Airservices Class E changes
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Why would we need a class E endorsement? It is uncontrolled airspace for VFR. Why anyone would not fit a transponder to their aircraft or low cost ADSB beggars belief. Cost should never superscede the safer outcome of ATC seeing you on their screen and high performance aircraft seeing you on TCAS. If you cannot afford it, probably can't afford to own an aircraft.. My LSA has transponder and I fly near RPT in NSW. Very comforting to know ATC can provide me as traffic to the jets and the jets can see me If they can't spit me through the window.
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I doubt that an alarm would have occurred at Mangalore pre-collision. Circuit areas of aerodromes such as Mangalore (anywhere with reasonable traffic numbers) have defined areas, lateral and vertical, within which alarms are inhibited or they would be going off all the time
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AVSEF, where are you?
Class E wouldn't be so bad if Airservices actually provided some approach controlling; it doesn't, of course (as we have seen at Coffs) and all this will mean will be ground and airborne delays waiting for the other IFR to clear the area, all the while fighting on the CTAF (eg Sunshine Coast A320).
The only good part of this is that VFR will require a transponder unless they are in the weeds. In fact, if it's deemed that IFR must have E to improve safety, then it's high time that ALL aircraft, regardless of airspace type, mixing it with RPT have a transponder for TCAS.
Class E wouldn't be so bad if Airservices actually provided some approach controlling; it doesn't, of course (as we have seen at Coffs) and all this will mean will be ground and airborne delays waiting for the other IFR to clear the area, all the while fighting on the CTAF (eg Sunshine Coast A320).
The only good part of this is that VFR will require a transponder unless they are in the weeds. In fact, if it's deemed that IFR must have E to improve safety, then it's high time that ALL aircraft, regardless of airspace type, mixing it with RPT have a transponder for TCAS.
The presentation does suggest they are providing Radar approach at the Whitsunday aerodromes. I think the tower does approaches currently. But could be wrong.
Two Fifty,
Your statement might have some validity if Airservices had all the following:
- staff that actually understood how the STCA worked,
- detailed operational concepts and concept of operations of the STCA application in varying airspace types,
- accurate records of how often the STCA alert went off at each functional sector per day,
- accurate records of how often a STCA alert prompted the controller to intervene where they had not previously,
- a detailed understanding of the current shortcoming of the STCA software in TAAATS Eurocat,
- standardisation of application across Australian airspace specific to varying airspace requirements (noted above)
- recording evidence where the STCA is being perceived and/or used as a controller tool rather that a system safety net,
etc etc etc
But I'm sorry. If you'd care to find out you'd be disappointed.
MNG apparently did not have any STCA Inhibtion area.
Therefore I don't doubt and have to at least question your premise...
What altitude would you use as the ceiling if it was going to have ? What altitude would you use as the ceiling of the STCA Inhibition area when MNG becomes a SAFIS in ? G airspace after proposed AsA changes are implemented?
You may be further surprised (if your rationale has logic) to find that there are few if any G Airsapace aerodromes with STCA Inhibtion areas in Melbourne Centre.
So your comment "Alarms...they would be going on off all the time"....Yep that is exactly what has been happening for years.
Some G airspace controllers according to my sources are being exposed to FALSE OPERATIONAL POSITIVES of Short Term Conflicts Alerts of between 99 to 99.9 percent. Yes only 1 in a 1000 STCA alerts is relevant to where the controller is prompted to action...
So after a while the safety net becomes a safety issue itself, the STCA is ignored or is confirming what the controller has already done....
We could be better than this...sigh!
Your statement might have some validity if Airservices had all the following:
- staff that actually understood how the STCA worked,
- detailed operational concepts and concept of operations of the STCA application in varying airspace types,
- accurate records of how often the STCA alert went off at each functional sector per day,
- accurate records of how often a STCA alert prompted the controller to intervene where they had not previously,
- a detailed understanding of the current shortcoming of the STCA software in TAAATS Eurocat,
- standardisation of application across Australian airspace specific to varying airspace requirements (noted above)
- recording evidence where the STCA is being perceived and/or used as a controller tool rather that a system safety net,
etc etc etc
But I'm sorry. If you'd care to find out you'd be disappointed.
MNG apparently did not have any STCA Inhibtion area.
Therefore I don't doubt and have to at least question your premise...
What altitude would you use as the ceiling if it was going to have ? What altitude would you use as the ceiling of the STCA Inhibition area when MNG becomes a SAFIS in ? G airspace after proposed AsA changes are implemented?
You may be further surprised (if your rationale has logic) to find that there are few if any G Airsapace aerodromes with STCA Inhibtion areas in Melbourne Centre.
So your comment "Alarms...they would be going on off all the time"....Yep that is exactly what has been happening for years.
Some G airspace controllers according to my sources are being exposed to FALSE OPERATIONAL POSITIVES of Short Term Conflicts Alerts of between 99 to 99.9 percent. Yes only 1 in a 1000 STCA alerts is relevant to where the controller is prompted to action...
So after a while the safety net becomes a safety issue itself, the STCA is ignored or is confirming what the controller has already done....
We could be better than this...sigh!
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Two Fifty,
Your statement might have some validity if Airservices had all the following:
- staff that actually understood how the STCA worked,
- detailed operational concepts and concept of operations of the STCA application in varying airspace types,
- accurate records of how often the STCA alert went off at each functional sector per day,
- accurate records of how often a STCA alert prompted the controller to intervene where they had not previously,
- a detailed understanding of the current shortcoming of the STCA software in TAAATS Eurocat,
- standardisation of application across Australian airspace specific to varying airspace requirements (noted above)
- recording evidence where the STCA is being perceived and/or used as a controller tool rather that a system safety net,
etc etc etc
But I'm sorry. If you'd care to find out you'd be disappointed.
MNG apparently did not have any STCA Inhibtion area.
Therefore I don't doubt and have to at least question your premise...
What altitude would you use as the ceiling if it was going to have ? What altitude would you use as the ceiling of the STCA Inhibition area when MNG becomes a SAFIS in ? G airspace after proposed AsA changes are implemented?
You may be further surprised (if your rationale has logic) to find that there are few if any G Airsapace aerodromes with STCA Inhibtion areas in Melbourne Centre.
So your comment "Alarms...they would be going on off all the time"....Yep that is exactly what has been happening for years.
Some G airspace controllers according to my sources are being exposed to FALSE OPERATIONAL POSITIVES of Short Term Conflicts Alerts of between 99 to 99.9 percent. Yes only 1 in a 1000 STCA alerts is relevant to where the controller is prompted to action...
So after a while the safety net becomes a safety issue itself, the STCA is ignored or is confirming what the controller has already done....
We could be better than this...sigh!
Your statement might have some validity if Airservices had all the following:
- staff that actually understood how the STCA worked,
- detailed operational concepts and concept of operations of the STCA application in varying airspace types,
- accurate records of how often the STCA alert went off at each functional sector per day,
- accurate records of how often a STCA alert prompted the controller to intervene where they had not previously,
- a detailed understanding of the current shortcoming of the STCA software in TAAATS Eurocat,
- standardisation of application across Australian airspace specific to varying airspace requirements (noted above)
- recording evidence where the STCA is being perceived and/or used as a controller tool rather that a system safety net,
etc etc etc
But I'm sorry. If you'd care to find out you'd be disappointed.
MNG apparently did not have any STCA Inhibtion area.
Therefore I don't doubt and have to at least question your premise...
What altitude would you use as the ceiling if it was going to have ? What altitude would you use as the ceiling of the STCA Inhibition area when MNG becomes a SAFIS in ? G airspace after proposed AsA changes are implemented?
You may be further surprised (if your rationale has logic) to find that there are few if any G Airsapace aerodromes with STCA Inhibtion areas in Melbourne Centre.
So your comment "Alarms...they would be going on off all the time"....Yep that is exactly what has been happening for years.
Some G airspace controllers according to my sources are being exposed to FALSE OPERATIONAL POSITIVES of Short Term Conflicts Alerts of between 99 to 99.9 percent. Yes only 1 in a 1000 STCA alerts is relevant to where the controller is prompted to action...
So after a while the safety net becomes a safety issue itself, the STCA is ignored or is confirming what the controller has already done....
We could be better than this...sigh!
Well, I seem to have offended someone with my ignorance, haven’t I.
I know that my aerodrome Armidale has a STCA inhibition area, I’m told because the STCA predicts loss of separation (5NM and/or whatever vertical separation), not likelihood of collision, and so any pair of aircraft in the circuit would cause an alarm.
I know that my aerodrome Armidale has a STCA inhibition area, I’m told because the STCA predicts loss of separation (5NM and/or whatever vertical separation), not likelihood of collision, and so any pair of aircraft in the circuit would cause an alarm.
The Webinar held the other day seemed to have a participant that sounded like the PA of a well know contributer to this site (??) who to date has been silent on this thread........
With the proposed implementation date in December and the chance of an early election, maybe there is some politics behind this proposal? Only time will tell I guess but it all depends on who may be pulling (or trying to pull) the strings in the background. Its a poorly presented proposal with no published risk analysis and no maps to date. I wonder when the time comes will the OAR be pressured into acceptance?
With the proposed implementation date in December and the chance of an early election, maybe there is some politics behind this proposal? Only time will tell I guess but it all depends on who may be pulling (or trying to pull) the strings in the background. Its a poorly presented proposal with no published risk analysis and no maps to date. I wonder when the time comes will the OAR be pressured into acceptance?
With the proposed implementation date in December and the chance of an early election, maybe there is some politics behind this proposal?
The proposal is now stinking to high heaven as being the usual pre-election Dick distraction. Doomed to fail as a proposal and complete success as a political tactic.
Time to speak up, Dick: Do you know who's driving this proposal and, whether or not you do know, what do you think of its merits as an airspace arrangement?
Airservices will need to get all things agreed, approved and finalized by 17 June.
That's the cut-off date for AIP MAP and DAH effective 2 December 2021.
Given the choice between a conspiracy theory (pre-election stunt) and a blunder (not being aware of or thinking about all the implications) I'm leaning towards the latter.
