Does anyone know where I'd be able to catch up on the episode in question?

I heard about it today. I was told the stall warning alarm sounded 58 times?

It's easy to say "how come they didn't recognise the stall blah blah" but I was also told one of the junior crew in a control seat had back pressure applied the whole time trying to clibm the aircraft without the knowledge of the other crew until it was too late?

I have heard many conflicting reports as to the cause of the crash so if most of you think 60 mins did a good job, I'd like to watch it very much.

I'm staggered that some engineer ******** found it impossible for a jet aircraft to do 60kts so cuts a stall warning warning? So when the thing accelerates past 60kts a stall warning re-activates when the aircraft is in the act of righting itself. How can you trust this POFS?

I'm staggered that some engineer ******** has seen fit to remove such a basic thing as being able to see and feel what the other pilot is doing.

I'm staggered that some ******** airline manager has seen fit to put a 200 hour pilot in the RHS when they know it is dangerous to do so and they know the LHS has no hope of being able to train the RHS. And that there is some ******** management pilot that supports it.

"A very cost aware industry" is surely the main reason we have simulators in which to practice our flying skills rather than use real aeroplanes.

Regardless of the many jet transport accidents that were proved to have been caused by the pilot losing control (in other words poor flying ability) - it is probable that even today, 90 percent of simulator sessions still involve making full use of the available automatics.

If you want to crew aircraft with pilots equally at home at pressing buttons/monitoring automatics or hand flying in IMC in a seamless transition from automatics to raw data hand flying, then why not teach them how to do that task in the simulator? It is not an insurmountable problem - except to those pilots who are so addicted to automation, that they are privately apprehensive of their own lack of confidence in their ability to fly an aeroplane.

If you have an i Pad download the 60 minutes Australia new app.

Then you can watch it.

Also download and read the BEA accident report.

Final report

BEA
 

Nitpicker, Mac Job wrote a good piece on the Trident crash, very interesting 'tech crew gradient' issue on that ill fated flight.

So with these fly by wire jobbies, do you have to tell the aircraft which sidestick "has control". Can one over-ride the other or is it only one at a time?

May I ask do many airline crews still hand fly legs to maintain currency?

Just in case anyone is confusing this BEA -

http://www.bea.aero/img/visuels_habi...acteurbleu.jpghttp://www.bea.aero/img/interface/he...o_et_coord.gif


with the old British European Airways that operated that Trident
that crashed at Staines near London.

either side stick will work. inputs from both are added together although it will generate a "dual input" warning.

either side can lock out the other in case of side stick fault or incapacitation

shag

some engage the a/p after gear up, some wait a bit. its been a while since i last saw any hand flying above transition on the line.

What's needed is an Angle of Attack indicator and a section in the QRH on power settings needed at particular AoA to maintain cruise. You dont need fancy computers to fly! Power + Attitude = Performance is how we are taught. They mentioned the difficulty in seeing the PF side stick movements but dont think any mention was made that the THS was at or close to its backstop at stall and would have needed time to get back to a sensible position to enable a recovery and the aircraft was perhaps unrecoverable by stall stage. I think Airbus got off lightly on 60 Minutes at the expense of PF and 'Systemic' problems.

pitch and thrust are already in the qrh.

if you dont know whats normal in the cruise you shouldnt be in the seat.

aoa vanes ice up too. perpignan

'chris' that info already exists in the buses QRH Att/thrust settings under unreliable airspeed.
I'd say most modern day airliners would stay aloft in the crz maintaining an airspeed that's safe with around 2-3 deg's attitude & around 75-80% N1 'till the drivers can explore further.
It's amazing the amonut of time pilots spend at the steering wheel whilst in crz so there's plenty of time to see what's needed for level flight.

I believe that Airbus most likely looked at adding the non flying pilots stick to move duplicating the PF's movements but just at a guess there would be numerous issues associated with that concept such as the sticks aren't in the direct view of the pilots looking fwd or at the inst panel (not to mention they are black against a black background) unlike a conventional control column &
if any lose items where present in the area of the stick (sufficient surface area there for all sorts of crap!) it may inhibit or at least restrict the control sticks movement.
The concept to me is very good as it does provide for a uncluttered feel/look to the cockpit & allowing a tray table which is very handy for playing cards, computer games (outside of the big one yr currently playing) & stuffing yr face with goodies:ok:

Wmk2

The 787 is bloody fantastic in this area.

Systems reconfigure the PFD to show AOA,GPS ALT, GS etc in this situation apparently.

Why we can't select AOA is beyond me.:=

Are you guys forgetting the B.U.S.S?

Fly the green, it's an AOA indicator!

As for hand flying, I hand fly where I can to transition, hand fly the approach from 3000 feet and do a manual thrust landing at least every roster change.

Most guys seem to do something similar unless it's a complex SID or approach in poor weather and you need increased SA by load shed.

'GG' I believe the B.U.S.S feature is optional on busses, ( I think std on the 'Dugong' though) would be great if they where std:ok:
Sounds like a brilliant piece of kit not using those pesty ADR's but IR's for AoA & GPS for Alt as well as stall warning protection, something you lose with all ADR's off.
I can just see it now, the two F/O's on that night had the presence of mind to turn all 3 ADR's off to display the B.U.S.S, I don't think so as total confusion was over taking them.

One could say has mankind made a rod for his own back when it comes to technology? Possibly but some said that monoplanes where just a fad not too long ago in the scheme of things as the wing would fall off:-)

I think hand flying today's modern transport Cat jet anymore than really necessary is pretty much frowned upon by most training dept's as it can increase the workload of the PNF considerably especially after T/off with multiple things going on anyway besides having to adjust speed selections, V/S, (if wanting a reduced V/S to be shown on the F/D's to lvl off) turns & diff Alt's not to mention flaps, lights, switches & checklists.
All too hard, I like simple at my age the days of poling around a plane are long gone for me:)

Wmk2

P.S ..Yr right there 'nitpicker' although Airbus only recommended that the BUSS not be used Abv F250 as I believe it's difficult to manage at higher Alt's although it is still available at all Alt's. I read Air France decided not to fit the BUSS to their fleet, somewhat academic now I guess.

The BUSS is only to be used below FL 250....

Jack, the explanation behind the stall warning behaviour is NOT as you believe.

Rather, it is as follows:

Below 60 kts, the AOA vanes are considered unreliable. For the stall warning to sound, the AOA vanes must be indicating the stall angle AND the vane data must be valid (2 CONDITIONS that must be met).

So, in this case, as the airspeed dropped below 60 kts, the vanes were showing stall but the computers stopped considering the vanes valid - hence the stall warning ceased (one of the CONDITIONS was no longer met).

CONDITIONS- this is one of the big areas where man and machine don't get along.

The automation has got hundreds of conditions built in. E.g. for something to turn automatically turn on, the conditions must be satisfied. For something to automatically turn off, the conditions must be satisfied.

For something to continue happening as the humans expect, all the conditions must remain satisfied. For something to NOT happen at the wrong time, some of the conditions must remain unsatisfied. You get the idea.

Problem is, however, that the number and combination of conditions is too great for any normal human to master. So when something out of the ordinary happens in these highly automated aircraft, the humans will often be unable to appreciate what is happening, but more importantly, what will happen next.

Yes, an FO related an incident over the South China sea that happened about 6 months ago. A/P dropped out, lost IAS etc.....they flew pitch and power and came out of it 1 minute later. Paperwork filed on landing and undies changed.:ok:

Thanks mate for the explanation. But as it comes 'out the other side' and the stall warning sounds again appears to be a huge human factor issue to me.

The aircraft gets below 60 kts, stall warning ceases, action is taken to rectify, as the airspeed increases above 60 kts stall warning sounds again? Doesn't make sense to me? If Airbus knows this is an issue and hasn't documented procedures because it doesn't see it as an issue?

I would wager that they never anticipated such a scenario in the first place.

Another thing that was coming and going was the flight director bars. When they were showing, they were commanding a pitch-up. This indication may well have reinforced the belief in the PF that back stick was required.

Amazing stuff.

'FGD' I imagine that was exactly the problem for the hapless drivers, the F/D bars where telling them to go that way (up) due false info to the F/D's, this is where it's time NOT to believe yr instruments, that's at odds as to what we have been taught from day one. If only they had tried the FPV display as that's not effected by blocked Pitot tubes, only if the static ports where blocked.

Blocked static ports ruin everything in a plane, that's the nasty one!
The conditions need to be met as you mentioned (which is obviously correct as you said) is with everything in life from the fuel gauge in yr car to when the LE slats drop out on a Tiger Moth, certain conditions need to be met for it to happen.
The words 'only if'......

