None mentioned in the manual.

you dont need a specific stall warning system to know of an impending stall.

I don't know about that, Ultralights. If you don't often go out and do stall refreshers in XXX type, how would you know? The reason stall warning systems are put in aeroplanes is so the pilot gets advance notice of what is about to/may happen. If you know your aeroplane really well, fair enough, but if you don't or if it is a vicious bugger, then...

Turning onto final... even the experts get it wrong...

I'd be very surprised that it didn't have a stall warning, unless specifically certified without.

The Heron and the Dove in original form didn't have stall warnings as they were specifically certified by the UK CAA without any.

Re artificial stall warnings .. it depends on the aircraft shake, rattle and roll characteristics.

Current light aircraft requirements at FAR 23.207.

Aerostars don't have them

Yep. Eg C-152 requires a horn, PA-23 doesn't because it exhibits sufficient buffet.

The expert would have had a stall warning in his Cirrus, but apparently still managed to stall it.

Should anyone really, really want to know stall warning requirements, the type received certification September 8, 1947 under Transport Category, CAR 4a.

http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Gu...20Rev%2010.pdf

Edited to add: Had a look, no requirement I could find.

Having just read all of this I think the elephant in the room, as evidenced by the full right aileron & neutral rudder deflections visible as the aircraft started to spin, is the lack of effective spin training in GA - something that gliding (my world) still does very well. It seems like there are several reasons why he got into the situation but essentially he failed to immediately recover from an incipient spin/wing drop when very low. Sad.

CAR 4a specifies compliance with CAR 4b for transport category flight test requirements ... takes time to find it all ....

Training and stall warners aren't going to help you get out of a situation like that at that level. Disorientation would mean the pilot would possibly react inappropriately to visual and aural cues...if he saw or heard them. The series of decisions that took the aeroplane to that point are what caused the aeroplane to run out of numbers and stop flying.

I agree that it was probably a series of decisions/circumstances that got him there Clare Prop (as in just about every accident) but I think it's unfortunate that GA training organisations spend so little time training for an instinctive & correct recovery for just this kind of scenario. With early recovery actions (right rudder, forward stick - no aileron - & full power) this may well have been recoverable in my opinion .. but yes, much better to not get in the situation at all. Humans will always make errors - best to minimise the consequences with appropriate training.

Rich, conventional wisdom is that the practice of teaching stall/spin training caused more accidents, therefore it was removed from the PPL syllabus.

All you get is a demonstration with the admonition, "don't do this". The syllabus deliberately warns against teaching a student how to spin or practice a recovery apart from the "dancing on the rudder to pick up a dropped wing" BS.

I had to sign up for aeros to get taught to spin and recover. Still rusty on the process because there isn't an acrobatic aircraft for training within 100 miles of where I live.

There are some interesting observations from driver training. You see the occasional A Current Affair story from some driver training organisation (or course with no commercial interest in the outcome...) saying "if only people were taught advanced driving techniques they'd know what to do if they lose control." Which on the face of it sounds sensible. Except that where it has been tried, from memory in Scandinavian countries, it had the opposite effect and fatal accidents actually went up. I understand mainly because it meant people learnt a skill then forgot in 3 months, but retained the overconfidence. Flying isn't driving of course and there is some opportunity to make people demonstrate the skills occasionally, but still...

I think the better 'conventional wisdom' is to practice how to avoid getting in the situation in the first place.

I knew someone who was terrified of stalling the aircraft. Their partner, a very experienced pilot, had her fly it at normal cruising height all the way from departure to destination (a ~50nm hop) with the stall warning on all the way, so she could actually feel what the aircraft was doing, and how it reacted as it got a bit slow. This meant it took an hour to make the flight, rather than the normal half.

She reckoned it was a more valuable exercise for her than going up and practicing fully developed stalls. There's still a big place to practice stalls, though, as an exercise in why not to loose control in this manner.

Perhaps skid training in cars should be carried out using a similar philosophy.

I'm with Clare Prop: It was the decision making and general handling that was flawed, probably by the time the aircraft made its stall onset clear it was too late to do much.

How many of us, having gained the license/rating, then spend time on an ongoing basis, to play around with the behaviour of the aircraft near the edge of its envelope? For a lot, I think time and $ constraints would probably limit this sort of ongoing practice.

I was learning to fly (not in Australia) about the time that spinning was taken out of the syllabus and made optional. It was replaced by "slow flight awareness" pottering around right on the edge of the stall, horn blaring, keeping it in balance for a couple of hours from memory before you then did the fully developed stalls. People who wanted to do spinning went with the aeros instructor in the Chippy and did as as an aerobatic lesson.

Some interesting reading here:
An Evaluation of Stall/SpinAccidents in Canada 1999
http://www.richstowell.com/documents...a_TP13748E.pdf

In particular this part on Page 9 is relevant to this thread:
One feature that stands out in all except one of the 39 stall/spin accidents
examined is that knowing how to recover from the stall or spin was of no benefit to
the pilots in these circumstances. They stalled at altitudes so low that once the
stall developed, a serious accident was in progress.

I still reckon some correct and instinctive recovery action may have saved the day .. certainly trying to correct the wing drop with aileron and no rudder guaranteed it was going in. Stick & rudder flying, just like was taught back in the good old days when Mallards were built.

Even this Canadian research says "They (instructors) need to be able to teach their
students how to recover from these stalls as soon as the wing drops and before
autorotation develops" .. but everyone is saying the training is all too hard/not relevant .. confused!

I've done lots of stalls. Lots and lots. And a fair number of spins, in three different types, and I can't disagree with you. I used to practice stalls (and all sorts of other stuff) at least once a week, when I was flying lots. I was fortunate enough to be able to. I doubt the majority of pilots are able to maintain that level of currency.

I think, that in this kind of situation where there's been a stall/spin crash, that the pilots headspace was probably far enough away from what the aircraft was doing that the reaction time -even if stall recovery has been thoroughly taught - is likely to be excessive. By their very nature, it's clear these unintended events catch people by surprise.

I doubt that in this case recovery was possible once it was stalled. There may have been a brief opportunity before the wing started to drop, if the reaction had been correct and immediate. The out-of-spin aileron probably wasn't a mistake; it was more likely to have been a panic reaction, and by the time it was applied it was beyond recovery, anyway.

I believe that better training toward planning, and risk analysis regarding any proposed manouever, combined with some kind of resilience-against-surprise training might pay off better.

Still haven't seen the CASA Final Report...
But, my inexperienced/low hours personal opinion is...
- From a Human Factors angle, they were in danger the instant his lady occupied a Front Seat.
The concern about OAT/ engine performance was a distraction that possibly over-occupied the owner's mind. Understood in marksmanship, the wind can affect the shooter, more-so than the projectile.

A Pilot (PM) in the RH seat would have noticed the airspeed, and "mentioned" it... and if the PF doesn't react properly & immediately.. take control.
- A CFI did that to me once... still have the Lesson embedded...and tinnitus.

Seriously, later when taught to spin a full aerobatic 'plane, I'd add a quick touch of aileron to deepen the inside wing's stall and positively establish the spin.

Just like he did, sadly.

I was under the impression that analysis of available evidence was what was required in a report.
What input does "administration" have?

It shouldn't take two years to confirm what we already suspect. Dotting 'i's and crossing 't's means stuff all in the big picture which is what a report is about.

How long? Why so long?
 

Why so long for a report?
 

Report.when if.
 

https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-11-...eport/11718076

An investigation into the fatal 2017 Australia Day plane crash in Perth's Swan River that killed a pilot and his girlfriend in front of thousands of onlookers has suggested pilot error and poor procedures were to blame for the accident.

Key points:

• The plane was taking part in an air show in front of thousands of people
• It had completed two passes, but on the third it stalled at an "unrecoverable height"
• A report found this third manoeuvre was against air show procedures

Pilot Peter Lynch, 52, and his girlfriend Endah Cakrawati, 30, died when their plane nose-dived into the Swan River during an air show ahead of the city's annual fireworks display.

Tens of thousands of people watched in horror as the Grumman G-73 Mallard flying boat banked sharply before crashing into the water.

A final report into the crash from the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) has called for improved approvals and oversight for air show displays.

The report found the Mallard was supposed to conduct two circuits over the water following a Cessna Caravan aircraft being flown by a pilot who had experience flying in the air show.

"Following the Caravan was intended as a risk mitigator against the Mallard pilot's unfamiliarity with display flying over the Swan River," the report said.

RIP Peter

The report didn't mention the video posted to Instagram, which shows a woman's hands on the controls just before the crash, she also seems to start in the right seat then move to the left seat.

I would have thought that using this event to please followers on Instagram could be a contributing factor. I don't do Instagram but I understand there is a financial incentive to get your posts seen by as many people as possible? Maybe one more pass was needed to get the money shot? It shows she had her hands on the controls but had no qualifications to fly it and wasn't even supposed to be on board at all.