gate of their yet-to-be-ascertained residence in Port Harcourt. No demand for ransom had been made as at last night.
Sources said amid sporadic gunshots, the hoodlums removed Mrs. Dickson’s eye glasses and moved her away in the car she drove to the gate, as the gateman was opening the gate for her to drive in.
It was also learnt that the gateman initially opened the gate, but when the woman was no longer driving in, she ignorantly closed the gate.
Shortly after the kidnap, the victim’s husband drove to the gate and the gateman opened the gate for him, parked normally and the gateman closed the gate, without informing him of the ugly development.
Yesterday morning, it was gathered that the gateman told his boss: “Oga, last (Sunday) night, they carry madam go. They don carry madam go. Me I no know where they carry am go.”

[Mama Mangrove]

And the beat goes on ........

[Phone Wind]

There were some reports yesterday that Mrs Grace Dickson had now been released. Sadly, that does not seem to be the case and her ordeal continues.

As if the threat from Boko Haram and its splinter group, Jama'atu Ansarul Muslimina fi Biladis Sudan (usually known simply as Ansaru) were not enough, there is now another fundamental Islamist group, which was initially active in Algeria, which may now be trying to enetr Nigeria through its porous border with Niger. The group, the Jamaat Tawhid Wal Jihad Fi Garbi Ifriqiya (The Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa - MOJWA) was formed on 10 December 2011. It comprises young militants from al Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) but broke away from the parent organization. While espousing the same goals, they seek to finance their activities using kidnappings for ransom. They have many weapons looted from the fall of the Ghaddafi regime to assist their operational activities, including many modern first-world weapons. MOJWA, is now going after military operatives and facilities of countries that are assisting France's efforts in quellingthe terrorist insurgency in Mali, including Nigeria whcih has a large force there.

On Thursday, the Jihadist group claimed responsibility for a twin suicide bombing attack at the Nigerian/Nigerien border. Twenty six, mostly Nigerien soldiers, were killed and about 30 injured, in the multiple attacks. MOJWA (also known as MOJOA because it originated in a Francophone country, hence Ouest for West) spokesman, Abu Walid Sahraoui, said the attacks were targeted at "the enemies of Islam."

Nigerian forces are now worried that MOJOA insurgents may well link up with Boko Haram as a result of the large security operation now going on in the north of the country, where Boko Haram bases are being bombed and rocketed and many Boko Haram fighters are crossing the border into Niger. A report in Yesterday's Sunday Punch newspaper highlightsw the concerns:

According to an official, who pleaded anonymity because he was not authorised to speak on the subject, MOJAO poses a threat to Nigeria's security.

He said, "We now have to prevent them from infiltrating Nigeria; we have enough Boko Haram challenges. Don't forget that members of Boko Haram, who were dislodged from Sambisa Games Reserve and other camps in Borno State fled to neigbouring states and the Niger Republic. So many of them from Abadan, Malam Fatori and other villages, are now refugees in Difa, Niger Republic. They can decide to pitch tents with MOJAO.

"MOJAO has attacked barracks in Niger, which is similar to what Boko Haram does in Nigeria. This new group may want to do the same in here majorly because we are also involved in the Malian operation - which is one of their grievances.

"They are also likely to target our soldiers at the border."

When the newspaper contacted the Director of Defence Information, Brig.-Gen Chris Olukolade, on Friday about the threat of the new group, he said efforts were on to sensitise all military formations across the country to exhibit a high level of alertness.

Olukolade said the Nigerian troops were at the border with Niger in line with the military's decision.

He said, "Our troops are everywhere. They have been at the border since the beginning of the operation.

"Military formations are being sensitised on the need to maintain a high level of alertness in all locations whether or not they are involved in any operation or exercises.

"The public is implored to be vigilant and ensure that they report all suspicious movements or activities to security agencies promptly."

President Goodluck Jonathan had on May 14, 2013, during a national broadcast, declared a state of emergency in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states.

This was in response to the activities of suspected terrorists in North-Eastern part of Nigeria.

Some sections of Nigeria's border with Niger pass through Yobe and Borno states.

Meanwhile, Adamawa State has begun the registration of residents of communities in its domain as a precautionary step against infiltration by militants fleeing military bombardment in Borno State.

There are reports that holders of the traditional titles of Sarkin Matasa (youth leaders) in communities across the state were driving the project.

A military source in the state said, "Adamawa State through the emirate council has introduced a house-to-house count of people in the state. This is to enable all wards leaders to know the exact number of persons per household and to check infiltrators in Borno."

The source, who pleaded anonymity, added that suspected Boko Haram members, who had fled northern Borno, were regrouping at Zumo area of Song Local Government Area of Adamawa State.

The area is believed to have a difficult topography comprising mountains, rocks, and thick forest that extends to the country's northern border with Cameroon.

The Director, Press and Public Relations of the Adamawa State Government House, Mr. Ahmad Sajoh, confirmed the development.

He said, "What is happening is part of our pro-active measures to mitigate the effects of the state of emergency. The Sarkin Matasa, who are traditional title holders in the state's Emirate Council, will mobilise people to be pro-active.

"What they are doing is to encourage the people to open registers, either in writing or using indigenous methods, to keep track of residents of a given area.