At the very least such discussions as this one prods the mind into thinking about 'what if':ok:

Wmk2

The bottom line is that if the pilot flying had done nothing other than maintain attitude, we wouldn't be discussing this. Full backstick & full power was a totally inappropriate response.

The question needs to be asked - "can today's pilots fly, or can they only 'manage' the autoflight system?" Although some in the industry would say that that is all they need to be able to do, I personally don't agree with that.

I think BUSS is now standard on A380's but optional for other buses and wasn't on AF447.

That was NOT the response that caused the climb and stall. Sure the aeroplane climbed under pilot command but that was surmised to be, in part, as a reponse to a possible overspeed (I wonder what the margin to Vmax was at the time?). The full backstick started after the descent had started.

http://www.bea.aero/docspa/2009/f-cp...nexe.03.en.pdf

People need to look at the big picture and not just sledge the drivers.

After the descent had started = after the aircraft had stalled. Still a totally inappropriate response IMHO.

Bloggs:- reading page 22 of the BEA report. As soon as the A/P disconnected the PF pulled back, it may not have been full back stick but it caused the stall none the less.

Final report

Great timing... I went to watch the video but it appears to have been removed.

People argue how automation dependence is now causing accidents and what a problem it is.

Imagine all the smoking holes over certain parts of the world without it.

Imagine no TCAS, no GPWS! Imagine raw data approaches, mental arithmetic for descent profiles, holding pattern sector entries and speed control after 14 hours in ****ty weather. No thanks.

Automation may have killed a few people now, but I wonder how many people it has saved!

If I flew as a pax on certain airlines, I'd appreciate the autoflight systems on.

Thanks :)

TCAS and GPWS, probably the big saviours of passengers in the recent decades, have nothing to do with automation dependency. Agree that VNAV has increased safety, but automation certainly hasn't prevented the opportunity for at least a bit of fair-weather hand-flying.

In any case, as Centaurus pointed out, simulators are ideal. We just need the extra time allocated! ;)

No it didn't. Even after the PF had "flown" it up to 37k, it was still doing 233kt.

Probably because the speeds had dropped from 275 to 60 "sharply" just before.

46 seconds later, the thing really stalled. Look at the pitch command trace: all he was doing until the thing was descending was waggling the stick around (with a slight nose-up bias). Then he pulled full back stick.

Implying he pulled full back stick, stalled it and held it til splashdown is simplistic and unfair.These guys got shafted as much by the aeroplane as by their own lack of skill.

I thought it was lazy.
Look familiar?

No hot heads please:-)
 

Healthy debate is good as it can only improve ones mind.

But lets for a minute look at the events in a different light to provoke more discussion if only to stimulate more thought (without personal insult which is rife on Pprune). Now before all you hot heads out there get wound up this is NOT the only possible blame scenario but just another angle.

One could look at all this as the blame lies 100% with the pilots, more specifically the Commander.

We all know that man has invented the A330 as he has with all other flying machines so that being the case it's guaranteed that these machines will fail sometimes.
Ok we know the probes didn't handle the outside wx conditions on the night, fine we accept that (as it's now fact) as humans designed/made the bloody things in the first place & we pilots have been using them (or any invented stuff) knowing full well that like any other zillion parts on an Aeroplane that they/it could fail at any time (that's why we have redundancy although in this case 50 probes wouldn't have helped!)remembering we don't fly in nice sunny clear days all the time. So we train for such failures (unreliable airspeed) & we have text books via zillions of pages on the Net, on-board text, general knowledge of flight ( a stall is a stall whether it be in a Wright Flyer or an Airbus) & we have the basic instinct as humans to survive.
Engine failures, there's plenty of them that have happened over the years from day one & we have trained to deal with them & modern day planes will fly all day on 1 engine (twin) so the question is why do we have trouble swallowing the fact that the pilots on AF447 where not totally responsible for the crash?
If you have an engine failure in a twin for Eg & you crash, is it not the pilots fault that the plane crashed all things being equal (I'm talking about a basic eng failure where it's survivable)? Yes obviously as we knew damned well that engines can & do fail so we fly accordingly, again what's the diff with AF447? It had an engine failure so to speak by way of blocked sensors (Pitot's) & the aircraft was simply miss-handled & crashed (much like a miss-handled eng failure) where we know had the pilots done some very basic airman-ship stuff they may very well be all still alive today.
For crying out loud they had around 40000' to do it in (get it under control) 4 mins by all accounts, that's quite a long time to be totally out of it when the answer initially was so very simple.(yes I know hindsight is a wonderful thing)

Why do we do all the checks we do in any aeroplane? 'cause to make sure it's safe to fly (safe as possible) so why not continue those checks albeit via recall actions at any stage of the flight should there be a problem?
We where all taught to fly (pilots obviously) & that skill should cover ALL scenarios that are fixable or preventable from the time we start the donks 'till it's chocked. The complexity of the machines we fly increase as we go thru our flying careers & so does the knowledge we need to have to handle such events.

