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Originally Posted by Capt Fathom
(Post 10006504)
Having flown floats, I find it quite unusual that nothing floated, especially the floats. So much buoyancy in those compartments! :(
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180% |
Someone poignantly posted on the thread about the new year's eve disaster when six died in a seaplane on a branch of the Hawkesbury just north of Sydney, that the thought of wishing anyone a "Happy New Year" to some degree stuck in his throat. Which for me prompted the beginning of a line of thought to do with taking a look back to possibly find a way to reduce the number of careless accidents in the year ahead.
How to inculcate in the novice or in the more experienced who repeatedly "gets away with it again" a revitalised sense of an active awareness of the pitfalls of inattention or the cock-sure and dangerous belief that they have the game scunned? Ossie Osgood of Arnhem Air Charter saw to it that all new recruits to his company ploughed through and read a list of prescribed books including 'Fate is the Hunter' and 'Sigh for a Merlin' so as to acquire an appreciation of the stand-point of those who had gone before and who had the gift to impart in their writings the various key factors that helped to ensure their repeated survival in the hostile environment in which the business of flying has always functioned. Not just their survival, but their newly discovered ability not to be stupid, but to be realistic in assessing every potential hazard. Ossie was the mentor supreme. He wanted his pilots to think about those who had stuffed up. He wanted to talk with them about what they thought killed Smithy. Or killed Charles Ulm. And what it was saved men like PG (Bill) Taylor from disaster time and time again. But he could not teach them how to take the calculated risk. He knew, and they soon knew, that you cannot pick away at your quota of coal without doing it essentially on your own at the coalface. If on the other hand, Ossie found that he could not get anywhere with certain individuals (whom he soon realised he had initially misjudged and had acted on an erroneous gut feeling in employing them) he would then in a fatherly way take them aside and use his well tuned powers of persuasion to point the object of his disappointment in another direction to that of being the reincarnation of James Bigglesworth. In John Gunn's book , 'The Defeat of Distance' , there are early passages that tell how the Queensland and Northern Territory AIr Service emerged out of a combination of business acumen (Fergus McMaster, Ainslie Templeton), operational nous and caution (Hudson Fysh) and sheer gung-ho balls for the adventure (Paul McGuiness). Ossie lamented the passing of the days of pioneering flight but at the same time knew that the future was one that would be driven and held together by a new breed of men and women more attune to pressing buttons than discovering the roots of their craft. Shiny bums devoid of first hand experience of the real character of the business would be employed sitting at their desks devising new programs of risk management and occupational health and safety. Brave new (inevitable) world! |
Originally Posted by Traffic_Is_Er_Was
(Post 10006677)
Must be very efficient!
Furthermore, they are designed so that the aircraft will still float if half of any of the compartments in one of the floats are flooded. |
So are you saying that your 10,000 kg aircraft will sink when you load it up to 18,000 kgs gross?
|
Originally Posted by FAR CU
(Post 10006697)
to possibly find a way to reduce the number of careless accidents in the year ahead....
the future was one that would be driven and held together by a new breed of men and women more attune to pressing buttons than discovering the roots of their craft. ! I think some basic aerobatics should be part of all pilot training. I don’t think pilots even need to do spins in most countries to get a CPL ? I’ve come across many pilots who appear to think the rudder pedals are really only for taxing. It's too early to assume the pilot was at fault in this accident, but stalling at low level in a turn is one such ‘carless accident’ that simply does not have to happen in 2018. “Speed is life” has always stuck in my head from my Ag rating. It’s a moto I used in all flying activities. I think we naturally get more cautions with time, and probably we can all admit to doing one or two silly things when flying. Especially when not restricted to Airways and Published Arrivals and Departures. “No turns below 400 feet” was another rule we had in the Maldives, which I always try to adhere to when flying floats, even if there in nothing but open water all around. Discipline can be very difficult to self-monitor for single-pilots. Two crew: a take-off briefing is standard, but as a single pilot it’s easy just to start a take off run without any self-brefing, especially if VFR. I think in training this should be addressed. Maybe today it is, but when I did my PPL/CPL training, I never had to say, "if the engine quits at 100 feet I’m going to land straight ahead. If it quits at 400 feet, I’m tuning 30 degrees left and heading for the golf course, however the wind is from the right so i’m going be extra cautious with the loss of airspeed ...and so on” I’d be curious to know if instructors today make their students give a brief prior to each phase of flight? This is something I get lazy with when flying alone - which obviously isn’t good. I need to work in that in 2018. So thanks for your post. It’s timely to ask how to "possibly find a way to reduce the number of careless accidents.” This is something well worth thinking about as individuals and collectively. It’s just a shame it sometimes takes a tragic accident before we reexamine our own flying habits. |
Reporter on the nine news said the divers would be looking for the black box when they located the wreckage. Good luck with that! :ugh:
DF. |
Originally Posted by FAR CU
(Post 10006718)
So are you saying that your 10,000 kg aircraft will sink when you load it up to 18,000 kgs gross?
