Cirrus Chute Pull, 4 Survive landing in trees, 22/07/12

[Pace]

007H

Apologies for being a stubborn bugger There was a tragic PC12 crash at altitude which APPEARS to be Stall, spin, spiral dive, overstress!
With aircraft handling you cannot look at one area in isolation anymore than when I used to race cars I had to know about oversteer, understeer, slides, throttle control, Spins etc etc etc. They all added up to handling a car and being comfortable at speed out of shape.

The same goes with flying IMO. While we all hope to never get into an inadvertent situation its when we least expect, when we miss the recovery at incipient that those basic skills can save you.

If you never experience a spin are you going to sit there wondering if your in a spin or spiral dive? Easy to confuse if you have never experienced a spin yet both requiring very different recovery techniques and both requiring prompt identification and rectification!
So in that respect spinning in itself is irrelevant but handling is not.
I have had some old school instructors/examiners in the past who would put you and the aircraft twins included through your paces (twins up at 10=12K)

I would like to see more towards handling pilots rather than plane drivers.
If for no more than all these technological advancements become a real safety addition rather than a cover up for inadequate training.

Looking at the Cirrus recovery it worried me whether at different CoG the chute wires cables could not entangle themselves around the aircraft.
At that Altitude in that aircraft there was NO excuse not to recover other than a lack of training IMO.

Pace

[paulp]

Looking at the Cirrus recovery it worried me whether at different CoG the chute wires cables could not entangle themselves around the aircraft.
At that Altitude in that aircraft there was NO excuse not to recover other than a lack of training IMO.

First the chute system is designed to recover from any attitude including a spin. With over 30 activations in Cirrus and many more in other aircraft, your entanglement concern is not an issue. There was one issue very early on (see Australian accident) which resulted in an SB. As far as the accident that started this thread, it appears to be a cross country that wasn't quite half way when there was engine trouble at altitude. The pilot talked to ATC (I've listened to the recording) and diverted to Pickens County. When he saw he wouldn't make it he pulled. As for what was reported as a dive, I suspect that was really after the initial chute pull. It is a staged sequence. First the rocket fires which makes a loud sound. People on the ground have reported that this catches your attention. In this accident the guy on the ground heard a loud bang. As the rocket pulls the chute out, the plane points nose down with an unfurled chute behind it. The reefing cutters then fire and release the straps to the nose and the plane becomes horizontal as those rip out from the sides. All this happens quickly.

[421C]

I would like to see more towards handling pilots rather than plane
drivers. If for no more than all these technological advancements become a
real safety addition rather than a cover up for inadequate training.

Well, you are 30 years out of date in your thinking. Flight training used to emphasise maneouvers and handling exercises and resulted in pilots who crashed planes because they were inadequately trained in decision-making, SRM, integrating modern systems into their flying and real-world scenarios that present threats. The emphasis in Cirrus training is very much the modern approach. A Cirrus pilot needs the skills to autonomously captain an aircraft on long trips across a variety of environments, making the right decisions and using the right resources. A traditional "handling" focused course, like the UK PPL, teaches people "captaincy" only to the extent of operating an obsolete aircraft in ideal conditions under the close supervision of a school in the local area of that school.

Of course any pilot needs basic handling skills. But I think you are wrong that there is a systematic problem with handling skills or technology substituting for handling skills in GA. Most studies identify decision-making and SRM as the key problems. Let's face it, handling skills and methods haven't changed much since the 1930s. All the vast improvements in commercial aviation safety since then are the result of technology and CRM/SOP methods. Handling has nothing to do with it. So ironically, my view would use your own words but reversed, I think that training should focus more on producing all-round "plane drivers" and not just "handling pilots".

I can't say I am an expert on any of this, so please take it as a friendly exchange of different views and no more!

