Dick: #22/#28

I'll start with the basics. I agree it's past time surveillance was introduced to Tasmania. You want the US system, there are other options, such as tower based approach. You really should spend some time watching a sector when there is moderate to busy traffic. Oz sector controllers have huge airspace, are are already working to or beyond maximum at times. If the sector controllers get the approach function, I can bet it will be limited to clearing the approach and handing off to the tower, probably with directed traffic info gained from the radar. HB and LT can get sequences of around 6 or more jets (it's not uncommon, couple or few arrivals from Vic, another from FLI, and one or two to depart in the meantime), which need separation, sequencing, holding, before being sorted out with the local traffic. There is no way an en route controller could possibly have the time to do this with the current staffing and organisation. Then, we have the same sector guy/gal running two real sequences, one into HB, another into LT, forget somewhere else that could be happening like DPO or even Victoria.
Let me remember the history a little. Until a grand new plan about 20 years ago, aircraft in CTA were separated. Then "someone" had the great idea that light aircraft operation VFR could transit over head airports with jet operations, and all they had to do was listen out, maybe announce their presence, and maybe deviate a little if the pilot thought it was necessary. Class E over D. Works great in US, why not here, with no, niente, nulle nixt surveillance. Despite serious concern from pilots and controllers, the idea was introduced. So now the safety of hundreds depended on a VFR pilot with possible less than 100 hours, determining the threat, then the reaction. That lasted about 3 weeks, if I recall, until the already mentioned Virgin encounter near LT. Now, tell me again, that I or my ideas are ridiculous. Really, you should have quietly pulled your head in over that one, and thanked someone that it wasn't a noisy aluminium shower.
I also recall "someone" again, in an airspace review/restructure arguing for more space for lighties, which would be so incredible that flying training would flourish, creating jobs and wealth for everyone. One result of that gave us CTA steps AO85 at 30 miles. What's wrong with that? Nothing really, just that many times every day of the year, RPT jets have to apply power, waste fuel, and often cause the approach to be above profile, because they are held to AO90 until 30 miles. Why, well, because of all that VFR traffic beneath them. How many VFR, less than a handful a year; how many jet approaches stuffed around, conservatively 1000 a year, just for a place like HB. Any jet drivers here want to dispute that, arriving from Clark with a good tailwind, but landing on 12 because of the every present sea breeze.
Just a couple of examples of a little knowledge, from a well meaning, high profile amateur.
Now, tell me again that I'm being ridiculous.
Back to the story. After the LT E airspace event, a portable radar was installed in LT. This was at the time when aircraft numbers were taking off, pun intended. Accordingly, TASWAM was introduced, which gave en route pretty well a picture of en route airspace; aircraft were, from memory, separated by "radar" (not really radar) from above about AO60, lower in some areas.
Lets look at a couple more of your statements. You suggested that ASA are running airspace management with the priority of giving a few mates in HB a job. Are you serious?? ASA would sack every controller if they could manage, the controllers are pushed pretty hard in the new world. I know, I'm just being ridiculous.
You admitted in one of your posts, that you didn't even know the radar separation standard, but you are ready to reorganise Oz airspace.
You also said CFIT was the major threat. It was, but until recently, at least, the major threat has been related to runway occupancy. Now, at Hobart, still no taxiways to the thresholds, so backtracks, prolonged time on the active are normal every day. Using logic and statistics, the greater threat to safety at HB is the taxiway/runway situation. You would be better pushing for taxiways than radar.
Back to sector controllers providing approach function. In US, I'll bet the sector/approach controller will be providing directed traffic, based on paints he/she observes on the screen. The same information could be gained by the pilots from their own TCAS display, if acft in the area had transponders. I'll get flamed for this, but mandatory transponders would save a lot of time, talk, etc. ASA would save a pile, get the same result, if they paid or heavily subsidised the fitting of transponders. If ASA were to run with the sectors providing the approach function, there will be quite a few extra controllers needed, believe me.
I'll repeat, I agree that surveillance in TAS is an idea long overdue, it's a matter of consultation and consideration, and there are other pressing issues.

I introduced mandatory transponders for all aircraft in class E and I have pushed for 25 years to update selected class G terminal airspace to class E. So we get a double safety improvement.

Yet it has'nt happened because you claim it will cost a little more money . How come other developed countries can afford this basic safety issue and not Australia?

