Absolutely. Something is seriously wrong with my aircraft I want priority... dont leave it to the bloke/blokette in atc to make the call.

Flighthappens. I agree. But I can't help thinking that the ATSB would have done well to examine the psychological reaction to receiving and obeying a direction from ATC to descend in a state of duress, rather than the waffle it had on the psychological effect of a gear warning horn. It would appear that the ATSB have discounted this topic completely. Also, if you look at the difference in reporting of the controllers radio calls between the preliminary report and the final report plus the lack of any transcripts, I think that leaves them open to the suspicion of changing the radio dialogue to suit their desired conclusion.

The official NTSB transcript is here ;http://dms.ntsb.gov/public%2F47000-4...0%2F420526.pdf

But I have found a number of blogs accusing the NTSB of adding the mayday call. Listening to the recording, I have sympathy with this view.

Wouldn't it have been nice for the ATSB to have done a similar transcript for PGW in the 131 weeks it took to write the report?

To LeadSled (and apologies to others…)
 

LeadSled says “Go even further back to the night the TAA B727 on takeoff hit the taxing CPA DC-8. Once again, pedantic and slavish Australian (and non-ICAO) "radio procedures" played a big part in the accident. “ and “As to the B727/DC-8 --- why was the DC-8 still on the runway?

Because the clearance was something like: "Take next taxiway right, backtrack, call ground xxx.x"

This is exactly what the DC-8 did --- followed the clearance in internationally accepted/ICAO terms, at the next taxiway, they did a 180 and backtracked on the runway.”

You are incorrect – the instruction was “take next taxiway right – call on 121.7” – nothing confusing about that and to say that “pedantic and slavish Australian (and non-ICAO) "radio procedures" played a big part in the accident” is nonsense.

Regarding the tragic B200 accident at Sydney, the B727 was never a factor in that accident (there were, however, a number of factors involved that you conveniently fail to mention and that appear on pages 28-29 of the accident report. They include: environmental conditions - 39 deg C plus sun glare, overweight ops by approx 128kg, a likely reduced power take-off technique used by the company, a company policy of not using the auto feather system even though it was fitted to this aircraft, using a hand microphone to transmit and turning toward the "dead" engine”. Therefore given the above factors do you still agree with your statement that “had he not been cleared No2 behind a B727, in all likelihood the aircraft would have made it”? In my opinion this sort of distortion and misinformation from you just backs up my claims that you endeavour to denigrate the Australian system at every opportunity.

Regarding the ATSB report into the Norfolk ditching – I do agree that there has been an apparent fundamental shift here and agree with the Senate inquiry as this report is way off what I would have expected from the ATSB. However, that report has little to do with the 2 events you have raised.

Lastly, I have absolutely no issue with your comment “Rest assured, I shall continue to criticise associations/unions and individuals who stand in the way of advancements in cost/benefit justified risk reduction, or much needed reforms, or associations that promote "changes" that are for the benefit of the associations, particularly commercial benefit , and not aviation in general, for whatever reason” however what I do have an issue with is the amount of distortion and misinformation you throw around with gay abandon to try and make your point.

My apologies to others for the thread hijack here but LeadSled needs to be exposed for his misinformation.

VH-MLE

Yes, well let's get back on topic, shall we? This thread has drifted far enough.

What was this thread about again?

Yes Jack,

You're 100% correct, I do apologise for my posts however ultimately I had to draw a line in the sand as far as LeadSled's bull**it is concerned.

Back to the tragedy of VH-PGW...

VH-MLE

Heard the tape of a Mayday call I made, "mayday mayday mayday" sounds like a short word, rest of it was a bit clearer.

MLE,

Don't apologise! It's good to see fact disproving conjecture & personal opinion :ok:

Turbocharger failure and the incorrect engine shut down? Wouldn't be the first mishandled turbocharger failure in PA31s, and would explain a few things...

How come the ATSB were forced to revisit their wonky Whyalla report yet PGWs report is still in its original ignorant and incurious form?

The ATSB report was a crock. One of my favourite failings of the report was that they changed the radio transcript between the draft and final report. Another is that they used groundspeed (from radar returns) plus the forecast wind to estimate airspeed. But, they used made the same adjustment both flying away from Bankstown and returning to Bankstown. I forget the wind direction, but they (for example) gave it a headwind in both directions. Then they used this flawed arithmetic to criticise the pilots airspeed control!!

Its not at all clear that the pilot shut down the wrong engine. The engine he left operating was still operating, but failed to allow the aircraft to maintain altitude. It was never investigated whether the operating engine was capable of producing full power.

A factor that was never highlighted in the report is that the pilot complied with ATC descent requests. These descent requests were the standard profile that ATC use for its own convenience to descent IFR aircraft below the Sydney steps. So, the pilot did not find out that the aircraft would not maintain altitude until it was too late and his fate was sealed. For me a massive lesson is that ATC are not necessarily going to have your best interests at heart in an emergency. If the pilot had refused to comply with the ATC descent requests and maintained altitude, there would have been a happier outcome.

I'm appalled to note that I'm unsurprised to note another ATSB 'report' that is a mixture of fiction and inept bungling.

Which is what any competent twin pilot knows to do and would've done in the first place.

Simplistic answer that doesn't help.

Akro et al, Furious agreement gents, but I didn't mean to revive this thread for repetition.

Even with the ATC descents it should have maintained height at 2500ft on one... unless the one that was going was only putting out a bit over 200hp in its naturally aspirated form

- in the tests following the accident was the scenario and performance of one engine shut down and one operating without turbocharger evaluated?

- with this in mind was the turbocharging system on the 'good' or operating engine really closely examined? Or was it assumed that the bad engine was the one that the pilot shut down, and this was the one that got most attention? (perhaps the ATSB investigators are time poor and are under some form of pressure to get results under time constraints, leading to unconscious bias or assumptions that suit their own situation, so to speak)

- maybe it all was done by ATSB, but in reports of yesteryear a hypothesis would be proposed and the proven or disproven with the available evidence (or insufficient evidence, which no doubt is what happened here, but at least mention that in its relation to the hypothesis!)

- for those of us that want to know, I'd argue all of us that have lives invested in aviation, what is the avenue to get reports re-examined?

The pilot was young. He was under great stress. He received what was essentially was an instruction from ATC. He needed to descend anyway. I don't condemn him for complying or blindly trusting that the instruction was in his best interests rather than traffic management expediency.

The issue is that the ATSB have a massive blind spot about this and other issues which firstly, denies the ability to understand the truth of the situation and secondly to learn from the experience.

It was a scandalously shabby report.

The first transmission from ATC to the pilot was maintain 5000’ which the pilot accepted but then either chose not, or was unable, to do. They descended below that assigned level and were then issued further descent.

ATC then specifically asked the pilot whether they were capable of maintaining altitude and advised that if they were unable, that YSRI aerodrome was 2nm away. They got another non-committal response, the aircraft overflew YSRI, and the rest is tragic history.

Your assertion that a controller would deliberately put an IFER (in-flight emergency response) aircraft in increased danger because it suited their airspace layout or traffic management is disgusting.

Adamaster,
is your assertion the pilot should have landed at YSRI? I passed over RIC shortly after the event. The runway was obscured by Fog.

There is nothing in the ATSB report about organisational, operational and bullying issues with the operators chief pilot, reported to CASA but ignored.

I have experienced an engine failure in the type aircraft and had no problem maintaining height for a considerable distance, over 60 NM.

Listen to the voice of the young pilot on the tapes, he is cool, calm, in control and endeavouring to find solutions to his problem, he flew his aircraft under control to the very end.

I knew this young man very well, he was well trained and very well aware of the limitations of the aircraft he was flying.

You arm chair experts are quick with your condemnation, but you were not there on the day, nor is there anyway to establish what actually occurred.

Suffice it to say, any SAFETY issues that may have been learnt went out the window to protect a vindictive incompetent regulator.

Thorn_bird, I can see that this was a difficult accident to deal with for both of us.

No, it is not.

Agreed.

I knew him too. It was a tragic loss, and yes, it is still raw.

The only person I was attempting to ‘condemn’ was Old Akro for stating that the ATC deliberately placed a stricken aircraft in further harm’s way for something as trivial as airspace layout or ‘traffic management expediency’. Attempting to lay blame after a tragedy is a natural response, but that was uncalled for and simply not true.

I learnt plenty from this one (and would gladly give it all back in a heartbeat), but I agree that other valuable lessons were lost in the haze. Safe flying.

Exactly! So what happened here then?

The whole ATC instructions may be nothing but a misdirection in analysing this. Maybe it didn't help, but seems very possible it was not the root cause of why the aircraft could not maintain height.

The analysis of the power plants was skimpy, to put it politely. Who does the ATSB use to look into these engines? An overhaul shop, experienced piston engine expert, or a staff member that once took his lawnmower apart and then got it going again.

Lumps,

I had a discussion with some ATSB folk in Canberra a few years ago, he declared they had no piston engine specialists, all turbine. Much like CASA.

They still believed the Whyalla report was factual despite the data and coronial inquiry proving it was full of crap.

So who knows? :hmm: