Initial Twin training. Are aborted take off's required by CASA
 

Just a thought on initial training on light twin piston engine aircraft. There used to be a CASA requirement in the initial twin training syllabus for the candidate to demonstrate a rejected take off with engine failure. Is that sequence still mandatory? If so, what is the recommended engine cut procedure on the runway and at what airspeed?

Tee Emm, your best bet is to go have a look at the part 61 MOS, it'll tell you what you need.

But a bit more specifically go have a look at the test form:
https://www.casa.gov.au/files/form61-1496pdf

Item 49 AME.5 Perform rejected take-off – multi-engine aeroplane.

Then go look up AME.5 in the Part 61 MOS Volume 2, it's a little vague, there of course can't be anything specified by CASA as it depends on the Aircraft type, could be contained in your POH/AFM as to the exact Manufacturer procedures for practicing it.

There might be a CAAP on it but I'm not really sure, you'd have to look that up yourself.

reccomended engine cut procedure on the runway........

Close all throttles.

Think he means like how to conduct the actual simulation, haha. What speed? How far along the runway? Aural command to conduct it or cutting an actual engine? etc...etc...

My recent experiences have been that the Instructor has told me that we'd be practicing at some point, during the Take Off Roll he has told me "ENGINE FAILURE" or something as opposed to actually manipulating the engine controls.

That is correct. Some instructors will simulate an engine failure by closing one engine to idle at approximately 50 knots into the take off roll. This has the danger of causing a massive yaw before the average candidate can prevent it; plus the added risk (it has happened) of the pilot under test delaying even for a second of closing the throttle of the other (live) engine. There is no room for an error by the candidate or the instructor.

The side strain and possible structural damage on the landing gear can be significant and the probability of the testing officer having to salvage the situation is high. The instructor might know which throttle he intend to retard to "simulate" the engine failure but the candidate won't know until it happens.
Because there is no margin for error in this exercise the candidate must react instantly to apply the correct rudder as well as rapidly close the live throttle to idle. The risk of mis-handling is high and the risk of damaging the landing gear if the candidate is slow to control the yaw, is IMHO, quite unacceptable.

If the flight test exercise only requires the instructor to call "stop" which in turn only requires the candidate to close both throttles and brake to a stop, then that is fine.

Now to another subject contained in the Flight Test Form. Item 40 requires a candidate to demonstrate a short landing in his light twin. As the Vref speed for the type of aircraft, AUW and configuration is published in the AFM and is approximately 1.3VS for the configuration, there should be no difference in airspeed regardless of available runway length. Therefore a "short" field landing speed should by definition be the same as a normal landing i.e. not below the AFM speed. Thus the requirement to demonstrate a "short" landing is superfluous as technique doesn't change.

On the other hand if "short" landing means plonking the wheels on the landing threshold, and mashing the brakes which may not have anti-skid systems then that introduces a new hazard. Burst tyres. Who pays?

There is no requirement during a type rating (eg Boeing 737 or Airbus) to demonstrate a "short" landing; because there being no such thing. So what is the CASA rationale requiring demonstration of a "short" landing in a light twin? Does that mean knocking off 10 knots on final below Vref to make it a "short" landing and thus invalidating the AFM speed?
Pprune readers constructive comments welcomed

I'd be very surprised if your POH/AFM didn't include instructions on how to accomplish a "Short Field Landing" or at least in the Amplified Procedures some description of landing with minimum field length used, most seem to and I'm guessing if yours doesn't then the Instructor will simply put Not Tested down for it.

If you look at the Type Rating form Tee Emm, you'll find it includes only the absolute basics, I've always assumed this is because any company operating an Aircraft which is type rated will be required to have their own Training Manual which covers such things.

*EDIT*

It's worth noting that I believe most Type Rated Aircraft these days require to have things like the Rejected Take Offs and EFATOs done in a Simulator after the Bras incident in Darwin a while back.

I remember doing my twin training approval that the instructor decided to demonstrate the RTO procedure in the dutchess (can't remember what his thoughts were) and promptly blew a tyre and left us stranded near the intersection of two runways. I do remember when I asked the very experienced ATO when doing the test he said "what do you mean procedure, you close throttles and stop on the runway"

Therefore a "short" field landing speed should by definition be the same as a normal landing i.e. not below the AFM speed

Most of Tee Emm's flying has been on heavies where book speed is the aim with only minor additives involved.

I suspect that the CASA concern is with the oft-seen GA approach at speeds considerably higher than book speed .. ergo .. the intention is to ensure that the candidate can manage a satisfactory book speed approach and landing.