[Pace]

Paul

Firstly I am not knocking the Cirrus or chute system as I think it is an amazing development in light single GA aircraft.
I hope others follow suit and also build in such a system to their aircraft as I feel it does and can save lives in what can be a very cruel passion if things go wrong.
I have just two concerns one that pilots maybe lulled into situations above their or the aircraft limits.
Two that priority should still be piloting skills and abilities with this system complimenting those skills and abilities not covering the lack of skills and abilities.
Apart from that I am convinced of the chutes reliability and potential to save lives.

Pace

[Pace]

421C

I have the greatest respect for your knowledge and considered opinion.
I cannot agree with you on this subject and do not agree that handling is 30 years out of date. Maybe more handling would have helped the outcome of the very very sad and tragic PC12 crash ?
Regardless yes we have much higher technology and more complicated airspace but little changes in aviation.
Anyway best to agree to disagree on this one : )
Looking forward to flying the Cirrus on a regular basis

Pace

[421C]

Pace

To be clear, I am not saying handling is out of date! I am saying that a view of pilot training that focuses on handling and maneuvers and does not integrate technology, SRM, decision-making, scenario/LOFT training etc is out of date.

To some extent I am not really arguing with you, but against a certain kind of traditional view of training that emphasises the minutae of handling exercises and ignores the rest, particularly in having a suspcion of "over reliance on technology" whilst teaching zilch about any GA technology developed since the 1960s. I'd characterise much UK training this way.

On the PC12 tragedy, it is hard to say. Certainly, on the margin, in some thunderstorm encounters, I guess real skill in handling might just save the day. There's always a story out there where amazing "right stuff" averted disaster, my favourite is the IAF pilot who landed an F15 with one wing. But the banal point remains that I don't think deficiencies in handling skills are a major issue for GA safety. Perhaps the odd damage to landing gear etc. The PC12 descended >10000' in ~30s. That ain't a spin. Practical training on weather planning, storm detection and avoidance, threat and error management etc I think is going to help more than aeros training in the event you encounter a storm.

brgds
421C

[Gertrude the Wombat]

IAF pilot who landed an F15 with one wing

This one?

1983 Negev mid-air collision - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

He was later quoted as saying "(I) probably would have ejected if I knew what had happened." However, he also (incorrectly) stated that above a certain speed, the F-15 acted "like a rocket" and didn't need wings.

When to pull the handle, when not to?

[paulp]

Pace: My comment was regarding your fear about entanglement.

Be careful with general statements including being able to recover at altitude. One chute pull involved a CFI and aerobatic pilot who was at something like 16,000'. He was in clear air but over an undercast. The next thing he knew he was upside down in the clouds. The speculation involves rapidly building clouds which can rise at 5000'/minute. I back his decision to pull rather than try to recover in the clouds and over mountains. An interesting side note was that the Christmas ornaments in the luggage compartment survived intact.

[Pace]

Paul

I think we can get lost in the technology facts are that airframes other than being built out of composites have changed little in layout in 60 years!
Technology yes and the ability to reliably lower an aircraft and it's occupants to the ground safely had to be one of the most exciting developments!
When everything is running right flying is pretty easy it's when the technology breaks down or things go wrong that we are left with basic flying and handling skills.
IR flying is actually a handling flying skill hence why in a test we are expected to hand fly in the raw! No autopilot and minimal nav!
The same goes with pure handling.
421 C highlighted the high descent rate with the PC12! As not being a spin ! How many spins end up in a spiral dive and without knowing and being familiar with both confusion could easily cause the incorrect recovery methods and hence a breakup of the airframe!
Technology and terminology is all fantastic but most important of all is still handling piloting skills which in themselves lead to correct descision making !

Pace

[englishal]

Maybe more handling would have helped the outcome of the very very sad and tragic PC12 crash ?

We don't know anything about what the pilot in the PC12 was or was not trying to do. Maybe the aeroplane had entered a spin previously and he'd already recovered that using exceptional skills before something else happened. Maybe the aeroplane wouldn't allow him to recover...Who knows, but I do know the PC12 is not authorised for intentional spins making it no different to a Cirrus in that respect. So why don't we forget about that accident in relation to this discussion as it is not relevant.

[007helicopter]

When to pull the handle, when not to?

This really is the big question point for me.

I have blatantly planned and made my mid up when I will use the chute:

1) that in the event of virtually all off airport landings for what ever reason (unless I can guarantee the quality of the surface which is unlikely)

2) In the event I lose control of the aircraft through pilot error, disorientation, mechanical failure.

3) Over Sea requiring a ditching.

4) Find myself out of my depth in conditions I can not assure a safe landing due to WX, ice or anything else I should have totally avoided but for whatever reason failed to.

This is at odds with other's, and I can fully understand why, because I use to think in exactly the same way. In four years of flying with the CAPS and observing outcomes of both successful and unsuccessful off airport landings my attitude has changed to what it is now.

I understand others will cite that as lack of confidence, insufficient training, being a cop out and becoming a passenger for the ride rather than control the aircraft to the ground.

I firmly believe none of those are valid, but my firm opinion as PIC on what I consider the safest and least life threatening option when in an uncontrolled situation, under extreme pressure, into a totally unknown and unexpected landing area.

Sooner or later there will be one or more CAPS pulls that do not turn out well and this will skew the so far 100% success rate quite dramatically, The CAPS is far from risk free, high winds, landing on wires, or a road, all sorts of factors could go wrong, but for me this is still the choice I have made and hope if ever I need to take the decision it will be taken in time to save me and my PAX rather than leave it to late and then the option has gone.

Others have a totally different opinion, in fact I would guess the vast majority of the GA population would not agree with this stance and maybe think it irresponsible , a reasonable proportion of the Cirrus owners would agree but certainly a fair few would not.

It is not a fair to compare this attitude if say a 172 had a BRS would I choose the same strategy, maybe, maybe not, for off airfield landings, A 172 with bigger wheels, lower landing speed is much better equipped to land with a better outcome in random fields.

[Pace]

007H

We are probably not as far apart as when to pull the chute as you imagine!
Loss of control ? I would attempt recovery but add a ceiling where I knew there was still room to effectively use the chute! Failure to recover use the chute.

Engine failure ? I may use the chute depending on what's below !

Night ? Definate use of chute

Over fog or very low cloud use chute

Engine failure over densely built up area? I would try to Glide clear with responsibility to those on the ground! If no chance of gliding clear use chute!

Over water ? Depends on water conditions and winds although the two don't go together! Heavy winds heavy seas : )

I would avoid the chute where the aircraft is flyable but this discussion has opened up other options for using it !

Would it encourage me to push my luck ? Probably yes if I am
Being honest : )

Pace

[007helicopter]

Engine failure over densely built up area? I would try to Glide clear with responsibility to those on the ground! If no chance of gliding clear use chute!

Pace, agree with that, I think the area we would probably not agree over a pint is the risk ratio of landing in fields, we did cover that in detail so no need to go over again but I still think a very good debate as may provoke thoughts.

[421C]

When everything is running right flying is pretty easy it's when the
technology breaks down or things go wrong that we are left with basic flying and handling skills.
....
Technology and terminology is all fantastic but most important of all is still handling piloting skills which in themselves lead to correct descision making

Who is saying that handling is not important? No-one. But what handling skills don't do is trump everything else. I could equally reverse what you've said....eg. when handling skills break down, we are left with technology. Professional pilots of the 1930s or 1950s I am sure had a high level of your right-stuff "handling skills". But they crashed all the time.

Take CFIT. Historically, one of the biggest killers in CAT or GA. What the @?!%* does handling have to do with CFIT avoidance? There's a plateau beyond which no amount of navigation, CRM and SOP training is going to improve CFIT accident rates because crews of one or two human pilots are going to make mistakes. The vast improvement beyond this plateau was down, initially, to GPWS and, ultimately, EGPWS. Of course, it doesn't eliminate CFIT entirely, but it has done for all practical purposes enroute, although not in the final approach phase if people are going to descend below minima or attempt approaches in IMC to VFR airports.

