PPRuNe Forums

PPRuNe Forums (https://www.pprune.org/)
-   The Pacific: General Aviation & Questions (https://www.pprune.org/pacific-general-aviation-questions-91/)
-   -   MYSTERY RE. TASMANIAN MULTILATERATION (https://www.pprune.org/pacific-general-aviation-questions/566907-mystery-re-tasmanian-multilateration.html)

Dick Smith 31st Aug 2015 00:10

MYSTERY RE. TASMANIAN MULTILATERATION
 
Following is an article which appeared in the Weekend Australian headed, “Airservices Australia ‘lying’ over use of Tasmania’s radar system ”:


Airservices Australia has been accused of lying about why Tasmania’s radar system is not used to control aircraft at low altitude, after the company behind the system revealed it was designed precisely for that purpose.

The government-owned air traffic controller has repeatedly suggested the $6 million TASWAM radar-like system introduced in 2010 was not intended to provide radar control of planes below 8500 feet.

Instead, it has suggested its limited use of the system below this level — as an aid to assist “procedural separation” by tower-based controllers relying primarily on radio contact with pilots — is in line with TASWAM’s objectives.

However, The Weekend Australian has obtained a press release, issued in the US by the company that supplied the system, which categorically states that it was intended to replace procedural separation with full radar control to the ground.

The release by Sensis Corporation, made to global media on November 1, 2010, after TASWAM began operating, says the system means Tasmanian airspace is “now controlled”, allowing radar controllers to “separate aircraft in both en route and (in) terminal airspace”.

It describes this as a “safer, more efficient use of the airspace in a region that was previously controlled with procedural separation”.

However, five years on, airspace below 8500 feet at the Hobart and Launceston airports is still controlled by procedural separation, described by the Virgin Independent Pilots Association as “nowhere near” as safe as radar control and by aviator Dick Smith as a “1930s” system.

Airservices has accused The Australian of inaccurate reporting in suggesting that TASWAM was not being used to the extent originally intended.

However, yesterday, Sensis — now called Saab Sensis — stood by its 2010 statement that TASWAM was intended to provide radar control to 150 metres from ground level, allowing a “safer, more efficient” system to replace procedural separation.

“From a technical perspective, the system is capable of that (radar control to the ground): at the end of the day, it’s up to Airservices and the Civil Aviation Safety Authority to determine how they use it,” a Saab Sensis spokesman said.

“We’ve never had any concerns or issues raised by Airservices Australia in relation to TASWAM operational function.”

Airservices insists procedural separation is safe and appropriate for the level of traffic at Hobart and Launceston airports, althoug¬h CASA has ordered a new review of Tasmanian airspace in light of a rise in traffic.

Mr Smith, a former CASA chairman, said the revelations from Saab Sensis showed Airservices had been “lying” to the public to “cover up” its failure to use TASWAM, which uses signals to triangulate plane positions, as intended.

“It just shows that Airservices are not telling the truth,” Mr Smith said.

“We are going to end up with an accident before anything happens. Someone has made a serious mistake here.”

CASA has said it will not approve the use of TASWAM below 8500 feet because it does not provide sufficient coverage.

Airservices air traffic control general manager Greg Hood did not directly respond yesterday to Mr Smith’s claims, or suggestions that Airservices had misled the public, but insisted Tasmanian airspace was safe.

While not commenting directly on whether TASWAM was originally intended to provide radar control to the ground, he suggested it had allowed safer, more efficient use of Tasmanian airspace as stated in the Sensis press release.

“Airservices uses the TASWAM system to safely and efficiently manage over 70,000 aircraft movements in Tasmanian airspace each year,” he said.

A CASA report in December 2011 quoted air controllers and managers complaining that TASWAM was “worse” the previously patchy old-style radar based in Launceston that it replaced.

Minutes of a May 2012 meeting with stakeholders suggest Airservices representative Kent Quigley discussed “coverage issues” with TASWAM and “the infrastructure required to improve surveillance”.
This is really a fascinating story. Why would the company involved in supplying the equipment categorically state in a media release that the system was to give a “control” service across Tasmania and to ground level at Hobart and Launceston if this was not so? Can someone shed some light on this mystery? Why would Airservices spend $6 million and not get a proper air traffic control “separation” service to ground level? Surely this could easily be done for that amount of money?

It’s interesting also how Greg Hood does not “directly respond” to questions from The Australian. Why would this be so?

