I herewith, rest my case. :(

El G.

Had it with Pprune
 

what a load of egotistical sanctimonious prats that run this site, this thread has been moved to "Private Flying"---- quote " and some other people". As far as I am aware the C402 was on a sortie with 3 commercial pilots on board and an engineer. Maybe it is to free up space in rumours and news (obviously the deaths of five people is not news!_ but hey a 738 blowing a tyre is STOP PRESS!), so those overpaid system monitor idiots that sit at the front pushing buttons and massaging their own egos can whinge about some other non event

OUT- forever

I took a look at this thread to see if I could find out if I knew anyone in GEYES from AAG where I worked for ten years, pity that with the loss of so many lives, all I see is arguing among the ppruners. Have a little compasion, what ever your feeling may be on how why etc

Hey dope05 I agree with you, but pprune is full of compalining pilots that think the world owes them a living, always has been. Too many pilots think they are something very special these days, see what they think when the next downturn arrives, coming soon me thinks

I don't see much evidence for that - other than tradition.

As has been said here many times before, assuming straight trajectories, a target on a genuine collision course will be a stationary point in your field of view, and unless contrast is working in your favour you won't spot it until too late.

All those who 'nearly hit and would have done had I not taken evasive action' were PROB99 not on an accurate collision track with you in the first place.

The Mk1 eyeball is a cornerstone of aviation tradition (along with epaulettes, stopwatches, circular slide rules) but in reality it is about as good as a chocolate teapot. It works if the target is not on a straight trajectory so it probably works OK in gliding, but in GA most people fly straight lines most of the time.

If one plane is flying the ILS, accurately, and perhaps doing an ILS survey (the wreckage movie on sky.com shows the gear UP and normally you would have the gear down at 2-3D if you were going to land) and somebody flies in from the side at say 100kt, you won't spot him.

No doubt we won't find out - rumours and leaks aside - why the SE traffic was where it was until the AAIB report comes out a year from now, which is a great pity IMHO.

The great protector is the big sky and incredibly low traffic density (compared to say a road). That's why midairs happen at low levels, generally 1000ft or below.

Condolences to all affected by this terrible accident.

Speculation is a positive thing in my view so long as it refrains from negative or offensive assumptions on deceased aviators abilities. Clearly nobody here was involved in the accident on sunday so I doubt very much whether anyone can catagorically state that a poor lookout was the overriding factor in this accident. Although 'lookout' may play a part one must also realise that any number of other factors could be involved including airspace classification, ATC limitations and not least a bit of sunshine on a weekend bringing many flyers into the busy UK skies. My sources tell me Coventry was extremely busy on sunday.

To insinuate the pilots involved were not maintaining a proper lookout is... well... I refer readers to the red writing at the bottom of this page! Constant bearing = constant danger and as the above poster states, you probably won't spot it until it's too late.

My thoughts are with all those affected by this awful accident.

RIP fellow aviators. :(

VFE.

why is this in private flying?
 

Sorry mods, but as I understand it, G EYES was flying in a commercial capacity with a commercial pilot at the controls on approach to an airport approved for public transport.

I fly 737s in and out of CVT for a living, and would like to know more about why a light aircraft could collide with a public transport cat aircraft at 5 miles on the the ILS at my home base without having to trawl through some of the the more obscure threads of this website.

No disrespect to private pilots intended, but would it not be appropriate to keep this thread in R & N or Airports and Routes for the time being as I'm sure people will keep opening threads on those forums in order to find out more about this serious accident.

And what about the other victim, not flying public transport, seemingly a private flyer in a private aircraft on a private flight?

Its a sad fact that any time we have an accident, fatal or not the speculation and comments on pprune generally turns into a bit of a bun fight!! As far as i am concerned lives here have been lost and that is so sad, I earn my living by looking after GA traffic as far as ATC is concened, I love my job and also the people I speak to in carrying out my task so any loss is a great loss to me.........that said my own views on this is that it appears that 2 aircraft have collided in class G airspace whilst operating VFR....if they were recieving an ATC service or not the buck stops with the aircraft commanders maintaining a good look out!! In this case I fear that this failing was the ultimate cause of this tragic accident.

Look, I don't mean to be offensive, but how else do two aircraft come to collide in good vis and class G if there isn't an "element of poor lookout" involved? Both were responsible for their own navigation, notwithstanding the fact that at least one was making an approach.

Like many of you, I've seen most of the ways in which other aircraft can remain near-invisible, particularly if they are on a collision course and so have no apparent relative motion. However, safe operation under VFR means see and avoid. I'm in no way apportioning blame, or casting aspersions as to ability, but the fact remains that neither of these competent pilots, both of whom were operating under VFR, saw the other in time to avoid a collision.

Maybe that means that the lookout of both was exemplary but that some other factor caused both pilots to simultaneously experience something that made them unable to avoid the other. We will find out in due course, when the report is published. I'll re-open this thread then and see whether or not my assertion that there was an "element of poor lookout as a causal factor" turns out to be correct. If it isn't, then I will apologise profusely.

In the meantime, it behoves us all to think a little more about how effective our lookout really is, irrespective of the cause of this tragedy. I make no apology for highlighting this aspect, as I know beyond doubt that many of us could keep a better lookout than we do.

VP

What is it with this desire to blame???

We are human, the folk in those aircraft were human. A human may do his utmost, highly-trained best, to achieve a good lookout, but may still find himself in a collision. This is because the human eye and brain are very poor at identifying targets with which they will collide.

So please would you stop blaming the pilots and start simply accepting that the human is not good at lookout (in the same way he's not good at avoiding CFIT), and that technology may be the answer.

I pointed out, in the lost thread, that the leisure aviation community was unwilling to accept Mode S. I said that, in my view, those who voted against it gave up their right to bemoan collisions. If you can't be bothered to put up with the expense and weight of fitting a transponder, you have no right to worry about collision, because you could have done something to avoid it and you haven't.

Until and unless transponder carriage is mandatory, there will be no demonstrable case for fitting TCAS to small aircraft, and the opportunity to prevent collisions will continue to be missed.

Please remember too that the relatives and friends of those deceased will read this.

Once again, I offer my heartfelt condolences.

None of you can possibly say poor lookout had anything to do with this. How many times have you actually had traffic info and had several pairs of eyes looking for it and never seen it? I've had lots. And as for 'big sky' etc, this collision happened at approximately 3nm final at a full ATC radar-equipped airport, with one and possibly both a/c speaking to ATC. Not the same as a random conflict in the FIR.
NS

IO540I am not a controller and never have been, although many of my friends are or have been.

It is a libel whether you read it in a book or not, and you are still responsible for it. Try reading the report you claim to be referring to, and telling the truth about why you deleted the thread. Instead of attacking those that correct you have the guts to give the apology you owe to the controller involved.

Oh, and in future stick to commenting on things you know about.

On this thread you are still giving a poor argument. Aircraft on a closing trajectory are not that difficult to spot. Even if not on a constant bearing the relative movement is small enough to be irrelevant at any great distance, and I and pilots I have flown with have seen many aircraft at a great distance. Noting the poor lookout of some others I have flown with, who have failed to spot everything I have seen, I can see how some pilots think it is useless to try to maintain visual separation.

See and avoid is difficult, but it also does work. It is stupid and dangerous to suggest otherwise.

P.S. I am not criticising either pilot in this case. I have not been in the UK since it happened, and even if I had seen all the reporting I would not know the real facts. See and avoid can fail through no fault of the crew, but to suggest it is useless is ridiculous.

Two aeroplanes collided in VMC. Obviously they didn't spot each other or else they wouldn't have collided. So something must have gone wrong, and "see and avoid" failed - whether it was bad airframe design creating a blind spot, sun in the eyes, not looking out, looking at the airport instead of "up final", concentrating on flying an ILS and looking at the instruments, another problem diverting crew's attention.....whatever

One thing that was mentioned was instrument approaches. An IAP in VMC does not absolve the commander of "see and avoid" any more than a VFR pilot joining the circuit. That goes for a 747 or a C150.

Perhaps it is time to enforce a) collision avoidance systems on ALL commercial aeroplanes and b) mandatory transponders on all aircraft?

Some will say this is a knee jerk reaction, but if we can't rely on See and Avoid then should something be done?