"You know, counter-insurgency cannot succeed without security winning the hearts and minds of the people. With this method, the people will know one another better and will be able to account for members of the community, in case they go out and do not return."

So far none of the Islamist groups has made any serious attempts to attack oilo industry targets in the south, probably because when operating in the mainly Muslim north of Nigeria, they have easy exit routes across the porous borders with neighbouring states. However, they are very well armed and gaining more money through their kidnapping activities. Don't be surprised in the next year or two, to see them extending their theatre of operations further south.

[imuney]

Jascon 4

Jascon 4 has capsized and sank in the early hours of Sunday offshore Escravos:

Chevron vessel capsize in Delta state - Vanguard News

[imuney]

Survivor found!

One survivor found inside the vessel 60 hours after it capsized:

One alive after Jascon 4 capsizing -Upstreamonline.com

[Phone Wind]

Rumour says that Mr Obaro Ibru, son of Mrs Cecilia Ibru will be replaced as managing director of Aero Contractors in the very near future.
Captain Akin George was sacked as managing director and replaced by Obaro Ibru in March this year. However, Mr Ibru was not acceptable to the NCAA as accountable manager due to his lack of airline experience, so his position was temporary.

I hear that he will be replaced by an expatriate with considerable experience in airline management in Africa. If so, I hope that he will be able to turn around the fortunes of the troubled operator, especially the rotary wing side. Aero has a good infrastructure and many contacts within the oil and gas industry, but until they get either a large cash injection or manage to get a technical partnership with a competent and respectable partner, their return to being a mainline player in the Nigerian offshore scene must remain in doubt as they have no big contracts with any international oil companies now and are very cash-starved.

Good luck to them in the future and I hope that the rumoured management change will also be the start of a chenge for the better in their fortune

[Phone Wind]

Hezbollah Armoury Discovered in Kano

There may be some substance to the stories that Boko Haram is getting aid from Al Qaeda in other countries if the story reported on the Al Jazeera today is true:

Nigerian authorities have arrested three Lebanese men in northern Nigeria on suspicion of being members of the Lebanese movement Hezbollah. Soldiers uncovered a hidden arms cache that authorities believe belonged to members of the Shia political party and armed group, the military and secret police said on Thursday.

The three suspects were arrested between May 16 and May 28 in the north' biggest city Kano, said Captain Ikedichi Iweha, the city's military spokesman in a written statement.

All suspects reportedly admitted to being members of Hezbollah under questioning.

A raid on the home of one of the Lebanese had uncovered 60mm anti-tank weapons, four anti-tank landmines, two rounds of ammunition for a 122mm artillery gun, 21 rocket-propelled grenades, seventeen AK-47s with more than 11,000 bullets and some dynamite, Iweha said.

"The arms and ammunition were targeted at facilities of Israel and Western interest in Nigeria," Iweha said, but did not elaborate.

Separately, five fighters from Chad and two from Niger were arrested among fighters fleeing a two-week-old offensive against the Boko Haram armed group in the north-east, as they tried to cross the border into Chad, Nigeria's defence spokesman Brigadier General Chris Olukolade said in a written statement.

'Underground bunker'

Authorities believe there has been a growing involvement of foreign fighters linked to al-Qaeda in Nigeria.

The secret service detained the first suspect, Mustapha Fawaz, on May 16 at his supermarket in Kano. His interrogation led to other suspects, including Abdullah Tahini, who was later arrested at Kano airport with $60,000 in undeclared cash.

The third, Talal Roda, a Nigerian and Lebanese citizen, was arrested on Sunday at the house where the weapons were found two days later.

"The search team uncovered an underground bunker in the master bedroom where a large quantity of assorted weapons of different types and calibre were recovered," Iweha said.

"All those arrested have confessed to have undergone Hezbollah terrorist training."

Bassey Etang, the Kano State director of State Security Service, said the discovery of a Hezbollah cell in Nigeria was a very serious matter for the West African nation.

"Even if it is targeted at Israeli and Western interests, we are also aware that where all those people are, Nigerians are also there," Etang said.

Boko Haram probe

The possibility of a link with Nigerian group Boko Haram was being investigated, Iweha said at a news conference.

There has never previously been evidence of an alliance between Salafist Sunni Muslim Boko Haram and Shia Hezbollah.

Most Nigerian Muslims are Sunni, but there are several thousand Shia Nigerians, a legacy of Muslim Ibrahim Zakzaky's preachings since the 1980s.
Zakzaky still leads Nigeria's main Shia movement, seen as largely peaceful, and has campaigned for a government with stricter adherence to sharia law.

Iweha declined to say if any link to Zakzaky was being investigated.

Nigeria has a large Lebanese community, but this was the first time Nigerian authorities had said that Hezbollah had an operational interest in the country.

Iran, which backs Hezbollah, has recently been implicated in two incidents in Nigeria. An Iranian and his Nigerian accomplice were sentenced to five years in prison this month for trying to smuggle a weapons shipment heading to Gambia.

In February, Nigerian authorities broke up what they described as an Iranian-backed group gathering intelligence about locations.

Nigeria Arrests Trio Over Hezbollah Cell