A320 incident wrong lever in haste
 

Interesting, not surprised really as we are after all humans. I recall doing this exercise in the Sim years ago with no re-select of the flaps, sure got yr attention if you didn't firewall the bus (if not already) & lower the snout asap! Does show one thing though, with all the training, all the feel good CRM & multiple ground school feet putting to sleep days we can still stuff it up! Imagine how many similar acts are done daily world wide?

Very similar incident to a NJS Airlink BAe146 taking off out of Cairns in the nineties. Stick shaker and stick push activated. No immediate increase in thrust( flex thrust takeoff power).
ATC in tower hit the crash button as it disappeared (RWY 33) then watched it re-emerge from the hills.

There is also the selecting park brake instead of flap trick that will manifest itself as a very short field landing and blown tyres. Always a good lesson in confirming what you are doing with a lever before actioning the command.

Similar story except on short final in a Lincoln bomber at Townsville in the late 1950's. The pilot under instruction was our Commanding Officer, Wing Commander Cy Greenwood. He was a former prisoner of war of the Japs in 1943 after being shot down in his Beaufighter while strafing Jap float planes at Timor. The Japs weren't best pleased so they tortured him.

We were doing dual circuits in the Lincoln when he asked for full flap on final for runway 02 Townsville. The flap lever was a push/pull vertical selector with a neutral position after each flap selection.

I selected full flap for him and once the gauge showed full flap I selected the lever back to neutral as SOP. On very short final the Lincoln started to sink rapidly and fell out of the sky and bounced heavily.
The CO said "WTF" and firewalled all four engines and went around. Aircraft didn't have stick shakers in those days. The CO then asked for flap retraction as part of the go-around. I went to select flaps up then realised to my chagrin the flaps were already up.

Turned out when the CO had asked for full flap on final, I had inadvertently missed the neutral position of the flap lever and instead had selected flaps up. So the full flap landing turned out to be a flaps up landing but without increasing the Vref speed. The result was very heavy landing and very loud oaths by the CO and grovelling apologies by self the instructor..

Way back at what was probably the birth of human factors, flight crews confusing flap and gear levers was one of the first trends noticed by Dr Paul Fitts. That was back in 1947.

I'm barely into my PPL and can confirm that this almost happened to me already. We were taking off in a 152 and my instructor called for flaps to be raised in stages - instinctively my hand went to the flap lever, my eyes were on the horizon heads up and I "felt" my way to raising flap by 1 stage.

Cue my instructor shouting loudly and quickly snatching it out of my hand to lower to the correct position, luckily it hadn't had any adverse effects by the time he'd spotted it and intervened. I hadn't realised what I'd done wrong until we cleared busy airspace and he explained it to me. In fact we went to a safe altitude and he showed me exactly what happens when you go from full to 0 flap and just how much altitude you can lose.

I was also told it happens quite a lot, especially with students when calling a go around and I should always be on the lookout. Didn't realise even 320 pilots with that many hours could be susceptible too!

I've heard of a captain, in his haste, initiating an emergency descent mid Pacific Ocean following an unrelated cockpit aural warning.

If you are talking about retracting the flap from full down to up in one go in a Cessna 152, you shouldn't normally lose more than 100 feet of altitude providing you adjust the nose attitude up to cover the slight sink. Your instructor sounds like a panic merchant if he shouted loudly and snatched the flap lever out of your hand then climbed to a "safe" altitude. What did your instructor consider a "safe" altitude? Sounds like the instructor needs retraining.

It is only a Cessna 152 for goodness sake. Check the C152 Cessna Information manual where it states: In a baulked landing (go-around) climb the wing flap setting should be reduced to 20 degrees immediately after full power is supplied. Upon reaching a safe airspeed 55 knots wing flaps retract slowly.

He's not a panic merchant at all, he's a sensible guy who is safety conscious and taught me many things other instructors never pay attention too. I trust him over anyone else at the academy and at the end of the day, you weren't there and I don't have a robotic memory to give you a second by second account so you'll just have to trust that it was appropriate to the situation rather than being an armchair commentator.

Its "just" a 152 until you cock up and risk your own and/or someone else's life because you've not understood the impact of your actions. I'm well aware what the manual states and they don't reach it any differently, but that's not what I was talking about.

It has happened to me in an Avro RJ at lift off. I called for gear up and he put the flaps to zero. Experienced FO too, just a brain fart I guess. I concentrated on flying, he put the flap lever back to 18, no harm done.

I have noticed some crew, in excited anticipation of your next call, place their hand either on or very close to the controls, eg. flap lever. So guess what happens when you sneeze!!

Agree. Quite common observation in the simulator. Can be most distracting as well as potentially disastrous. Similar to a B737 PM backing up the thrust levers until V1 during the takeoff roll with his hand when it is unnecessary since there is no external friction nut like a DC3 where the throttles can slip back if the fiction nut is not working properly.