The 'leisure aviation' community didn't object to Mode-S as a whole - the arguments where that Mode S vs Mode C was unnecessary and that it was not technically possible to fit transponders to many aircraft and in light of this technical detail a mandate to do so was silly. (there was a smaller 'civil liberty group' who have objected to transponders on general principle and I would agree with your comment as it applies to this group)

In addition - and possibly relevant in this case, was the argument that the lack of TIS and/or 'lars' Radar Service resulted in very little benefit to those fitting the technology. It will be a very sorry comment on the Safety Regulation approach of the UK if it transpires both aircraft were transponding.

The 402 surely had Mode-S and Glass (so in the US would have TIS). In addition, the decision by the regulator to allow the sale of radar data to support NATS' profits rather than cover marginal cost (and therefore being 'expensive') will have been a part in Coventry operating their own primary only radar rather than a primary/secondary feed from NATS. My untrained eye finds it much easier to see conflicts on the NATS screens than on Coventry's.

mm_flynn

Glass? TIS? What do you mean?

I suspect you are talking about technological solutions. However the 402 is an old aircraft, not often kitted with such things. That does not mean it is unsafe, or that it should necessarily be fitted due to a rare and unfortunate occurence. I think too many people are trying to find a reason for a tragic accident and make it impossible to happen again, when such things have always occured and always will, and risks must be balanced by rewards. Maybe you agree, I am not sure from your post whether you think the technology should have been fitted or not.

Thoughts about how to make accidents less likely are good. Technical solutions can be very good too. Some days, though, an accident occurs and we should leave it at that, until we have more information. Even then we should consider the perspective of the accident, and its rarity.

Sorry to be the bearer of scary realities here but you can be maintaining a great lookout and still miss another aircraft on a direct collision course!

To insinuate "poor lookout" purely because a collision occured in VMC is absurd... and very unfair given the fact those involved cannot voice their account. Shameful to say the least.

VFE.

Now I see where I have been getting it wrong all this time. There I was thinking that if I was cleared on an ILS approach (not a practice ILS approach) to a radar equipped airport that all I should have to do was concentrate on my scan till DH regardless of what the weather was doing outside of the window and I would be protected....clear skies and a quick lookout just being a bonus.

Would any of the "see and avoid" advocates in this case like to extend their argument to explain how a large commercial aircraft with a fairly swift approach speed (say Concorde or an A380) is supposed to see and avoid a microlight in those conditions ?

Surely the approach is either protected or it isn't ?

We'll have to wait for more information from AAIB so there is little point in speculating.

However, it would be a relief to some of us to rule out the involvement of friends and colleagues asap. It is now over 24 hours since the incident and we still don't know, officially, of the type involved. If the BMAA knew hours ago the type of the SEP involved, it seems odd that that the media is still peddling false stories.

In particular, there is a presumption amongst the Great British Public (as I found out at work today) that the Cessna 402 was automatically in the right because it was filled with experienced commercial pilots.

In the sport and recreational area we have to be careful not to be labelled as casual and dangerous playboys getting in the way of 'important' traffic

There is no doubt that something went wrong with look-out - be it visual or electronically assisted, and there, for the grace of God, go all of us. But in the meantime more facts are needed to make any judgements. These will emerge in time, so let's wait for them to appear.

VP959. I'm trying to assume you have more than 5 minutes in your logbook, but each time you post that lookout is an infallible way of keeping traffic apart 100% I doubt it more and more.

This was a tragic accident. The fact that the two crews didn't see eachother is going to be a factor obviously (you generally don't fly into things you have seen and positively identified) but that doesn't mean that anyone is at fault.

I was based at CVT for a while and operating into there during the day could be an absolute nightmare. We had TCAS and two crew with their eyes wired outside the cockpit, but the simple fact is that even with a controller telling you where traffic is, TCAS showing you and with you looking hard, you just don't see it.

We generally operated at night, which cut down the problems of Commercial Vs GA, but if we were late back in the mornings, then descending into CVT at 200+kts could be a scary experience. I pitied the poor controllers who were looking after us, they had us under radar control and were just trying to do their best to thread us through the maze of airspace and aircraft. We'd often stay a bit high and slow down as much as we could and if we could go VFR to help the eyeball count under a RAS we'd do it. Not exactly commercially expedient, but neither is smashing into someone.