Fieldmouse 31st Aug 2015 07:24

Ah Dick..................
 
http://awesomegifs.com/wp-content/up...dead-horse.gif

Dick Smith 31st Aug 2015 08:06

That's what they want us to do.

Stop trying to find out what went wrong.

So it's only flogging a dead horse if they get away with it.

$1.4 billion was lost on the Super Seasprites with not one person held responsible- probably promoted.

It's clear this system was ordered to actually provide a proper terminal radar separation service. I bet the truth will soon come out.

If the fault was caused by Sensis they should not be given further work until they explain why they failed. What could be fairer?

Capn Bloggs 31st Aug 2015 08:31

Meanwhile, how's your CBA on "radar" approach services to most regional aussie jet ports (including Hobart and Launy) coming along, Dick?

PA39 31st Aug 2015 08:51

radar
 
Stick it to them Dick. We are paying for a "service"!!

OZBUSDRIVER 31st Aug 2015 09:54

Fieldmouse:ok: Love your work:D

Jabawocky 31st Aug 2015 13:51

Dick, do you know the ACTUAL and real safety implication of that article which confronted the staff in Hobart and Launceston on the weekend?

You really need to think things through. The exact issue you spruke about, safety in the Tas region, was no doubt compromised by the distress created by your lies and BS in this article.

I am actually calling BS here and calling you out over it.

I know I have the support of many ATC's in TAS.

Bad act Dick…………………. :=

If only you knew………………………………..you have no idea how lucky you are.:ugh:

But hey…………..I know nothing about flying IFR or ATC…..you know that and you told Tasmanians that several years ago on ABC radio….so just ignore me. I never posted here :rolleyes:

Jabawocky 1st Sep 2015 07:09

And while I am having a cranky moment, although I have vented my steam a bit. How about an "Apples with Apples" comparison.

You have listed incidents that were not even ATS attributable in Tasmania, pilot error etc to paint a bleak picture for the great unwashed, particularly the Political class.

If what you are doing is honorable, compare data with Surveillance areas . How about the Gold Coast or Cairns for the last 5 years just as a random sample.

le Pingouin 1st Sep 2015 09:12

So Dick, you're willing to take the word of a press release on face value of a company with a vested interest in portraying their product in the best light possible to support possible further global sales? As if they're going to say "sorry, we hyped the press release" when questioned.

Now where's that "like" button Jaba :ok:

P.S. Procedural separation is a "proper" ATC separation service - you'll find it applied all over the world every hour of every day.

Hempy 1st Sep 2015 11:14

Dick,

Seriously. Take a few days off, contact one of the OMs at either BN or ML (I'll supply the phone numbers if you like..), get a visitors pass, and spend 4 or 5 days plugged into a console next to someone at the coalface*. You think you know how it all 'works', but really you are making assumptions/accusations based on flawed 'knowledge' and an underlying 'pilots' bias tbh.

*pity you didn't do it 20 years ago..

Dick Smith 3rd Sep 2015 00:42

What amazing justification for the unjustifiable. In Tasmania we’re using a procedural approach system. This is a system invented no doubt in the 1930’s. No one can kid anyone that procedural separation using radio and position reporting can ever be as safe or as efficient as one using an approach radar system. But the last posters are trying to justify that. Why could that be?

For those who are reading this thread and don’t understand the full details of air traffic control and radar separation, under the Tasmanian system at the present time aircraft have to call up air traffic control and state the position which has been worked out by the air crew. If that position is wrong the air traffic controller normally has to accept it. This has resulted in many hundreds, if not thousands, of deaths over the years. A common form of accident causing fatalities by professional pilots is a “CFIT” – controlled flight into terrain. The NTSB states that the best way to mitigate against CFIT accidents is to use controlled airspace and radar. It’s clear that the $6 million was spent in Tasmania to give a radar service at both Hobart and Launceston airports. Why else would the money be spent?

There has clearly been some major stuff-up and I simply can’t understand why air traffic controllers would be protecting this. Or could it be that the controllers who control the airspace in the towers want to keep that air space for some reason – i.e. “it’s what we’ve always done” - and have insisted on being trained to use radar separation standards when this is simply not feasible.

All around the world controllers standing in visual towers are not trained to use radar separation techniques for obvious reasons.

One day the truth will come out - why doesn’t someone expose it on this thread? Then we can go ahead and get the system working properly.

Capt Claret 3rd Sep 2015 01:28


Originally Posted by Dick Smith
For those who are reading this thread and don’t understand the full details of air traffic control and radar separation, under the Tasmanian system at the present time aircraft have to call up air traffic control and state the position which has been worked out by the air crew. If that position is wrong the air traffic controller normally has to accept it.

