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Sunfish 24th Mar 2018 22:09

Barriers To Prosperity: Red Tape And The Regulatory State In Australia
 

Australia has experienced 26 years of unbroken economic growth. However, this aggregate figure masks stagnant wages growth and a deterioration in the living standards of many in the Australian middle class. The central cause of this deterioration is low and declining levels of business investment, which is approaching historic lows.

Overregulation and red tape are two key causes of weak investment. The regulatory burden on private enterprise has grown unabated for decades at the state and federal level, and under both Labour and Coalition Governments. Red tape reduces economic output by $176 billion each year. This means that if previous attempts to eliminate red tape were successful, the Australian economy would today be 11 per cent larger and the average household would be $19,300 better off each year.

From the report:


....Red tape arises when more regulation is in place than what is needed to achieve a given stated objective. More formally, red tape can be defined as 'rules, regulations and procedures that require compliance but do not meet the organization’s functional objective for the rule.'......

............Red tape imposes a range of costs on individuals, families, communities, and businesses. These costs can be broadly categorised along the following lines:

1.Administrative costs: costs incurred to demonstrate compliance with a given regulatory requirement. This includes the direct costs of compliance such as reporting requirements, paperwork, and keeping and producing records.

2.Substantive costs: costs incurred to meet the regulatory requirements, such as hiring or training new staff, or purchasing new equipment.

3.Opportunity costs: activities forgone or delayed as a result of red tape, such as delayed implementation of a new project.

4.Financial costs: payments of fees by private actors to government, such as through cost recovery
.
Amen brother.

https://ipa.org.au/publications-ipa/...tate-australia

Lead Balloon 24th Mar 2018 22:49

My ‘favourite’ recent example is Part 175.

An aeronautical data originator provides information and the information is published in the AIP. 367 days later the originator has yet to do a review of that information. The originator is a criminal, even if the published information remains complete and accurate in fact.

An aeronautical data originator provides information and the information is published in the AIP. During the following year the originator does a review of that information, but does not record the fact that the review happened, or its results. The organisation is a criminal, even if the published information remains complete and accurate in fact.

An aeronautical data originator provides information and the information is published in the AIP. During the following year the originator does a review of that information, and makes and keeps a record of the fact that the review happened and its results. During the second year the originator does a second review and makes and keeps a record of the fact that the second review happened and its results, but throws the record of the first review in the bin. The originator is a criminal, even if the published information remains complete and accurate in fact.

It’s criminalising people because they fail to be good bureaucrats.

The “safety” regulator is so disconnected from reality that it forgot to deal with the substantive safety issue as elements of the offences: First, that the published information is inaccurate and, secondly, that the inaccuracy creates a material risk to safety. Not all inaccuracies result in a risk to safety.

I imagine the “safety” regulator would say that it would not pursue regulatory action in the cases in which an inaccuracy did not result in a risk to safety. But that attitude is again why “safety” bureaucracy has such a stultifying effect. Who is going to take the risk of the bureaucracy exercising its discretion in that way, when the law on its face is clear? You’re a criminal for not being a good bureaucrat, even if the outcome creates no risk to safety. It’s no wonder a couple of thousand aerodrome/HLS operators told the regulator and Airservices to stick Part 175 up their a*se.

Sunfish 24th Mar 2018 23:12

Some of you, with time on your hands, might like to draw the attention of the author of this report to CASA, perhaps with some examples........

[email protected]

alphacentauri 24th Mar 2018 23:26

LB, I agree with what you have written.

In the interests of having a discussion where I might be able to learn something, and you seem to know 175 as well as I do.....I have a genuine question. And I think I am seeing this in all the regulations.

Is it because the regulation, as written, is quite heavily process based? Should regulations be outcome based? Is this what you are alluding to when you state;

The “safety” regulator is so disconnected from reality that it forgot to deal with the substantive safety issue as elements of the offences: First, that the published information is inaccurate and, secondly, that the inaccuracy creates a material risk to safety. Not all inaccuracies result in a risk to safety.
I have been heavily involved in the Part 173 world for quite sometime, and my biggest frustration was that the regulator only ever seemed interested in my processes for doing stuff. Not once did they ever look at whether an appropriate outcome was being achieved.

Sunfish I know this is not specifically about 173/175, but the similarities to what you posted are there.

Is this why we can't have US based regulation because it seems largely to be outcome based, and they are not compatible with our process based regulation? What is it that makes people in authority so uncomfortable with an outcome based focus? Is it because an outcome based focus puts the responsibility back on the people, and the authoritarians don't trust us?

Lead Balloon 25th Mar 2018 00:11

No, it’s not about outcomes-based v prescriptive regulations.

It’s about the law dealing with the safety issue and penalising on the basis of safety risk.

For example, let’s take the requirement for a data originator to conduct an annual review of the accuracy of AIP information it originated. The ‘crime’ - if it is to be a crime - should not be merely failing to do an annual check of the accuracy of AIP information provided by the originator. Rather - if the rules are about safety - the ‘crime’ should be deliberately failing to do the annual check and, as a consequence, incomplete or inaccurate information remained in the AIP and, as a consequence, there was a material increase in the risk to air safety.

As it stands, the ‘crime’ is mere failure to conduct the annual review. That’s why so many operators said stick it.

aroa 25th Mar 2018 00:38

Trouble with CAsA and other regulators is that what they call 'crimes' and are crimes of 'strict liability', do not conform to government definition of a crime.

A crime is you rob someone of money, stealing. Kill some one, murder with intent ie victims are 'hurt' either financially of physically.
Those of the legal bent will know more about it that I do but...

for example... being very busy with yr job you forget to complete a line in yr log book.
An issue of forgetfulness, a human trait...distracted by other more important issues.

This incomplete line...wasnt deliberate, no-one was hurt, it didnt cause a crash or any injury to others, it has no 'safety' issue.
But for the "Walking Dead" in (Non)Aviation House, there is a strict liability reg and to have that incomplete line in yr log book makes you a criminal.!
Are they mad??

With this sort of rampant BS crushing aviation and individuals within it, its no wonder the place is fcuked.

'Bomber' Harris fighting bureaucracy.. and a War, stated in 1943 that the country would soon be buggered by the unfettered growth of regulations and bureaucrats.

Its here, its real, and he was very, very right.

Aussie Bob 25th Mar 2018 01:37

Australians just need to look in the mirror to see who is responsible for all this.

Two simple cases in point:

Insurance, no one wants things the way they are but no one wants it to change either. No one is asking for legislation review, litigation is on everyone's lips. FFS, how many lawyers make parliament? We vote for these parasites! (no offense to the lawyers that post here intended)

Safety Jackets: Everyone can see the stupidity of the mandated wearing of these things but everyone puts them on anyway. FFS, people are always telling me how stupid this is, but then they do it anyway.

There are untold examples just like this ....

Aussies just do as they are told, always have and probably always will. They then get what they deserve.

LeadSled 25th Mar 2018 03:06

AAAaaahhhhh!! The joys of the Approved Aeronautical Data Originator.

I draw your attention to a certain amount of publicity on the subject a few months ago.

Due to the lack of response to the CASA "safety" rules, and the Airservices "compliance" imperative, Airservices announced that, starting some time in January 2018, all aeronautical data that did not comply with the "roools" would be wiped from the AIP.

In the AIC announcing this, Airservices declared that that it has taken all reasonable steps (or words something like that) but where this had failed, the "aeronautical data" would be expunged.

This AIC was some 80 pages (Yes! eighty pages) of names, and the lats. and longs. all to go.

One of the organisation that Airservices could not locate, to obtain data, was the Royal Australian Navy. Given that you can see Russell Hill from the Adam Woods building, I was just a little (no, not really at all) surprised.