If the Max take off weight is 10,000kgs, then the floats must have enough buoyancy to support 18,000 kgs. |
Regarding the previous comment that turns below 400ft should be avoided in float operations - I have seen a caravan operated in the Brisbane Water channel enter a 70 degree bank angle turn immediately after liftoff (albeit having discharged passengers) to clear terrain,and on different days smaller aircraft including a Beaver weave down the channel after takeoff before climbing over Broken Bay. How feasible is it, operating in Cowan or channel areas to have a straight climb after takeoff? I would have thought that immediate turns would be required just about everywhere
|
Originally Posted by FAR CU
(Post 10006186)
zzuf - we were probably hoeing into one of Carmel's great hamburgers at the time. VH-HTS, the C185, used to be with Wilderness Air at Strahan in Tasmania. The principal there was one KP. I christened him Captain Sudden as he sometimes threw his seaplanes around like a dodgem car driver. When he was asked if HTS stood for anything in particular, he point to the battery and jumper leads in the luggage compartment and said -
"Gees yeah . . .. HARD TO START." The wreckage of HTS at Berowra was notable in that the scatter was closely confined, pointing right off to a stall/ spin being the end result, but really not the prime cause at all. (There were many other earlier factors that in hindsight pointed to a calamity in the making.) It has to be said that it had no maintenance problems. The aircraft under went a extreme service piour to the accident. It was over heard by poeple recovering the aircraft that a basi person said it was the best maintained sea plane that they had seen. The accident was purly pilot error. They did find one commercial bolt in the accident. However this was proven to be installed by the operator post service. The main difference between these two accidents at this stage is the weather. Just two extremely sad endings to what should have been a happy occasion. Thoughts to all thoose envoled. |
Originally Posted by Capt Fathom
(Post 10006504)
Having flown floats, I find it quite unusual that nothing floated, especially the floats. So much buoyancy in those compartments! :(
|
Did she stall on the right turn? Sad times and a reminder to those that fly, airspeed is king!
|
Connedrod - not wanting to feed a troll - but here goes... What absolute nonsense. https://www.atsb.gov.au/media/24994/...802830_001.pdf what he has said about the earlier prang does not warrant your insult. |
Ossie’s insights
Originally Posted by FAR CU
(Post 10006697)
Someone poignantly posted on the thread about the new year's eve disaster when six died in a seaplane on a branch of the Hawkesbury just north of Sydney, that the thought of wishing anyone a "Happy New Year" to some degree stuck in his throat. Which for me prompted the beginning of a line of thought to do with taking a look back to possibly find a way to reduce the number of careless accidents in the year ahead.
