I think, BPF has hit the nail with his first statement. The whole discussion somehow reminds me of the (by now fortunately pretty much terminated) discussion about the use of GPS. There are the old guys who truly believe, that everything is fine the way they do it. And there are other ones who can imagine the possibilities and start thinking out of the box. Because sometimes new technology needs other approaches than the existing stuff. There is a lot of data available proving 007s SOPs. The fact, that (obviously) many people have not really done their homework, have not searched for the available knowledge, and have not started to inform themselves, does not erase this knowledge. If you are really interested, get informed!

The second point from BPF is, I believe, also quite true, but is wrong in being limited to the Cirrus. It holds true for other airplane with comparable use, therefore not a Cirrus specific problem, but a problem of todays training environment (what BPF has also stated).

I will add that i have flown quite a range of types and so i feel able to make some comparison. I have also intentionally stalled the cirrus on more than a few occasions. I have found no evidence that its characteristics are exceptional, it provides more than enough indication of an imminent stall, infact more than most because its low speed handling really lacks feedback, it will drop a wing but not violently or unexpectedly and it will recover predictably from a stall.

I also really dont think the cirrus should be portrayed as the rocket ship it isnt. Everything is relative. Compared with a 152 it will seem amazing, sophisticated and complex. On the other hand it will seem none of these for anyone with some time in faster singles. For a twin pilot it will appear very basic. In many ways it is simple. Two levers, and one set at that. Fixed u/c. Other than the avionics its very simple. Even the avionics are over done. Yes for ifr flight they need a thorough understanding and this takes time. For vfr flight a few hours is really more than enough for a pilot with a reasonable background.

If a cirrus catches you out it does so because like any good touring aircraft, and there are many, it encourages you to go places, it encourages you to fly reasonably quickly, and therefore it equally can result in the pilot falling behind the aircraft or events going on outside. No different than many faster touring aircraft. When things go wrong they go wrong for all the usual reasons.

That said for the lower time pilot there is plenty there to cause you problems and some characteristics that will be new and different. It will bite. However i am just not sure it will bite any more or less than a lot of other high performance singles.

The chute is different. I think it will take time to develop a full understanding of its best use and i think the way in which pilots are trained with regards the chute has and still is evolving. As i have often said in the interesting discussion i have had with pace the chute gives the pilot an option and an option in potentially a life threatening situation. In some ways in these situations options arent good. Far better to follow the flow diagram and the last box tell us now pull the handle. I dont see it will ever be like that because i dont think the chute can ever provide absolute certainty. It will also mean there will always be discussion about if you had chosen the other option the result would have been different / better and of course we will never know. Pilots are different. There will be those who fly lots of different types, regularly practise pfls, and are confident in their ability to select and land in a good field. There will be those that have only ever flown a cirrus and havent done a pfl in years. Their assessment will inevitably be very different of when to use the chute.

Life is full of uncertainties and the chute just gives the pilot another to wrestle with. However far better the uncertainty because the evidence suggests it is a rather nice option to have. Moreover if you use it as much as some might try, try as they might it will be impossible to prove you selected the wrong option!

Rory Dixon; My quotes were from Philip Greenspun - he is a very well respected pilot and Cirrus owner.

Cirrus SR20 (and a bit about the SR22)

I searched very hard to try to find any official report of the claimed 60 spins during flight testing for EASA certification, please explain why the type certificate shows the CRI B2 comments with reference to spinning.

I think that the Cirrus is a great aeroplane, but cant help but wonder if some have now gained confidence into entering flight conditions that they would not have entered had the CAPS system not been in place.

Equally I note that Cirrus advocates use of the CAPS system as a last resort, yet it would seem some regard it as a first line SOP.

Without doubt the CAPS system has saved lives, but had it not been there then how many times would the pilot have ventured into the flight conditions that required its use. The deployment over Oxfordshire would seem to be one of those times.

Air Accidents Investigation: Cirrus SR20, N470RD

Gep

I have read his report. Its an opinion and as with any opinion there are parts with which i agree and others with which i dont. However i am very surprised with regards to his comments about the feedback from the sidestick particularly during slow flight. I dont recognise his description.

