Hoosten,
I worked Approach for 21 years and we would regularly pass traffic info on behalf of adjoining sectors - both on our own initiative and on request of the adjoining sectors.

No you don't. You don't know what calls were made on the CTAF or if all the required DTI was provided and acknowledged.

What I do know is that safety dropped markedly when "close-in" CTAFs replaced the bigger MBZs. Having to operate on two radios at the same time can result in comm overload is not good and, I believe, will be a major contributing factor in this accident.

In any case, show us the money.

Two aircraft collided mid air. The system failed.

OK then, what "system"?

That's a good topic for a review into airspace in Australia.

Or rather someone within the system failed - commonly known as human error which we all realise, that despite the best of intentions, cannot be completely eliminated. Sad but true and not to make light of it.

People are part of the system; a failure of a human is a failure of the system.

That's why atsb reports and such examine the human factors at play to try to build more robust procedures.

And as human error can never be eliminated, no matter how hard you try, no system will ever be faultless.
Stay alert everyone.

But it can be reduced. That's why pilots participate in cyclic check and training, flight reviews etc. It's why we have developed checklists and crosschecking etc. All these came through studies and and research leading to redesigning of systems based around human factors. It's the basis for why T.E.M is now a mandatory competency for pilots.

Yes we know all that - so who f****d up this time ?

Tell that to the Renmark pilots operating a periodic review under supervision of a CASA FOI.

James Reason himself details the limits of process based safety in his books. In many ways Tony Kerns work takes over from James Reason. But personal responsibility doesn't fit well with a regulators mind set.

This forum is good at being unforgiving of pilots. But this accident had 4 very well qualified pilots with very good recency flying well equipped aircraft. Both had active IFR flight plans. Both were flying consistent with their flight plans. Personally, I cannot point to anything that would give me any comfort that the same thing would not have happened to me.

The ATSB report acknowledges that both aircraft were identified via ADS-B returns received by the AsA system (as opposed for F24 etc). The ATSB preliminary report acknowledges that the AsA system had the information that indicated a traffic conflict (note that I say system, not controller. Its unknown what the controller was presented). ATSB have departed from typical practice by not making any comment on the recorded radio transmissions in its preliminary report, nor presenting any transcripts. Which is curious.

This is going to be a complex report and I'll put money on the ATSB not publishing a final report for 3 years after the accident. But I'm pretty sure that airspace design (ie class E, CATAF and control step location), radio frequency boundaries, radio procedures and the concept of aircraft self separating in IMC are all likely to feature in the final report. These are all systems based issues.

This says a lot about what might be coming later.

No takers here, that's a sure thing.

I have the solution. Class c sfc -180 then class A above that. Ok let's do it

The bottom line is this.
Four people are dead because ATC could have separated them but did not.
Why not?
Because the level of service in any airspace is decided by the Office of Airspace Regulation which is required by Ministerial Direction to implement international best practice in airspace management.

VERY PLAINLY any system of airspace administration that is able to separate IFR aircaft but does not do so, in the full knowledge that those aircraft may be operating in conditions where they can not visually separate themselves is NOT applying any form of international best practice nor proven international systems.

No matter who overseas the OAR - it is their responsibility to carry out the Ministerial Direction and they have failed to do so.


Now let us make sure the Coroner and other investigative bodies are aware of the aspects of Aviation Legislation that you can bet nobody in CASA or AA will point them to.

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What law says the OAR must comply with ‘Ministerial Directions’, and where is the Ministerial Direction that says the OAR must implement international best practice in airspace management?

It might be worth having a look at what the Airspace Act actually says (here: https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2016C00178 )

Or ... and hear me out. When you're given traffic you could self separate. I think of the traffic at places like caboolture and know there is no way people are going to want to wait while soomeone else is doing an approach.

In a perfect world that can work well.

However I often rent an aircraft fitted with only a single radio; it's not possible to hear all relevant broadcasts when switching between the CTAF, AWIS and Centre (and other) frequencies.

But if cta then you will need to be on centre not the ctaf otherwise how do they seperate?

That's my point; one is not necessarily always on CTR with a single radio.