This list of data to be expunged included virtually every Emergency Medical Service Heliport at every major and minor hospital in Australia. Which meant that any GNSS procedures associated went, as well.

As I said at the time, if this is the answer, for Emergency Medical Services, what the hell was the question.

Fortunately, a political baseball bat (ie: lots of very public publicity) applied smartly to Airservices head resulted in a "reconsideration". The urgent air safety issue AIC was with drawn.

Given the extraordinarily complex set of rules and offences CASA has created around the issue of Approved Aeronautical Data and Approved Aeronautical Data Originators, with suitably swinging penalties for all involved, I decided to have a look at the "standards" for actually deriving the data.

It is crude, to say the least, just about ANY GPS that has a lat and long display will do.

Typically, CASA and Airservices have created a complex administrative/bureaucratic process, with a raft of new "crimes", but with no safety outcome significance, to handle data of possibly quite significant importance, without any serious attention to the integrity/accuracy of the data.

In short, the "safety outcome" doesn't matter as long as you comply with the process.

Tootle pip!!

PLovett 25th Mar 2018 03:38

The sense of deja vu while reading this thread is enormous. I have spent the last few years as safety manager of a medium sized GA operation. I am no longer as I have decided to retire and have nothing to do with aviation ever again. During that time I was trying to draft a new SMS that would incorporate the two, and soon to be, three areas of activity that require a SMS.

The premise I started with was that it was to be easy to understand and use. I understood that there were some essential elements required and that it had to include some hefty provisions for change management. Once drafted it was sent to CASA for comments and approval.

Now, to be fair to them, they did pick up on some internal consistencies that I had overlooked but they also wanted much more detail on some points than I considered necessary. An example, they wanted a time limit on safety report investigations (a month). This I considered was unnecessarily restrictive given that sometimes people who need to be consulted or questioned are absent; reports requested sometimes take longer than expected to be received and so forth. No, there had to be a time limit and whats more, and extension for a longer time period had to be authorised by the accountable manager.

This was process gone mad. When I sat back and looked at what was being required it was nothing more than audit points. Items that CASA could look at when conducting an audit and say "you have not complied with section whatever in this safety report". The whole issue of whether there was a safety risk inherent in the report is immaterial. At one stage they were looking to impose an interim safety committee to decide issues before the mandated safety committee would meet.

I am glad I am out of it. While the industry (GA) continues to act individually rather than taking a unified position with the government it will continue to be screwed.

Lead Balloon 25th Mar 2018 20:30

You should have put a section in your safety management plan that said something like this:

When we do a safety investigation we have an action item to develop a plan to forward to the Manager about when we plan to have the investigation report to the Manager, and we assume that plan would be done in the next couple of months. We would be hopeful that it would not be long after that most of the draft investigation report would be delivered to the Manager. For the purposes of this section, “not long after” means at least 13 years.
If it’s good enough for an erstwhile DAS to say that about the regulatory ‘reform’ program in 2005, it’s good enough for an air operator’s SMP.

ramble on 25th Mar 2018 22:20

The Aussie AIP is 888 pages of dog vomit.

Overcomplicated, repetitive, verbose, flowery, confusing; unfit for use.

outnabout 25th Mar 2018 23:45

Sunfish:

It appears that regulation of any industry in Australia (but particularly aviation) has now resulted in an interesting paradox.

1/ The conscientious operators are getting increasingly sick of the confusing, mishmash of ever changing regulation with no demonstrated safety benefit and are either a) ignoring them (relying on a good safety record as their backstop), or b) retiring.

2/ The cowboy operators (who have always known to keep their heads down) are now becoming increasingly sneakier in the ways they do business and avoid unwarranted attention.

Ergo - instead of the industry becoming safer, the industry is actually becoming less safe as the conscientious operators get sick of the bullsh!t and leave, leaving the cowboys as the last man standing....

Just a thought...

Sunfish 26th Mar 2018 00:55

Actually big established players like Qantas and others with dominant market positions just love regulation because it builds barriers to entry by new players - the cost of an AOC is a good example.

LeadSled 26th Mar 2018 07:46


----- like Qantas and others with dominant market positions just love regulation
Sunfish,
A popular but off-beam view at that level. At the GA level, true, I have sat and listened to bigger GA operators argue against "reform" because of the protection from competitors that existing regulation gives them.

But at the Qantas level, NO!!

The cost to Qantas, over the years, of Australian unique operational restrictions (regulations) have cost it dearly in international competition.

Likewise Engineering and Maintenance, CASA "roools" have driven heavy maintenance offshore, and it is not a simplistic answer about "cheap labor rates", unless you can convince me that Lufthansa Technik (Hamburg) is a haven of cheap Asian labor.

There is a Bleeding Good Reason (BGR) Qantas have built a new maintenance hangar at KLAX and not anywhere in Australia (or Asia).
There is a BGR why a Kingair 350 was ferried bask to US just to bring it up to Australian ADS-B requirements. (Fitting ADS-B to Qantaslink -8s cost about twenty (20) times the CASA "estimate" in the NPRM -- but exactly in line with the FAA NPRM estimated range)

There is a BGR why it is now cheaper to ferry a light/mediom "executive" jet back to the US for even an intermediate check, not even a "major", the $$$$ price difference and the time out of service differences are startling.

And one way or another, it all boils down to the CASA "roools".

Tootle pip!!

thunderbird five 26th Mar 2018 23:43

Looks like this died in the RRRs three years ago:

https://www.cuttingredtape.gov.au/

Stab Bar 27th Mar 2018 00:21


The Aussie AIP is 888 pages of dog vomit. Overcomplicated, repetitive, verbose, flowery, confusing; unfit for use.
I actually reckon the AIP is pretty good. It's the CASRs which are a lot more as you describe.

Horatio Leafblower 27th Mar 2018 02:42


I actually reckon the AIP is pretty good. It's the CASRs which are a lot more as you describe.
Stab Bar,
I bet you started flying after 2000/2001.
The AIP USED to be very succinct, practical, logical and well organised.

Vale Reg Meissner.

LeadSled 27th Mar 2018 05:36


The AIP USED to be very succinct, practical, logical and well organised.
Horatio,
How true. In my "historic collection", I have a complete AIP from the mid-1960s, simple, straightforward, and all the IAPs with coloured terrain contours were really something.

From the same era, the Air Navigation Act 1920, and associated Air Navigation Regulations (now CAR/CASR) was an A5 book (standard size of publishing legislation) about 1.5cm thick, plain language, generally unambiguous.

The ANOs (now CAO/MOS/AC) were A4 and for most of us, one 5cm binder not stuffed full. There was a bit more if you were a maintenance org.

BUT --- It was all PLAIN ENGLISH.

AND --- You could talk to an "Examiner of Airman", or an Airworthiness Surveyor, and ask questions, and get binding answers, without triggering an "aggressive audit".

Tootle pip!!

PS: I also have a copy of the ANRs from mid-30s, it would, in this day and age, make you cry, it is less than 30 pages of standard A5 format.

thorn bird 27th Mar 2018 06:27

Anyone counted the total number of pages of Australian Reg's?
Understand the US regs are 1000 pages of A5, NZ about the same.

LeadSled 27th Mar 2018 06:55

Thorn Bird,
Somewhere I have a complete but a bit out of date (Jep) copy of FAR1-199, I will have a look for it.
It fits in one big (3 inch, not the usual 2 inch) binder.
Tootle pip!!

PS: The total of ALL material of a legislative or associated nature for Part 61 alone is now put at 6000+ pages. Some claim as high as almost 9000.
About six or so lines of regulation for Limited Cat in the CARs became Part 132, hundreds of pages?? I haven't counted them, but the huge expansion addresses NO new or existing risk that was not already covered. An eruption of volcanic proportions of irrelevant excess regulation.


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