As for glider pilots keeping great lookouts, why did I have to file an airprox from within controlled airspace on an IFR plan when we flew straight through a gaggle of thermalling gliders 2000ft up into the London CTA? How we didn't collect any I'll never know, it scared the living the daylights out of me at the time.

RIP chaps.

I have a horrid feeling that this may have been an accident waiting to happen in that area, but I know nothing more than what has been reported on the news. I know there has been a move to increase CVT's airspace, accidents like this if proven to be because mixing IFR and transiting VFR traffic, then there is no option really.

http://www.bredow-web.de/ILA_2004/Gr...06-Cockpit.JPG

The 404 cockpit is very similar to the F406.

My thoughts are with everyone down in COV.

And to be honest I don't think TCAS would have helped in this situation anyway being inside 3 miles. TCAS II goes into TA only below 1000ft agl.
And just above that it goes a bit funny and flips between RA and TA depending what rate of decent you have on. It can generate confusing cycling between warnings and resolutions. By the time it had triggered with a traffic traffic and you had spotted where the danger was and started looking for it, it would have proberly happend. That is if you hadn't presumed it was some knob who had just turn their mode C on sitting at the hold waiting for line up.

I tend to support FrontLeftHampster on this. See and avoid is unrealistic. Flying an aircraft especially single pilot will sadly mean that he will have to not only be looking out but within too.
Especially on approach the commander will be selecting flap and gear, checklists and approach plates as well as scanning instruments.
Even looking out in certain light and angles its likely that he will not see another aircraft.

GA is the poor man in aviation. More and more airspace is being put over to IFR traffic and VFR is being squeezed into less and less space.

Even with the best controllers offering RIS how many times are aircraft missed?

I was flying around London a few years ago as a safety pilot into sun in a 172 around London. The controller who was giving us an RIS missed an aircraft coming out of the sun towards us. I was looking up some frequences. When I looked up another aircraft passed within 12 feet over the top of us. So close I could see the tread on the tyres.

The Cirrus has a ballistic Parachute system. Maybe all aircraft should have transponders, Maybe all singles should have ballistic parachute systems and maybe maybe all twins and above should have TICAS fitted.

We have all been there where an aircraft got too close or was missed for some reason. This was unlucky but it will happen again.

Pace

Condolences to all involved
 

I find all this talk of see and be seen, well rather misplaced here and point less. We all know the out come, if not the reason and this should not happen to any aircraft on short final to a commercial airport (or another airport for that matter) as tragic as this is, this could very easliy have been a 737 with loss of a 100+ lives and answers are required in due course, to make sure as far as is possible that it never happens again at any airport or ideally anywhere else.

Back to see and be seen, not as easy as it sounds, i was flying in the area on the day and vis was good or very good, but even with TCAS and radar control some 'targets' were not eyeballed at even a few miles range and we knew where to look for them.

If you fly either for a living or fun we are all in the same sky and all are pilots, if you are not a pilot, then by all means express your sympathy at our loss, but please leave it at that, RIP

but for the grace of God:sad:

Yup. You've been getting it wrong.

Easy. Choose not to operate into airports which involve flying the approach in uncontrolled airspace.

Correct. And you can tell the difference by looking at the chart, which will tell you whether the approach is in controlled airspace (protected) or not (not).

all of which is not usually what (most?) IFR pilots descending with an ILS actually are thinking about in the UK after receiving clearance to land...there's an emerging hole in the UK versus US way of doing things here, surely?

This is beginning to exhibit hallmarks of a classic accident at a busy airfield supporting busy VFR circuits entwined with straight in ILS traffic.

Coventry has long been home of an instructor school and CPL school I think, and our dearly beloved Air Atlantique plus various larger commercial operations like ThomsonFly from time to time. They must have almost bombproof procedures with all that instruction and testing going on. Has this type of conflict been a problem previously? Background noise on PPRuNe earlier indicated vicinity of CT locator can be a bit busy. Are all those training on instrument approaches taught that either they or their instructor will be keeping eyes peeled as they 'encroach'? into the circuit from long final? Seems a bit unlikely to me ...

I certainly do not remember it being drilled into my brain at ANOther airfield where CX & long straight in ILS are mixed. There was Radar coverage and I am now sorry to say that I relied heavily upon it unless particularly warned otherwise on the day. Whilst I expected to be aware of any radio clues of upset in the circuit, I certainly wasn't looking left or right while I was trying to hand fly the ILS...I will go as far as to say that by 3 miles and cleared to land then it was MY ILS, and I was Number 1 ...

Is Coventry a one-off? Has it always been eyes out all the way down the ILS for a full scan?

I DO recall having it drilled into me to look back (out) along final before turning final, but that's just one pair of MkI eyeballs as a last resort - again at a busy airport like this I think as circuit traffic I'd anticipate some correspondence whilst downwind on whether I had contact with the ILS traffic?

Each such airfield is different of course but though I hesitate to say it because it plays to media speculation i.e. 'what if it was a big jet', the background noise on this accident suggests we must surely see the Coventry instrument approach/radar coverage urgently re-evaluated. I only hesitate further to ask the counter question "Well if there was anything wrong with it, there would surely have been other incidents over the years ... and there haven't been ..."(?)

I hope we don't have to wait long for an official synopsis of this one because it takes a rather good GA pilot to nail an ILS and to do a full effective scan left and right at the same time, and it is easy for one pair of eyes on base to miss a fast one on long final unless told it's there and potentially conflicting.

A quick word of reply about a couple of things:

First: lookout and see and avoid. I fly aircraft, both big and small, in and out of CAS. Lookout is my last line of defence. I don't trust it, but it works most of the time. I simply know that because I'm human, it can't be relied upon. Interestingly, I fly with some people who are very recently experienced in air combat, and I give myself a huge pat on the back if I spot something before they do (this happens quite rarely). This tells me that, generally speaking, you can be better at lookout if you've been trained properly and your life has depended on it in a serious way.

Second: Mode S and Mode C.

Mode S is here; it works; and it's not terribly expensive compared to Mode C. Any move towards mandating Mode C would be pointless.

Yes, there are technical problems with the ultra-compact Mode S kit which is under development, but there's nothing like a blossoming market to sort out the geeks.

There are things afoot in the regulatory world which appear likely to put a stop to commercial operations outside CAS, because it's impossible to put together a reliable safety case against mid-air collisions, and mid-air collisions are quite common.

This might have one of three rough outcomes: either the commercial world stops operating outside CAS, or the other operators have to do something to address the threat that they (leisure pilots) pose to the commercial world (who are there for a purpose, not fun), or there's some sort of elastoplast job in the short term with a view to a better resolution in the longer game. No prizes for guessing how that might play out.

Finally, to mm flynn, the safety case has nothing to do with individual accidents; it's 'big picture' stuff, and I'm not even sure whose work covers the circumstances of this collision. Certainly, it's something the major ANSP would not be keen to associate themselves with, in my view.

How will that help matters in any shape or form?

Condolences to the pilots that have lost there lives and their families that now have to deal with this tragedy.

I dont think it is helpful to portion blame to what happened but look at the evidence and try to find out what occured and why and what could be done to avoid a re occurence. (In Aviation learn from everyone and everything all of the time).

The Cessna is assumed to be on final approach but as mentioned earlier the gear was still up (what where their respective speeds )as clearly seen on the sky news film showing the aircraft upside down. Was the aircraft intending to land ? The aircraft is equipped for survey and calibration work, was the aircraft calibrating the ILS ? or testing its own equipment involving all crew on callibration/survey equipment question on board.

If both aircraft where talking to CVT where they talking to Radar or Twr. Where both aircraft reporting their correct positions. Did ATC warn of the other at any stage.

How many times have pilots been informed of other aircraft by a ATC service provider whether FIS or RIS on open airspace and being looking very hard for it and never seen it pass by. ( I have lots of times )

It would appear the smaller aircraft (what ever type) is approaching from one side and would have needed to look at 90 degrees or more to see the faster approaching C402. It would seem the C402 may have had the smaller aircraft ahead/to one side and the C402 would likely be travelling a lot faster in a clean configuration and a much higher powered machine.

Did the smaller aircraft have a transponder. Whether it did or did not is a good question. ATC would be able to see it. Did G-EYES have TCAS ? I think likely not therefore it would not pick up anything anyway.

