What beautiful confidence. It was only a few years ago when a Seneca 3 crashed and caught fire at Tyabb. The instructor cut the mixture on one engine while joining the circuit with a student on her initial twin endorsement.

However, instead of restoring the mixture to rich after the student had correctly identified the engine "failure," the instructor purposely left the mixture at idle cut-off and told the student to fly the asymmetric circuit with the propeller windmilling with lots of drag. He told her to assume the prop would not feather.

On final, he told the student to conduct a touch and go on two engines, because after touch down he would place the mixture of the failed engine to rich so the student would have full power available on both engines for the touch and go.

After touch down the instructor placed the failed engine mixture to rich and the student advanced both throttles. The Seneca yawed strongly into the previously "failed" engine and left the strip. The instructor took over control from the student but was unable to control the yaw. The aircraft hit an obstacle in long grass near the strip and caught fire after coming to a stop. Apart from some minor burns to her skin the student was unhurt nor was the instructor. But the instructor felt a bit bloody stupid.

By allowing the propeller of the `failed` engine to windmill all the way around the circuit the injector lines were starved of fuel and when the instructor opened the mixture control to rich after touch-down for the touch and go, there was fuel starvation.

take over, lower the nose, mixture rich and the engine fires back to life instantly? :ok: Well that may have been the plan but it didn't work that time:E.

They didn't have a windmilling prop, the prop stops windmilling at airspeeds lower than I'd personally be prepared to be in that configuration.

With the prop RPM close to or at zero, placing the mixture to rich will not restart the engine.

Does a Seneca 3 have impulse coupling or starter vibrator ?.

No, I don't think so.

I will not criticise the instructor you have spoken of above, with confidence I can say:

* I would not put myself into that situation, and,
* to date, I have not had a problem conducting multi engine training, using the time old tried and proven methods taught to me.

You are not comparing apples with apples are you, the situation you have described would suggest someone didn't think through the situation.

That accident appears to have more to do with the touch and go than the EFATO training.

The EFATO training was a great success, the continuation of circuit training after delivering the aircraft safely to the runway went poorly.

Also note that at RPMs below 1000 odd you may not be able to feather the prop.

How so ?.

Yes, but carby icing or plug fouling could have provided a similar result by closing the throttle for an equal period of time. A poor exercise that didn't consider the risk vs. training reward.

Both methods can have their downsides in the wrong circumstances. However for me the mixture method is the best way for two main reasons.

The RPM and manifold pressures guage indications realistically match a real engine failure.

The process of opening the throttle to verify the dead engine also acts in the same manner as it would on a real failure.

The student sees and experiences actions that very closely mimic a real failure which cannot happen by closing the throttle.

The situation described above re flying the windmilling prop to the ground then doing a touch and go is very risky by leaving it to the last minute to see if the engine will respond whether or not it's done with the throttle or mixture and is taking a scenario too far IMO.

Australian ME training is in a worse place than I thought. If this kind of thinking exists in GA (and with a touch and go off the approach as well!), the problem has gone well beyond which lever to pull.

I think it is probably unreasonable to expect CASA to stop this kind of stupidity. Mixture vs. throttle, yes, CASA can make rules to settle the debate from a legislative point of view. But people, surely you can see that many of these accidents were just plain ignorance and stupidity? Can't legislate against those.

From The Lycoming "Flyer" page 49 under the sub heading of National Transportation Safety Board Warning on Simulated Engine-Out Maneuvers

