Midair Collision Danger

We spent hours and hours cruising happily over continents like India, China, Russia and other places where the communication could be improved (This is an understatement!) and it is frightening to see todays accuracy of our on board navigation-systems with opposite traffic. In the older days (Before GPS/IRS DME update) you could spot this traffic somewhere left or right of your own track. These days there is no more "left or right", it is right on the nose.

Now, taking into consideration that some of this opposite traffic has no TCAS, in some cases no transponder, and in the worst case scenario flies with an altimeter in meters, using a manual slide ruler to "translate" meters into feet, it needs no further explanation that it would be nice to have an additional horizontal separation from your mere 1,000 - 2,000 feet vertical separation.

We would therefore like you to consider the following article perhaps for publication in some sort since the implementation of the procedure is of such a simplicity that we wonder why this hasn't been done before.

After having circulated this idea amongst some of our colleagues we realized that some companies are already following this "offset system" as a sort of in-house SOP.

It would be a good idea if all companies would follow this procedure over the above mentioned areas or at least be aware of the fact that some companies are already following this procedure.

If we would have to draw a parallel with the present situation we would construct a nice super highspeed highway with just one white line in the middle and all the traffic in both directions centering on this line, hoping that nobody comes roaring around the corner.


FLY RIGHT

The recent mid-air between a Kazahk Il-76 and a Saudia 747 highlights a concern which we have been discussing between ourselves for months. While all the details may not apply; this disaster does dramatically illustrate our concern.

The modern onboard GPS and/or DME updated IRS/INS navigational equipment has greatly enhanced the ease and accuracy of aircraft navigation. However, under certain circumstances, this accuracy could become a flight safety hazard. Airline pilots spent untold hours EXACTLY in the centre of their 10 mile wide airways guaranteed only 1000 or 2000 feet separation from opposite direction traffic. If there is a mistake during an altitude change by the crew of either aircraft, by the controller, with the communication between the two, or an autoflight equipment failure -- a disaster may occur.

FMS navigation computers should be off set just 1 or 2 miles to the right of track. This would guarantee 2 to 4 miles lateral separation between opposite direction traffic while all aircraft would still remain well within airways. This would utilise the extreme accuracy of onboard navigational systems to both remain within airways and to provide additional traffic separation. Had both aircraft been equipped with TCAS, the Delhi disaster would have been prevented. However, all aircraft world-wide are not so equipped.

Airline pilots almost daily will pass another aircraft with this 1000 feet clearance. Wouldn't it be much safer to also have at least 2 miles lateral separation? Since equipment and people do fail, why not implement this fail-safe technique?


See also 'LESSONS FROM DELHI'