The most unnecessary chute pull ever?
So pace while you where hand bombing the airplane in the bumps while programming the STAR and talking to ATC what would you have done if the master caution light had illuminated ?
Just because I can do something, and yes I could hand fly the scenario you described to a safe landing, doesn't necessarily mean it is a good idea.....
Part of being a good pilot is managing risk. I had a friend who talked a lot like you, until he splattered himself all over a mountain side when his ego wrote a cheque his ability could not cash.......
Just because I can do something, and yes I could hand fly the scenario you described to a safe landing, doesn't necessarily mean it is a good idea.....
Part of being a good pilot is managing risk. I had a friend who talked a lot like you, until he splattered himself all over a mountain side when his ego wrote a cheque his ability could not cash.......
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Pace,
I am 99.9% sure that the single pilot RVR limit is an absolute limit at the time you are executing the approach. So if the AP packs up enroute and at the FAF the tower says RVR 700, you are in the same position as you would be if the AP is working and the tower says RVR 450 (I.e. 100 metres less than legal minimum and illegal to continue to approach in both cases). So yes, without doubt, I personally would not continue.
You are of course correct when I am practicing I do it to system minimums (and sometimes consciously below just in case one day I have a really serious emergency shortage of options). However, I am a chicken and have a choice of where I fly so in a minimally equipped IFR aircraft with no backup systems, I would be a lot more cautious of the mission profile than in a well equipped aircraft with plenty of redundancy.
I am 99.9% sure that the single pilot RVR limit is an absolute limit at the time you are executing the approach. So if the AP packs up enroute and at the FAF the tower says RVR 700, you are in the same position as you would be if the AP is working and the tower says RVR 450 (I.e. 100 metres less than legal minimum and illegal to continue to approach in both cases). So yes, without doubt, I personally would not continue.
You are of course correct when I am practicing I do it to system minimums (and sometimes consciously below just in case one day I have a really serious emergency shortage of options). However, I am a chicken and have a choice of where I fly so in a minimally equipped IFR aircraft with no backup systems, I would be a lot more cautious of the mission profile than in a well equipped aircraft with plenty of redundancy.
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BPF
Yes and i have 7 friends who have all lost their lives to aviation some of them far better pilots than I. i just have an overworked guardian angel!
But this is not ego trumpet blowing as you suggest as you will know as well as I that in a sim yes you will get multiple failures and be expected to handle them.
you also know that hard IFR/IMC is not a playground and you are trained to expect the worst and to be able to handle the worst.
If you are saying that I am wrong in suggesting that pilots are on top of hand flying IFR and that technology should not be used to make up for a lack of skills then we are talking a different language
Pace
Yes and i have 7 friends who have all lost their lives to aviation some of them far better pilots than I. i just have an overworked guardian angel!
But this is not ego trumpet blowing as you suggest as you will know as well as I that in a sim yes you will get multiple failures and be expected to handle them.
you also know that hard IFR/IMC is not a playground and you are trained to expect the worst and to be able to handle the worst.
If you are saying that I am wrong in suggesting that pilots are on top of hand flying IFR and that technology should not be used to make up for a lack of skills then we are talking a different language
Pace
Having the ability to control the airplane at the limits means you are a good airplane driver, having the judgement to manage a situation so that you never have to use those skills means you are a good pilot.....
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are saying is it's ok for pilots to use technology to cover up their lack of skills
So I am very relaxed about giving myself some extra margin when flying a 1966 Mooney; I'm not trying to prove that I'm the world's best pilot, and I'd rather land at my alternate than go missed at 200ft in IMC, or - depending on the weather - break out at 200ft and try do a nice landing in rough conditions. I'm equally relaxed at flying a missed approach from minimums in a Cirrus, or landing well after a last-minute transition from IMC to VMC. If that is covering up for my lack of basic skills, then so be it.
And, anyway, which skills might be lacking? Obviously everyone needs to be able to hand fly in IMC - but beyond that, what? Partial panel? It's a very different concept in a Cirrus compared to steam gauges; if the "gizmos" fail you are left with a mechanical attitude indicator, ASI, altimeter and compass, so you either find VFR conditions, or you end up using the parachute. Or perhaps the skills to use old-style navaids? The Cirrus I fly in the States has no DME and no ADF, so obviously the skill to use them fades. (The Mooney does have an ADF, but only to keep bureaucrats happy. I'd have to be masochistic or stupid to use it to fly an approach.)
As I said earlier, I think the world has moved on. Beyond the basic ability to control the aircraft in IMC, the skill that matters most in IFR in an aircraft like a Cirrus is a thorough understanding of the technology - the failure modes, the flight director and autopilot. But a lot of the skills that were essential for flying with steam gauges are not relevant.
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However you seem to be proud of the fact that you flew that jet in circumstances where any further malfunction would have put you in a very ugly situation. Personally I think you were foolish.
Why would I be proud of the fact! It is what any competent IFR pilot should be able to do and is tested to do.
I can assure you I have a lot more demanding experiences than hand flying an ILS
As for being foolish thats your opinion and you are unaware of the circumstances! The point I was making is you cannot trust pilot aids as they have a habit of letting you down!What if you missed and diverted to another airfield? In 20000 feet of solid cloud with a fair bit of icing and still had another failure? What if your diversion airfield was 400 overcast is that more manageable than 200 overcast?
for me there is no difference hand flying to 200 feet as to 400 feet its whether you are visual at minima to make a landing. If not you miss and then go somewhere else. you are talking absolute rubbish which is unusual for you.
But a lot of the skills that were essential for flying with steam gauges are not relevant.
Pace
Last edited by Pace; 15th May 2014 at 16:45.
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If I pull the chute because I can't fly a partial panel approach, or can't fly a DME or NDB procedure without cheating and using the GPS, I'll send you the insurance cheque! 
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I think the difference is that few (any?) RV-8s come equipped with autopilots, glass cockpits and ballistic parachutes as standard, whereas the Cirrus does.
The point is there are many high performance aircraft (in terms of speed, not avionics) and some of these aircraft can only be legally flown in VMC.
Which demonstrates that in both practical and legal terms we have no problem as a community flying high performance aircraft in VMC any more or less than we accept lower performance aircraft may be flown in VMC.
From my experience flying a Cirrus and many other aircraft there is no reason at all why the aircraft cannot be safely operated by a pilot restricted to VMC any more than any other aircraft of similar or lesser performance. I would go further and say there is nothing about a Cirrus which makes it more likely to find yourself in IMC than for any other aircraft type subject as always to the pilot have received adequate training on type.
Quite simply I believe it is just wrong to suggest its the aircraft fault when an involuntary incursion into IMC occurs, there is no more or less reason why a VFR pilot cant operate a Cirrus, than an RV8 than a Warrior.
Having flown with many pilots who are new to higher performance aircraft the "problem" they always have to conquer is the additional speed with which the scenery passes. The often reported nonsense that the Cirrus is difficult to hand fly and that the pilot requires and intimate knowledge of the avionics and autopilot is just that. It is a delight to hand fly for hours on end, and once you are accustom to a glass display the information is more intuitively presented and the pilot requires to interact very little with the avionics.
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If you are saying that I am wrong in suggesting that pilots are on top of hand flying IFR and that technology should not be used to make up for a lack of skills then we are talking a different language
Well I would say you are wrong.
I would like to see a lot of IFR pilots fly a difficult approach with partial panel. Yes, of course they should be able to do so, but how many can honestly say they could?
In reality, in the GA world even IFR pilots are on the whole not flying enough and are not in the SIM enough (or at all) to make these procedures second nature.
The technology comes to the rescue, and hopefully it comes to the rescue to the extent that difficult approaches, with multiple failures dont occur, but in reality, I would suggest they are really dangerous and the evidence is many pilots will really struggle if and when they happen. Even high time GA pilots that are current and flying IFR a lot end up killing themselves. Single pilot IFR in a typical light single is one of the hardest things we do, arguably much harder than operating in a multi crew environment with all the bells and whistles.
With an eye to the response likely I repeat I am not suggesting that in an ideal world every pilot should be on top of their hand flying, but I am suggesting safety is about recognising the reality of the real world, not how we would wish that world behaves.
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Fuji
Reading some of the defensive responses makes me feel that some think I am attacking the Cirrus and its BRS system.
I am not in the slightest and consider it to be the biggest safety enhancement in GA.
The idea that if all goes pear shaped with either yourself or the aircraft and rather than ending up as a hole in the ground the complete aircraft and its occupants can be safely lowered to the ground has to be a major advancement in potential safety.
The argument is not about the concept or the aircraft or the technology but its about when to use it ? and the dangers of having such a life saving option available actually drawing pilots into situations where they cannot cope and end up having to use the BRS.
Technology is great but I can only go by my own experience of a lot of hard IFR in a multitude of piston twins, jets and ferry work to warn others of the dangers of relying on technology to compensate for their own lack of instrument flying ability!
Loose the technology and you are left with yourself, your own instincts ,ability, spatial awareness and ability to pick up your game to what is required. Sit there like a frozen Cod and the chute is your only option.
So please do not misunderstand what I am saying.
When the manufacturer(Cirrus) will not condone the use of the chute simply stating consider its use if all other conventional options are not available and a second body are advising the use of the BRS for any engine failure almost even down to using it if you sneeze then its natural that when to pull will be discussed as there is NO official guidance.
The chute pull records would indicate that many could have been avoided by basic training and pilot skills.
I also accept that in light GA PPL flying there will be a huge variation in pilot ability, currency and experience hence even more important that pilots guard against the BRS luring them into conditions where they cannot cope and end up having to use the chute for reasons which could have been avoided by more concentration on basic instrument flying skills and not on how to press buttons.
Pace
Reading some of the defensive responses makes me feel that some think I am attacking the Cirrus and its BRS system.
I am not in the slightest and consider it to be the biggest safety enhancement in GA.
The idea that if all goes pear shaped with either yourself or the aircraft and rather than ending up as a hole in the ground the complete aircraft and its occupants can be safely lowered to the ground has to be a major advancement in potential safety.
The argument is not about the concept or the aircraft or the technology but its about when to use it ? and the dangers of having such a life saving option available actually drawing pilots into situations where they cannot cope and end up having to use the BRS.
Technology is great but I can only go by my own experience of a lot of hard IFR in a multitude of piston twins, jets and ferry work to warn others of the dangers of relying on technology to compensate for their own lack of instrument flying ability!
Loose the technology and you are left with yourself, your own instincts ,ability, spatial awareness and ability to pick up your game to what is required. Sit there like a frozen Cod and the chute is your only option.
So please do not misunderstand what I am saying.
When the manufacturer(Cirrus) will not condone the use of the chute simply stating consider its use if all other conventional options are not available and a second body are advising the use of the BRS for any engine failure almost even down to using it if you sneeze then its natural that when to pull will be discussed as there is NO official guidance.
The chute pull records would indicate that many could have been avoided by basic training and pilot skills.
I also accept that in light GA PPL flying there will be a huge variation in pilot ability, currency and experience hence even more important that pilots guard against the BRS luring them into conditions where they cannot cope and end up having to use the chute for reasons which could have been avoided by more concentration on basic instrument flying skills and not on how to press buttons.
Pace
Last edited by Pace; 16th May 2014 at 14:01.
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Fuji,
I do think there is a bit if a pattern of some low experience pilots thinking that all of magic on the plane will let them fly through conditions they are not qualified for. Note this is not a comment on the airplane but on a limit set of pilots.
Ps happy to move this to any new thread - but I do think it is important to understand the human factors behind something like this accident
I do think there is a bit if a pattern of some low experience pilots thinking that all of magic on the plane will let them fly through conditions they are not qualified for. Note this is not a comment on the airplane but on a limit set of pilots.
Ps happy to move this to any new thread - but I do think it is important to understand the human factors behind something like this accident
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Pace, let me quote a couple of your statements:
Read on . . .
Seems your choice of words mis-states, and for effect attacks, both Cirrus and COPA positions on the use of the parachute.
"Simple stating consider its use"?
The POH, as well as several other Cirrus training documents, emphasize the use of the Cirrus parachute for loss of control situations and avoiding landings where safety is not assured. For spins, it says this: "Because the SR22 has not been certified for spin recovery, the Cirrus Airframe Parachute System (CAPS) must be deployed if the airplane departs controlled flight. Refer to Section 3 – Emergency Procedures, Inadvertent Spiral/Spin Entry." For inadvertent spiral dive, it says "In all cases, if the aircraft enters an unusual attitude from which recovery is not assured, immediately deploy CAPS. Refer to Section 10, Safety Information, for CAPS deployment information." For forced landings, it says "If flight conditions or terrain does not permit a safe landing, CAPS deployment may be required. Refer to Section 10, Safety Information, for CAPS deployment scenarios and landing considerations."
Seems more thoughtful than simple, and more emphatic than consider.
"Advising the use of the BRS for any engine failure almost even down to a sneeze"?
Rhetorical flourish? Setting up a stalking horse? Or your interpretation for an attack that diminishes substantial effort?
Check the investigation reports for "sneeze" and you won't find it. Check COPA safety presentations for "sneeze" and you won't find it.
What you will find is the estimation that 120 people have died in scenarios similar to survivable parachute pulls. VFR-in-IMC. Mechanical failures. Avionics failures. Avoiding off-airport landings. How can we get into the minds of Cirrus pilots that they need to think differently in emergencies, since they have an option of abandoning recovery and pulling the parachute handle?
For the record, in the past 6 months, Cirrus pilots have had 1 fatal accident and 7 survivable parachute deployments:
Brazil -- pilot presumed dead in the interior since no aircraft has been found (1 fatality)
Brazil -- pilot avoided off-airport landing after loss of engine power (3 survivors)
West Virginia, US -- pilot avoided off-airport landing after engine failed to respond to go-around power (1 survivor)
France -- pilot avoided off-airport landing at night after loss of engine power (2 survivors)
Idaho, US -- pilot avoided off-airport landing during emergency descent following catastrophic engine failure (2 survivors)
Colorado, US -- pilot avoided off-airport landing in mountains during icing encounter (1 survivor)
Mexico -- pilot avoided off-airport landing in desert after loss of engine power (1 survivor)
Australia -- pilot avoided off-airport landing after loss of control (3 survivors)
No sneezes. 15 survivors.
Some situations could have been avoided by training and better judgment. COPA sees over 400 of COPA pilots (about 13% of our membership) attending recurrent training, over 500 attending decision-making seminars, and about 1,500 credits issued for the FAA Wings program. The Cirrus training network has expanded and the messages delivered more consistently. All this in a general aviation context that does not require more than a flight review every 24 months.
However, one consideration of thoughtful people is that the penalty for poor aeronautical decisions should not be death.
And before you get to amped up about avoiding off-airport landings, please be advised that Adrian researched this. He looked at the last 100 fatal accidents in each of Bonanza and Mooney aircraft, both comparable high-performance single-engine piston aircraft to the Cirrus fleet. He found about 20% of the fatal accidents in each type happened during off-airport landings. Good things to avoid, eh?
So, yes, Pace. I think your choice of rhetoric does attack those who have contributed to this significant reduction in Cirrus fatalities -- 1 in the past 6 months. Less than 1.00 fatal accidents in 100,000 flying hours in the past 12 months.
Cheers
Rick
-----
COPA Aviation Safety Chair
Originally Posted by Pace
Reading some of the defensive responses makes me feel that some think I am attacking the Cirrus and its BRS system.
Originally Posted by Pace
When the manufacturer will not condone the use of the chute simply stating consider its use and a second body are advising the use of the BRS for any engine failure almost even down to a sneeze then its natural that when to pull will be discussed as there is NO official guidance.
The chute pull records would indicate that many could have been avoided by basic training and pilot skills.
The chute pull records would indicate that many could have been avoided by basic training and pilot skills.
"Simple stating consider its use"?
The POH, as well as several other Cirrus training documents, emphasize the use of the Cirrus parachute for loss of control situations and avoiding landings where safety is not assured. For spins, it says this: "Because the SR22 has not been certified for spin recovery, the Cirrus Airframe Parachute System (CAPS) must be deployed if the airplane departs controlled flight. Refer to Section 3 – Emergency Procedures, Inadvertent Spiral/Spin Entry." For inadvertent spiral dive, it says "In all cases, if the aircraft enters an unusual attitude from which recovery is not assured, immediately deploy CAPS. Refer to Section 10, Safety Information, for CAPS deployment information." For forced landings, it says "If flight conditions or terrain does not permit a safe landing, CAPS deployment may be required. Refer to Section 10, Safety Information, for CAPS deployment scenarios and landing considerations."
Seems more thoughtful than simple, and more emphatic than consider.
"Advising the use of the BRS for any engine failure almost even down to a sneeze"?
Rhetorical flourish? Setting up a stalking horse? Or your interpretation for an attack that diminishes substantial effort?
Check the investigation reports for "sneeze" and you won't find it. Check COPA safety presentations for "sneeze" and you won't find it.
What you will find is the estimation that 120 people have died in scenarios similar to survivable parachute pulls. VFR-in-IMC. Mechanical failures. Avionics failures. Avoiding off-airport landings. How can we get into the minds of Cirrus pilots that they need to think differently in emergencies, since they have an option of abandoning recovery and pulling the parachute handle?
For the record, in the past 6 months, Cirrus pilots have had 1 fatal accident and 7 survivable parachute deployments:
Brazil -- pilot presumed dead in the interior since no aircraft has been found (1 fatality)
Brazil -- pilot avoided off-airport landing after loss of engine power (3 survivors)
West Virginia, US -- pilot avoided off-airport landing after engine failed to respond to go-around power (1 survivor)
France -- pilot avoided off-airport landing at night after loss of engine power (2 survivors)
Idaho, US -- pilot avoided off-airport landing during emergency descent following catastrophic engine failure (2 survivors)
Colorado, US -- pilot avoided off-airport landing in mountains during icing encounter (1 survivor)
Mexico -- pilot avoided off-airport landing in desert after loss of engine power (1 survivor)
Australia -- pilot avoided off-airport landing after loss of control (3 survivors)
No sneezes. 15 survivors.
Some situations could have been avoided by training and better judgment. COPA sees over 400 of COPA pilots (about 13% of our membership) attending recurrent training, over 500 attending decision-making seminars, and about 1,500 credits issued for the FAA Wings program. The Cirrus training network has expanded and the messages delivered more consistently. All this in a general aviation context that does not require more than a flight review every 24 months.
However, one consideration of thoughtful people is that the penalty for poor aeronautical decisions should not be death.
And before you get to amped up about avoiding off-airport landings, please be advised that Adrian researched this. He looked at the last 100 fatal accidents in each of Bonanza and Mooney aircraft, both comparable high-performance single-engine piston aircraft to the Cirrus fleet. He found about 20% of the fatal accidents in each type happened during off-airport landings. Good things to avoid, eh?
So, yes, Pace. I think your choice of rhetoric does attack those who have contributed to this significant reduction in Cirrus fatalities -- 1 in the past 6 months. Less than 1.00 fatal accidents in 100,000 flying hours in the past 12 months.
Cheers
Rick
-----
COPA Aviation Safety Chair
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SDBeach
If the chute pull record is now so positively established is it not about time that Cirrus add the recommendations to the POH and officialise its use?
Surely to stick with their previous stance given the favourable BRS evidence is itself now negligent!
Passing the buck to COPA really is not on.
I will also add that I am taking 50 hrs in a Cirrus starting late june! Hardly likely if I was against the aircraft or its concept.
I am also open to persuasion on where and when to use the chute so forgive my slight journalistic interrogation postings on when the chute should be pulled.
Pace
If the chute pull record is now so positively established is it not about time that Cirrus add the recommendations to the POH and officialise its use?
Surely to stick with their previous stance given the favourable BRS evidence is itself now negligent!
Passing the buck to COPA really is not on.
I will also add that I am taking 50 hrs in a Cirrus starting late june! Hardly likely if I was against the aircraft or its concept.
I am also open to persuasion on where and when to use the chute so forgive my slight journalistic interrogation postings on when the chute should be pulled.
Pace
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Pace, I see you edited the paragraph that I quoted. So let me address your edited thought:
I wonder what "condone" means to you? Have you read the Cirrus materials? Are you relying upon memory or other sources?
In my reply, I quoted several statements from the manufacturer (Cirrus) in their regulatory document, rev A10 of the Cirrus SR22 Pilot Operating Handbook.
Do you agree that those statements go beyond your criticism? Would you now change your position?
There is lots of official guidance. For all Cirrus pilots. From Cirrus. From COPA. From CSIPs. Even officially from insurance underwriters. One went so far as to say "Pull! I would rather keep you as a customer than deal with your estate!" Underwriters give discounts for participation in the safety programs conducted by the "second body," COPA. And members of that organization show up in accidents much less frequently than you would expect if all Cirrus pilots were the same. Participation has its privileges.
Pace, if you stay on the issue of training and decision-making, then we can have a productive dialog. When you stray over the line into mis-stating positions and denigrating the complexity of decisions to deploy a whole-airframe parachute, then your misstatements and rhetorical flourishes deserve attention.
Good grief! Did you read what Cirrus has put into it's recommendations?
And do you have any idea of the way plaintiff's attorneys use your logic of negligence to sue Cirrus? "Ah, members of the jury, you see, Cirrus now admits that the pilot should have pulled the parachute and my client followed their earlier guidance, so now Cirrus should be held liable for damages because my client died without using the parachute."
In my opinion, Cirrus has taken a courageous step in strengthening the guidance for pilots on the use of the parachute. But even those steps seem to trigger your attack that it is "now negligent."
The phrase "No good deed goes unpunished" comes to mind.
Cheers
Rick
Originally Posted by Pace
When the manufacturer(Cirrus) will not condone the use of the chute simply stating consider its use if all other conventional options are not available and a second body are advising the use of the BRS for any engine failure almost even down to using it if you sneeze then its natural that when to pull will be discussed as there is NO official guidance.
In my reply, I quoted several statements from the manufacturer (Cirrus) in their regulatory document, rev A10 of the Cirrus SR22 Pilot Operating Handbook.
Do you agree that those statements go beyond your criticism? Would you now change your position?
There is lots of official guidance. For all Cirrus pilots. From Cirrus. From COPA. From CSIPs. Even officially from insurance underwriters. One went so far as to say "Pull! I would rather keep you as a customer than deal with your estate!" Underwriters give discounts for participation in the safety programs conducted by the "second body," COPA. And members of that organization show up in accidents much less frequently than you would expect if all Cirrus pilots were the same. Participation has its privileges.
Pace, if you stay on the issue of training and decision-making, then we can have a productive dialog. When you stray over the line into mis-stating positions and denigrating the complexity of decisions to deploy a whole-airframe parachute, then your misstatements and rhetorical flourishes deserve attention.
Originally Posted by Pace
If the chute pull record is now so positively established is it not about time that Cirrus add the recommendations to the POH and officialise its use.
Surely to stick with their previous stance given the favourable BRS evidence is itself now negligent!
Passing the buck to COPA really is not on
Surely to stick with their previous stance given the favourable BRS evidence is itself now negligent!
Passing the buck to COPA really is not on
And do you have any idea of the way plaintiff's attorneys use your logic of negligence to sue Cirrus? "Ah, members of the jury, you see, Cirrus now admits that the pilot should have pulled the parachute and my client followed their earlier guidance, so now Cirrus should be held liable for damages because my client died without using the parachute."
In my opinion, Cirrus has taken a courageous step in strengthening the guidance for pilots on the use of the parachute. But even those steps seem to trigger your attack that it is "now negligent."
The phrase "No good deed goes unpunished" comes to mind.
Cheers
Rick
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SDBeach
I am not up to date on what Cirrus have recently added to the POH in regards to advice on use of the BRS.
i was aware of a previous clip regarding engine failure which advised gliding to a suitable landing site and performing a standard FL and ONLY to CONSIDER the BRS if no suitable landing site was available.
The recommendations from many here is to use the chute for every engine failure as standard practice regardless of being over built up areas or otherwise.
Sadly one day a Cirrus will pull over built up areas rather than gliding clear and will cause a multiple road collision or injury/death to someone on the ground.
If Cirrus have now changed their policy regarding engine failure then please post the new recommendations.
Also consider an engine failure is more likely to happen soon after takeoff when the engine is most stressed has consideration been made regarding pulling at below recommended safe chute altitudes.
finally what are COPA and Cirrus recommendations in strong wind conditions? We all know the damage caused to a car in a 30mph crash into a solid object a car has far better crash protection than an aircraft with a large lump of engine in front of the pilots.
what is the COPA attitude regarding a descending aircraft moving not just vertically but horizontally at 30 to 40 KTS?
Surely that 30 to 40 KTS would suit an in control FL into wind better than under a chute?
Again its not to much to ask for official guidance or is it? These are valid points!!!
Pace
I am not up to date on what Cirrus have recently added to the POH in regards to advice on use of the BRS.
i was aware of a previous clip regarding engine failure which advised gliding to a suitable landing site and performing a standard FL and ONLY to CONSIDER the BRS if no suitable landing site was available.
The recommendations from many here is to use the chute for every engine failure as standard practice regardless of being over built up areas or otherwise.
Sadly one day a Cirrus will pull over built up areas rather than gliding clear and will cause a multiple road collision or injury/death to someone on the ground.
If Cirrus have now changed their policy regarding engine failure then please post the new recommendations.
Also consider an engine failure is more likely to happen soon after takeoff when the engine is most stressed has consideration been made regarding pulling at below recommended safe chute altitudes.
finally what are COPA and Cirrus recommendations in strong wind conditions? We all know the damage caused to a car in a 30mph crash into a solid object a car has far better crash protection than an aircraft with a large lump of engine in front of the pilots.
what is the COPA attitude regarding a descending aircraft moving not just vertically but horizontally at 30 to 40 KTS?
Surely that 30 to 40 KTS would suit an in control FL into wind better than under a chute?
Again its not to much to ask for official guidance or is it? These are valid points!!!
Pace
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Originally Posted by Pace
Again its not to much to ask for official guidance or is it? These are valid points and a head in the sand attitude is not acceptable
And did you acknowledge that I quoted three paragraphs of guidance from the Cirrus SR22 POH?
Cheers
Rick
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OK
Have removed the H in the S bit
I think all my questions regarding engine failure fit the above ?
seems very like the previous extraction I saw from the FM do you have section10? but still very different from the advice posted here to use the CAPS for literally any engine failure
Pace
Have removed the H in the S bit
if you stay on the issue of training and decision-making, then we can have a productive dialog.
For forced landings, it says "If flight conditions or terrain does not permit a safe landing, CAPS deployment may be required. Refer to Section 10, Safety Information, for CAPS deployment scenarios and landing considerations."
Pace
I think it is time to put a fork into this thread, it is done like dinner.......
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Safety action
As a result of discussions arising from this accident and others, the CAA is
considering enhancing publicity to the GA community concerning the operation
of light aircraft equipped with advanced avionic and ballistic recovery systems.
As a result of discussions arising from this accident and others, the CAA is
considering enhancing publicity to the GA community concerning the operation
of light aircraft equipped with advanced avionic and ballistic recovery systems.
Pace