The fatal crash of a light twin in which a flight instructor and an applicant for a multiengine rating were killed prompted the NTSB to issue an urgent warning to all pilots simulating an engine-out condition on multiengine airplanes.
The Board’s investigation revealed that some flight instructors do use the fuel selector or the mixture control to shut down an engine to test a multiengine applicant. Although this is a recommended procedure, the urgent warning was aimed at flight instructors who were using this procedure at altitudes too low for continued safe flight.
The NTSB observed that use of such procedures at traffic pattern altitudes may not permit instructors enough time to overcome possible errors on the part of the applicant.
The recommendation by the NTSB means that all simulated engine-out operation at the lower altitudes should be accomplished by retarding the throttle, and this should be done slowly and carefully to avoid engine damage or failure.
Many flight instructors down through the years used the technique of abruptly cutting an engine with a multiengine candidate to test his emotional reaction and judgment with this extreme technique. Big radial piston engines with short, stubby crankshafts could tolerate the abrupt technique. However,
flat-opposed piston engines with their long crankshafts and attached counterweights could not as readily take the abuse of suddenly snapping a throttle shut, particularly at takeoff or climb power. Use of the latter technique would tend to detune crankshaft counterweights and could possibly result in a nasty engine failure.

Since it was common technique by flight instructors to terminate power abruptly to simulate an engine power loss, we had to protect the engine. As a result, we published in our Engine Operator’s Manual and in Service Bulletin No. 245, the recommendation that if the power was abruptly terminated, it must be accomplished with the mixture control. Of course, this was intended for the higher altitudes where a complete engine shut-down could be conducted safely. The student was to identify the dead engine by retarding that throttle to about 12" MP to simulate zero thrust, or similar to having the prop feathered. At that point, the instructor could immediately return the mixture to an engine-operating condition, and power would be available
if needed.
In our publications, we then explained the reason for using the mixture to abruptly terminate power. By putting the mixture control in idle cutoff position with the throttle in a normal open or operating position, the pilot merely cut off the fuel, but allowed the air to continue to fill the cylinders with resulting normal compression forces that are sufficient to cushion the deceleration of the engine and prevent the detuning of the crankshaft counterweights.
However, any practice of simulated engine-out condition at low altitudes should be best accomplished by a slow retardation of the throttle in accordance with the NTSB recommendation. This careful technique will protect the engine, and at the same time, provide for instant power if it is needed.

The above information from the engine manufacturer is in marked variance to what many in Pprune have written on this thread. Time for those concerned to step back and reflect on their folly?

That's great Tee Emm,

And I am certain there are other manufacturers "recommending" mixture cuts, exactly like Lycoming still does, their recommendation is exactly that, a recommendation and this piece of literature is written by a Lawyer after someone killed themselves.

If it was such a big issue, as opposed to the response to an accident, they would have used the word "MUST" and changed all flight manuals to reflect this change.

Slowly retarding the throttle does not give the desired yaw rate or engine indications.

The next step would be to prohibit EFATO training......

So its not about the engines, mixture cuts are better for the engines, its just poor instructors level of training perhaps ?.

Mixture cuts safer yet again.

Slow retardation of the throttle is IMO not a realistic training environment.

This mixture versus throttle is a personal preference, until CASA mandates one or the other, it will remain a personal preference.

Those that enjoy getting on their soap boxes and proclaiming that throttle cuts are safer, legal, better for the aircraft engine etc etc need to understand that it is not a black and white issue. Throttle cut are: not a legal requirement, it's not better for the engine and many, myself included do not feel mixture cuts are a safety issue ( its managed risk ).

I have had ATO's turn fuel taps off during instrument renewals, and I'm still here to talk about it, it was again, managed risk.

Every aircraft flying involves a very complex managed risk profile, pilot experience, pilot training, pilot SOPs, well designed aircraft, well trained engineers maintaining with quality controlled spares, airspace to suit risk, appropriately designed airports with fire services etc etc.

The complete flyer is here: http://www.lycoming.com/support/tips...Operations.pdf

If you're worried about pilots killing themselves during EFATO training, petition to have it banned, but be aware there will be other consequences, possibly far worse than the one you are trying to protect against.

Safe aviation is an industry where aircraft are concreted to the ground, anything else is an aviation industry with managed risk.

This is a part of the reason pilots are so under valued, the general public has been programmed to believe that aviation is safe and we are just bus drivers.

Driving our buses which take the form of a pressurised aluminium tube, several miles above the ground, secured to two wings with very strong titanium bolts, with several thousand litres of flammable liquid in the wings, being pulled/pushed along by two or more very very hot fires in an environment so harsh that both the outside temperature and air density would not sustain human life...............doesn't sound so "safe" now.

The topic of the thread being low altitude failures, please elaborate who still does this? Proof talks, "I'm certain" walks.

Lycoming, no
Have you actually ever had an engine failure?
In my experience, not opinion, three failures, and none were a sudden catastrophic failure.

Using the mixture provides a better confirmation that the student is identifying the correct engine (they have to play with the throttles and the wrong selection is immediately obvious), but why not do this at 2 or 3 thousand feet, where there's enough height to counter an actual failure?

MIHC,

Luckily only two, both were inflight and happened with plenty of warning or altitude.

But this is not what we are discussing, we are discussing whether it is unsafe to do mixture cuts during EFATO training, I do not believe it is ( and this is from actual experience ) and its has not been outlawed.

No argument. This is a situation a well trained and experienced META pilot should be able to recover on any given days training, if not, they do not deserve to be there.

Why do EFATO training on take off at all ?. The answer to that question is obvious, its one of the highest risk scenarios that could happen, and it is globally accepted that it needs to be trained and practiced.

So the issue is not mixture versus throttle, it close to the ground versus not close to the ground.

Use the throttle and have an unrealistic training scenario, perhaps less risk, depends on the cut of the instructor ( if it is unrealistic training, why do it at all ? )

Use the mixture and have a realistic training scenario, managed risk with a well trained and competent instructor.

Quite obviously a good proportion of the industry, as many have said above, myself included, the CASA FOIs I flown with, do mixture cuts on take off / at low level, all managed risk.

As to your proof talk statement, even the lycoming flyer does not mandate a requirement over the Service Bulletin 245.

SB 245 recommends mixture cuts as it is safer and better for the engine.

The flyer recommends "slow" throttle cuts because some numpty killed himself.

Do you see the difference ?.

IMHO the issue really comes down to the training and competency of the current batch of META instructors.

That's the real issue here, why even go there? :ugh: People are sick of friends and family being needlessly injured or killed in these so called required low level training accidents!:{

Soon it will be outlawed in aircraft with 10 or more pax, or greater than 8,618 KG MTOW, so I think you'll find it will also eventually be outlawed or with severe regulation control for anything under 8,618kg. Synthetic Trainer manufacturers are about to experience a mini-boom.

Civil Aviation Safety Authority - NFRM 1007OS

Finally Oz aviation industry may be dragged kicking and screaming to worldwide best practice in the use of simulators/STDs for all EPs and checks other than LOFT and some approved upper level EPs.:ok:

Good pick up by the way Tee Emm!:D:D

Isn't that why CASA are in the process of mandating the use of simulators for engine failure training in certain type of aircraft?

Going back to "Up in the Air's" post. Generally I agree with the statement to follow the POH. However, it should be noted that they vary a lot. I think if you look at a training twin like (say) the Travelair POH it is completely different on this subject.

One of the deficiencies of this debate is that it hasn't acknowledged that there are different types of twin engine engine failure training.

At one level, recurrent training is about re-inforcing the checks and establishing the mechanical routine required in an engine failure. Simulators can do this pretty well and should be part of the strategy.

Statistically, the most likely scenario is an engine shutdown in flight. But in this instance there is plenty of time and its not so critical. You can pull out the POH checklists. This is where you need the feathering exercises. It proves that the aeroplane will continue to fly very happily on one engine.

The two most critical situations are engine failure in an instrument procedure towards the MDA involving a missed approach and engine failure after take-off.

Engine failure after take-off (or indeed go around) is critical because if you don't act swiftly, decisively and precisely then some twins won't climb on a single engine. Its also a high workload situation where the pilot is most likely to mis-diagnose the failed engine. I'd suggest that the new multi-pilot's first experience of this ranks with the first solo as a memorable experience. This cannot be replicated in a simulator. But proving that if you get everything right you can climb for a circuit at 150 fpm is a very big lesson.