The only reason the Launceston incident was known about was because I introduced mandatory transponders in that airspace and the VFR aircraft was so equipped . With the previous airspace above Launceston there was no transponder requirement and if the VFR aircraft was on the same flight path without a clearance no one would have ever known.

You have forgotten that the Tower and the airline pilots never sited the VFR aircraft. It appeared on the TCAS because it was transponder equipped. In the USA there is no transponder requirement in E below 10,000' over D . So it would not have been an incident. The VFR pilot said the Jet was sited at all relevent times through radio alerting and he was remaining clear . Are you suggesting radio alerted see and avoid doesn't work? Then how about our 100 or more G airports which use that in the terminal area? If it's not safe why don't you insist on a minimum of class E with mandatory transponder.?

You don't because it's all about resisting change .

Growahead,
Having grown a head, how about putting some facts in said head.

Every jet I have flown, 9000 at 30 track miles to run would be on or below profile.

Any pilot who didn't account for such a step in his aircraft handling, so that power application was not needed to pass 9000 @ 30 is taking money under false pretenses.

As for the rest of your posts, maybe you are an example of what is wrong with ATC in Australia, and a complete inability to believe that it is done far better in a number of countries, of which US is one.

By far better, I mean better separation assurance standards combined with more efficient traffic handling.

Tootle pip!!

Dick,
The pilots did mutually sight each other, it was quite close.
You are fixated on E, what I'm really saying is make it transponders for everyone.
For you to say that if the TCAS alert didn't happen, it was never an incident: What are you smoking man? They came close enough to count rivets. If a controller had done that, we'd never hear the end of it from you.

Leady,
Thanks for you patronising post. I definitely know what I'm talking about here, you may be correct, Oz is full of incompetent pilots.
There must be heaps of pilots reading this forum, I'll leave it up to them to confirm or deny the truth of this matter. Complaints re the profile onto 12, with the winds as described (local factors, i.e. tailwinds of 30kts or more become headwind below 1000 is a very common situation) are practically a daily moan.

I'm not against change. I think you might be stuck in the groove with the US model. The sector/approach function traffic info will be derived from transponder provided data that the controller sees on the screen. That's already passé.

Today, using transponders and TCAS, we can eliminate the need for the controller to verbally advise individual aircraft. Saves frequency time, effort and money. The pilot doesn't need to be told about the traffic, he can see the relative position from his/her cockpit display.

What is the definition of a separation assurance standard? I'm all over a separation standard but since everyone does the assurance standard better than us I am curious.

Grow ahead. You don't even know the facts.

I will quote from the ATSB report.

" the 737 crew did not see the Tobago at any time "

So now give me a correct answer now that you know this fundamental point!

And they didn't come close enough to count rivets. All a con. The jet never saw the Tobago and the Tobago pilot said they were never in any risk of a collision. It was a giant con to prevent australia from allocating airspace on a risk based formulae.

Dick,
The pilots did mutually sight each other, it was quite close.
You are fixated on E, what I'm really saying is make it transponders for everyone.
For you to say that if the TCAS alert didn't happen, it was never an incident: What are you smoking man? They came close enough to count rivets. If a controller had done that, we'd never hear the end of it from you.

Leady,
Thanks for you patronising post. I definitely know what I'm talking about here, you may be correct, Oz is full of incompetent pilots.
There must be heaps of pilots reading this forum, I'll leave it up to them to confirm or deny the truth of this matter. Complaints re the profile onto 12, with the winds as described (local factors, i.e. tailwinds of 30kts or more become headwind below 1000 is a very common situation) are practically a daily moan.

I'm not against change. I think you might be stuck in the groove with the US model. The sector/approach function traffic info will be derived from transponder provided data that the controller sees on the screen. That's already passé.

Today, using transponders and TCAS, we can eliminate the need for the controller to verbally advise individual aircraft. Saves frequency time, effort and money. The pilot doesn't need to be told about the traffic, he can see the relative position from his/her cockpit display.