How to inculcate in the novice or in the more experienced who repeatedly "gets away with it again" a revitalised sense of an active awareness of the pitfalls of inattention or the cock-sure and dangerous belief that they have the game scunned? Ossie Osgood of Arnhem Air Charter saw to it that all new recruits to his company ploughed through and read a list of prescribed books including 'Fate is the Hunter' and 'Sigh for a Merlin' so as to acquire an appreciation of the stand-point of those who had gone before and who had the gift to impart in their writings the various key factors that helped to ensure their repeated survival in the hostile environment in which the business of flying has always functioned. Not just their survival, but their newly discovered ability not to be stupid, but to be realistic in assessing every potential hazard. Ossie was the mentor supreme. He wanted his pilots to think about those who had stuffed up. He wanted to talk with them about what they thought killed Smithy. Or killed Charles Ulm. And what it was saved men like PG (Bill) Taylor from disaster time and time again. But he could not teach them how to take the calculated risk. He knew, and they soon knew, that you cannot pick away at your quota of coal without doing it essentially on your own at the coalface. If on the other hand, Ossie found that he could not get anywhere with certain individuals (whom he soon realised he had initially misjudged and had acted on an erroneous gut feeling in employing them) he would then in a fatherly way take them aside and use his well tuned powers of persuasion to point the object of his disappointment in another direction to that of being the reincarnation of James Bigglesworth. In John Gunn's book , 'The Defeat of Distance' , there are early passages that tell how the Queensland and Northern Territory AIr Service emerged out of a combination of business acumen (Fergus McMaster, Ainslie Templeton), operational nous and caution (Hudson Fysh) and sheer gung-ho balls for the adventure (Paul McGuiness). Ossie lamented the passing of the days of pioneering flight but at the same time knew that the future was one that would be driven and held together by a new breed of men and women more attune to pressing buttons than discovering the roots of their craft. Shiny bums devoid of first hand experience of the real character of the business would be employed sitting at their desks devising new programs of risk management and occupational health and safety. Brave new (inevitable) world! |
If the aircraft floats at a weight, the floats are supprting 100% of that weight, irrespective of what it is. The floats will have been designed to provide X kg/pounds max bouyancy each. Exceed that, and the aircraft will sink, irrespective of its BEW or MTOW.
If, however, you had said the floats are designed to support 180% of the aircraft's MTOW...... |
Dont need to be "Low and Slow" to enter into a stall/spin incident.
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Originally Posted by Traffic_Is_Er_Was
(Post 10006915)
If the aircraft floats at a weight, the floats are supporting 100% of that weight, irrespective of what it is. The floats will have been designed to provide X kg/pounds max buoyancy each. Exceed that, and the aircraft will sink, irrespective of its BEW or MTOW.
If, however, you had said the floats are designed to support 180% of the aircraft's MTOW...... |
but as a single pilot it’s easy just to start a take off run without any self-briefing, especially if VFR. I think in training this should be addressed. Maybe today it is, but when I did my PPL/CPL training, I never had to say, "if the engine quits at 100 feet I’m going to land straight ahead. If it quits at 400 feet, I’m tuning 30 degrees left and heading for the golf course, however the wind is from the right so i’m going be extra cautious with the loss of airspeed ...and so on” A lengthy quote - sorry. I recall from my RAAF Pilots Course in 1952 that these sort of so-called Safety Briefings briefings so beloved by CASA and incorporated in todays flying school Operations Manuals, were never considered necessary. in fact they were never even thought of. To this day I still consider them as superfluous. In any take off, the situation is dynamic. It is impossible to self brief all the possible permutations that could occur. So what's the point in gabbling away to yourself apart from making your passengers feel nervous as you mutter away to yourself a meaningless ritual. For example, before you drive your car from the driveway, do you verbally or mentally go through all the varying events that could occur requiring your instant action? "If I see a kangaroo hop from the side of the road, I shall immediately assess whether I should apply the brakes or swerve to avoid it. The Threat is the moving kangaroo and I will identify that threat and manage it. If someone is tail-gating me on the Freeway (very likely:ok:), I shall move gently into another lane. if that lane is not free, I will stamp on my brakes and hopefully frighten the bugger to back off." Get the drift? For every second after lift off the situation changes depending on rate of climb, current indicated altitude (corrected for OAT in cold climates :E) energy in store, IAS, flap setting, temperature and wind direction. You name it. In real life you simply have to wing it - literally. I’d be curious to know if instructors today make their students give a brief prior to each phase of flight? This is something I get lazy with when flying alone - which obviously isn’t good. |
It seems to me that supporting weight and rising up from the depths is a different thing.
|
I think the impact made the use of the term floats incorrect, as they now need to be referred to as sheet metal.
|
My condolences to the family and friends of the pilot and the passengers of this terrible tragedy.