The airspace around there and between Birmingham and East Mids and around Coventry is very busy with lots of users funnelled into the class G condensing the traffic. Birmingham and East Mids can ask pilots to remain clear of CAS usually initially and ask pilots to standby due a variety of factors and can sometimes be too busy to get back to them before they are approaching the CAS for a transit which will keep pilots in the corridor Also many pilots weaker on radio, not liking radio or not wishing to encumber anybody will not ask for a transit and will be happy to fly using gps or other means around any airspace increasing traffic density at certain periods in these hot spots, sometimes there is so much traffic in the hot spots that ATC may be unable to give a service of much value. Is there a way better to use Class D in order to help to reduce hot spots in class G or open FIR ? This was not likely a factor in this accident however could be worth noting to increase vigilance in these areas.

This is a terrible tragedy but this type of accident will happen again it is just a question of when and all pilots should be as vigilant as possible and practise good look out and scan techniques however ther will be always be times when you have to look inside the aircraft or even just in the other direction.

There for the grace of god go I.

I dont know these pilots but I am part of their community. I am very sorry for their loss.

My remarks that follow have potentially nothing to do with this accident but I cant help but comment on see and avoid.

I fly with TCAS for much of the time. Recently, and for the first time, I used TCAS to find and then formate with another aircraft (not the usual way I go about this). If you get the chance try it. It is a very good way of demonstrating even when you know where the traffic is just how difficult it can be to spot, particularly when you are moving parallel and at a similar speed to the traffic.

I have had three close misses. On one occasion over Germany I wasn’t the handling pilot and was looking at some papers. A brief look up and another aircraft was coming straight towards us. I could not believe the other pilot had not see it, or it us for that matter. Very rapid intervention on my part avoided and almost certain mid air. The handling pilot to this day can not believe how it was possible he hadn’t seen the traffic.

On final it is very likely a pilot will become fixated on the threshold or will momentarily avert his gaze to operate the gear, or flaps, or some element concerned with configuring the aircraft for the landing.

There is a mountain of evidence to suggest that see and avoid is not reliable even at GA speeds. See and avoid is not the salvation of avoiding collisions most of the time.

In a few thousand of hours of flying in VMC I become more and more concerned to use everything I know and every aid I have to minimise my reliance on see and avoid. Having done so I try to be meticulous about maintaining my scan as the arbiter of last resort.

As another example of course our scan should have started in the climb out. Anywhere in the circuit and the risk of a collision is high. The fact is the vast majority of low time pilots will not see an aircraft that cuts through their climb out from a position above them and to the left or right.

The fact is in my opinion see and avoid does not work. It does not work because we are fallible. Fly with most pilots and watch what they are doing after the take off. Are they doing anything to look above the aircraft? Are they scanning left and right? Nah. They are fixated on what’s ahead, and tasks in the cockpit.

Fortunately collisions are very rare but don’t kid yourself that this is because we are all really good at seeing and avoiding each other. Fact is the "perfect" pilot might do a reasonable job relying on see and avoid most of the time but there are very few among us that are perfect pilots.

In my opinion you are deluding yourself if you believe see and avoid will always ensure you avoid other traffic - I think we all dance on that particular pin head, and stay on the head but for the Grace of God - sadly in this case whether for this reason or some other reason these pilots luck ran out.

If you can guarantee me you would have avoided this collision or any other 100% of the time you have a great deal more courage in your convictions than I would or you have caught a healthy dose of blind faith.

IMHO if you take nothing from this thread other than more than a few pilots telling you that in their opinion see and avoid is not reliable which in turn leads you to question your approach to VFR flying outside CAS something will have been achieved.

On the subject of lookout/radar etc a few of you may be surprised to learn that some composite type aircraft have been known not to paint on radar..............
EVEN WITH THE TRANSPONDER TURNED ON :eek:

A lot of comments on this thread about CAS being an issue here however if the incident happened as a lot of reports have said between two aircraft inbound to Coventry then it isn't really the main issue as both aircraft were hopefully in contact with ATC as they were landing at the field.

CAS is all about creating a known traffic area so that ATC can deconflict transit traffic against inbound or outbound traffic. So CAS in my view isn't the main factor here as an incident like this could quite as easily happen between an ILS inbound and circuit/visual joining traffic in CAS as it could at an ATC airport in class G.

The only difference between this situation occuring just outside an ATZ in class G and at an airport in CAS is that you could say that there is no legal requirement for pilots outside CAS airspace to comply with ATC instructions however In my experience this has never been an issue.

Great posts guys, I hope you are all proud of your conjecture, especially when you realise that relatives and friends of those that have perished can look in and read all your ramblings.

I am finding it difficult to believe that educated aviators can be so far up their own arses to speculate, decide on what happened, blame, pontificate & generally write a load of egotistical garbage. My thoughts are with the relatives & Cov ATC. Why not let these poor unfortunate people deal with this tragedy & wait till someone who knows what they are talking about tells you what happened.

Frontlefthamster, when you say that there are things afoot in the regulatory world which appear likely to put a stop to commercial operations outside controlled airspace, do you mean that commercial operations outside CAS are to cease ? or alternatively that all airspace encompassing commercial operations is to become controlled?

There are incidentally many GA users who are out there "for a purpose" and not for fun, (including business use and aerial work etc,) just as the majority of holidaymakers in the metal tubes are out there for fun and not for a purpose.

All aircraft requesting a transit of Birmingham controlled airspace will be allowed to do so subject to traffic conditions and controller workload. I have never refused a transit to anyone wanting to do so. We routinely advise pilots to remain outside controlled airspace to remind them that they haven't got a clearance to enter not because we are refusing a transit, thereby preventing a potential incursion of CAS The majority of GA traffic inbound to / outbound from EGBE generally has no requirement to transit controlled airspace. If you want to transit, call 118.050 and ASK!


Coventry have secondary radar

Likewise East Mids are also good at ofering transits - I can only remember being refused once and it was clear that the controller was quite busy. They sounded almost apolgetic at having to refuse.

Birminghmam, I guess has more issues as their runway is largely N/S as will be (I guess) most of the light GA traffic wanting a transit. That siad, I've heard quite a few transits given and have had one myself.... It was offered. I didn't even ask!

What was the ATC policy at EGBE re mixing of IFR and VFR trafiic (rwy23) on the day of the accident. Was it possible for:

(a) VFR traffic to commence base leg while IFR traffic was localiser established

(b) VFR traffic to commence base leg while IFR traffic was inbound from CT (finals).

I think I know what in reality was the situation over the years has been at Coventry regarding IFR/VFR traffic, but I would be interested to know what the experience of others have been over the years.

As I think somebody wrote already, once you get handed from approach to tower (which happens when you call Localiser Established) you lose the "radar service".

So the last 6-8nm, possibly more depending on vectoring etc, is flown without a radar service.

My guess is that the tower controller is not allowed to pass traffic info even if can see a radar screen (for the same legal reasons that e.g. London Information cannot), but in an obviously dire scenario the approach controller could tell the tower controller to warn the pilot.

But if e.g. the SE aircraft was not transponding, there would not be a height readout and what assumption would a (any) Radar controller make then? I don't know the rules. I do know that if you fly through the Luton-Stansted gap without a transponder, Radar will assume you are OCAS i.e. below 2500ft (nothing else they can realistically do).

And if the SE aircraft had a poor/nonexistent primary return (e.g. largely non-metallic) then you have nothing at all. But is a zero return possible this close to the radar?? The engine is still metallic, and pretty rough shaped.

OCAS, any "protection" on an approach is no more than what you get when you get under any radar service. They will pass traffic, workload permitting. If the whole approach was in CAS, you get the additional protection that conflicting traffic is less likely to be there because if they were in there they would be illegal (but obviously they can still be there of course). Also different rules apply in that IF the CAS extends down to ground then ATC can take immediate action if they see even a primary return. AIUI.

There are no absolutes.

Why all this unhealthy speculation?

I don't need to remind you that aviation is inherently dangerous, but that is part of why we do it, theres a romance to it.

for me there is no issue of who or what is to blame, that is for another group of professionals to decide.

I just feel sad for the loss of fellow aviators, and particularily the 4 dedicated to specialised duties.

A friend departed.
 

RIP JB. You will be missed mate.

Condolences to all the families involved.