Unreliable Airspeed is nothing new, most have probably experienced it during their career I know I have it's no diff in some ways than as I have mentioned an engine failure 'cause it's mechanical & can fail so we deal with it as per our training.
To me the highest proportion of blame lies with the Commander but it goes further than that.

If you want to break down this accident blame game ('cause humans are good at this) then you could start with the Capt (as he's the ultimate responsibility on the day)then the F/O's ( if the Capt wasn't avail then the next highest F/O is in CMD) then the designers of both the Airbus itself (Boeings have plenty of crashes under their belts as well just to be balanced) & the Pitot probes as well as the Co's check & trainers inc the Owners/managers all the way down to the Wright Bro's for getting us all in this mess in the first place!:-)

It crashed, man made it (the machine) & made it crash & they will continue to do so 'till the end of time.


So who do we blame here? You chose as like the Airbus itself there's more than one way to skin this cat!:-)

Remember we are all pilots, engineers & aviation enthusiasts so we can all learn something everyday:ok:


Wmk2

While it is very easy and appropriate to apportion blame to the 2 guys in the seat, the real culprits are the people who allowed them to be in those seats.

That's true 'Trent' as mentioned in my above post & in some ways blame could be at them (the Capt in particular)but on the day we are ALL responsible for our own actions whether it be ordering a sandwich or flying a plane.

Although you could have the best well trained pilot in the seat & still lose the plane, remember humans fail we are fallible

Wmk2

More than likely covered in the AF 447 thread, but what about the decision to delay the replacement of the suspect make of pitots? Bean counters?

They sure as sh!t replaced them as a priority after the event!

QF one back in '99 may have just avoided the 19th hole at Bangkok, if the use of reverse thrust hadn't been trained out of that crew. Bean counters?

They sure as sh!t reinitiated the use of reverse thrust as the rule rather than the exception after that event!

The point I'm making is that even though pilots are often, and in many cases turn out to be, the last line of defense, the initial hole in the cheese quite often belongs to decisions made at a much more "ground based" level.

Can't blame the bean counters, Krusty. They are just doing their job. It is up to the flight operations departments to say "no" to the bean counters.

I blame the airworthiness authorities for being so slow to recognise that there are fatal flaws with the man/machine interface in these highly automated aircraft. These problems were evident well before Air France 447, and are not confined to Airbus types.

I find it frightening just how overwhelmed a crew can become when faced with even minor problems in these aircraft. These are highly trained and experienced crews, but their effectiveness is reduced to the point where a couple of passengers at the controls would be just as effective.

The interface seems to be designed primarily around normal operations (where all systems and instrumentation are functioning properly). Given that these aircraft spend 99.95% of their time in such normal operations, this is understandable, but for abnormal situations such as those AF447 found itself in, the interface can then work against the pilot - as we have seen.

What seems to have been lacking in the certification process is some rigorous testing of the human factors when things go abnormal. At the moment, this testing is being done by real world pilots on real world flights, with passengers on board.

Every now and then, we get some of those test results back. AF447 for example.

Point taken FGD135, and if you don't mind me saying, your post was well considered and informed.

I guess what I may have failed to articulate, was the deferral (by the various departments/authorities) to the Bean counters.

Let's not bag Air France, after all only 10 hull losses in 38 years, including the only loss of a 340, obviously a pretty sound safety system in place there? Maybe they should go back to drinking wine with dinner.
Most of the airlines I have worked for required hand flying in the sim, in fact one required every second sim to be around 50% manual flying
Unreliable airspeed is a recall and none of the recall items are full back stick, if old mate had done absolutely nothing the aeroplane would pretty much have flown itself.

Amen to that ..... aerodynamics 101, if in doubt let everything go and the aircraft will take care of itself .... worked for me in a PA38 with a worldly 22 hours, finding myself inverted and in a spin many, many moons ago.

I'd love to hear plankys sentiments regarding how a professional pilot stalled a sophisticated airliner that is supposed to be 'unstallable ' :ok:

His comments:

Is actually relevant :cool: