Is 787 done for?
 

...first on the agenda should be scrapping the Dreamliner moniker...

Those M$ 6.6 barely pay for a stabilizer on one 787. What kind of fine is this, especially compared to what banks are fined?

It is alleged that the new Boeing plant in Charleston SC was purposely set up with local non-unionised labour and a minimum of personnel (and expertise) from Seattle in order that costs could be kept to a minimum. Fast-forward to mid 2020 and airlines start refusing deliveries from the plant on quality grounds. There have been with allegations of poor workmanship, internal damage to structures, build swarf & debris found inside assemblies and pressure on employees not to report safety violations.

Business is..... whatever you can get away with. When you allow companies to regulate their own safety - This is what you get.

This is not a problem with the assembly...it is a problem with the manufacture of the parts. The pieces did not fit together properly, no matter built in Everett or Charleston.
If it takes a month to fix each aircraft, and almost 900 have been delivered???

The latest I heard was rather than repair, they are trying to get a reduced MTOW...that should go over well...

Forget the total delivered, 88 airframes affected.

For a company trying to rebuild their reputation, this isn't good. Still trying to get my head around why it took 88 airframes (and probably external pressure) before this was flagged, how big is the QC dept at Boeing?

Wow so Boeing was investigated over safety in 2015 but got off with a $12 million slap on the wrist and a safety agreement, but then ignored the agreement. So now the FAA is giving them an even smaller $6.6 million penalty as if that is going to change their behaviour?
$19 million spread over six years is pocket change to Boeing.

I think you missed the part where it stipulates that the fine has to be paid from the personal account of the executives...

🤔

It will affect ALL 787...It started out with 9 that were in service, with an issue with a tail section shim. They were able to quickly repair 8 of them, but then found other problems with the 9th one.
Boeing then stopped further deliveries of the aircraft in October. ALL 787 manufactured from that point on were not delivered.
Upon further inspections, they found issues with all of the fuselage section joints.
This is not an issue with joining, but an issue with the manufacture of the parts. Doesnt matter where joined, the parts are the issue.

Currently, they are trying to figure what to do...so far it looks like using them "as is". This means the ones in service will likely have a reduced MTOW.

Therein lies the rub. Since inspections were going so well with automated testing equipment, BA petitioned the FAA to reduce the number of inspectors needed. and were successful. The laid of hundred of inspectors.

Surely the lack of inspectors is not the source of the problem, but rather the inadequate quality of the parts being produced.
Why did the 'automated testing equipment' fail to inform the operators that the product was deficient? Perhaps it did, but management opted to ignore the message.
Guess the virtue of having inspectors is that they may blow the whistle, unlike the 'automated testing equipment'.
Ianal, but is there not a clear cut case for corporate malfeasance here?

You have to wonder what’s going on at Boeing!
the B737MAX issue, the B777 engine and other issues and now the B787.

Let's say it is much easier to see unlatched fan cowls than badly sized shim in a composite structure, the original subject of this thread.

I wonder if the MTOW limitations will be permanent or temporary, pending a rectification work party.

$$$$$ or $$$$$$$$$$$

"You have to wonder what’s going on at Boeing! the B737MAX issue, the B777 engine and other issues and now the B787"

There's a plague of 'B's changing the product names, that's what .

The key to identifying a problem is not the “what” it is the “why”. The “why” sadly is the broken corporate culture at Boeing. 20 years of prioritizing short term profit over engineering and production excellence is at the root of this problem, just like virtually every other Boeing failure.

The shim issue wasn’t caught until many flawed aircraft were produced because Boeing successfully argued with the FAA that a computerized QA process could replace the work of 220 QA personnel. This move was wholly designed to reduce costs and appeared to be implemented without, and boy does this sound familiar; a full risk analysis and over the objections of mid level management.

Another triumph of clueless MBA bean counters in the C Suite being penny wise and pound foolish. Sadly I think the rot is so deeply entrenched in the DNA of Boeing that it is too late to fix the company as it is currently organized.

Was there ever a more stark comparison between the construction of the 777 and the construction of the 787?
The 777 was the last airframe built under the old Boeing engineering culture.
Then they succumbed to the MD culture, outsourced all their knowledge capital...and Boeing’s own engineers won’t let family fly on the 787.

A very sad, but instructive tale.

We don’t see these sort of issues with Airbus, there were problems with wing cracks on the A380 a few years ago but I can’t recall anything significant since. The A350 has been relatively trouble free and the A320 family soldiers on in its latest form.

Boeing seems to have lost the plot after the first generation B777.

Long time since it was a topic, but my recollection is that for a bonded joint, the insertion of mechanical fasteners reduces the effectiveness of the adhesive bond. The fasteners provide component keying for alignment, but that is possible by keyways in the components. The addition of mechanical fasteners would presumably localise stresses from imperfections in the mating surfaces which could be removed by a bedding epoxy fill as is done in moldless fabrication. Curious. Re A380.... the demise of the fleet removes the question as to how long it will take to have GLARE compromised by interstitial corrosion events. The material is dependent on keeping moisture out from the fastener holes through the multilayered material.

We know this much: "the flaw arose when “software notification designed to alert when a shim exceeded the maximum thickness per engineering specifications was not being used.”"

From https://www.seattletimes.com/busines...may-be-needed/

How many of their commercial programs are left being profitable?

Joe_K

BigPistons noted above that Boeing was able to eliminate inspectors based on persuading the FAA that automated testing would do the job.
Perhaps they did not also promise the FAA that they would actually use the automated testing. That oversight cannot be blamed on the bean counters at Corporate in Chicago.
Seriously, the rot here goes pretty deep.