Other than for specific approvals, civil standards don't address STOL ie there is no defensible reason for approaching below AFM/POH book speed. If one does, and screws the landing up somewhat, then one ought to have a good story in mind for the Inquiry. The only story I can see being valid is something tied up with an emergency or other non-normal high priority situation. (Yes, I know .. we've all done it but it really isn't a routinely good idea).

Aural command to simulate a engine failure on takeoff roll? That's a new one for me. When I did my META the practice was ghost the rudder, chop a mixture at around 50kts and if the student didn't respond promptly chop the other mixture to regain directional control. Worked just fine on a 10m wide runway. Is this not standard practice anymore?

Frightening stuff. If nothing else it proves that cowboys still exist in the world of general aviation instructing :ugh:


Hopefully not..

So flying schools don't do any form of failures on the runway any more?

Maybe why there are so many pilots around that don't seem to know what to do when things go wrong.:ooh:

Sadly I think you are correct, the majority of new ME Class Rating holders I meet have never seen a feathered prop and did their whole class rating with the instructor closing the throttle to simulate the failure. It's a lot easier for a student to identified the failed engine when they only have one throttle to play with.

I wonder how long before the practice is for the instructor to simulate the failure in flight by shouting "engine failure right engine" without any engine input. After all preparing your student for the dangers of OEI flying is cowboyish behaviour.

It isn't the students fault tho. I think I has a lot to do with the quality of the modern day ME instructor.

When I did my initial multi endorsement in 1990, I had to demonstrate a full shutdown and restart in the air, engine failure at any point in the circuit, and rejected takeoffs where the instructor would pull the power just before rotate speed.
Recently I had to undergo the same training (hadn't flown multi-engine since doing the endorsement) prior to starting my instrument rating. Things have changed a bit with respect to the initial actions - mixture, pitch and power still go up, but only to the next level....ie, if you're in cruise power, you go to climb power instead of balls to the wall. Also, we didn't shut down the engine in the air. Still had to do a rejected takeoff, though...that hadn't changed.

I think there is some value in at least one feathered landing during (certainly, initial endorsement) training, especially on prop aeroplanes with bigger engines.

Reason, of course, is the reverse swing as the operating throttle(s) is (are) closed .. once experienced, it stays in the mind, especially if the failed engine is on the outboard position.

If the engines are in the multi-thousand HP arena it certainly does focus the attention. Better to experience the fun with an IP sitting in the other seat unless, of course, one has a simulator of reasonable fidelity.

There is no doubt that a successful feathered landing increases the pilots confidence. Rather like the feeling generated after one's first solo. The problem is one of cost benefit. The RAAF in the early 1950's found that to their cost after three Lincoln (four engine bomber) crashes during practice feathered landings where mishandling (pilot error) took place and the aircraft crashed and were destroyed during attempted low level go around after ballsed up asymmetric landings. Two of these were at Townsville in perfect weather conditions.
Case one was where the instructor was actually demonstrating an asymmetric landing with an outboard propeller feathered. He failed to detect the aircraft drifting to the side of the runway until too late during the hold-off and went around. Even with full corrective rudder he was unable to prevent the aircraft from yawing under asymmetric power and one wing hit a lone power pole on the grass between runways.

The aircraft crashed and caught fire but luckily the three crew were able to escape before the aircraft burst into flames.

A couple of years later an instructor was talking his student through an asymmetric landing with an outboard propeller feathered. The Lincoln bounced on touch down (and those tail draggers could really bounce). The instructor took control and tried to cushion the bounce by applying power to the three remaining engines. By now speed was low and the aircraft yawed sharply into the feathered engine as the instructor tried to let it down gently.
Directional control was lost and the aircraft crashed sideways and the landing gear collapsed. The three crew escaped before it caught fire.

Following that last accident, the RAAF banned all practice feathered landings on multi-engine types including the C130 Hercules and Dakota aircraft. I believe that rule still stands. Instead, for practice asymmetric landings, the engine failure was simulated by closing the throttle to zero thrust which approximated feathered drag.
The advantage of that was an all engines go-around could be made if the landing was stuffed up.

Tellingly, the then Department of Civil Aviation decided to ignore the experience of the RAAF accidents and practice feathered landings in civilian light twins continued in general aviation despite many accidents.

Finally: Leaving no room for error which means instant perfect reaction which most students are not capable of during initial twin endorsement. Risk mitigation was unheard of then?
Not at all surprising. Amazing what some instructors will do to inject a spot of realism..:E