As to spinning reading the easa report the point is made that pushing the stick rapidly forward when the aircraft spins nose down is not naturally intuitive. The report also cites the lack of spin training. I find it very difficult to conclude reading the report how on earth some jump to the conclusion once a spin is entered it is virtually impossible to recover. The evidence suggests very differently, while recognising that such is spin training these days and because of the particular spin characteristics of the cirrus most pilots will not make a good job of recovering.

I wonder how many pilots would recover an aerobat or a slingsby from a spin? A fa200 spins very nicely but nose down. I found it a bit disconcerting and i have often wondered if a cirrus presents in the same way. I am not intending to find out. ;)

Hi Fuji - Do you have a link to the EASA spinning report for the Cirrus? I could not find one,

The spin recovery you describe is not that different from the one in the POH for the Terrohawk.

As an example of spins:


With reference to the Aerobat or Slingsby, both recover very easily, the Slingsby recovers happily from both upright or inverted spins - providing you apply the correct controls and procedure.

I have taught many people spins and recovery, most people soon get to grips with the techniques (or are sick!!)

Thats fair enough comment usually I am about 20-25 a week. Actually handling half that although recently I have had a big lump of training to do so the baby FO's get more than half the approaches. Which is more work than if I just flew them myself.

And currently sitting at just over 600 approaches with 3 months to run to the end of my FTL year. Out of that quarter of them will be visual approaches though. And down to mins and rvr limits maybe 50 a year.

BTW the biggest problem with inexperenced instrument pilots is that they fly the plane way to much. Set the machine up and let it do the flying. Don't annoy it with huge control inputs and multiple power changes.


A debrief line which has been used to me in the past and I will admit I have used as well.

"well we arrived despite your best efforts to prevent us"

And I am far from perfect thursday day 6 sector 8 of a 13 hour duty day starting at 5am with a split, pitch black and snowing with hills all about I boxed that NPA loc approach to the limits, my airspeed was up and down like fiddlers elbow and then procceded to rape the runway.

The FO just said on the taxi back in with me cursing under my breath at my self.

"what you needed to do with that one was set your power and attitude and use smaller control inputs"

"so why didn't you take it off me then?"

"sod that, it was horrible" was the reply.


Just had to agree and laugh and go and do the walk of shame and apologise to the pax.

Human performance factors also make a huge difference to your performance on the day. Day one of a roster even with the split duty and I would have looked as if I knew what I was doing instead of the utter garbage that I did.

(Just to note we can work a max of 7 days then 3 days off but more normally it max 6 days then 2 days off so if you see folk post day x its the number of days they are into a block of flying after a day off)

Link to Cirrus EASA Spinning report, strangely found on Peters web site here

http://www.peter2000.co.uk/aviation/...spinreport.pdf


Concludes all 60 spin's tested recovered within one turn within a range of 1200-1800ft

Also concludes that Cirrus Cirrus is making AFM changes to clarify loss of control response and CAPS deployment.

GEP Maybe he is but just goes to prove you should not believe everything you find in Google.

Are the accident reports for all types not littered with fatal's of VFR into IMC, I have seen no evidence this is higher than average in the Cirrus than other similar non BRS equipped type's.

Badly prepared pilots continue to launch into conditions which exceed there ability and die, always have done and always will.

This harks back to a similar debate during WW1 when it was argued that giving pilots parachutes might cause them to abandon their machines prematurely. The fact remains that two people are walking around today who otherwise would be being mourned by their loved ones and that has to be the prevailing view...
Somehow we need to get across to low time pilots that the difference between operating in IMC during training exercises and doing it for real is much greater than you think.

An interesting report.

In summary: It talks of the spin charecteristics not being fully tested as required for JAA certification WITHOUT the CAPS system being fitted.

I do note the one comment in the report:

I also note the remedy suggested by Cirrus:

GEP, 007 and Fuji have answered, I don't need to repeat that.
007 has also replied to that. It is a fact that the rate of fatal accidents in Cirrus isn't much different than in other high performance airplanes. So obviously not. Or do you have any other proof of your guess?