Codswallop!

Speaking for ops to/from Hobart, unless bugsmashing quite low, one is radar identified until handed off to Hobart Tower at 45 nm, inbound. Even then one is generally on a prescribed airway, so reporting position is not a huge feat.

Departing Hobart, depending on the traffic mix, one can be officially radar identified as early as 3000' or 4000', and unofficially observed well before that.

You're scare mongering Dick, a bit like Abbott & Co did for 3 years in opposition, and most of their 2 years in power. Now it's bitten them on the neither regions!

alphacentauri 3rd Sep 2015 02:23


The NTSB states that the best way to mitigate against CFIT accidents is to use controlled airspace and radar
Actually no Dick, the NTSB states no such thing. The NTSB offers that the best way to prevent CFIT is to establish as many barriers against it as possible. It then goes on to list these barriers such as GPWS, TAWS, GPS, ADSB, assisted recovery....and then it lists ATC as barrier. They then go on to ellude that approach surveillance and ATC on its own is not an effective barrier against CFIT because it is only a ground based defence.


No one can kid anyone that procedural separation using radio and position reporting can ever be as safe or as efficient as one using an approach radar system.
Why do you think CASA are going down the path of introducing PBN? Effective next Feb all IFR aircraft need to be equipped with GPS as primary means nav. This basically eliminates the risk that an aircraft will ever report in the wrong position. PBN will allow efficiency within the existing airspace structure, without the need for more infrastructure and cost


Then we can go ahead and get the system working properly
Apart from you telling us the system is broken...you have not yet provided any evidence to prove this

le Pingouin 3rd Sep 2015 05:52


Originally Posted by Dick Smith (Post 9103720)
Why else would the money be spent?

Wouldn't possibly be anything to do with the VFR plonker in a Tobago who had an AIRPROX with a 737 in E now would it?

That's why we got the temporary radar in Tassie in the first place.

Dick Smith 3rd Sep 2015 07:07

Alpha. The 50 passenger airline that was involved in a CFIT in Irian Jia a few weeks ago was fitted with GPWS. TAWS GPS and ADSB plus a fully trained expat two pilot crew and the accident still happened.

Are you telling me that an approach radar service would not have helped prevent the deaths of 50 people ?

Why bother to have such a service at Canberra - lets go to 1930's procedural like Hobart , She'll be right mate!

fujii 3rd Sep 2015 07:52

Capt Claret.

Proscribed airway?

Proscribed (adj.) excluded from use or mention

PLovett 3rd Sep 2015 08:52

As someone who has bugsmashed his way around most of Tasmania including one memorable time of filing IFR to Bathurst Harbour (that got some interest from Centre) I can verify Capt. Claret's comments about how low one can be verified. The coverage does drop off early when going to the west coast and you get outside of the airways route between Smithton and Hobart but is generally good elsewhere.

Just how good was brought home to me recently when I was able to observe an Airservices record of a flight. It indicated that the system would certainly work down to an initial approach fix. It makes me suspect that Airservices either don't want to train the tower staff in radar procedures or don't want to load centre with the approach phase.

My understanding was CFIT as the most common form of industrial homicide has been replaced with loss of spatial awareness and nothing Airservices can do will fix that. Please don't misunderstand me. Radar or TASWAM to initial approach fix would be great. I have lost count the number of times I have had to hold enroute to give the jets time to put in the procedural distance approaching Hobart and wouldn't have to do that with radar separation. You can guarantee a worried question from clients as to why we are "turning back". However, being without it is not the end of civilisation as we know it. Dick there is a far bigger fight that needs to be fought and this is not it.

Capt Claret 3rd Sep 2015 08:58

fujii my humble apology, all fixed. :ok:

alphacentauri 3rd Sep 2015 09:22

Dick,

A) prove that a radar service would have prevented that accident. Don't just say that it would have PROVE IT!
The entire aviation risk model is based on evidence ...you have only presented your opinion.

B) My post was to point out that you were talking cr*p. If you want credibility mate, you have to stop selectively posting peices of information out of context

Dick Smith 3rd Sep 2015 09:27

I did not state an absolute. ie " prevent"

I said approach radar "helped prevent"

I stand by that statement as it is commonsense .


All times are GMT. The time now is 05:39.


Copyright © 2024 MH Sub I, LLC dba Internet Brands. All rights reserved. Use of this site indicates your consent to the Terms of Use.