Dick,
If the report says the 737 crew didn't sight, I'll accept that. However, the captain, in an agitated tone, transmitted that he had half (meaning one side) of the passengers seeing the Tobago. That may or may not be included in the transcript, but take it from me.
If you can't accept that this was a very serious incident, then there is no point talking about it any further, we are universes apart.
The whole concept of allowing light aircraft to transit overhead an airport with frequent jet movements, and not needing to announce, and being completely invisible electronically, is unbelievable. In the states the model worked because there was surveillance.
Oz controllers do a pretty good job with the available resources. A major reason traffic moves better in some overseas countries is because of infrastructure. Pretty every airport I'll flown into in the US, which is reasonable number, has had multiple parallel runways, crossing at that. Places like San Franscisco, where you are on final with two other aircraft next to you, with three lined up on the crossing ready to roar. As you know, we have nothing like that in Oz.
At the end of the day, the traffic, meaning delays also, is determined by the runway availability, something like one a minute. Then we have other pieces such as high speed taxiways, allowing minimum time on the runway.
We also have political issues like curfews. Come on, back in the 727 days, a valid concern. Today, modern jets make more aerodynamic noise, which is very little, on approach, an not that much more on departures. So we have the artificial bottleneck every morning around 6 am as the internationals arrive. Seriously, any train line makes more noise these days, why not put a curfew on trains?
If we had multiple crossing runways in the major airports, it would make a huge difference. But no, it's those overpaid, lazy, leftie controllers deliberately delaying the pilots.
Anyway, you have convinced me that I am an idiot, so you can sit on the top of the sandpile in the playground. It's all yours. Ciao ciao

Growahead: I'm with you. The two biggest waste of time, effort, staffing and money in the history of aviation in OZ have been NAS airspace and SDE. It still astounds me that there is this surveillance and controlled airspace down to 1500ft over Tasmania during the night with only two or three regular week day movements for the whole shift when Canberra airspace, during the same time, is uncontrolled Class G to 8500ft. Now there's security for you over the nation's capital when Joe Lunchbucket can load his aircraft up with fertiliser and fly it to Canberra and plunge it into Government House and nobody would know - or dare I say care!!

Some really bad stuff! That statement from Dick sums up this whole farcical situation. Dick, you're the one who needs to open your eyes.

Grow. We have many class G airports with RPT jet services and VFR traffic flying through the terminal area without survailance and without transponders. Ballina is an example. Don't even have a Unicom radio operator to report a plane taxiing on the wrong frequency as they all do for safety in the USA.

If we upgrade them to class E we get full Separation of all aircraft in IMC and also mandatory transponder so TCAS will work. But Bloggs is happy with the status quo at these airports because " that's how we did it in the 1950s and nothing must change"

If the VFR aircraft did not have a transponder requirement - say as at Ballinna today- no incident would have been reported as the VFR pilot has always maintained that he had the jet visual and was not going to run into it. That's how alerted see and avoid works all around the world

But who is going to pay for all the extra controllers and consoles we're going to need, and more fundamentally where the hell are we going to get them from? You never answer these questions.

Stop trotting out the "change resistance" bull**** Dick. You and your mates are the ones so stuck in a rut your ears are clogged with dirt. Show us the money!

Perspective
 

I'm struggling to follow your logic Dick, let me briefly explain

Ballina Area

In the Newspaper and on here you say you want Class E CTA and a Unicom;

In the Newspaper it mentions a possible lowering of the CTA base to 5,000ft (from 8,500ft); What do you want to happen between 5,000ft and the circuit? Installation of radar? Multlat, ADS-B Mandate for IFR and VFR? Cost v's Safety Benefit?

The Unicom. Who would man it and when? What training? Who pays for it, Who insures it (Strict Liability – Not agreeing it is right, just asking)? Will it need things such as recorders for liability, investigation etc? Will it operate on the CTAF frequency? How would you ensure the Unicom did not impede pilot to pilot Comm's that may be of and urgent or critical nature on either CTAF or AREA ATC?

You saidLets assume for argument that Class E over Ballina is put in place down to 700ft
VFR non-transponder aircraft are immediately excluded – OK
VFR transponder equipped aircraft could neglect to turn the transponder on (Unicom won't know, ATC won't know, TCAS RPT won't know – OK
The cost or ATC terminal services would cost extra – OK
I assume from your previous comments regarding the necessity of Regulatory Impact and Cost/Benefit processes, you will of course support those processes to determine if the changes you want are a proper allocation of finite Industry funding.

In contrast to the Ballina Class G to E debate. It seems a completely different issue to that of the controlled Tasmanian terminal airspace as that is much busier and is currently Class C and D (full ATC control of VFR and IFR traffic).

Tasmanian Airspace

I am struggling with your arguments as things don't add up. You say
https://www.atsb.gov.au/media/24413/...305235_001.pdf
Prior to the NAS class E airspace in which this Airprox occurred, The Airspace was Class C which requires an ATC clearance via Radio and Transponder carriage and use, and the aircraft would have been separated (presumably vertically 1,000ft or an amended route) by Air Traffic Control. You say
From the ATSB Final
and;
and;
I trust you can see the difficulty in reconciling your comments, both in accuracy and context.