What the Cirrus has NOT delivered (on first sight) is to be more safe than other planes, despite the safety features it has. Well, this is something interesting, but doesn't wonder. People like you and many others, including the normal CFIs, believe a Cirrus should be handled like any other plane. Don't use the safety features, only if its to late, that is the mantra. I would expect no change in the safety of an airplane with this approach.

The interesting thing is, there is evidence clearly showing that a different approach to flying this airplane makes it safer. This approach is the one 007 has extensively elucidated on. The group of pilots accepting this approach has a rate of fatel accidents which is much lower (I think it was in the range of factor 3, if I recall right) than of the Cirrus pilots flying the old way.

So new technology sometime necessitates new thinking.

Isn't this the same for all aeroplanes? If you spin a C150 and you use "incorrect control inputs", I doubt it would recover - example if you held the rudder all the way in and held the yoke all the way back as your "spin recovery" then I doubt very much the aeroplane would recover.

My take on the statement is that incorrect control input may place the aircraft beyond recovery through further use of the controls.

On another note, 1200' to recover from a spin (from input of anti spin control) is a lot to drop. By way of an example, a Terrohawk in a fully developed spin could be recovered in 600', a Pitts S2A in 500'.

Goldeneaglepilot
 

Your statement about the damage to the wing roots is not backed up by the picture, it depends what the wheel spat hit and how hard.

Splicing a GRP spar boom is common practice in GRP repair so even damage that would write off a metal aircraft is unlikely to write off a GRP aircraft.

As I said in a post above I had seen nothing on the Utube clip that made me think that the aircraft could not be fixed, I am not saying that it is not beyond economic repair but that I can't see a reason to write the aircraft off on the basis of pictures.

A&C, My comment was directed about the hole in the wing skin. We looked at buying a SR22 at one point and what impressed me was the degree of structural strength in the design, not from just the spar but from the clever use of tapered layup techniques in the skin itself. From my own companies experience on other such damage (damage puncturing the skin in or near the root area of the wing, certainly in the first third of the wing) is often uneconomical to repair and a new panel is often the cheapesrt option.

You are right, its a question of economics for the insurance company.

Nothing about the wing skin looks bad enough to give me any reason that it can't be fixed, it would be the internal damage that I would want to see.

The other thing I would like to take a look at would be the pilots seat support structure, the area below the seat is off limits for the instalation of any equipment presumably because the seat is designed to progressively collapse into this area, the deformation of that area would indicate to me a very hard impact that I would not see the airframe recovering without uneconomic amounts of work.

It is not a "fact" that the accident rate isn't "much different" than other high performance singles. The true measure of accident rates has to measure both risk and exposure.

For example if you looked at the the number of accidents versus the fleet size of Cessna 182's in Alaska you would find it is 5 times higher then the total accident rate per 100,000 hrs for similar aircraft in the Continental US. The obvious reason is the extremely demanding flying conditions in Alaska compared to the lower 48.

Similarly if you have a higher proportion of low time pilots combined with a higher proportion of hours flown in IFR weather , which is the case for the Cirrus, then you are comparing apples and oranges if you are measuring it against other aircraft. The only "fact" in the question of Cirrus accidents is that there has been 38 accidents involving a chute pull where everyone survived that would otherwise have resulted in certain death for most/all of the aircraft occupants.

There been numerous other accidents where the chute was not used and the outcome was tragic.

Obviously continued efforts should be made to reduce the number of accidents that resulted from poor piloting, but for me the bottom line is simple.

If the engine fails and a cause check will not get it going again, pull the chute.

If you have lost control of the aircraft, pull the chute.

The chute is a major first for a standard production aircraft! A chute which will lower the aircraft and its passengers to the ground.
The possibilities are huge and I for one would love to see the chute as standard fit in other SEP aircraft.
For me there are two issues! Without doubt the security of having a chute will lure pilots into conditions they would not normally venture into.
As stated I would not be comfortable flying cross country at night in a single piston.
Flying a Cirrus would encourage me to fly at night etc.

The second issue is when to use it? I feel there could be a complete course on that fact alone.
Everyone here has presumed zero wind conditions and a vertical descent.
Many times in the past I have flown singles in 30 to 50 kt winds.
Pulling the chute in those situations will not only mean a high descent rate but the possibility of slamming hard into an object in the horizontal mode.
We have all seen the effects of a 30 mph (25kt) car crash.
Yet for the flying aircraft wind is the saviour as into wind landings reduce the ground speed to sometimes very low speeds.

So I feel reading the comments here that there is a mass of confusion and lack of direction on when and when not to pull the chute and no or little manuafacture direction or even authority direction on the matter.
The whole approach to the chute comes over as wishy washy and amateurish rather than a properly researched and directed SOP

It seems to be left to individual opinion which is not good enough on such a major development which goes away from traditional training and procedures.


Pace

I have to agree with Pace, about the surface wind being a major factor to take into account when deciding if a parachute deployment is the best option.

A forced landing into a 30kt head wind would very quickly result in the ground speed being very low after touchdown, being dragged along by the chute at 30kt untill the aircraft snags in something big enough to stop it sounds a little risky to me!

Some on this forum would tell you the SR20/22 is a bit of a rocket ship, having operated out of an airfield with a TORA of 500m I can tell you that it is just another SEP in performance terms.

But you see personally for me I wouldn't want to be carting the weight of the chute around in a SEP.

For me the risk it migates isn't worth the cost.

If I was wanting flying in WX or terrain which required me to say the risk is too high in a single I would use a twin or get the train or more likely go to the pub.

Regarding stats...If you search the AAIB from 1st jan until now, you will see than in the UK alone there have been 7 accidents involving Cessna SEPs. Does this mean that the Cessna is a more dangerous single?

There have been 10 involving Piper SEPs and so by this deduction I can safely assume that a Piper SEP is more dangerous than a Cessna SEP ? By contrast there have been no Cirrus accidents at all!

Just showing how statistics and peoples' perception of them can be as meaningless as you want them to be which is why I don't believe the hype about the Cirrus. To have meaningful stats you'd have to break it down to "per flight hour" and by "type of flight".

PACE - I stated earlier that your posts confuse me. You asked me to elaborate. I could have lifted many posts from the Irish Sea crossing thread, regarding you not wanting to fly single engine pistons. Ever!!!!

You are now stating that Cirrus have a wishy washy approach to chute installation, and no SOP to deal with the situation.:confused::confused::confused::confused::confused:

You now state that your view is that the chute/safety devices will lure pilots into a false sense of security heaven. This differs from some of your original comments.

I have not flown a Cirrus, therefore am unqualified to comment type specific. I have however, flown many fast complex twins and singles. Over sea, over mountains, over flat land. If I had a chute, a new glass cockpit, linked to autopilot, with all the latest technology, I would go and get trained fully on the systems and their use. You would also, as would the majority. However, many would not, many would think, this lot (new gizmos) will get me out of anything. The accident stats look to confirm this. This is the basis of the discussion. The American Bonanza Society recognised this with the Baron and Bonanza models, and set up the BPPP. This is a training proficiency programme, which if completed can give insurance discounts, and all in all should make for a better flying experience, with more experienced and knowledgeable pilots on type.

Perhaps Cirrus, in line with Cirrus owners should consider this. They may already have such a programme. The stats however are worrisome on Cirrus incidents, linked to IFR flight, and this can only be attributed to a training deficiency, either instruments, false sense of security, lack of systems knowledge, but it is a fundamental lack of training on type.

BPF, you are spot on. I guess, I have not written may point in the best possible manner. What I wanted to say is, that if you compare the Cirrus to other airplanes used in an identical manner, there is no reason (from the statistics) to believe, that the Cirrus is worse with regard to safety.
You are absolutely right: to compare accident statistics you have to riskadjust them, otherwise they are meningless.

maxred:
This program exists and I would highly recommend that to every person flying a Cirrus, not just the owners.

This is endeed worrisome, but it is NOT a feature of the Cirrus. The stats are pretty much identical to other high-performance singles (e.g. Barron), as outlined above, therefore there is a training issue in GA.

Point taken and I agree

Pace:
This is your impression, but I do have to tell you this is due to a lack of information on your side.
If I recall right, you were thinking about chartering a Cirrus. Do yourself a favor. Invest $65 and buy yourself a one year membership in COPA, the Cirrus owner and pilot association. It will be the most cost effective investment you ever did in aviation.
Reserve yourself (at least) two weekends for reading the vast amount of information available and then start asking your questions to the knowledgeable people there. You will very soon see that your statement above is just not true. Joining COPA will have impact on the safety of your Cirrus flying. COPA members have a much lower number of accidents than non-COPA Cirrus pilots.

Max Red

Please feel free as you are talking absolute rubbish so go reading and cut and paste.
Please be accurate and back up what you say not what you imagine or want to read in my posts.
I have 3000 hours in piston twins and around 900 in singles crossing large expanses of water IN SINGLES was a risk I was prepared to take and DID take but nevertheless a risk.

Pace

Rory

When we have one pilot here who claims to have done the COPA course and states he will pull the chute for every single engine failure regardless ??? That for me is worrying!

I also find it worrying that the manufacturer treats the whole chute decision going into absolute detail on advice for a forced landing but when it comes to the chute all they can say is that the pilot may CONSIDER the use of the chute if a forced landing is not advisable. wow!!



Pace

So I stand by every word I have said

Pace we are likely never going to agree on this which is fine but as previously stated my decision has been arrived at over a period of years and I am sticking with it.

Commercial Air Taxi companies in the USA have adopted the same principal for their SOP so there must be some mileage in it but everyone is free to do what they want.

The sad thing is there are to many deaths where the Pilot could have saved their lives and that of PAX if they had pulled the chute and not attempted an off airport landing.

One valid point you have raised is the outcome of CAPS in high winds and this is an area which I need to consider more, not only in terms of lateral speed impacting a solid object on the ground but I believe in very high winds (not sure of the number) the aircraft could be dragged along the ground by the chute, I need to consider this more.

Pace that is simply not true, the POH has a section on CAPS (from memory section 10) with much more detail, I am not justifying what Cirrus do or don't say in there POH just pointing out I think your statement is totally misleading.

007

I am only using your interpretation of when to use the chute as an example and trying to have a discussion on possible pitfalls with that policy.So please do not take it personally as I know others hold your view!

In the past and present individual chutes are used to abandon an unflyable aircraft or one where the pilot has irretrievably lost control hence glider pilots and aerobatic pilots carry chutes!

This is a different concept to the normal use of a chute as now the arguement is to use the chute with a perfectly flyable aircraft!

I do not know? You maybe right but surely this new concept needs and deserves discussion without such sensitive protectionism at anyone who dares question the sensibility or possible pitfalls in such use of a chute.

Normally if anything major goes wrong with the jet I fly it is straight to the emergency checklist or the flight manual and then to follow the manufacturers procedures for dealing with it!

Not so in this case.

Nowhere does the manufacturer state engine failure pull the chute or even worse pull the chute regardless of the situation.

I am sold on the Cirrus and the OPTION of a chute I am not convinced of its use other than for a true unflyable emergency so convince me and as a matter of fact convince the manufacturer too.

Pace

I tell all my students that when the engine fails the insurance company just bought the plane. Under pretty much every circumstance IMO, the only advantage of doing a conventional forced approach in a Cirrus is there will be a possibility that the airplane will not be damaged. If the chute is used the airplane will definitely be damaged and possibly written off but at a much higher probability of no or low injuries. Seems like a pretty good deal to me.

I find even the 30kt wind example unpersuasive as yes if you were to touch down exactly into the wind you would in the best case scenario have a forward speed of around 35kts, But you have to first make it to a piece of flat ground. It is very easy to screw up a forced approach in such high winds with a resultant touch down short of the desired point and probably involving hitting something hard at flying speed and still in the air. Those are the killer accidents.

BPF

Fine ! you maybe right but then get this accepted as standard procedure by the manufacturer as well as the CAA for a change in training procedures in this aircraft. That is what I am banging on about!
You do not know neither do I !!! We both hold opinions but that is all they are opinions

Pace

I am not convinced either & the idea of voluntarily relinquishing control of a flyable aircraft does not sit comfortably with me.

At the same time I am mindful that the statistics for off-airport landings following engine failure in a SEP are not comforting. From memory I believe about 30% of such incidents as are reported result in injury or worse to the aircraft occupants (though that may be skewed as some successful off-airport landings may not be reported).

I still remember practising forced landings with my first instructor & was in awe of his ability to slip the aircraft down to within inches of the ground & then with pinpoint accuracy halt the descent, add just enough power to fly in ground effect to warm the engine & then climb away. A few weeks later, faced with a real engine failure whilst flying solo, that same instructor was killed after hitting power wires on the final approach (see G-BKDZ).

No matter how skilled the pilot, there is an element of unavoidable risk in off-airport landings which may be greater than we'd like to think and, in spite of my natural disinclination to knowingly surrender control of a flyable aircraft, pulling the 'chute may statistically offer a better chance of survival following engine failure, even for the highly experienced. This can't just be dismissed & is worthy of serious debate.

However, this thread started after a 'chute pull in a perfectly functioning aircraft because the pilot lacked the skill and/or confidence to continue to fly it. This IMO is also worth exploring further & to me highlights the mismatch between current PPL/IR training (this pilot held a current IR AIUI) & the capabilities of a TAA such as the Cirrus.

Thats my view on it as well.

The chute meaning that they can tell everyone what a plonker they were is nice and more than likely saves more money to the manufacture than not having to do extensive tests to prove that it wasn't a design fault.

But fundamentally there is a pilot that shouldn;t have got themselves into that position in the first place.

This is unlikely to happen, simply because of the product liability issue. So long as the pilot is still flying the aircraft, any undesirable outcome can be put down to "pilot error". Pulling the 'chute is essentially turning to the manufacturer & saying "you have control" - if the manufacturer makes it a formal recommendation in the POH, the lawyers will have a field day if the worst happens.

Yes absolutely...... but they did. Do you really think Death is the appropriate penalty for their carelessness ?

BTW No offense taken from anybody and it is a very useful debate, the last few posts for me serve well to demonstrate the polar opinions which are most hard to change.

The quote above sums up in the real world how dangerous for all forced landings are, maybe on average 80% work, not great odds to me.

It also reminded me of earlier this year I decided to do some PFL's from 2000ft above Rochester airport and dead stick landings, it was fairly calm, I was fresh, I knew it was coming etc. The first one I may have made across the fence but was dangerously short, so aborted at 300ft, the second two were spot on greaser landings.

It only served to convince me more that for me, the chute is right option, I am just not good enough to ensure the right landing spot, reasonable surface, no obstructions etc when the heat is on, I may be tried, I will certainly be highly stressed and adrenalin will be pumping.

I have no desire to fly all the way to the scene of the accident.

I also think trying to change Cirrus / CAA / FAA advice on this will likely never happen, it is just for me an informed personal choice based on my view of the world.

I don't think there is much argument on this point but in all our flying history's there for the grace of god go you or I.

We have all made mistakes, some stupid, some down to ignorance, but we are all here to now use those mistakes to learn and hopefully not do it again.

This guy lost control, lost altitude and 100% correctly pulled the chute, I do not believe the manufacturer, FAA or Insurance company will argue with or fault that decision.

Neither do I believe they will fault a decision to pull the chute in the event of engine failure over the beautiful South Downs meadows, Beech at Le Touquet or anywhere else.

Regarding the Cirrus, I say again, it is only because we hear about the chute on the news that we discuss it. Yesterday I read an AAIB report of a 206 which just flew into the ground in the Uk a while back (CFIT). You can read all manner of "PA28 - VMC into IMC" type accidents on the AAIB website, people seem to do it every year. Worse than stuffing up an approach is you get some idiot VFR only pilot who decides to press on and then gets themselves into the ****e. Read the sobering accident report of the chap in a PA28 who decided to ditch it in the channel next to a ship after electrical failure. The plane was perfectly flyable, he had enough fuel, he could have saved himself and his aeroplane. Very sad.

My point is that it is not remarkable if a PPL stuffs his aeroplane, but it is remarkable that a pilot saves 4 lives by using a chute to bring his aeroplane down to earth.

No but I would prefer that we cure the base problem and not use an engineering fix to cover up poor training.

I am not actually against the chute as such and those that want to have it I am more than happy they have it.

But this in my view comes down to the age old problem that exercises 1-12 are not being taught properly or being understood.