Any data as to the number of actual accidents and incidents actually caused by incomplete or inaccurate data published in AIP about these places? Any “evidence” and “risk analysis” to justify the statutorily-mandated bureacratic structure and criminalisation of human error?

Astonishing that Australia managed for decades without the equivalent of Part 175 bureacracy and offences but now it’s going to rain aluminium if all those criminals who haven’t been providing or updating complete and accurate aerodrome information continue to get away with it.

CAAP 89O-1(2) - Published aerodrome information and reporting changes

Unlicensed aerodromes. Unlicensed aerodromes are not required, under the regulations, to provide aerodrome information to AIS or CASA and to have their aerodromes included in ERSA.
However, on request of the aerodrome operator, an unlicensed aerodrome used by aircraft with 10 or more passenger seats and engaged in regular public transport operations will be accepted in ERSA with full aerodrome information similar to that of a licensed aerodrome.

FAA: Now, from I remember, the airport surveys are good for 10 years. You are supposed to update or verify the survey at least every 10 years, or if there are any changes. This is up to the owner of the airport.
Every 10 years is a minimum, or if there have been any changes. 10 years looks at the vegetation and obstructions, and of course, the magvar.
Waypoints are reviewed on the AIRAC cycle, every 56 days, any changes are noted, but if there are no changes, waypoints can stay forever.

EDIT: update...

The Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) Manual of Standards (MOS Part 139 Sect 7.2) and Sydney Airport’s Airport Operations Manual requires an annual instrument survey of approach, take off and transitional surfaces of all of our runways.

Any reason they cant be left on maps marked as "unverified" with last known data and date.
Not only talking 10 pax RPT need this info
Small singles in trouble might be very happy to know an old runway exists somewhere under them.

Agreed, if I had to do a precautionary search and landing, I'd much rather attempt to do it on something that was once a landing strip than a dodgy paddock with sprinkler systems, undulating furrows and god knows what else that I wouldn't see until already bouncing along the ground.

In my pinion, the malaise that infects most government departments now is that they are Canberra based and staffed with career public servants who change between departments or disciplines regularly rather than industry specialists.

I suspect that this move is really driven by laziness from bureaucrats wanting to make their life easier without having any understanding of the impact of their decision.

Putting the regulations aside, AsA's raison d'etre is to provide infrastructure to facilitate aviation safety. Or in their own words:

It would seem to me that this move is an abrogation of this responsibility.

Or put bluntly, they are trying to short change us by not delivering a core safety service in the interests of cost cutting

Alphacentauri, I actually work in Survey so understand a little about this. My main point is that if an approach was now off by 200m then surely the approach is now no longer valid and would be pulled and to put it back in would need to be re-surveyed, thusly even knowing the details and calling an ADO wouldn't assist in this matter?

Plus, once again, what does 200m matter to a VFR Pilot?

I can't see any council finding a designated senior manager for this role given that a stuff up will result in them receiving a criminal conviction.

Instrument approaches to non certified/registered aerodromes was removed some years back due to the fact that the details of obstacles etc was not reviewed often enough, much to the frustration of some airfield operators.:{

I understand there is a push now to revisit the approval of an approach to such airfields, perhaps to a higher (circling) min.:D

It seems that this aerodrome data collection process has been handled badly by Airservices, however the real blame must rest with CASA and those that were responsible for the drafting of 175 (and other regs as well!) in that very little if any consideration is given to GA or operations below 5700kg and the unintended consequences of the poor drafting. One would think that the 'experts' in CASA might consider this in their reviews, but as said above they have no responsibility to foster or encourage aviation:ugh:!

Mostly CASA, but no prizes for guessing which ANSP would have been pressing for the regime that’s been implemented.

Or worse yet Triadic, they did consider the ramifications to GA and as usual, just don't give a damn!

Am saddened to read what is happening to aviation in the Lucky Land :(

There's a few ports served by RPT flights in there too, I'd imagine those companies and operators won't be thrilled if their airports and instrument approaches disappear from the databases! What a mess.

Advice to hand is that some of the RAPAC convenors have been advised that the AIC is to be withdrawn. It will be redrafted to address industry concerns.

Alpha,
I understand the regulatory framework all too well.

I also understand that the AIP is the responsibility of Airservices, an international treaty obligation of Australia as a member of ICAO, not CASA.

For Airservices to unilaterally decide that the answer to updating some 2000 or so spot positions (not aerodrome data packages), including a large number of hospital EMS helipads vital to public health, is wiping them from the database ---- to ensure CASA compliance.

It is simply not good enough that these positions will no longer be available for GNSS/FMCS/EFB updates, and later disappear from paper maps.

There has to be a better way than creating "inadvertent criminals", or losing the data altogether ---- an obvious way is for Airservices to contract suitable surveyors who do have the expertise to "get it right" ---- versus such as hospital administrations, local shire councils and the like who do not have the knowledge and expertise to even digest CASA's terrible regulations. How much has Airservices paid in dividends to the treasury in recent years??

Tootle pip!!

PS: I had a quick look for the "standards" for a survey of a position/airport reference point, to meet Part 139 requirement, can anybody give me a reference.

This is not a trivial question, given the recent "move" of Sydney's Centerpoint Tower, after all these years, necessitating adjustment to a number of procedures for YSSY 16L/34R.

I would think, but don't know, that a surveyors differential GPS would be satisfactory, but the differential corrections are not available in many remote areas, as I recall, unless you have OmniSat gear??

Here is a ‘good’ example of what is so wrong with the thinking of the aviation ‘safety’ rule makers:I note that there is no element of the offence requiring that the data or information is actually inaccurate. Nor is there an element of the offence requiring that any actual inaccuracies have any substantial effect on safety. (The structure of the regulation is also ridiculous.)

This regulation is not about safety.

It’s about bureaucracy.

The data originator is a criminal simply for failing to be a good bureaucrat. Whether that failure has any substantial impact on safety is completely irrelevant.

"It's about bureaucracy"? No it isn't, it's about Government and their minions not accepting any shred of liability for safety outcomes.

"Bureaucracy" as a system of administration saves us from corruption by and large.

What CASA, Airservices, the ATSB and Department of Infrastructure have done is attempted to build a firewall between the Government and the Governed by passing draconian regulations that purport to produce a safe system for the general public.

"I don't know what more we can do" the Government can piously say after the next aircrash. "We have the strictest safety standards in the world backed up with severe criminal penalties for anyone who breaks the rules" they will say.

It will take at least three large smoking holes, followed by a Royal Commission to give the lie to this.

Meanwhile actual safety performance will continue to degrade.

This latest safety bungle will reduce the number of aerodrome options available to a pilot in need of somewhere to land as well as limit the amount of information available on the remaining aerodromes.

To put that another way; you can't be held responsible for something you don't have to provide. I've noticed this with weather information, no forecaster will give you their opinion of weather at say, Kilmore Gap. Similarly Airservices response to this problem will be to minimise the amount of information presented, less some of it be innaccurate from a legal point of view.

To put that yet another way; Who is going to take responsibility for Marree considering the amount of tourist traffic it gets in a flood year?

It's all about the CARE Factor Sunfish, CARE being Cover Arse Retain Employment. Anytime someone from CASA, ASA or the Government tells you that they CARE, they're being honest, just not the way you think!

Ixixly - such cynicism!

I am shocked and dismayed...........that you may - in fact - be bang on the money.

Here’s where these rule making processes go wrong, and why.

We start with an accurate statement about a risk: If information or data published about an aerodrome is incomplete or inaccurate, the incompleteness or inaccuracy could cause an aviation disaster.

That statement is correct, in the abstract.

But the next step is where it goes wrong: Given the potentially disastrous consequences, any regulation that mitigates the risk of incomplete or inaccurate information or data in AIP is justified.

Although that second statement may make perfect sense to some - usually the people on a mission to make the world risk-free by regulation - it is fundamentally flawed logic that produces regulatory over-kill and unintended consequences as a matter of practicality.

First, the statement fails to take account of the fact that the incompleteness or inaccuracy of some aerodrome information may have no or negligible consequences. Certainly the safety of the operations with which alpha centauri is concerned do depend on complete and accurate information. But many other operations don’t. Further, not all incompleteness or inaccuracies necessarily result in increased risks to safety.

Secondly, and probably more importantly in this case, the logic makes assumptions about human behaviour, which assumptions are disconnected from reality.

We know how to get the data and information complete and accurate: Make the people who provide it criminals if they don’t provide data and information that is complete and accurate. Brilliant! And it’s even worse in this case: Make them criminals even if the incompleteness or inaccuracy had no actual impact on safety. Extra brilliant!

The response of potential information providers in the real world? You can stick this up your ar*e.

So if all these airstrips disappear from the maps will we have to call on the Area frequency and not 126.7 when operating there? The cynical might suggest that the two issues are somehow interlinked....