EFATO may be an exercise which carries risk, but so do many other things. The issue is how one manages the risk. I would argue that an EFATO exercise that requires the pilot to go through the checks feather the engine (ie the instructor set zero thrust) and establish a climb is an exercise best done at a country airport with flat terrain. If the objective is to identify the dead engine and do the checks before the instructor restores the engine, then the circumstances in which this is done is less important.

I'm part of the school that still thinks stall / spin training is important. Ditto, I think the experience of a simulated EFATO at low altitude done once is indelibly etched in the memory and an important part of multi training.

But, after the first experience the check rides are about re-inforcement of the correct routine. Every time I do a sim flight I fail an engine on myself. I'm going to hit any instructor who pulls one of my turbo engines at full power on first take-off and like most turbo engine owners we avoid circuits. But pulling an engine toward MDA in an instrument approach after the engine has been at low power for a while is much kinder on the engines and still lets you do the climb transition in the go-around at 1,000 ft or more above the ground.

The instructor involved with the Duchess practice engine failure (mixture cut) fatal crash was quite experienced with over 30,000 hours and the Boeing 767 Air Canada captain in the left seat of that Duchess undergoing the instrument rating renewal was less experienced with only 16,000 hours...

So now about this "realistic training scenario, managed risk with a well trained and competent instructor"?:rolleyes:

Was that at Camden at night and bad weather ?.

How do you know it was a mixture cut ?, by my recollection the ATSB didn't know, how is it you know ?.

Investigation: 200300224 - Beech Aircraft Corp 76, VH-JWX

Either way you wont find me doing that at night ( mixture or throttle ).

100% agree.

Weather was fine and conditions just after dark. ATSB report avoided mention of whether throttle or mixture used to simulate engine failure. Surviving pilot told ATSB investigators the mixture was cut, but ATSB elected not to mention this in their report. Possible legal ramifications?

Well said sheppey, that is also reinforced by this comment in Annex A of the Mandatory Simulator NFRM/NPRM, by none other than the regulator:

.....and this

Night or IMC don't preclude asymmetric training. I have done it where it was considered acceptable. The key was to increase safety margins according to risk. E.g. No EF below MSA in some cases.

By day or night, it is unacceptable to leave the student or candidate in control if things don't go to plan. Aircraft doesn't climb? Take control. Drills incorrect? Take control. Many of the accidents listed here occurred after the student made errors. Continuing in order to 'prove a point' is high risk but is associated with inexperienced instructors.

How could you possibly be certain of this ?, is there proof ?.

That said, is it relevant in this accident ?, mixture or throttle, would the outcome have been different either way with any certainty ?.

Throttle cut or mixture cut is irrelevant to this accident. The ATSB laid the blame at the feet of the ATO for initiating the exercise "when a safe outcome could not be assured"

The ATSB quote a CASA guideline not to do asymmetric below 1500ft after dark.

Further, I would suggest that it was not conducted "just after dark" since the ATSB say they did not take off from Bankstown until 16 min after last light. They then flew to Woollongong then Cambden. So it was properly dark. And anyway, dark is dark. Its a binary state after last light.

Its a bit unusual for a 16,000 hour ATPL to be getting an initial issue MECIR. One wonders if the ATO overestimated the candidates experience in these circumstances - especially since this was the first and only flight the ATO had with the pilot under test. Which is another risk management warning flag the ATO ignored.

This accident is about poor practices by the ATO, not mixture cuts, throttle cuts or even really asymmetrics. It has no more logic than cutting power on a single in the same circumstances. Its about not clearly understanding how to achieve the training objective in a low risk manner.

Octas8,
A large body of well informed opinion would totally disagree with that statement. One large and very long standing Australian operator bars any engine shutdown ( and that would include mixture cuts), except in VMC, daylight, min. 3000 AGL.

As for asymmetric training ---- zero thrust only --- and the training manual mandatory requirements meant that night operations were severely limited. On pistons (a la FAA) "slowly retard the throttle".

All risk assessment based (although those were not the words used when the policy was established in the 1940s) with the assessment that night training hugely increased the risk --- hence the very tight night limitations.

Not surprisingly, this same operator was an early adopter, a pioneer even, of flight simulation --- long before a mandate for their use.

We kill more people asymmetric training than as a result of actual engine failures, but it is clear that the message is lost on "the survivors".

Tootle pip!!

Captain Sled

Whilst that is sound logic, if we provided no asymmetric training what so ever, I think real engine failures would kill many more pilots than it presently does, probably with passengers onboard.

JC I think your cherry picking what Leadie said, he definitely wasn't implying no assys, more how and where you do those assys versus the risk involved! :=

You might be the 'gun' instructor with META but there are individuals out there who let their 'perceived' abilities affect sound judgement and risk assessment to the point of the accident!

If you read back over the posts in this thread I think you will see that Leadie's concerns are well founded.:rolleyes:

SARCs,

I am a "gun" nothing, least of all a "gun" META instructor, any knowledge or skills I have, were taught to me by mentors and instructors.

It was not my intent to cherry pick Captain Sleds post or disagree with what he/she has said, just trying to provoke intelligent discussion on the point raised.

I also believe we do kill more people in EFATO training than from actual engine failures whilst flying the line.

So that might lead one to question why we do EFATO training at all.

Imagine for a moment the state of our industry if there were pilots out there without any initial or recurrent EFATO training and with passengers onboard.

Would it be fair to say, we would kill a lot more people with no initial and recurrent training on EFATOs.

SARCs, you've worked under a CAR217 organisation many times, how many dozens of time have you been beaten with V1 cuts and EFATOs on take off ?.

My opinion as posted in any of my posts above is in no way an alternate or contrary opinion to that of Captain Sleds statements, infact he/she questioned the accuracy of one of my statements, and rightly so.

Noting that my pseudonym is not a pseudonym and all reference to leadie has been that of the utmost respect.

The particular asymmetric training I conducted was in accordance with UK CAA expectations. It was not asymmetric circuits for example. The UK CAA has quite a good reputation for safe practice. But given Australia's recent accident history, sure, discouraging or forbidding may be appropriate at this time.

I don't have any accidents to relate. But perhaps these TEM practises would have helped the accidents above?

Has the examiner placed feet to physically prevent wrong rudder input? Will the examiner take control immediately the safe outcome is no longer assured? Will the examiner discontinue the exercise if performance isn't immediately satisfactory for any reason at all? Has the examiner quietly reviewed the intended flightpath to prevent loss of SA if distracted? Is there any terrain ahead or abeam the aircraft? If not day VMC are there two independent attitude indicators in plain sight, and is the aircraft at relatively high speed and low power, to mitigate yaw & roll, and are the height buffers even bigger than normal?

Apologies to Leadsled & other experienced pilots - this kind of thing is already done by many experienced pilots and I don't mean to imply otherwise. But obviously not all pilots.

Josh I know you've been through the ringer a round or two with some pretty dubious Checkies. Checkies that probably shouldn't have a licence let alone a check pilot approval. You know the type that slam the power lever back to the flight idle stop just as you rotate and then call "auto feather failed"!:ugh:

However these cowboy types somehow keep managing to escape all the checks and balances put in place and continue to put the fear of life into even experienced drivers...so if there is a better way with less risk..then we should be promoting that.

And Josh I wasn't alluding to your posts mate!:ok:

Agreed in it's entirety.

Cheers,

Josh

Are you still in FNQ ?, Red Beret Friday night ?.

If you want to see the result of poorly conducted (and arguably illegal) V1 cuts at night - google VH-NEJ crash at Tamworth. This resulted in the unnecessary and negligent deaths of two young, up-and-coming pilots.