The danger of unnecessary backing up until V1 with the hand behind the thrust levers (or throttles with some types) in the 737, is that a sharp closing of the thrust levers by the PF if he perceives an abort is necessary and there is no time to politely request the PM to kindly gets his mitt out of the way so an abort can be accomplished without delay.. This may jam the PM's hand between the back edge of the thrust levers and the adjacent start levers. Very painful and worst case the PF may not be able to fully close the thrust levers to idle if the PM's hand is in the way.
There are so many gimmicks perpetuated by some pilots either brought across from previous types or copied during simulator training. While this all sounds a bit trivial now, it can be distracting to another crew member. A PM hovering over the controls with feet on the rudder pedals is another unnecessary and distracting habit one frequently sees in the simulator.

I move my hand to the vicinity if we are getting close to the limit speed. Both speeding up and slowing down. Is this not sensible to prevent an overspeed or ending up below speed? I don't physically touch it, never had anyone say anything.

Sitting in the instructor’s seat in the simulator, you soon get to know when the flare is late and the landing is going to be a real doozy. One instinctively lifts one’s bum off the seat to protect one’s private parts as the impact can be severe. The highlighted bit above then follows…

The correct move if you are concerned with the status of the flight is to bring it to the other crew member's attention - not sneakily move your hand about.

That way you may bring both of you back into shated situational awareness when their mind has drifted - for which they should thank you:

"Aprroaching flap overspeed there, John", or "Getting a bit slow for flap 2 there, John." , or

you may detect a subtle incapacitation which has gone unnoticed up until that stage.

I do this with certain switches, levers etc on my machine but it isn’t because of excitement but actually so that I can take my time to correctly identify it before the call to hopefully reduce the likelihood of doing what those in the article did.

I agree with Slezy9.
In previous jobs, I have politely placed my hand next to the flap lever to kindly remind the old bloke flying that we are approaching GS capture and that if we don't get any drag out somewhat soon-ish, then we're NEVER gonna slow down! And, in situations when I've been under the pump (usually the sim), a colleague placing their hand next to the flap lever, has politely reminded me that a bit of drag might help the situation.
It has never been about being "sneaky" - just a team working together.

It's "sneaky" because it's easy to miss - and thus ineffective.
Really? Wow.

https://cimg9.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....b79a4798f9.png

I wholeheartedly agree with Checkboard. Backseat driving by sneaking up on the flap lever is not on. If your oppo's forgotten something, just tell him/her.

As I said, it's not "sneaky", well, not the way I do it. And also, not "ineffective" - indeed I have found it to be very effective - or why would I use it?
In my experience it has been a technique that has worked well for me, and been appreciated by me when a colleague has done it. I have used this technique a handful of times in my time flying multi-crew operations.
But, each to their own - all part of life's rich tapestry!

Get with the times Bloggs. We don't talk, we Text. :{

That was an interesting incident having seen the report. It was not strictly true to say it was an unrelated cockpit aural warning however. The aircraft departed at midnight for an island destination four hours away. Same aircraft had a pressurisation defect on earlier flight that day and written up on last page of maintenance document. New maintenance document ready for the crew and no reference of earlier problem. In other words the crew were unaware of the earlier defect. Climbing through 29,000 ft the cabin altitude warning horn sounded. No serious pressure changes noticed in ears. Cabin altitude noted going though 12,000 but not rapidly. All previous simulator training in this company included only rapid depressurisation (not uncommanded pressurisation change which is a more leisurely event) and woe betide any crew if any delay in emergency descent.

Accordingly, the captain directed the F/O to carry out the memory items which included closing the outflow valve (manual operation) while captain started down with no delay.
Severe ear distress experienced and a closer look at cabin altitude a few seconds after descent had got going, showed 3000 ft cabin altitude which meant cabin altitude had gone from 12,000 ft to 3000 ft in around two minutes - explaining ear distress. Aircraft levelled around 23,000 ft and situation evaluated. The full closing of the outflow valve had caused the cabin pressure to increase causing ear distress. All this being wise after the event. .

Aircraft did 180 and returned to base landing 20 minutes later. . Investigation revealed the replacement cabin controller from the earlier flight which was a spare from the flyaway kit, was filled with moisture from being in a plastic bag in the aircraft hold. Another cabin controller was installed and the flight proceeded normally. The emergency descent was never needed because the symptom was an uncommanded pressurisation change (albeit a gradual one) until the cabin passed 10,000 ft which triggered the warning horn. The captain accepted full responsibility for the incorrect decision to treat the event as worthy of a rapid descent when it should have been treated as only an uncommanded change of cabin altitude and that particular non-normal checklist applied. Paucity of proper training in the simulator for this type of non-normal set the scene for a stuff up and was no help.

Paucity of proper training in the simulator for this type of non-normal set the scene for a stuff up and was no help.[/QUOTE]


Thanks Judd for providing the full details, as I said I only heard about the incident and you know how that goes.

Interestingly enough, not long after the incident this outfit dropped ALL simulator training as an unnecessary expense, some pilots however, just one or two, considered this as only a "perceived" safety issue.