|
Love the attitude Hooters. Iv flown around the area enough to know that it is possible and the limiting issue is Airservices internal procedures in for Melbourne airspace. Everywhere else in the country traffic statements form a controller down stream is never an issue. On a daily basis I get traffic statements issued by approach for the next area, Center issuing a tragic statement from Moresby FIR, centre for an approach area. Controllers are capable of talking to each other and do it thousands of times a day.
It was made even more obvious that’s this is the case as the day after the accident traffic statements and alerts started to be issues in a much more timely manner. |
CAVOK92, you don't know what you're talking about. Simple. If that is attitude, so be it.
So, you get traffic on a daily basis from Approach for the next area? That is the single greatest load of bull**** I think I've read on this site. Another effing Australian airspace expert. |
Hooters. Thanks for the bout of confidence.
Every time I have been dropped out of CTA laterally or vertically I have been given a traffic statement even when the airspace is on seperate controller to who is underneath or next to. |
CAVOK92, I call bull**** on you being given traffic by an approach controller for the next sector you're dropping into 'on a daily basis'
Does not happen, if an approach controller wanted to give traffic, they would have stayed on sectors. I worked the MNG sector as an ATC for 18 years, I'm now teaching (and have done for years) IFR as an instructor into that airspace. You don't know what you are talking about in this accident scenario. |
Every time It has been warranted anywhere else I the country the traffic has been given to me. Your right, defiantly wouldn’t be daily as I would be working way to hard.
looking at this scenario also with significant IFR examining experience and significant experience in the area. The traffic information was not adequate. If I was in JQF and lived to tell the tale I would be ropable. Now we have established some inside knowledge. Could you please enlighten the rest of us as to why the traffic information was so poorly handled? Why Melbourne ATC’s procedures can’t be changed to provide traffic information at an appropriate time to inbound aircraft (at TOD)? |
HOOSTEN......Argue all you want and make excuses.....THE SYSTEM FAILED MISERABLY AND 4 PEOPLE ARE DEAD......
This should have been preventable, they weren’t doing 400 kts either and the system should have advised them in plenty of time to take appropriate action to avoid each other. Remember we had 3 very experienced Pilots ( no offense to the Thai trainee ) in those two Aircraft operating in a known environment with probably excess capacity available and they were still let down..... Now stop making excuses..... |
Hang about ACMS
I do not know Hooters but he is advocating change to the airspace classification, just as I am. The system is broken - but not at the workface level. It is broken at the management level in both OAR and Airservices. By definition, IFR aircraft can not separate themselves visually and giving them traffic does NOT solve the problem. IFR aircraft are frequently constrained to fly one flight path and one only - they have no choice; consider an instrument approach for example. Your are right to this extent: FOUR PEOPLE ARE DEAD because the SYSTEM IS A FAILURE. Fix the system not blame the worker who is only permitted to dish out traffic information. |
CAVOK92 & ACMS,
I have pointed out several times that the airspace set up, both boundaries and classification are deficient, I have gone into a bit of detail regarding the workload required from both sides of the fence in this scenario. You are both banging on about 'why wasn't traffic given sooner' I've pointed it out to you. To continue on about the timeliness of the delivery is to overlook the cause, it's a contributory factor yes, but it not the cause. Having an extra 5 minutes to consider the traffic may not have prevented this accident. Class E Airspace would have given these aircraft a much greater safety factor with positive separation. IFR traffic in high density Class G Australian airspace is archaic. I can have a conversation with either of you or anybody else about just what happens in this scenario, it is just too lengthy to 'back and forth' on a bulletin board. But to target an ATC in this instance is stupidly misguided and wrong. |
I’m not actually blaming the ATCO either......As a dumb Pilot I expect better of the system to protect us, is that too much to ask?.
and yes 5 minutes more would have made a big difference......Especially to the crew of JQF..... |
You won't be getting any better while there's a reliance on DTI in high density Class G.
You won't be getting any better when ADSB surveillance is 'there' and it's not used for CTA service. Better requires a fundamental shift from those that have the 'power' to mandate airspace change. |
Another weak report from the ATSB. It is dramatically late and despite the fact that they have (Area) had radio transcripts for weeks, there is scant reference to them in the preliminary report.
The report does however confirm that both aircraft had ADS-B which was being received by ATC. The preliminary report also confirms that neither aircraft was in in VFR conditions. The system that we have all had to invest large amounts in equipment upgrades in our aircraft and it would appear to have not given the safety improvement we were promised. Hootsen suggests that both boundaries and classification are deficient Cavok suggests that " Airservices internal procedures in for Melbourne airspace" are to blame. Advance says "The system is broken - but not at the workface level. It is broken at the management level in both OAR and Airservices. By definition, IFR aircraft can not separate themselves visually and giving them traffic does NOT solve the problem. IFR aircraft are frequently constrained to fly one flight path and one only - they have no choice; consider an instrument approach for example." Either way, the cause of this accident lies at the feet of AsA and / or OAR. And I think if previous submissions were reviewed, it would be found that they had warnings. There is not the faintest hint in the preliminary report that either aircraft crew has contributed as was speculated by many on this forum immediately after the accident. 4 people are dead because they put their trust in a deficient system that failed them. Compare the attention that 4 police officers who died on the Eastern freeway is getting. It would appear that at least 1 person will go to jail for a long time for the Eastern Freeway incident. This is an event of greater significance and should get the same attention. |
ACMS and CAVOK92,
If you are happy that four people died because of a broken system and are content to just whinge on a bulletin board then that is your right. BUT if you want to change the system then recognise what serious experts are telling you is true. Get on to Worksafe, the Victorian Police, the AFP, your local MPs and point out that the Airservices organisation responsible for separating aircraft had the means to do so but did not; that the CASA OAR organisation charged with implementing international best practice in airspace administration has failed to do so. If you simply criticise how the ATC did the job you will find he/she did exactly what they are paid to do - nothing will change. A Ministerial question in Parliament is just a tiny annoyance to a public servant but imagine if a homicide detective or coronial investigator walks in to their office.......... that might get their attention! Get AOPA or AFAP or any organisation you are a member of behind you. And it would be really great if Civil Air (the ATC union) started telling their employer that change must happen to protect their members against possible criminal charges. |
|
Originally Posted by thorn bird
(Post 10786500)
|
Folks - It is great to see some hitherto unknown names joining this crusade, so please read the Minister's Airspace Policy Statement (AAPS) and reflect on the fact that, regardless of his words, we do not provide Class E airspace for any uncontrolled airports with RPT services, never mind those that do not have RPT:
Mr Jim Wolfe General Manager Air Traffic Policy Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development GPO Box 594 CANBERRA CITY 2601 Phone: (02) 6274 7611 Fax: (02) 6274 7804 |
Originally Posted by Meester App
It is great to see some hitherto unknown names joining this crusade
|
Originally Posted by Mr Approach
(Post 10787392)
Folks - It is great to see some hitherto unknown names joining this crusade, so please read the Minister's Airspace Policy Statement (AAPS) and reflect on the fact that, regardless of his words, we do not provide Class E airspace for any uncontrolled airports with RPT services, never mind those that do not have RPT:
Mr Jim Wolfe General Manager Air Traffic Policy Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development GPO Box 594 CANBERRA CITY 2601 Phone: (02) 6274 7611 Fax: (02) 6274 7804 Part 2—Australian Airspace Policy Statement 8 Minister must make Australian Airspace Policy Statement (1) The Minister must make a statement (the Australian Airspace Policy Statement). Note: Generally, CASA must exercise its powers and perform its functions in a manner consistent with the statement: see section 11A of the Civil Aviation Act 1988. Contents of statement (2) The statement must: (a) specify and describe the classifications to be used to administer Australian‑administered airspace; and (b) specify and describe the designations to be used for the purposes of restricting access to, or warning about access to, particular volumes of Australian‑administered airspace; and (c) describe the processes to be followed for changing the classifications or designations of particular volumes of Australian‑administered airspace; and (d) outline the Commonwealth Government’s policy objectives for the administration and use of Australian‑administered airspace; and (e) include a strategy for the administration and use of Australian‑administered airspace in the future. (3) The statement may also include any other matter the Minister thinks appropriate. Consistency with Chicago Convention (4) The statement must be consistent with the Chicago Convention. However, if Australia has notified differences under Article 38 of that Convention, the statement must be consistent with those differences. Legislation Act 2003 (5) A statement made under subsection (1) is a legislative instrument, but section 42 (disallowance) of the Legislation Act 2003 does not apply to the statement. Note: Part 4 of Chapter 3 (sunsetting) of the Legislation Act 2003 does not apply to the statement: see regulations made for the purposes of paragraph 54(2)(b) of that Act. 9 Consultation before making Statement (1) Before making the Australian Airspace Policy Statement, the Minister must consult: (a) CASA; and (b) Airservices Australia. (2) The Minister may also consult any other person or body the Minister thinks appropriate. 10 Statement must be reviewed every 3 years The Minister must cause the Australian Airspace Policy Statement to be reviewed at least once in each of the following periods: (a) the period of 3 years after it is made; (b) the period of 3 years after the completion of the last review. |
As mentioned previously, readers of this thread may be interested in the article I wrote in The Australian newspaper four years ago.
It is interesting that it was ignored by all the CASA people and the people at Airservices. I suppose the Board members of each organisation will say it is nothing to do with them and the Minister will say he knows nothing about airspace so it isn’t his responsibility. If I were a relative of one of the four pilots who lost their lives, I would be quite angry. |
Having operated in the lowered E over the last few days, and considering various traffic scenarios I was put in by fate, Dick, you will have to show us the money because Class E will NOT be cost-free.
BTW, I am disappointed you appear to be trying to leverage an agenda when you don't even know if the current system failed... |
I do know that the current system failed.
So does CASA , AsA and the ATSB. It’s all about delaying the truth so no one from these organisations will be held responsible. Imagine the situation for the poor controller. Seeing the aircraft disappear but knowing that the current regulations do not allow a control service to be provided. Complete madness. |
| All times are GMT. The time now is 12:17. |
Copyright © 2024 MH Sub I, LLC dba Internet Brands. All rights reserved. Use of this site indicates your consent to the Terms of Use.