It's easy, sadly, to read of CFIT accidents in light aircraft in Europe. I don't ever remember reading of an enroute CFIT in a light aircraft equipped with TAWS. You could argue that TAWS in light aircraft might lead to "over-reliance" and over-confidence and thus more danger. But, I believe the evidence is that this is totally false and that TAWS is a major safety benefit.

With technology, training and handling, my sense is the right answer is balance. Let's use the Air France crash in the South Atlantic as an example. It led to loads of forum pontificators bemoaning the loss of real-man handling skills in airline flying. As a totally non-expert GA bloke I am not going to have a view with much validity, but, nevertheless, my view is that modern airline technology and training methods avoid 10 or 100 accidents for every one that could be attributed to a lack of handling skill. I am sure the industry has taken on lessons from the AF tragedy, but I doubt it will change the balance I mention in terms of technology and training.

In GA, let's face it, the balance of training is towards handling and maneouvers. It's better in the US, but certainly very traditional in the UK. A Cirrus pilot still has to complete courses and pass checkrides predominantly related to handling. Being realistic, after 100 years of people being taught to fly small airplanes I don't think we will see major improvements in what handling skills can be expected of a typical private pilot. Similarly, I don't see that serious GA accidents are significantly down to handling skill issues, certainly not ones that could be avoided by more 'extreme' aerobatic or spin training.

It seems to me that the Cirrus philosophy is down to augmenting the basic private pilot's "hygiene level" handling skills with safety technology. The recommendations of the Cirrus training community on CAPS deployment I think simply recognise the reality of risk. If CAPS has a very low risk (say 5%), then deployment in a scenario where attempting a non-CAPS emergency landing or recovery has a risk of more than 5% is the right thing. It is not "complacent" or "over-reliant", it is the correct decision-making. Yes, the success rate of forced landings or loss of control at higher altitudes should be quite high. But if the success rate of CAPS deployment is higher, then shouldn't pilots deploy?

My sense of your concern about "over reliance" is that, in fact, the Cirrus community became concerned with "under reliance" - ie. that there were too many fatal accidents without CAPS deployment where pilots were relying on their handling skills and not on the technology, hence the emphasis on deployment in recent years.

Note that this is entirely a statistical argument. One rarely reads of an accident report where better actions by the pilot wouldn't have avoided a tragedy. Of course one could point back to that and say "well if he'd had 5hrs proper aeros training etc etc". But the point on CAPS is that given the realistic plateau that one can get to with private pilot handling training, there are many scenarios where CAPS deployment is statistically the better course of action, even if someone could read about it afterwards and think with superior handling skills, they'd have saved the day.

brgds
421C

[peterh337]

Except that population stats are not valid for any individual except the average one, who probably doesn't exist.

If I have an engine failure, and I see loads of nice looking fields (which frankly is the case most of the time when flying in half decent wx) and somebody tells me the chance of killing myself in a field landing is 5%, and the chance of killing myself under the chute is 3%, I will still go for the field landing.

Perhaps with a "decision height" equal to the min chute activation height...

It's like the stats about flying being similarly risky to motorcycle riding. With about 100k miles on bikes, in the 1970s and 80s, I don't buy that at all. Bikes are much more risky to the careful rider because most bike deaths are (and always have been) caused by a car driver - often in a manner where the car driver gets away with it. With all the half blind drivers, and many crazy drivers, I wouldn't ride a bike now if you paid me for it.

The other thing is that if I land smack down vertically with a say 20G shock under a chute, and the plane is salvaged and repaired, I will still want to chuck away all the avionics, but the insurance company isn't going to pay for that.

Many people say that the instant your engine stops, the plane is the property of the insurance company. That is actually true only if you are a self fly hire flyer (whatever happens you can stick a finger up and walk away) or in very narrow circumstances (engine failure at night, above "impossible" terrain, above a forest, above a low overcast/fog) but the rest of the time an aircraft owner will be considering his flying future which is likely to be impacted by a really stupid aircraft write-off decision.

I consider myself to be an average pilot, but given a decent starting height I would hope to be able to do a field landing, in the same way I can fly a glide approach onto a 18m wide runway, etc. And if I am not established on a nice "final" at the chute decision height, I will pull the chute.

[007helicopter]

421C good post,

I think in the USA there are several Cirrus CFIT with TAWS enroute, they do have much bigger mountains that certainly you sometimes wonder in ammazment at what on earth was the pilot was thinking taking off in the weather / night / icing etc etc. It happens and Pilots in all GA types will keep on killing themselves.

Anyway back to this CAPS pull, preliminary report has come out and I have to say a bit confusing, did he have total loss of power or shut the engine down? which would seem odd for a prop over speed.

Either way he felt he lost control by around 1000ft despite initially have sufficient altitude and speed. Once realised he had lost control and not going to make the runway he pulled the chute so in my mind did the right thing and walked away.



NTSB Identification: ERA12LA473
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Sunday, July 22, 2012 in Pickens, SC
Aircraft: CIRRUS DESIGN CORP SR22, registration: N138CK
Injuries: 4 Uninjured.



This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.


On July 22, 2012, at 1705 eastern daylight time, N138CK, a Cirrus SR-22, was substantially damaged during a forced landing in Pickens, South Carolina. The commercial pilot and three passengers were not injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and no flight plan was filed for the flight that departed Cobb County Airport-Mc Collum Field (RYY), Atlanta, Georgia, and was destined for Piedmont Triad International Airport (GSO), Greensboro, North Carolina. The business flight was conducted under the provisions of 14 CFR Part 91.

According to the pilot, he fueled the aircraft "to the tabs" and performed a preflight and run-up inspection prior to takeoff from RYY. No abnormalities were noted during the inspections. The pilot departed, and as the airplane climbed through an altitude of 800 feet, he noted the oil temperature was "in the green" (about 190 deg) and the airspeed was about 130 knots.

A few minutes later, the pilot felt a "wiggle," or a slight vibration from the engine, as the airplane continued to climb. The engine RPMs began to rise rapidly and he noted an engine oil pressure warning on the primary flight display (PFD). The pilot applied full mixture, turned the fuel pump on, and manipulated the throttle. He also assured the magnetos were in the "on" position. The pilot thought he may have had a propeller overspeed condition, so he reduced the throttle; however, the RPMs remained high. He then secured the engine and declared an emergency with Greer Approach Control, with whom he had been communicating. The air traffic controller informed the pilot that Pickens County Airport (LQK) was at his "10:00 and 4 miles," and the pilot turned toward the field and prepared for a forced landing. He noted the RPMs were not decreasing as he pitched the airplane down for the descent (the airspeed was about 110-120 knots). The pilot attempted unsuccessfully to restart the engine, and then re-secured it while on the downwind leg of the traffic pattern for runway 23 at LQK. He believed he had plenty of airspeed and altitude, when he turned base at 1,200 feet, and added one notch of flaps.

As the pilot added the flaps, he felt the handling characteristics of the airplane change, and it began to feel "mushy." He then retracted the notch of flaps and the condition became worse. As the airplane descended through 1,000 feet, the pilot felt as if he had "lost control of the airplane" and decided to pull the emergency parachute. The parachute deployed and within seconds the airplane settled into the trees. The airplane remained suspended in the trees until emergency personnel arrived on-scene and rescued the occupants.

Examination of the airplane by a Federal Aviation Administration inspector revealed the presence of oil on the underside of the airplane. An examination of the engine was planned for a later date after the airplane was recovered from the trees.

[007helicopter]

If I have an engine failure, and I see loads of nice looking fields (which frankly is the case most of the time when flying in half decent wx) and somebody tells me the chance of killing myself in a field landing is 5%, and the chance of killing myself under the chute is 3%, I will still go for the field landing.

Peter that is a perfectly reasonable argument and strategy and probably a fairly safe one, the key is to at least constantly consider CAPS before it gets to late and then not an option.

Manufacturers recommendations is 2000ft but it is pretty much from practical evidence still proven successful at 1000ft and much lower, I would still pull lower if in a bad place.

My main personal problem with your strategy is the ability to positively identify a "nice field" what looks good at 1000ft can look horrible on the ground and the Cirrus is not forgiving in marginal terrain with an awful lot of energy at anywhere from 60-70 knots or higher if bothched.

I also think the chance of killing yourself, landing under stress in the best looking filed available is higher than 5%, who know but I would think death or serious injury in a Cirrus in this scenario maybe somewhere from 10-20% for the average guys. But I appreciate my guess no better than yours.

The stretching the glide if coming up short is another problem leading to a fatal stall.

[Pace]

007H

It does worry me your concern at a forced landing!
If a pilot stretches the glide and stalls that is a fault in the pilot or training.
With a forced landing even with a slight wind your ground speed will not be that high.
The difference is you will be in command of where you go in the air and even on the ground.
If the field is rougher than you thought you may damage the undercarriage ?
But I do not believe that there are that many fatalities or serious injuries from
Forced landings as long as you keep the thing flying and do not stall out!
With the chute pulled you no longer have any control and on windy days may not just have to suffer a high descent rate into the ground but also 30 odd kts forward speed.
You will also wreck the aircraft while in a forced landing you may have no damage or minimal damage compared to the chute.
Even taking out a hedge is not that big a deal!
Yes NO suitable landing site pull the chute but I still do not see the chute as an answer to all!

Pace

[007helicopter]

It does worry me your concern at a forced landing!
If a pilot stretches the glide and stalls that is a fault in the pilot or training.

While we practice PFl's on generally good vis days with a cosy instructor sat by our side (for most) and often go around at x 100ft it is a whole different ball game with the full on stress of a genuine engine failure, adrenaline pumping around and a host of other worries, plenty have stalled it in when trying a forced landing including several Cirrus Fatal's of Pilots far more competent than myself.

The difference is you will be in command of where you go in the air and even on the ground.

You will have a degree of control but massively reduced and if you do not like what you see as you get closer then options are minimal to say the least.

If the field is rougher than you thought you may damage the undercarriage ?

Or cartwheel, flip, bounce and still stall it in.

But I do not believe that there are that many fatalities or serious injuries from Forced landings as long as you keep the thing flying and do not stall out!

As above, you, I or any other Pilot could stall in a forced landing situation, how ever competent they think they are, it could and does happen.

With the chute pulled you no longer have any control and on windy days may not just have to suffer a high descent rate into the ground but also 30 odd kts forward speed.

Generally very true other than the rate of descent at 17knots I do not consider that high, the more worrying factor is a strong wind could as well as add to forward momentum it could drag the aircraft once landed, that is a genuine risk to be considered when deciding on using CAPS.

You will also wreck the aircraft while in a forced landing you may have no damage or minimal damage compared to the chute.

Various Chute pull aircraft have been fully repaired and put back in service but that would not be a consideration I would factor in to my decision making process. If I write off the aircraft so be it.

You may have minimal damage in a forced landing or you may have a dead pilot and passengers, the odds are to high in my book to be landing Cirrus in fields.

I flew over Kent today with this in my mind today and to be frank there were few fields I would fancy when you factor in those with high crops, steepish inclines, trees at each end, walls and sturdy looking fences, Animals etc A few weeks ago I would have added water logged fields to the list.

[007helicopter]

Apologies for being a stubborn bugger

No worries, so am I..