The Fatal Slippery Slope.
 

I think I am seeing what I think might be the beginning of a fatal slippery slope leading to an increase in CFIT accidents. It is due to the increasing sophistication of glass cockpit systems that are not certified and that have fairly sophisticated autopilot capabilities.

my evidence is patchy, I admit. It consists of continuing wish list requests on support forums for vertical guidance capabilities to be added from non certified GPS sources plus one or two anecdotal admissions from pilots of experimental aircraft fitted with sophisticated but not certified systems and without an IFR rating that they occasionally "push the VFR envelope" for want of better words.

I've also idly thought about how I might try to get in to my local strip in marginal wx so I am tempted too - at least until I thought more about the hills and power lines in the area and the idea of trusting a computer, albeit with synthetic vision, terrain alerting etc with my life and without training at a strip which does not have a designed instrument approach.

clearly there is much more to this IFR caper than I know, but I am not sure if there aren't people who might be sucked in by the technology and get away with it ...up until they don't.

I don't think CASA is likely to be a source of leadership here except to ban VFR aircraft from being equipped with this stuff.

anyway, over to you. What do you think?

Read the crash comics from 40-50 years ago. I think it has always been a problem with people pushing into poor weather conditions

The Citation into Mt Emerald near Mareeba from 26 years ago is a tragic example of misuse of nav gear and pressing on regardless too.

Its alread illegal to fly non ifr pilot or aircraft in ifr conditions, banning equipment is unlikely to help stop it
Some of these efis units are becomng certified too i believe, eroding concept they arent up to the task

i have finished a 3500 word report covering part of this topic, lack of situational awareness is the biggest cause of CFIT, it rarely has anything to do with the glass cockpit, but a lack of skill in interpreting the data given to the pilot, and with the addition of synthetic displays and top down moving map displays, the chances of CFIT are greatly reduced, certified or otherwise, its getting harder to not know where you are in relation to terrain. not to mention most if not all GPS units now come with terrain warning, even small handheld units.
the other biggest contributor is bad weather, though the resulting accident is not what would classified as a CFIT, more uncontrolled flight. usually a spiral dive manoeuvre.
Most large aircraft CFIT accidents have been the result of the crews failure to understand their position given the data at hand,(most before the widespread use of moving maps), a mis interpretation of that data, or the aircraft automation being in the incorrect config, or mode.

Sunny I think your concerns are quite valid. As light aircraft get more sophisticated pilots will assume that the box will take care of them. Its a problem that is still being addressed by the airlines worldwide.

There will always be the clever dick who thinks they know better than the system and devise their own procedures, you just have to look at the Mt Hotham prang for evidence of that. They get away with it several times and then think their knowledge and the equipment on board will keep them out of trouble.

The problem with this thinking is that at some point the aircraft will have to be handflown in marginal conditions. No amount of electronic wizardry will save you when spatial disorientation takes over.

Any chance we can have a read of your report Ultralights?

Perfect example here;

https://www.caa.govt.nz/Accidents_an...0SML_Fatal.pdf

My initial reaction was to be a bit skeptical of Sunfish's post, but thats a great read Weekend_Warrior, thanks. Well put together report that demonstrates exactly how a slight charting error, induced by of all things a map join in the software provided by the manufacturer, was a major contributing factor that lead to a pilot attempting to fly through a mountain that was 2000 ft higher than his EFIS indicated. And with all screen indications showing things were fine right up until he hit the trees.

not sure i think it property of UNSW at the moment. bit i might be able to find some references i used

Post Natal Genetic Selection at it's finest.

The same could be said for a cashed up newbie with a G36 too.

It doesn't matter what information you give the pilot and how it's given to them, they will still find a way to crash due to stupidity and or lack of experience.

weekend warrior, that is the perfect example. God protect all of us from trying the same thing.

Folks,
If you google around a bit, you will find some US (FAA, AOPA??) studies that show the expected "safety" dividend expected from modern "glass" cockpits is not being realised, with some interesting theories and conclusions.
Sorry I can't give you direct links, but they should not be too hard to find.
Tootle pip!!

Sunfish,
I think training and discipline might be a better bet than the almighty. Rather than remove these great additions to situational awareness from the flight deck, it would be better to remove those that try to use them incorrectly.

Flying into IMC is the problem, this could have been an accident relating to vertigo as well.

So many contributing factors, I dont believe reliance on advanced systems can be the single contributing factor.

You will hear all about the cases where synthetic vision/glass cockpit systems have played a part in pilots coming all undone. You won't hear peep about the number of times they've saved a pilot's arse. The accident data could tell a misleading story.

Andy, what concerns me is the substitution of technology for airmanship. I already see it on the water - substituting gps for seamanship. I'm concerned about how to integrate a glass cockpit with sound VFR practices. I'm not sure what to do with the welter of info a glass cockpit provides and the temptation to take shortcuts for example. (study 'risk shifting')

I also wonder if training syllabi should take account of new technologies. we touched on this issue with a thread discussing if VFR students should be given actual controlled experience of VFR into IMC conditions. And as look left suggests, hand flying in marginal conditions. maybe that might serve as a warning against pressing on, relying on glass to keep you safe.

I'll guess that the day the crewman of the RNZAF Iroquois helicopter was winched down to the remains of ZK-SML, the WX was CAVOK?

VFR pilots deliberately entering IMC are simply stupid. Autopilot available or not..

Probably. The day that the crewman of the RNZAF Iroquois helicopter found himself being winched off a hill, himself seriously injured, the rest of his crew dead due CFIT, was a good day for IFR. 25th April 2010. I imagine he has since queried why they went VFR.