I witnessed (and attended) that occurrence post-crash, and am astounded that criminal charges weren't forthcoming.

Take a read of the CVR transcript. The RHS trainee was spot-on questioning the legality of V1 cuts at night. The rest is history.

Rest in peace Messrs. Chomley and Smith. Piss on you Tamair!

Folks,
As an example of how not to do it, read the ATSB report on the last one at Camden, a Twin Comanche, and study the photographs carefully. Read the whole report carefully, it is one short.

Credible eyewitness reports said the aircraft never got above 100-200ft.

Does the prop. on one engine look feathered to you!!

Consider the widely differing reports from the student and the instructor as to what actually happened, and what the aeroplane did, and figure out for yourself what "most probably" really happened.

In your considerations, take account of the AFM note about the fact that recovery from a spin is unlikely with full tip tanks.

Is it probable, given the verifiable facts, and the witness statements, that the CAAP was followed?
What action has CASA taken in this matter??
What pro-active action has ATSB taken, to find out why these accidents keep happening???
What action has ATSB taken to prevent, to the greatest extent possible, further similar fatal crashes --- I will not call them accidents????

Please, anybody, don't suggest I am saying "no asymmetric training", but let's drop the (I was almost going to say macho, but then I realised I know at least two female instructors who also indulge in the seriously risky practice of pulling the mixture "just off the ground") unnecessarily dangerous practices, to almost eliminate the chances of recovery, on the day it all turns to custard.

I was on the aerodrome at YSBK the day of the last fatal. That is not the only similar one at Bankstown when I have been on the aerodrome. Not long after I stated flying, I actually witnessed an Apache crash on an asymmetric missed approach, the PIC was the Piper agent Chief Pilot, fortunately, both lived. Not long after, a Heron crashed on the same airfield, same deal, attempting a physically impossible missed approach, all died, then a best mate died in yet another twin training accident.

I had a blazing row with the pilot responsible for the last fatal at Camden, about two weeks before that accident. The subject of the row was a very close go, virtually a rehearsal for the final fatal crash. We all know the PIC was a high time instructor, but he was an accident looking for somewhere to happen. Finally, it did.

Several people on previous posts have said that the accidents we have had have been inexperienced instructors ---- in every accident, of which I have all too direct knowledge, that was not the case, but all high time and "highly respected" "professionals". There was no shortage of experience on the flightdeck of the Braz at Darwin.The laws of physics and aerodynamics, underlined by real world "human factors" have no respect for hours in log books or popular reputations.

I never cease to be amazed at the ignorance of some very high time instructors of close acquaintance , all Grade 1s, three are ATOs, who, quite frankly, simply do not understand just how un-safe their "SOPs" actually are.

Just because you are still alive doesn't prove your practices are "safe".

The FAA recommendation on the subject make worthwhile reading, but in certain quarters in this country, FAA recommendation are treated with disdain ---- we know better ---- an attitude thoroughly discredited by our actual record.

A quote:

Aviation in itself is not inherently dangerous. But to an even greater degree than the sea, it is terribly unforgiving of any carelessness, incapacity or neglect.

Tootle pip!!

Here: http://www.atsb.gov.au/media/3460925...77.pdf#page=39

Well, we all think "we know better" Leadsled. It's human nature. I think it, and quite obviously you think it too. Tricky bit is to get the regulator to state publically and enforce-ably what "better" is, so it's no longer a matter of opinion.

- No mixture cuts below 3000', and then only for demonstrating the feathering procedure;
- Never fail an engine "creatively" - e.g. fuel selectors;
- No feathered operations below 3000' or it's an emergency;
- No surprise failures ever, everything briefed beforehand even for tests, and failures done methodically;
- No multi-engine training at non-towered airfields;
- Touch-and-goes off a simulated asymmetric approach are undesirable but not forbidden (special risk management applies);
- Training for META is expensive and difficult and requires substantial ME experience;
- Training for examiner approvals also expensive and difficult;
(edit)

None of these are my ideas. They are all the UK way of doing things in the single-pilot multi-engine part of the training industry. I think it's uncontroversial to say that they are safer than Australia in this segment.

Some more:
- Creative use of a flight simulator is positively encouraged;
- Almost any "professional" simulator is acceptable for training credit in a flying school, approval relatively easy to get, to encourage their use;
- Mixture cuts in the circuit are discouraged although not forbidden;
- Feathered propellers at low level are forbidden, unless it's an emergency.

That's the NZCAA.

The FAA publishes those commonly circulated documents already mentioned by others. Whilst I don't have a strong opinion on mixture vs. throttle personally, the bulk of the respectable world says "no" to mixture at low level, so I don't do it any more.

There's quite a bit of stuff out there but it's not always easy to access, unfortunately.

Lots to think about there, and every word of it true. :ooh:

Oktas8,
Like the FAA, the UK CAA put out some excellent material, we ignore such wisdom at our peril. Which is exactly what we all too often do in Australia, ignore, because "we" know better.

The one thing I would take issue about, in your last post, that to "know better" is human nature. In my experience it is commonly a mixture of lack of maturity (unrelated to chronological age) and lack of training at an early stage.

One of the great problems of changing entrenched attitudes is what could loosely called the "you can't teach and old dog new tricks" problem --- but even that is possible to overcome, and the organisation that should take the lead is CASA ---- but, is that going to happen --- where do the FOIs come from???

Some of the worst example of absolutely un-safe practices come from the "informal" demands of some FOIs.

As far as I can see, the only potential circuit breaker is ATSB, they now have the power to investigate systemic safety problems.

If this problem is to be solved, it is going to be political pressure on ATSB to exercise its power --- and without political pressure ATSB will not move, that is already clear.

So, folks, create the political pressure --- it's all in the power of the pen.

Tootle pip!!

Just to clarify the above comment. It's a long time ago now but I interviewed the survivor by phone to Canada after he had been following earlier Pprune discussions that followed some time after the accident. He contacted me by Pprune PM service; hence follow up phone discussion. Yes! Pprune OZ is read in Canada, too.

The very close go? Was that in a Cessna 310 where the navigation light on the wing tip was shattered with contact with a tree or bushes during a very low level mixture cut also at Camden? There was no incident report filed as far as I know but it was a mighty close call.

Another incident I recall was written up by Mac Job in the former Aviation Safety Digest. Chieftain departing out of Port Lincoln at night with PF under training. The check pilot cut a mixture after take off but never got around to opening the mixture again in order to set the throttle at zero thrust to simulate a feathered prop. The aircraft was unable to maintain a positive rate of climb because of the excessive drag from the windmilling prop and the crew never saw the gently rising terrain they flew into.

Looking now on the bright side of this discussion of mixture cuts versus throttle closure to simulate engine failure after take off in a twin. I note that to date, 6863 Ppruners have viewed the posts since September 2011- as well as the usual suspects who have contributed their views. If nothing else, it means a lot of pilots have now seen both sides of the argument, which is a good thing.

Nope, not that one, but it probably proves there are some very slow learners, aren't there??

Of the 6000+ lookers, I hope somebody has been persuaded to change their ways ---- think of it as the 90:90 rule, if you stick with the FAA/UK CAA guidelines ( they manage quite well without having to "mandate" everything) ----

You can get 90% of the training value but eliminate 90% of the risk associated with the (very dubious) remaining 10%.

Tootle pip!!

EFATO - training
 

A lot of the discussions here have to do with words and definitions in the training environment. One that has come up regularly is "recommended" and I show this below.

Most people rely on part 2 "........as a course of action" for the definition, but I believe that in the flying arena, part 1 is the most applicable.

recommended - past participle, past tense of rec·om·mend (Verb)

Verb:

1. Put forward (someone or something) with approval as being suitable for a particular purpose or role;
2. Advise or suggest (something) as a course of action.

More info »Merriam-Webster - The Free Dictionary