Does anyone know where I'd be able to catch up on the episode in question?

I heard about it today. I was told the stall warning alarm sounded 58 times?

It's easy to say "how come they didn't recognise the stall blah blah" but I was also told one of the junior crew in a control seat had back pressure applied the whole time trying to clibm the aircraft without the knowledge of the other crew until it was too late?

I have heard many conflicting reports as to the cause of the crash so if most of you think 60 mins did a good job, I'd like to watch it very much.

I'm staggered that some engineer ******** found it impossible for a jet aircraft to do 60kts so cuts a stall warning warning? So when the thing accelerates past 60kts a stall warning re-activates when the aircraft is in the act of righting itself. How can you trust this POFS?

I'm staggered that some engineer ******** has seen fit to remove such a basic thing as being able to see and feel what the other pilot is doing.

I'm staggered that some ******** airline manager has seen fit to put a 200 hour pilot in the RHS when they know it is dangerous to do so and they know the LHS has no hope of being able to train the RHS. And that there is some ******** management pilot that supports it.

"A very cost aware industry" is surely the main reason we have simulators in which to practice our flying skills rather than use real aeroplanes.

Regardless of the many jet transport accidents that were proved to have been caused by the pilot losing control (in other words poor flying ability) - it is probable that even today, 90 percent of simulator sessions still involve making full use of the available automatics.

If you want to crew aircraft with pilots equally at home at pressing buttons/monitoring automatics or hand flying in IMC in a seamless transition from automatics to raw data hand flying, then why not teach them how to do that task in the simulator? It is not an insurmountable problem - except to those pilots who are so addicted to automation, that they are privately apprehensive of their own lack of confidence in their ability to fly an aeroplane.

If you have an i Pad download the 60 minutes Australia new app.

Then you can watch it.

Also download and read the BEA accident report.

Final report

BEA
 

Nitpicker, Mac Job wrote a good piece on the Trident crash, very interesting 'tech crew gradient' issue on that ill fated flight.

So with these fly by wire jobbies, do you have to tell the aircraft which sidestick "has control". Can one over-ride the other or is it only one at a time?

May I ask do many airline crews still hand fly legs to maintain currency?

Just in case anyone is confusing this BEA -

http://www.bea.aero/img/visuels_habi...acteurbleu.jpghttp://www.bea.aero/img/interface/he...o_et_coord.gif


with the old British European Airways that operated that Trident
that crashed at Staines near London.

either side stick will work. inputs from both are added together although it will generate a "dual input" warning.

either side can lock out the other in case of side stick fault or incapacitation

shag

some engage the a/p after gear up, some wait a bit. its been a while since i last saw any hand flying above transition on the line.

What's needed is an Angle of Attack indicator and a section in the QRH on power settings needed at particular AoA to maintain cruise. You dont need fancy computers to fly! Power + Attitude = Performance is how we are taught. They mentioned the difficulty in seeing the PF side stick movements but dont think any mention was made that the THS was at or close to its backstop at stall and would have needed time to get back to a sensible position to enable a recovery and the aircraft was perhaps unrecoverable by stall stage. I think Airbus got off lightly on 60 Minutes at the expense of PF and 'Systemic' problems.

pitch and thrust are already in the qrh.

if you dont know whats normal in the cruise you shouldnt be in the seat.

aoa vanes ice up too. perpignan

'chris' that info already exists in the buses QRH Att/thrust settings under unreliable airspeed.
I'd say most modern day airliners would stay aloft in the crz maintaining an airspeed that's safe with around 2-3 deg's attitude & around 75-80% N1 'till the drivers can explore further.
It's amazing the amonut of time pilots spend at the steering wheel whilst in crz so there's plenty of time to see what's needed for level flight.

I believe that Airbus most likely looked at adding the non flying pilots stick to move duplicating the PF's movements but just at a guess there would be numerous issues associated with that concept such as the sticks aren't in the direct view of the pilots looking fwd or at the inst panel (not to mention they are black against a black background) unlike a conventional control column &
if any lose items where present in the area of the stick (sufficient surface area there for all sorts of crap!) it may inhibit or at least restrict the control sticks movement.
The concept to me is very good as it does provide for a uncluttered feel/look to the cockpit & allowing a tray table which is very handy for playing cards, computer games (outside of the big one yr currently playing) & stuffing yr face with goodies:ok:

Wmk2

The 787 is bloody fantastic in this area.

Systems reconfigure the PFD to show AOA,GPS ALT, GS etc in this situation apparently.

Why we can't select AOA is beyond me.:=

Are you guys forgetting the B.U.S.S?

Fly the green, it's an AOA indicator!

As for hand flying, I hand fly where I can to transition, hand fly the approach from 3000 feet and do a manual thrust landing at least every roster change.

Most guys seem to do something similar unless it's a complex SID or approach in poor weather and you need increased SA by load shed.

'GG' I believe the B.U.S.S feature is optional on busses, ( I think std on the 'Dugong' though) would be great if they where std:ok:
Sounds like a brilliant piece of kit not using those pesty ADR's but IR's for AoA & GPS for Alt as well as stall warning protection, something you lose with all ADR's off.
I can just see it now, the two F/O's on that night had the presence of mind to turn all 3 ADR's off to display the B.U.S.S, I don't think so as total confusion was over taking them.

One could say has mankind made a rod for his own back when it comes to technology? Possibly but some said that monoplanes where just a fad not too long ago in the scheme of things as the wing would fall off:-)

I think hand flying today's modern transport Cat jet anymore than really necessary is pretty much frowned upon by most training dept's as it can increase the workload of the PNF considerably especially after T/off with multiple things going on anyway besides having to adjust speed selections, V/S, (if wanting a reduced V/S to be shown on the F/D's to lvl off) turns & diff Alt's not to mention flaps, lights, switches & checklists.
All too hard, I like simple at my age the days of poling around a plane are long gone for me:)

Wmk2

P.S ..Yr right there 'nitpicker' although Airbus only recommended that the BUSS not be used Abv F250 as I believe it's difficult to manage at higher Alt's although it is still available at all Alt's. I read Air France decided not to fit the BUSS to their fleet, somewhat academic now I guess.

The BUSS is only to be used below FL 250....

Jack, the explanation behind the stall warning behaviour is NOT as you believe.

Rather, it is as follows:

Below 60 kts, the AOA vanes are considered unreliable. For the stall warning to sound, the AOA vanes must be indicating the stall angle AND the vane data must be valid (2 CONDITIONS that must be met).

So, in this case, as the airspeed dropped below 60 kts, the vanes were showing stall but the computers stopped considering the vanes valid - hence the stall warning ceased (one of the CONDITIONS was no longer met).

CONDITIONS- this is one of the big areas where man and machine don't get along.

The automation has got hundreds of conditions built in. E.g. for something to turn automatically turn on, the conditions must be satisfied. For something to automatically turn off, the conditions must be satisfied.

For something to continue happening as the humans expect, all the conditions must remain satisfied. For something to NOT happen at the wrong time, some of the conditions must remain unsatisfied. You get the idea.

Problem is, however, that the number and combination of conditions is too great for any normal human to master. So when something out of the ordinary happens in these highly automated aircraft, the humans will often be unable to appreciate what is happening, but more importantly, what will happen next.

Yes, an FO related an incident over the South China sea that happened about 6 months ago. A/P dropped out, lost IAS etc.....they flew pitch and power and came out of it 1 minute later. Paperwork filed on landing and undies changed.:ok:

Thanks mate for the explanation. But as it comes 'out the other side' and the stall warning sounds again appears to be a huge human factor issue to me.

The aircraft gets below 60 kts, stall warning ceases, action is taken to rectify, as the airspeed increases above 60 kts stall warning sounds again? Doesn't make sense to me? If Airbus knows this is an issue and hasn't documented procedures because it doesn't see it as an issue?

I would wager that they never anticipated such a scenario in the first place.

Another thing that was coming and going was the flight director bars. When they were showing, they were commanding a pitch-up. This indication may well have reinforced the belief in the PF that back stick was required.

Amazing stuff.