Without pre-judging the outcome of the accident investigation, the following thoughts may have some relevance... The de Havilland Beaver floatplane has a long history of fatal accidents caused by low altitude stalls (see TSB Canada Aviation Investigation Report A15Q0120 below). Unfortunately in the floatplane configuration, the Beaver aircraft is necessarily operated at low altitude from rivers and lake valleys that are typically surrounded by high ground with gusty changing wind velocities. Added to that challenging environment, is the Beaver's modest performance envelope, low power/weight ratio, high drag form, the aircraft's stall behaviour and its stall warning characteristics. After a deadly Beaver stall/crash accident in which killed a pilot along with his 5 passengers in Ontario 23 Aug 2015, the Transportation Safety Board of Canada's investigation report recommended that commercially operated de Havilland Beaver aircraft should be fitted with a stall warning systems. The installation of stall warning systems were recommended because of inadequate natural stall warning provided by the aircraft itself and rapid onset of an accelerated stall. The extracts below are from the TSB Canada Aviation Investigation Report A15Q0120: Aviation Investigation Report A15Q0120 - Transportation Safety Board of Canada In the controlled conditions of certification, the stalling of the DHC-2 was described as gentle. However, as is the case for many other aircraft, a stall in a steep turn under power triggers an Incipient spin with few or no signs of an impending stall, and the flight path changes from horizontal to vertical. In low-altitude flight, stalling followed by incipient spin, no matter how brief, prevents the pilot from regaining control of the aircraft before impact with the ground. In 2014, Transport Canada and the manufacturer, Viking Air Limited, recommended that stall warning systems be installed, but only 4 have been installed on Canadian‑registered DHC-2s. There are currently 382 DHC-2s registered in Canada, 223 of which are used in commercial operations. Level of risk is determined by the probability and severity of adverse consequences. Given the number of DHC-2s without a stall warning system in commercial operations, combined with the fact that low-altitude manoeuvres are an integral part of bush flying, it is reasonable to conclude that a stall at low altitude is likely to occur again. Because stalls at low altitude lead to catastrophic consequences, this type of accident carries a high level of risk. Until, at a minimum, commercially operated DHC-2s registered in Canada are required to be equipped with a stall warning system, pilots and passengers who travel on these aircraft will remain exposed to an elevated risk of injury or death as a result of a stall at low altitude. Therefore, the Board recommends that the Department of Transport require all commercially operated DHC‑2 aircraft in Canada to be equipped with a stall warning system. TSB Recommendation A17-01 Appendix C – TSB aviation investigation reports on accidents involving aircraft that stalled and were not equipped with stall warning system Accident Type Fatalities Summary A14O0105 DHC-2 Beaver 0 The float-equipped DHC-2 Beaver aircraft (registration C‑FHVT, serial number 284) rolled to the left prior to the flare. The pilot attempted to regain control of the aircraft by applying full right rudder and right aileron. The attempt was unsuccessful, and the aircraft struck rising tree‑covered terrain above the shoreline. The aircraft came to a stop on its right side and on a slope. Two of the 3 people on board received minor injuries. The aircraft had no stall warning system. A12O0071 DHC-2 Beaver 2 The DHC-2 floatplane (registration C-FGBR, serial number 168) stalled and crashed during a go-around while attempting to land. Two of the 3 people on board drowned. The aircraft had no stall warning system. A11C0100 DHC-2 Beaver 5 The DHC-2 floatplane (registration C-GUJX, serial number 1132) stalled and crashed during takeoff. All 5 people on board received fatal injuries. The aircraft had no stall warning system. A10Q0117 DHC-2 Beaver 2 The DHC-2 amphibious floatplane (registration C–FGYK, serial number 123) stalled and crashed during takeoff. Two of the 5 people on board received fatal injuries. The aircraft had no stall warning system. A09P0397 DHC-2 Beaver 6 The DHC-2 floatplane (registration C-GTMC, serial number 1171) stalled and crashed during takeoff. Six of the 8 people on board received fatal injuries. The aircraft was equipped with a stall warning system, but it was not functioning, and the TSB identified this as a cause or contributing factor. A08A0095 DHC-2 Beaver 0 The DHC-2 floatplane (registration C-FPQC, serial number 873) stalled and crashed while the crew was attempting a forced landing. Five of the 7 people on board sustained serious injuries. The aircraft had no stall warning system. A05Q0157 DHC-2 Beaver 1 The DHC-2 floatplane (registration C-FODG, serial number 205) stalled and crashed during takeoff. The pilot, who was the sole person on board, received fatal injuries. The aircraft had no stall warning system. A04C0098 DHC-2 Beaver 4 The DHC-2 floatplane (registration C-GQHT, serial number 682) stalled and crashed on approach. The 4 people on board received fatal injuries. The aircraft had no stall warning system. A01Q0166 DHC-2 Beaver 3 The DHC-2 floatplane (registration C-GPUO, serial number 810) stalled and crashed on approach. Three of the 7 people on board received fatal injuries. The aircraft had no stall warning system, and the TSB found this to be a risk factor. A01P0194 DHC-2 Beaver 5 The DHC-2 floatplane (registration C-GVHT, serial number 257) stalled and crashed on approach. All 5 people on board received fatal injuries. The aircraft had no stall warning system; the TSB noted this fact under "Other findings." A00Q0006 DHC-2 Beaver 3 The DHC-2 (registration C-FIVA, serial number 515) stalled and crashed while climbing. Three of the 6 people on board received fatal injuries. The aircraft had no stall warning system. A98P0194 DHC-2 Beaver (modified: maximum weight increased) 0 The DHC-2 floatplane (registration C-GCZA, serial number 1667) stalled and crashed following a missed approach. None of the people on board were injured, but the aircraft sustained substantial damage. The aircraft had no stall warning system, and the fact that the pilot had no warning of the impending stall was identified by the TSB as a cause or contributing factor in this occurrence. |
Sniping
A reason I rarely bother with Pprune now is the constant sniping at contributors. If you think a post is wrong, say so in a professional way and move on. Reading slanging matches and 'one upmanship' posts is tedious and reflects poorly on aviators.
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Originally Posted by Alchemy101
(Post 10006764)
Regarding the previous comment that turns below 400ft should be avoided in float operations - I have seen a caravan operated in the Brisbane Water channel enter a 70 degree bank angle turn immediately after liftoff (albeit having discharged passengers) to clear terrain,and on different days smaller aircraft including a Beaver weave down the channel after takeoff before climbing over Broken Bay. How feasible is it, operating in Cowan or channel areas to have a straight climb after takeoff? I would have thought that immediate turns would be required just about everywhere
As I said, this is something "I always TRY to adhere to when flying floats”. Of course with obstacle clearance, it’s simply not always possible. Obviously nobody is going to fly into a hillside on take-off from a river because it’s at 300ft directly in front of them and they don’t want to turn before 400ft...That’s just common sense. I’ve seen numerous pilots on floats make needless steep turns immediately after take-off, or when coming into land - when there is simply no reason for it. I’m not even saying the 400ft idea is applicable to all pilots and all aircraft. It’s simply an example of a self-imposed standard - and I do think having a personal set of such standards is good way to mitigate risk and remain disciplined. |
Wish we had a "Like" button for flyingfox's post.
Perhaps the arm chair experts may care to wander off for a coldie or should the Mods start culling posts? :mad: |
Originally Posted by Ultralights
(Post 10006937)
Dont need to be "Low and Slow" to enter into a stall/spin incident.
|
Originally Posted by Jerry Springer
(Post 10006998)
I’ve seen numerous pilots on floats make needless steep turns immediately after take-off, or when coming into land - when there is simply no reason for it.
I’m not even saying the 400ft idea is applicable to all pilots and all aircraft. It’s simply an example of a self-imposed standard - and I do think having a personal set of such standards is good way to mitigate risk and remain disciplined. I do not wish to impugn the airmanship of the pilots - just passing on a frequent observation that left me at times confounded at what to me appeared a bit gun-ho. Never flown a seaplane so I put it down to "what would I know" |
Originally Posted by Traffic_Is_Er_Was
(Post 10006915)
If the aircraft floats at a weight, the floats are supprting 100% of that weight, irrespective of what it is. The floats will have been designed to provide X kg/pounds max bouyancy each. Exceed that, and the aircraft will sink, irrespective of its BEW or MTOW.
If, however, you had said the floats are designed to support 180% of the aircraft's MTOW...... - Yes floats are designed with a max buoyancy each. - Yes the plane will sink if that is exceeded. - Yes, the floats are designed to support 180% of your aircraft types MTOW. FAR 23.751 requires that the 2 floats of a twin-float floatplane provide 180% fresh water buoyancy. To determine the maximum weight allowed for a seaplane equipped with two floats, divide the total displacement by 1.8. Specific floats are designed for specific aircraft types. You could in theory put floats of reduced buoyancy capacity on your a/c, and reduce your MTOW accordingly - but that would be rather silly. What you do, is select a set of floats with enough buoyancy so that the upper limit on your MTOW is not restricted by the buoyancy capacity of your floats. So I as said, you will install floats that are designed to support 180% of your aircrafts MTOW. I can’t really help you more on this. It’s really not that complicated, so I’ll leave it at that. Just google FAR 23.751 for more information on float requirements. |
From the Beeb:-
The chief executive of catering giant Compass Group has died in a New Year's Eve seaplane crash near Sydney alongside his two sons, fiancée and her daughter, his firm has said. Richard Cousins died after the plane plunged into a river 30 miles (50km) north of Sydney. Mr Cousins, 58, died alongside Emma Bowden, 48, her 11-year-old daughter, and his sons, William, 25, and Edward, 23, police have said. The Australian pilot was also killed. Police in Australia have named the pilot as Gareth Morgan, 44. The crash happened at about 15.10 local time (04.10 GMT) on Sunday, New South Wales Police said. BBC correspondent Phil Mercer said the family were believed to be returning to Sydney from an exclusive waterfront restaurant in Jerusalem Bay on New Year's Eve when the plane crashed. Mr Cousins had been chief executive of the Surrey-based Compass Group - thought to be the largest food service company in the world - since 2006. He was due to leave his role in March and retire from the group in September. 'A tragic accident' Paul Walsh, Compass chairman, said the firm was "deeply shocked and saddened" by his death. "The thoughts of everyone at Compass are with Richard's family and friends, and we extend our deepest sympathies to them," he said. "It has been a great privilege to know Richard personally and to work with him for the last few years. Richard was known and respected for his great humanity and a no-nonsense style that transformed Compass into one of Britain's leading companies." The crash involved a single-engine DHC-2 Beaver Seaplane Detective Superintendent Mark Hutchings, head of the New South Wales marine area command, said: "These people had come over on holiday to one of the most beautiful parts of the world and for this to happen at a place like this is just tragic," he told a press conference. "We would like to extend our sincere condolences to the family and friends of those people that perished." He added: "This can only be described as a tragic accident, and our hearts go out to them." Plane 'sunk rapidly' Eyewitnesses said the aircraft turned sharply to the right shortly after taking off, before crashing. The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) said the plane "sunk rapidly" after crashing into the river. Police divers were flown to the scene, and all six bodies were recovered on Sunday evening. "The sequence of events leading up to the accident are not yet understood," the ATSB said. The single-engine aircraft belonged to sightseeing flight company Sydney Seaplanes, which offers scenic flights over local tourist attractions. Aaron Shaw, managing director of Sydney Seaplanes, said: "We do not yet know the cause of the accident." He said everyone at the firm was "deeply shocked by this incident", adding: "We have suspended all operations until further notice." The UK Foreign Office has said consular officials are in contact with local authorities and staff are "ready to provide consular assistance". |
Pilot Gareth Morgan, 44, and passengers have been identified.
CEO Richard Cousins and family cut down in seaplane crash before year of new beginnings RIP. |
This accident makes no sense to me.
Good weather and wind conditions, highly experienced pilot, video seems to show the aircraft safely airborne with reasonable terrain clearance over the ridge line. Yet the crash scene seems to indicate some sort of uncontrolled flight into the water. Why would the pilot choose to fly to Cowan Ck after, apparently, getting airborne in the safe, wide, waterway at Cottage Point for a southbound flight? There simply has to be more to this - major mechanical failure, pilot incapacitation, bird strike, cabin fire, controls obstructed by right seat pax etc. And yes, I have enough Beaver float time to know the primary flight control arrangement. |
Originally Posted by zzuf
(Post 10007082)
This accident makes no sense to me.
Good weather and wind conditions, highly experienced pilot, video seems to show the aircraft safely airborne with reasonable terrain clearance over the ridge line. Yet the crash scene seems to indicate some sort of uncontrolled flight into the water. Why would the pilot choose to fly to Cowan Ck after, apparently, getting airborne in the safe, wide, waterway at Cottage Point for a southbound flight? There simply has to be more to this - major mechanical failure, pilot incapacitation, bird strike, cabin fire, controls obstructed by right seat pax etc. And yes, I have enough Beaver float time to know the primary flight control arrangement. this year i am starting a degree in safety and accident investigations, so it will make an interesting subject of study for me, as i do know a lot of guys at Syd Seaplanes and Salt air pretty well. |
A great irritation of media reporting of events like this is: “Catering giant CEO Richard C.... killed...”
as if somehow one life was more important than the other five who died. Incidentally, I had never before heard of him or his organisation. Jack |
Originally Posted by Ultralights
(Post 10007087)
it makes no sense to me either, so, all we can do is wait on the ATSB report . it might be a cause that no one can predict or anticipate, who knows.
Originally Posted by zzuf
(Post 10007082)
major mechanical failure,
|
Ultralights
Glad to hear that you have more confidence in the machinations of the ATSB than I. |
Originally Posted by Jerry Springer
(Post 10007096)
Gareth was highly experienced with many thousands of hours on floats too - which if anything makes it even more unusual. Time will tell. RIP
This accident makes no sense to me. Good weather and wind conditions, highly experienced pilot, video seems to show the aircraft safely airborne with reasonable terrain clearance over the ridge line. Yet the crash scene seems to indicate some sort of uncontrolled flight into the water. Why would the pilot choose to fly to Cowan Ck after, apparently, getting airborne in the safe, wide, waterway at Cottage Point for a southbound flight? RIP Gareth Morgan, and your passengers. Something happened to you that none reading this would want to see themselves. There, but for the grace of God..... PS: Be nice if someone could fix the spelling of ‘HawkEsbury’ in the title of this post, |
Originally Posted by Centaurus
(Post 10006944)
.
A lengthy quote - sorry. I recall from my RAAF Pilots Course in 1952 that these sort of so-called Safety Briefings briefings so beloved by CASA and incorporated in todays flying school Operations Manuals, were never considered necessary. in fact they were never even thought of. To this day I still consider them as superfluous. In any take off, the situation is dynamic. It is impossible to self brief all the possible permutations that could occur. So what's the point in gabbling away to yourself apart from making your passengers feel nervous as you mutter away to yourself a meaningless ritual. In real life you simply have to wing it - literally. See above.. Saved my skin on at least two occasions on heavy jets with engine failure just after take off. Can't prepare for every eventuality, but you can at least prepare for many, costs nothing, might save the day. |
Jack - the media have to lead with something - you'd probably complain if they'd lead about the little girl
And Compass are a major player in food services all over the place - not a household name but a major company Always bad a whole family is hit like this - there but for the grace of God............. |
These pilot notes might be of interest
https://washingtonseaplanepilots.org...Beaver-POH.pdf A quick read through does highlight that the ASI goes up to 250 MPH (?) VNO is 180mph normal max speed is 145 mph at sea level but the normal flight envelope is between getting airborne a 55 -65 mph with T/O flaps and climbing at 80 to 95mph with climb flaps. The area of normal operation on the ASI is only about a quarter of the indicator and very compressed at the T/O and climb section. Referring to the stall (60 mph clean zero bank) the manual states "the stall is gentle at all normal conditions of load and flap and may be anticipated by a slight vibration that increases as flap is lowered. the aircraft will pitch if no yaw is present. If yaw is permitted there is a tendency to roll. Prompt corrective action must be initiated to prevent the roll from developing. Instruments like the ASI might well have been updated since then. |
Originally Posted by Jerry Springer
(Post 10006461)
UK Guardian:
"The company, which has been operating for 80 years” Err, ok... |
Given the list of Beaver stalling accidents and the partial fix of a stall warning system wouldn't you think that a stall warning system would be mandated???
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