I am sure I am not the only reader troubled by the mixing of two very different change agendas. The efficacy of changing G (uncontrolled) to E (half control) in Ballina is a very different thing to changing C (full control) to E (half control) in Tasmania irrespective of the availability of ATC surveillance.

Along the same lines, I can't imagine good outcomes are assisted at all by megaphone diplomacy that invokes responses such as this;

https://newsroom.airservicesaustrali...e-australian-4
As others have indicated, if change is necessary in Ballina, Tasmania, or elsewhere, then so be it. You will of course support the necessity for open, transparent Regulatory Impact and Cost/Benefit (and the like) processes to determine if the changes you want are a proper allocation of finite Industry funding.

Regards

Q

So the USA , Canada and many other countries can provide this safer system but not Australia. At the present time we get an ATC service where the risks are minimal but when the risks go up- in the terminal area- pilots have to become their own " ATCs" . Pathetic system at busy non tower airports most would reckon.

How come the work load on controllers is clearly so much lower than in other leading aviation countries.?

I have spoken to Aussie controllors of low level en route airspace and some claim they could also do approach work as long as we had the FAA enlightened procedural separation standards.

This was supposed to happen in 1992. Why not trial just one airport before we claim it would be too expensive?

And a number of controllors have told me that giving traffic information in our old 1950s way is more labor intensive than actually separating the aircraft in some circumstances .

But we would not know because we have never used en route controllors to provide a terminal service at non tower airports.

I observe!!
 

Come on, let Dick place his argument.

I for one have faith in what he does say as since 1997, when the last big change was to foisted on us, we did stop this attempt to protect the rice-bowls of ASA employees at the time.

Again, No Safety Case was advanced and I note watching the October 2014 and May 2015 Senate estimates, that #ASA still protects it's rice-bowl.

Need I remind you that the ASA Board made a decision on moving the Adelaide facility to Melbourne without the benefit of a safety case - Attitude advanced to the Senator's was that "...we can do it later and it really is OK anyway..."

Comments?? Le P, Grow, P lovett [I can supply you a rice-bowl if you wish!!]

I observe!!
 

Come on, let Dick place his argument.

I for one have faith in what he does say as since 1997, when the last big change was to foisted on us, we did stop this attempt to protect the rice-bowls of ASA employees at the time.

Again, No Safety Case was advanced and I note watching the October 2014 and May 2015 Senate estimates, that #ASA still protects it's rice-bowl.

Need I remind you that the ASA Board made a decision on moving the Adelaide facility to Melbourne without the benefit of a safety case - Attitude advanced to the Senator's was that "...we can do it later and it really is OK anyway..."

Comments?? Le P, Grow, P lovett [I can supply you a rice-bowl if you wish!!]

If this is meant to be a reference to Aussie airports, it may have been true a few years ago, but is not now. If you want to get rid of waste in aviation, there is a humdinger. A complete duplication of existing police services. I understand most airports remain "federal" land, but the bureaucracy and infrastructure created to police these little "islands" is astonishing. And the airports are charged by the govt for the service.

the big benefit (not) for any airside police need in HBA is that the local Tassie Police don't have ASIC, don't have airside access, and have to be met by a Duty Manager and escorted to the place of need.

No escort, no police. Not to mention that if, say, the police were busy with a siege of some sort, an aerodrome issue is put down the priority list, and the flight crew & aeroplane can just wait.

"Some circumstances", "some claim" - that's a lot of qualifiers Dick. Your problem is because it might be possible with existing resources in some areas some of the time (there's that "some" word again) that it will be possible in all areas all the time with existing resources. Many of them have all or nothing type workloads - you're either bored rigid or can barely keep up.

As to your ludicrous workload claim - you clearly have no idea.

Show us the money! Show us the resource!

Rice bowls? You do realise this is going to increase the number of controllers not decrease them?

Dick has been having his say for a very long time - he makes all manner of ridiculous claims that should not go unchallenged.

Where's the safety case for Dick's proposed changes? Things have moved on since the last time so it needs a new one. Hang on a sec, was there ever one in the first place?

Le Ping. I have never said or implied that the FAA system could be introduced at all time and all places. Quite the opposite.

I reckon we could test one or two locations. We may be pleasantly surprised how well our Aussie en route controllers can perform approach work even without radar like their US counterparts .

Folks,
The latest in The Australian.
Tootle pip!!

Airservices Australia fails to follow own safety plan
Airservices Australia’s failure to provide reliable radar coverage to runway level at Hobart airport is an apparent breach of its own target. The airspace safety body has repeatedly dismissed concerns about the lack of reliable radar below 7000 feet at the Hobart and Launceston airports as unjustified.
This is despite warnings from experts that a tragedy is inevitable unless the situation is rectified — and the revelation that Airservices itself intended to provide radar coverage to ground-level at Hobart airport in a 2010 project developed in *response to a wave of earlier safety concerns.
Outlining the goals of a $6 million TASWAM (Tasmania Wide Area Multilateration) radar system in its 2009-10 annual report, Airservices said the project intended to provide radar surveillance “down to the surface at Hobart”.
But the system it actually *delivered cannot be relied upon below 7000 feet — despite the presence in Hobart of mountains and hills — because its coverage at lower levels is deemed inadequate by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority.
CASA yesterday confirmed that it had refused to approve the system’s use below 7000 feet because the “surveillance coverage below this altitude does not meet the coverage requirements”.
Asked if this was due to Airservices’ failure to provide a sufficient number of ground stations to support full coverage, CASA communications manager Peter Gibson declined to comment and said: “This is a question for Airservices.”
Airservices did not directly answer the question when contacted by The Australian but *insisted the system did work to ground level, despite not being accepted by CASA as sufficiently reliable in Hobart.
According to one air-traffic insider, who posted on the industry chat site pprune.org, Air*services reneged on its promise of reliable radar “down to the surface” to cut costs on the project. “(They) decided to try and save some money on the installation by using fewer ground stations than recommended by the suppliers,” he posted. “You get what you pay for.”
Airservices denied it had failed to deliver its own plans. “Below 7000 feet, aircraft are separated using ‘procedural’ standards (pilots reporting their location), however (they) remain displayed (on the radar system) and can be seen by air traffic controllers in Hobart, Launceston and our Melbourne air traffic control centre,” an Airservices spokesman said.
“The TASWAM was a successful project that delivered on its key objectives in a cost efficient and timely manner.”
But businessman and pilot Dick Smith, a former CASA chairman, told The Australian he believed Airservices had bungled the project by failing to install sufficient ground stations.
It was now trying to “cover-up” its failure, instead of installing more ground stations to satisfy CASA and deliver the long-promised radar coverage to the runway level. “It’s outrageous that $6m would be spent and Tasmanians are still getting a 1930s system — and it’s not safe,” Mr Smith said. “If they’ve got 90 per cent towards putting in a radar system, why not do the other 10 per cent? No one can say that having mountains and bad weather and not using radar is safe. It’s not safe. Luckily, we’ve got away without an accident. It (collision with hills and mountains) is the most common form of serious accident, and the cause of our last serious accident (in 2005) at Lockhart River (Queensland) that killed 15 people.”
Instead of radar to the runway, pilots inform air traffic control of their location below 7000 feet.
Mr Smith said he believed the system would inevitably lead to a disaster in Hobart similar to Lockhart River.
Airservices insists air traffic operations in Tasmania are “safe”. It says the system of pilots reporting their location to air-traffic control below 7000 feet is used at large regional airports, including Broome, Rockhampton, Alice Springs, Karratha, Coffs Harbour and Tamworth.
Mr Smith said few if any of these locations had the combination of mountainous topography and weather conditions of Tasmania. “They put this WAM radar system (in Tasmania) because we had some scares — two near-misses where planes were flying around in cloud — that were quite serious near-accidents,” he said.

First sign of desperation...double posting in different threads. Tut tut, totle pip! :}

Bloggsie,
Quite deliberate, actually, there seems to be distinct differences in the readers of both threads.
Come to think of it, tell me you are not having conniptions at the statement of the President of AFAP re. supporting Class E
Tootle pip!!

Which experts?

Ahh, those ones.

Also, hills and mountains have been around a lot longer than aeroplanes, and procedures have been developed to avoid them, but pilots f#cking up the approach and running into said hills (eg Lockhart River) isn't the fault of the system.

Rice bowl? That's a funny one :D ASA is as busy as a one legged man in an arse kicking competition. They don't need work practices protected, they are a monopoly provider with steady increases of traffic year on year plus major projects. They provide separation in mandated airspace, any more of it and you are creating more work for them. :eek: Charged back to you of course. ;) Apart from the fact that as much as you'll hate to hear it, Australian controllers are probably the most productive considering the size of their sectors and the traffic numbers. :eek: again

Traffic. I don't believe I have ever blamed common pilot errors on " the system".

I simply believe that if we can put procedures in place to help reduce the chance of pilot errors that it's a good idea.

Radar control used properly can make operations safer in the terminal area.

Obviously. Only flying in VMC makes operations safer too. I would like radar approach services at all the ports I fly to, but I'm a realist; they're just not necessary. You know, Affordable Safety. You may have plenty of dosh, but you have also been ranting on about costs to industry. My operation certainly doesn't need radar control at most of the places I go to; would you be prepared to pay for the service, assuming of course you have done a cost-benefit analysis to work out how much it will actually be...haven't you?

Not at all, tittle pop. You see, people are entitled to voicing their opinions, a concept which you seem to have trouble with. I don't agree with him, but I'm not going to have a meltdown about it as I suspect he is an honourable chap who will understand other's positions without sledging them, unlike some around here.

What I am laughing at is your about-face on the AFAP; a few days you intimated they were the worst, most ratbag bunch of rednecks on earth, now you are singing their praises. A Visa moment...priceless! :D

Really .....??
 

"radar control used properly can make operations safer in the terminal area"

'Terminal' is right.
Wasnt publicised much and only Lockhart and Benalla seem to get a mention but in the recent decades out of Cairns in radar/transponder controlled airspace 2 aircraft flew into hillsides. Que?? Anybody say anything?
Aero Comander into Thorntons Peak. Aztec into Bellenden Kerr.
WTF. !!

One aircraft was VFR and flew up the wrong valley apparently avoiding weather - IFR charts were found in the wreckage, but no VFR charts. The other was IFR category, planned at a level above lsalt, but when airborne asked for a visual level, but nevertheless flew into cloud and then into Thornton's Peak which was in Class G and outside Approach terminal airspace. In both cases, terrain avoidance was a pilot responsibility. Pilot's don't like controllers getting into the cockpit, the same as controllers don't like pilots trying to take over air traffic control.

the point
 

is...were these two aircraft on the radar screen, never mind the airspace type or altitude ?

And if they were giving a tsp blip with alt. and seen to be off track, too low etc.
why didnt anybody make comment.

And if it had been an ADS B blip...would it have made any difference.?

Just asking.

I am not a radar controller but if they were visually operating below the LSALT what would you want a controller to say? Remind you every 2 minutes you are below LSALT? The radar screens don't typically have all the terrain marked on them so if the pilot is flying visually what exactly would you like ATC to do in that situation?

They were on radar.
The VFR aircraft was slightly right of cleared route, but at about 15NM South deviated further to the right. The radar paint disappeared a short time later. Terrain shielding around Cairns is a regular occurrence, especially in this area.
Also, VFR aircraft in Cairns area are often maneuvering due terrain and weather, you can't constantly be checking all is OK.
As for IFR cleared at visual level at pilot request, what are we supposed to do?
Our system does not give terrain alerts for VFR aircraft or for IFR aircraft cleared visually.

Bloggsie,
Merely acknowledging a major reversal of policy by AFAP, credit where credit is due. Probably something, with which you have some difficulty. It does represent somewhat of a seachange from the days AFAP members on the east coast refused to fly in E at all, and threatened industrial action against E.

As John Maynard Keynes said: " When the facts change, I change my mind, what, Sir, do you do?"

Tootle pip!!

Do the multilateration stations in Tassie also receive ADSB? If not. Are there any ADSB stations in Tasmanian?

What level does ADSB operate down to at Devonport? Or is there no ADSB coverage at low level in Tasmania ? Surely someone must have this info.

Fifteen seconds on ASA website:

ADS-B services are being implemented in stages during which time surveillance coverage will progressively increase. Currently, the system is supported by more than 60 duplicated ADS-B ground stations nationwide plus 14 ADS-B capable multilateration sites in Tasmania and 16 sites in the Sydney basin. These are now delivering continuous surveillance of aircraft operations high level airspace across western, central and northern Australia where radar coverage does not currently exsist. A further 14 ground stations are being considered to support the needs of airlines, regional and general aviation.

Good stuff. While the yanks are gnashing their teeth, we're getting on with it. Lead, follow or get the hell out of the way! :ok: