Check Flights and Pulling Circuit Breakers
Early BOAC days of the "real" Boeing 707 - i.e. not the simulator at that time, the Stabiliser Runaway drill was to shout "Runaway Stabiliser" then first stop the rapidly turning wheel situated on the sides of the centre console, maybe breaking a finger nail, or even a wrist (!) in the process, cut the adjacent switches on the console
Section 20A of the Civil Aviation Act is pretty clear........
20A Reckless operation of aircraft
(1) A person must not operate an aircraft being reckless as to whether the manner of operation could endanger the life of another person.
(2) A person must not operate an aircraft being reckless as to whether the manner of operation could endanger the person or property of another person.
There is a certain irony in the fact that recklessness often leads to a wreck.
20A Reckless operation of aircraft
(1) A person must not operate an aircraft being reckless as to whether the manner of operation could endanger the life of another person.
(2) A person must not operate an aircraft being reckless as to whether the manner of operation could endanger the person or property of another person.
There is a certain irony in the fact that recklessness often leads to a wreck.
HA HA HA....
Did not some 'check' pilots in 'the dept of many names' HS-125 do exactly 'that' to stop the 'infernal noise' from the U/C horn whilst doing circuits?
And the result was..........................
Take a guess....only 1 guess per person allowed.....
NO cheers 'ere.......
Did not some 'check' pilots in 'the dept of many names' HS-125 do exactly 'that' to stop the 'infernal noise' from the U/C horn whilst doing circuits?
And the result was..........................
Take a guess....only 1 guess per person allowed.....
NO cheers 'ere.......
Licensed Engineer's opinion;
High Performance or not, If technicians pull a CB for a test on the ground its because we are either following a procedure in the Type Certificate Holder's data, or we've analysed the wiring diagrams to be aware of the implications.
My advice to a pilot would be that, if its not a procedure in the POH or an approved Test Schedule leave it the f@ck alone! Whether you have pax on board, or not, is immaterial.
High Performance or not, If technicians pull a CB for a test on the ground its because we are either following a procedure in the Type Certificate Holder's data, or we've analysed the wiring diagrams to be aware of the implications.
My advice to a pilot would be that, if its not a procedure in the POH or an approved Test Schedule leave it the f@ck alone! Whether you have pax on board, or not, is immaterial.
Don’t even do it on a bugsmasher these days. If it has electronic injection, sophisticated lithium batteries and an EFIS you may have just made a terminal mistake. Even more if it has autopilot, an electric CS Prop and other stuff.
‘’Please note it is illegal to shut down an engine in flight for training.
‘’Please note it is illegal to shut down an engine in flight for training.
Thanks for your wise words of wisdom, Captain Sunfish
Avoid imitations
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Another reason not to pull a c/b is that they have a finite life. If everybody does it, one day it might not reset.
With regard to maintenance isolating items of equipment....dodgy. I once picked up an S-76B from a maintenance base on an IFR day, very early in the morning. It had been placarded for a failed VOR/DME without us being told about it. The c/b had been pulled and collared. Our MEL said we could go, so we departed, into rather challenging weather, as it turned out, worse than forecast. On getting airborne, on trying to tune an essential VOR, which couldn’t be received on the ground at the maintenance base, we discovered that neither of the VOR/DME boxes would receive. Things got a little complicated quite quickly, so we made a crew decision to put the breaker back in. BOTH VOR/DME then worked normally!
With regard to maintenance isolating items of equipment....dodgy. I once picked up an S-76B from a maintenance base on an IFR day, very early in the morning. It had been placarded for a failed VOR/DME without us being told about it. The c/b had been pulled and collared. Our MEL said we could go, so we departed, into rather challenging weather, as it turned out, worse than forecast. On getting airborne, on trying to tune an essential VOR, which couldn’t be received on the ground at the maintenance base, we discovered that neither of the VOR/DME boxes would receive. Things got a little complicated quite quickly, so we made a crew decision to put the breaker back in. BOTH VOR/DME then worked normally!
Last edited by ShyTorque; 31st Jan 2021 at 14:06.
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Most probably is not allowed by local CAA
Depending on where you are, for example in Austria/EASA it is forbidden to pull CB during examination flights.
https://www.austrocontrol.at/en/pilots/pilot_licenses/examination/examiner
https://www.austrocontrol.at/en/pilots/pilot_licenses/examination/examiner
Last edited by Airgus; 31st Jan 2021 at 09:42.
This is 2021. Failures are practiced in simulators, not the aircraft, period, In flight, CBs are tripped when, and only when, the check list specifically requires it.
Modern aircraft are so electronically complex you rarely know just exactly what systems mat be affected as a side effect of the system you are trying to electrically kill.
Modern aircraft are so electronically complex you rarely know just exactly what systems mat be affected as a side effect of the system you are trying to electrically kill.
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R22 Key out auto
I seem to remember during my helicopter training twenty years ago a tale (which I think is true) that an instructor had the habit of turning off the engine and throwing the key on the floor, one way of entering an auto !!!!
I think it was an R22, in the States, or the UK.
Last time he did it the key was discovered on the floor of the wrecked helicopter.
Couldn't find it on a Google search, but I'm sure someone else will have been told about it.
During my training a few instructors had a habit of pulling the C.B's
I think it was an R22, in the States, or the UK.
Last time he did it the key was discovered on the floor of the wrecked helicopter.
Couldn't find it on a Google search, but I'm sure someone else will have been told about it.
During my training a few instructors had a habit of pulling the C.B's
Airbus
Wasn't there a new big one having a pre acceptance engine run up at Toulouse that ended up broken over the blast deflectors after some bright spark pulled a CB to silence the take off warning?
Moderator
Did not some 'check' pilots in 'the dept of many names' HS-125
Dear old CAO.
There were some extenuating traffic circumstances at the time. Nonetheless, a crew foul up.
On the other hand, the then DCA Flying Unit (which was the operator at Essendon) had been trying to get the OK for some time to upgrade the aircraft mod status without getting any funds vote. The wheels up sorted that little administrative problem out and we ended up with the desired model out of the bingle.
ASD-51-7-67 HS 125 VH-CAO.pdf (airwaysmuseum.com)
Dear old CAO.
There were some extenuating traffic circumstances at the time. Nonetheless, a crew foul up.
On the other hand, the then DCA Flying Unit (which was the operator at Essendon) had been trying to get the OK for some time to upgrade the aircraft mod status without getting any funds vote. The wheels up sorted that little administrative problem out and we ended up with the desired model out of the bingle.
ASD-51-7-67 HS 125 VH-CAO.pdf (airwaysmuseum.com)
How else can you practice a manual gear extension? Pull gear motor cb, select gear down, nothing happens, pump gear down manually. Not that you need to do this every check flight but it’s nice to know that it works.
............do exactly 'that' to stop the 'infernal noise' from the U/C horn whilst doing circuits?
And the result was..........................
And the result was..........................
LEARNING TO BLEED
(the 1985 Westwind crash at Sydney)
1457:31 PIC states he's going to introduce some emergency..
1457:59 PIC states you've lost these... ######
1458:24. END OF RECORDING
1.16.1.1 The Pilot 1n Command
Comprehensive Interviews were conducted with all the company [] pilots and various management personnel. Mr [] was evaluated by other company pilots as having average manipulative and instrument flying skills for his level of experience. However, they considered that he excelled as an Instructor by virtue of his personality, lecturing technique and thorough knowledge of the aircraft and its systems. He was a loyal and hard working employee who disliked inefficiency and laziness, and expected nothing less than 100% effort from other company personnel. Several company pilots reported that on check flights, Mr [] in his role of check and training pilot, would introduce simulated systems failures at any stage of the flight. Which systems were Involved and the extent of the failure was mostly graded to take into account the experience of the pilot undergoing check. A point made by almost all of the company pilots was that Mr [] could be relied upon to Introduce a unique or obscure failure that had not been covered previously with the candidate. It was also his habit to require the candidate to handle simultaneous systems failures but this was also graded to the experience of the particular pilot. An example of the types of simultaneous and complex failures given related to the loss of various navigation and attitude Instruments, coupled with an engine failure, while the pilot was carrying out an instrument approach at night.
Mr [] expected the company co-pilots to demonstrate their ability to safely control the aircraft by reference to the emergency FAI, following simulated failure of the FAI on the right Instrument panel. Some command pilots were expected to make use of the rate of turn indicator, following simulated failures of both FAIs on the left panel. To prevent the pilot obtaining attitude information from the co-pilot's FAI, this Instrument was covered, or the cockpit lighting on that side was extinguished. Some of the company pilots had been expected to cope with this emergency exercise immediately after a take-off at night.
---------
So, starting at 240 KCAS in a climbing left turn, they get to 420KCAS and the water, 4700 feet lower in 12 seconds.
The PIC of this saga was the chief pilot and chief instructor/checker and, was the guy who had reported the turn indicator was displaying in the reverse sense, some 350 days previously, and which had been reported a further 3 times without being rectified. He was also the product of his 9000 experience, and the practices were not alone in the industry at that time, however failing the attitude systems at night, at low level, and on a fleet of aircraft that have had known anomalies with the instrument that would be expected to be used was... "courageous, Minister... ".
Just say "No".
(the 1985 Westwind crash at Sydney)
1457:31 PIC states he's going to introduce some emergency..
1457:59 PIC states you've lost these... ######
1458:24. END OF RECORDING
1.16.1.1 The Pilot 1n Command
Comprehensive Interviews were conducted with all the company [] pilots and various management personnel. Mr [] was evaluated by other company pilots as having average manipulative and instrument flying skills for his level of experience. However, they considered that he excelled as an Instructor by virtue of his personality, lecturing technique and thorough knowledge of the aircraft and its systems. He was a loyal and hard working employee who disliked inefficiency and laziness, and expected nothing less than 100% effort from other company personnel. Several company pilots reported that on check flights, Mr [] in his role of check and training pilot, would introduce simulated systems failures at any stage of the flight. Which systems were Involved and the extent of the failure was mostly graded to take into account the experience of the pilot undergoing check. A point made by almost all of the company pilots was that Mr [] could be relied upon to Introduce a unique or obscure failure that had not been covered previously with the candidate. It was also his habit to require the candidate to handle simultaneous systems failures but this was also graded to the experience of the particular pilot. An example of the types of simultaneous and complex failures given related to the loss of various navigation and attitude Instruments, coupled with an engine failure, while the pilot was carrying out an instrument approach at night.
Mr [] expected the company co-pilots to demonstrate their ability to safely control the aircraft by reference to the emergency FAI, following simulated failure of the FAI on the right Instrument panel. Some command pilots were expected to make use of the rate of turn indicator, following simulated failures of both FAIs on the left panel. To prevent the pilot obtaining attitude information from the co-pilot's FAI, this Instrument was covered, or the cockpit lighting on that side was extinguished. Some of the company pilots had been expected to cope with this emergency exercise immediately after a take-off at night.
---------
So, starting at 240 KCAS in a climbing left turn, they get to 420KCAS and the water, 4700 feet lower in 12 seconds.
The PIC of this saga was the chief pilot and chief instructor/checker and, was the guy who had reported the turn indicator was displaying in the reverse sense, some 350 days previously, and which had been reported a further 3 times without being rectified. He was also the product of his 9000 experience, and the practices were not alone in the industry at that time, however failing the attitude systems at night, at low level, and on a fleet of aircraft that have had known anomalies with the instrument that would be expected to be used was... "courageous, Minister... ".
Just say "No".
I'm guessing someone has had a checkie do it to him/her and is seeking validation here before 1. lodging formal complaint, or 2. hopping the checkie will read this and realise the error of his/her ways.
With thousands of pilots currently out of work, the price of being made redundant for speaking out and getting shafted for doing so is unfortunately much higher than it was 18 months ago.
Yes, it does seem like something of a "drive-by", firing off a single loaded question then running.
Another alleged CB-related event.
Dre, I often find your input somewhat droll however that one made me laugh out loud. Nice one.
Another alleged CB-related event.
Thanx 'JT'. I sorta remembered that it was 'CAO', but was not sure.
Re 'shut-up Gringo', # 35, that was (from memory) a South American '707' in South America I think, who was too low, got the 'voice' warning from the (GPWS) system, which was an American voice, being an American aircraft I guess, and did indeed utter the fatal words, and then the CVR suddenly STOPPED...as HE...CFIT!
Sad but true.
Re 'shut-up Gringo', # 35, that was (from memory) a South American '707' in South America I think, who was too low, got the 'voice' warning from the (GPWS) system, which was an American voice, being an American aircraft I guess, and did indeed utter the fatal words, and then the CVR suddenly STOPPED...as HE...CFIT!
Sad but true.
Sad but untrue. Yet another aviation urban myth. I doubt that any 707's were fitted with GPWS.
(wikipedia Avianca 011)
The accident was investigated by the Spanish Accident Investigation Board, who determined the most likely cause to have been pilot error, and a failure to follow proper instrument approach procedures. The pilot was not precisely aware of his position, and the Board determined he had "set out to intercept the ILS on an incorrect track", which placed the aircraft over the wrong terrain for his approach, in a hilly region of rapidly changing terrain height. [3]
The crew also did not respond properly to the ground-proximity warning system (GPWS), which can be heard on the flight recording. (There is a persistent rumor that the pilot responded to the GPWS by saying "Shut up, Gringo" but this is not borne out by the transcript of the recording; the pilot responds to 15 seconds of GPWS warning with "Bueno, beuno", roughly, "Ok, ok" in English.[4][5])
The airport's approach controller was also faulted for providing faulty position information, failing to inform the crew that radar service had been terminated, and failing to maintain proper radar surveillance of the craft.[6]
The crew also did not respond properly to the ground-proximity warning system (GPWS), which can be heard on the flight recording. (There is a persistent rumor that the pilot responded to the GPWS by saying "Shut up, Gringo" but this is not borne out by the transcript of the recording; the pilot responds to 15 seconds of GPWS warning with "Bueno, beuno", roughly, "Ok, ok" in English.[4][5])
The airport's approach controller was also faulted for providing faulty position information, failing to inform the crew that radar service had been terminated, and failing to maintain proper radar surveillance of the craft.[6]