The most unnecessary chute pull ever?

[Adrian N]

Sure, pilots should learn how to recover from a spin. It's fun. However:

don't presume a handle is going to fix it.

Well, actually yes it is. The manufacturer, the FAA, EASA, and the certifying authorities in every other country where the Cirrus is approved all agree that the best way to recover from a spin with minimum loss of altitude is to pull the handle.

If you spend some time reading fatal accident reports for other aircraft, you come across case after case where pilots spun to the ground. They should have been able to recover, but as was pointed out above, if a pilot is bad enough to get into an accidental spin it's asking a lot for them suddenly to be good enough to recover from it. The penalty for being an incompetent pilot doesn't have to be death.

About the same amount as you waste in fuel lugging a brs around for 100 hours.

Is it really your considered opinion that "lugging a BRS around" is just a waste of fuel?

[India Four Two]

I have had low experience in both the SR20 and 22 but of the two found the lower powered SR20 had a more balanced feel to the aircraft rather than the 22.

Pace,

That's an interesting observation. I've only had one flight in an SR 22 and I found it a delight to fly manually. Bearing in mind that the object of my flight was to see how the automation worked, I did two takeoffs, two landings and a go-around from an ILS, with no prior upper-airwork and had absolutely no difficulties.

What exactly do you mean by "a more balanced feel"?

Why the hell would a competetent Pilot in control of the aircraft get into a spin?

007, the short answer is "easily". I'll preface my slightly longer answer, by stating that I like spinning. I've done hundreds of spins in Chipmunks and in gliders and quite a few spins in an assortment of other aircraft, mainly Citabrias and C172s.

I've done spins and recoveries on partial panel in C172s and I've taught spinning in gliders, where some of my heavier students rapidly learnt the difference between a spin and a spiral dive, if they didn't hold the stick back on the stop.

So, concerning your competent pilot, I can envisage a situation where a pilot routinely flies in IMC, relying on the autopilot and then has an autopilot failure in cloud. If he has not routinely practiced manual flying on instruments, I can see him easily losing control. Admittedly, it would be more likely a spiral dive than a spin, but the result would be the same, unless he came out of cloud or had the red handle in a Cirrus.

Concerning the spin testing, it's interesting to note that three of the four cases were only tested at forward CG. I find that somewhat surprising.

[007helicopter]

So, concerning your competent pilot, I can envisage a situation where a pilot routinely flies in IMC, relying on the autopilot and then has an autopilot failure in cloud. If he has not routinely practiced manual flying on instruments, I can see him easily losing control. Admittedly, it would be more likely a spiral dive than a spin, but the result would be the same, unless he came out of cloud or had the red handle in a Cirrus.

I think the problem I have with this is "if he can not routinely fly in IMC with an auto pilot failure then that is the problem" and renders the pilot incompetent, his ability to recover from a spin is not even going to come into the equation as I would suggest very unlikely he will not recover.

I stand by my SOP and if I am in a spin for whatever reason (my lack of training, incompetency, mechanical or avionics failure) I will be pulling the chute.

I do not know the facts but I am not aware of any Cirrus Pilots that claim to inadvertently got into a spin and recovered, I know of a few that did not recover and I know about a few who pulled the chute and survived.

[mad_jock]

Is it really your considered opinion that "lugging a BRS around" is just a waste of fuel?

For me yes in a SEP.

The only situation I would want it and I haven't been trained to deal with is an in flight structural failure.

And the chances of that are so low on a youngish certified aircraft its a risk I am willing to take.

Apart from that give me the additional payload please.

And in flight failure of the magenta line will kill commercial pilots never mind ppl's and its something the industry is looking to solve.

[007helicopter]

And in flight failure of the magenta line will kill commercial pilots never mind ppl's and its something the industry is looking to solve.

What with a back up dual ipad's ?

Back to the spinning and avoiding it and if in it recovering, surely the pilot had to do many wrong things to get in that position, fly to slow (and not recognise it) stall the wing (and not recognise it and recover) so the chances if this is inadvertent of recovery is in my opinion very low.

A spin is an Aerobatic exercise that I personally believe has little value in time and money well spent for flying high performance GA aircraft. (Although I would like to do it some time for the experience only)

Stall and Spin accidents in GA are very often fatal and often at circuit altitude where recovery technique and the chute are useless so avoidance training is the key

[Pace]

007H

The problem with avoidance is that you have to identify what is happening to avoid it.
It is easy in an armchair position to say this should happen or that should happen very different on a dark night in poor visibility when a pilot is trying to locate a runway and his full concentration is outside the aircraft peering through the mist and rain while scared because the visual references are not adding up.

It is so easy to get slow, see something and over bank! Suddenly the pilot wakes up with a stall and huge wing drop. What good is avoidance then?

Or the pilot in IMC high level again distracted and scared because he has wondered into a storm cell? Suddenly he looses control enters a spin which he has no idea if he is in a spin or a spiral dive. Uses incorrect recovery methods probably for the wrong situation and breaks the plane.

YES YES YES avoidance is priority number UNO but its not enough. There are far too many silly avoidable accidents now which indicate aircraft drivers relying on fancy systems rather than Pilots with skills.

You only have to look through the Cirrus chute pull statistics and you think to yourself WHY WHY WHY? needless, stupid incidences which caused the knee jerk chute pull reaction.

Yes as in many walks of life people have to be protected from themselves and thank God for the chute as many have said its better they live than die but some come across as mountain walkers setting off in winter wearing a T shirt and shorts and wandering why they get into a mess.

The systems and BRS should compliment solid handling skills and experience not make up for a lack of those skills and experience.
I am sure the majority of pilots are serious people who put a lot into honing those skills and many do through organisations like COPA but then there is that minority who frankly I would not send my worst enemy up with never mind a loved one.

Pace

[Adrian N]

The only situation I would want it and I haven't been trained to deal with is an in flight structural failure.

That reminded me of a Cirrus crash in Florida. Here's what the NTSB said:

Although the airplane was equipped with an airframe parachute, an acquaintance of the pilot reported that the pilot would only use it in the event of a structural issue that rendered the airplane uncontrollable. Otherwise, if it were controllable, the pilot intended to hand-fly the airplane to landing. If the pilot had deployed the airframe parachute, he may have increased the likelihood of a successful emergency landing.

The pilot had 3,000 hours, and obviously thought that he had been trained and could deal with a forced landing in a flat grass field. On the day, he couldn't. He died, as did his wife. Their niece, who was in the back seat, was injured.

How about medical incapacitation? Catastrophic engine failure over rough terrain? Unexpected severe icing? Mid-air collision? I've had a lot of training too, but none of it has given me the secret to surviving those scenarios. And as for the more mundane forced landings, remember the statistic that was discussed earlier in the thread: around 20% of the fatalities in other high-performance singles (Mooneys and Bonanazas) occurred while attempting a forced landing - either due to unsuitable terrain or loss of control while manoeuvring to a landing site. That's a lot of dead people, and lots of them were far more skilled and experienced than me. Using BRS may not be as macho as pulling off a brilliant forced landing, but it does give you a much higher likelihood of living to fly another day.

You only have to look through the Cirrus chute pull statistics and you think to yourself WHY WHY WHY? needless, stupid incidences which caused the knee jerk chute pull reaction.

One could argue that the reaction hasn't been sufficiently "knee jerk", because more people have died in Cirrus accidents that would have been survivable if the chute had been pulled than have survived after using it.

Sure, people take dumb decisions and get themselves into difficulties. But if you spend some time reading the details of the Cirrus chute pulls, not a lot of them are the result of "needless stupid incidences". Some, maybe, once one has the benefit of hindsight, but at least the pilots lived. Lots of other pilots die needlessly and stupidly, and lots of Cirrus pilots have when simply pulling a handle would have saved them.

[Pace]

Adrian

what are we arguing here! How wonderful an escape route the chute is? NO that point is taken.

So what are you arguing that pilots do not need to have good handling capability any more because as long as they can drive the plane not fly it they can pull a chute?

from my point I am arguing that the chute and yes systems should compliment a pilots honed skills and experience and not be used as a get out of jail for free card.

You will always get the highly experienced pilot who messed up and on reflection may have been better pulling the chute but I am sure that works the other way around?

Is it possible that a fast spinning or spiral dive aircraft might tangle up in the chute? putting the aircraft in a no win situation?

YES a pilot has to make a quick judgement of whether to use the chute or not but I would rather that was based on experience and pilot capability than an " Its ok I can press on in this weather because if i cannot handle it i have the chute

Problem here is we are all going around in circle and I suspect are not really that far apart

pace

[India Four Two]

Although I would like to do it some time for the experience only

007,
I strongly urge you to try it. Not only for the experience (which can be fun), but also to become comfortable with seeing your aircraft in an unusual attitude and knowing what to do about it.

It could save your life one day.


Pace,
I think you are right. We are all not that far apart.

[Adrian N]

what are we arguing here!

We're not arguing. We're discussing!

I disagree with the assertions that the Cirrus chute pull statistics are filled with pilots who have made really stupid decisions followed by a "knee jerk" reaction to pull the chute. Most of the Cirrus chute pulls are not the result of pilots recklessly setting off into conditions that were beyond their abilities. A few might fall into that category, but really not many. Just under half of them have followed some sort of mechanical failure, where the pilot didn't want to risk a forced landing - a really good decision in the vast majority of cases. And just under half involved some sort of loss of control, usually in IMC, sometimes following unexpectedly severe icing. Some of those were the result of really bad decision making, but quite a few weren't.

I also think it is wrong to suggest that too many Cirrus pilots think "I can press on in this weather because if i cannot handle it i have the chute". Some of them might think "if I have an engine failure in this weather, the chute will let me survive where otherwise I would die", but I think that's different. I can't find any evidence to suggest that the parachute is used as a "get out of jail" card in the way you suggest. Yes, some pilots have used it having flown into really bad weather, but some pilots just overestimate their abilities, or underestimate the weather, or don't bother checking it - whatever aircraft they are flying. Once again, read through the Mooney or Bonanza accident reports and you will find staggering examples of pilots setting off into level 5 thunderstorms or severe icing or other conditions which they had no hope of surviving

Is it possible that a fast spinning or spiral dive aircraft might tangle up in the chute? putting the aircraft in a no win situation?

Cirrus test pilots spent months pulling the chute from every kind of attitude they could get the aircraft into, and didn't manage to tangle the aircraft up in it. It has been used in spins and spiral dives, and even at 34kt while inverted - which is about the best way I can think of of trying to get tangled. So I guess the answer to your question is "no".

[Pace]

The airplane was in instrument meteorological conditions, and the pilot intended to fly an instrument landing system approach. Review of non-volatile memory data revealed that the autopilot approach mode was armed as the airplane intercepted the localizer course and was descending toward 2,600 feet mean sea level (msl). At that time, the autopilot was selected to vertical speed (VS) mode with the altitude armed rather than selected to the altitude mode, which is one of the criteria for automatically arming the glideslope (GS) mode later in the approach. About 1 minute later, the autopilot automatically cancelled the VS mode and switched to altitude mode as the airplane reached 2,600 feet msl. However, at that time the airplane was above the glideslope by 53 percent needle deflection. The autopilot will not automatically arm the GS mode unless, in addition to the altitude mode being selected, the airplane is more than 10 percent needle deflection below the glideslope. As a result, the airplane remained above the glideslope until the autopilot was disconnected about 1 minute later. The pilot then attempted to hand-fly a missed approach; however, he was unable to maintain the heading or altitude assigned by air traffic control. He subsequently lost control of the airplane during a turn and elected to deploy the airplane's parachute system. The airplane came to rest in a vacant lot.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be:
The pilot's failure to maintain airplane control during a missed approach in instrument meteorological conditions. Contributing to the accident was the pilot's overreliance on the autopilot system and his inability to hand-fly the airplane once the autopilot was disconnected.

The above is just one example I can cut and paste here there are many more equally ridiculous CAP pulls! What the heck was this guy doing IMC with as the NTS Board stated reliance on systems and inability to hand fly without the autopilot? I can show you many more examples.

The recent channel crash with a recommendation by the CAA to look at highly automated aircraft with CAPS would indicate that there is a problem with these pilots flying out of their depth and being lured by the systems and CAPS into situations they cannot handle

Safety action
As a result of discussions arising from this accident and others, the CAA is
considering enhancing publicity to the GA community concerning the operation
of light aircraft equipped with advanced avionic and ballistic recovery systems.

to just defend and say everything in the garden is rosy is frankly sticking ones head in the sand even the CAA are identifying a problem which needs addressing!
I fully accept we are talking about a small minority and most Cirrus pilots are well trained and extremely competent pilots but as with anything positive there are negatives too.

Pace

[Jonzarno]

Pace

This pilot clearly got behind the aircraft and screwed up flying the missed approach: no argument there. Chances are, though, that he had flown missed approaches before under training conditions and got it wrong under the pressure of having to do it for real.

One way of trying to address this is to do emergencies training in a full motion simulator but even that won't recreate the pressure of having to do it for real.

Whilst I agree with you that training which properly incorporates CAPS into emergencies handling is vital, calling this pull "ridiculous" is, well, ridiculous.

The mistake had already been made when the pilot decided to pull. If he hadn't pulled he would have died. Whatever went before, the final decision to pull was a good one.

With respect: this isn't the first time in this thread that you have used this kind of confrontational and emotive language. You're obviously a very experienced pilot, but, if I may say so, you don't help the valid points you make by spoiling them in this way.

Incidentally: as I asked earlier, when you do the 50 Cirrus hours you talked about earlier, do you plan to do proper training with an experienced CSIP and / or go to the CPPP I suggested? I really do recommend it no matter how experienced you are.

[Pace]

Whilst I agree with you that training which properly incorporates CAPS into emergencies handling is vital, calling this pull "ridiculous" is, well, ridiculous.

The mistake had already been made when the pilot decided to pull. If he hadn't pulled he would have died. Whatever went before, the final decision to pull was a good one.

If as the safety board indicated the pilot relied on autopilots and was incapable of hand flying then the ridiculous was not referring to pulling the CAPS but to being there in the first place and I don't change my stance on ridiculous! ! Thank God he had a CAPS to pull. The CAA have also noted a problem in their conclusions on the accident over the channel.

Pace

[Chuck Ellsworth]

With respect: this isn't the first time in this thread that you have used this kind of confrontational and emotive language. You're obviously a very experienced pilot, but, if I may say so, you don't help the valid points you make by spoiling them in this way.

For sure we don't want to hurt any feelings here.

So maybe I can help settle this safety feature that seems to generate so much disagreement here.

They should rename the chute feature and call it " The Darwin Solution".

[Jonzarno]

Pace

There are lots of examples of pilots dying after screwing up an instrument approach ranging from this one through to the Cork Airport crash involving an ATPL on a commercial flight. This one lived.

Any thoughts on the question I asked?

[Pace]

Any thoughts on the question I asked?

If you are saying that the aircraft has unique handling characteristics which need mastering then the answer would be yes. if not NO! I have had to many sets of keys thrown at me in the past and told to get on with it

If you are saying I need to thoroughly learn the Cirrus perspective glass then Yes but I hope that is on the ground and not wasting money in the air? And no I never rely on or trust autopilots or systems and am happy hand flying approaches and missed as any ATP should be.

So maybe

Pace

[Jonzarno]

I have had to many sets of keys thrown at me in the past and told to get on with it

Yeeesss...... Famous last words?

If you are saying I need to thoroughly learn the Cirrus perspective glass then Yes but I hope that is on the ground and not wasting money in the air?

An interesting "perspective". Having so strongly, and rightly, advocated training for other Cirrus pilots, I thought you might find it useful yourself, especially the part that covers CAPS use. But you obviously don't need that.

Enjoy your Cirrus flying!

[Adrian N]

What the heck was this guy doing IMC with as the NTS Board stated reliance on systems and inability to hand fly without the autopilot?

Like Jonzarno said, he screwed up. From the report submitted by the pilot he had 1950 hours and an instrument rating, with good currency. He was also a flight instructor. It is simplistic just to say he was unable to hand fly in IMC. He may have been a hopeless pilot using the autopilot to cover his incompetence, and relying on the parachute to get him out of trouble. But it's unlikely that he got the qualifications he had without knowing how to fly reasonably.

For comparison, there was a Mooney accident where the pilot lost control flying a missed approach in IMC. Quite similar, but for the fact that the pilot died. The pilot was a CFI, CFII, and a current military B1B pilot who, according to the accident report, 'had received an “exceptionally qualified” rating on last military mission and instrument flight review'. Even really good pilots screw up sometimes.

As for the channel accident, the very inexperienced pilot effectively flew VFR into IMC over water - as hundreds of other pilots have done over the years. The evidence suggests that he was anything but gung-ho about setting off into poor weather, and if he'd just been relying on the automation he would have carried on relying on it and returned to VMC at the French coast. If he had used his parachute when he lost control, he might not have died.

[Pace]

Jonzarno

I would never take any aircraft i was not totally comfortable with in any conditions I flew it in if that means a COPA course so be it.

Adrian obviously both the NTSB and CAA have got it wrong in their conclusions ? Maybe write to them correcting their mistaken conclusions.

All in the garden is Rosy so really I should drop out of this thread

Pace

[Adrian N]

The NTSB concluded that on the day of this accident the pilot relied too much on his autopilot and messed up the missed approach badly when trying to hand fly it. They didn't conclude that he was just an incompetent who shouldn't have been flying in IMC, and nor did they do any investigation into that. Their "probable cause" conclusions are notoriously summarised, and the reality is often a lot more nuanced than their black and white assertions imply. (Read Peter Garrison's "Aftermath" column in Flying magazine for a monthly example of that.)

Similarly the AAIB report didn't conclude that the pilot had been lured out of his depth by his avionics and the comfort blanket of his parachute. They didn't find a cause. They speculated it was probably VFR into IMC, that he probably disconnected the autopilot causing him to lose control, but that medical incapacitation couldn't be excluded. The fact that there's a safety recommendation (an ambigulous one - "enhancing publicity" to the GA community concerning operation of aircraft with BRS might mean reminding them to use it as soon as they lose control) doesn't imply they share your view that there is a general problem with incompetent pilots relying on technology and parachutes in their Cirruses.