I don't think some in Airservices are that smart
That's the cut-off date for AIP MAP and DAH effective 2 December 2021.
Given the choice between a conspiracy theory (pre-election stunt) and a blunder (not being aware of or thinking about all the implications) I'm leaning towards the latter.
I don't think some in Airservices are that smart
What makes you think the election won't be called before 17 June, CM?
Lead. I believe the proposal is being driven by AsA because of the Mangalore fatalities.
It really needs to be instigated and driven by the Airspace Office at CASA.
Such major changes require an individual who has the leadership abilities and self confidence to “sell “ the need for change and the way it should take place
I believe an increase in E will only work and be safe if it closely follows the FAA proven system. This proposal does not. As an example , for E to work at low level we will need to change to FAA pilot and ATC procedures.
An FAA expert needs to be employed to advise on this.
There is no possibility,in my view, that such a major change could be introduced by December. Too risky!
It really needs to be instigated and driven by the Airspace Office at CASA.
Such major changes require an individual who has the leadership abilities and self confidence to “sell “ the need for change and the way it should take place
I believe an increase in E will only work and be safe if it closely follows the FAA proven system. This proposal does not. As an example , for E to work at low level we will need to change to FAA pilot and ATC procedures.
An FAA expert needs to be employed to advise on this.
There is no possibility,in my view, that such a major change could be introduced by December. Too risky!
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Lead. I believe the proposal is being driven by AsA because of the Mangalore fatalities.
It really needs to be instigated and driven by the Airspace Office at CASA.
Such major changes require an individual who has the leadership abilities and self confidence to “sell “ the need for change and the way it should take place
I believe an increase in E will only work and be safe if it closely follows the FAA proven system. This proposal does not. As an example , for E to work at low level we will need to change to FAA pilot and ATC procedures.
An FAA expert needs to be employed to advise on this.
There is no possibility,in my view, that such a major change could be introduced by December. Too risky!
It really needs to be instigated and driven by the Airspace Office at CASA.
Such major changes require an individual who has the leadership abilities and self confidence to “sell “ the need for change and the way it should take place
I believe an increase in E will only work and be safe if it closely follows the FAA proven system. This proposal does not. As an example , for E to work at low level we will need to change to FAA pilot and ATC procedures.
An FAA expert needs to be employed to advise on this.
There is no possibility,in my view, that such a major change could be introduced by December. Too risky!
Thank you for your points.
Given that the ATSB final report on MNG has yet to be published or the Coroner’s Inquiry has been held and report published, I and a lot of my colleagues find it incredible that AsA is implementing changes, allegedly due to the MNG midair and associated fatalities. Do they have such faith in their internal report presumably identifying what went wrong that they have no need for the ATSB or Coroner’s findings.
Why does not AsA publish their internal Safety Report on the accident with full voice transcripts?
I find it very strange that you don’t comment on the complete counterintuitive nature of their proposal given the rationale you presumably identify as the reason for the changes; ie for the very situation of airspace that the MNG accident happened will not be E airspace (?daylight hours at least) but still G as a SAFIS (whatever that means) of SFC-8500 / 15nm.
What services on the ?CTAF frequency in G will the “master controller” offer in G airspace that is not offered now?
Are you aware of an FAA staff visit to Australia over the next couple of months?
Will this visit specifically attempt to address all the issues raised in ATC simulation of E to 1500 throughout 2020 and raised by pilots and controllers for the last 29 years?
Will you be meeting with any of those FAA staff?
I can’t blame a lot of pilots and controllers who are very suspicious of these proposed changes, especially when AsA seemingly refuses to publish all the issues raised with the implementation of whatever is proposed and initially the proposed solutions for the issues. Even a draft but extensive list of frequently asked questions with honest answers and not another PowerPoint treacled with spin and bullS#@t would be a good start.
Dick, I am happy to answer a PM so you can establish my experience and I that have no “agenda” other than for the safety of pilots and their passengers and not to let another controller get the “BLA” treatment ever again.
Is IFR navaid training of the type that happens overhead a site like MNG possible in it's present form in E, especially if the controller is responsible for a much larger sector, thus doesn't have the time to concentrate on positively separating multiple constantly level-changing aircraft in close proximity? The only result I can see is that access is going to be incredibly restricted, to the point that training will just move to somewhere else in G where you can actually get in and get it done when you want to get it done.
Originally Posted by Traffic
The only result I can see is that access is going to be incredibly restricted
I predict this will be a copout, as Traffic alludes-to; in the Mangalore case, we'll just get "clearance not available, standby" until the other aircraft has landed because of what will be procedural separation. We will not get an "approach" service as I predict they get in the USA. Hence the CAGRO (or "insert a name") proposal at MNG.
“Why does not AsA publish their internal Safety Report on the accident with full voice transcripts?”
Because under the TSI Act they are ‘protected’ and under the control of ATSB, with heavy penalties for disclosure.
Because under the TSI Act they are ‘protected’ and under the control of ATSB, with heavy penalties for disclosure.
Is IFR navaid training of the type that happens overhead a site like MNG possible in it's present form in E, especially if the controller is responsible for a much larger sector, thus doesn't have the time to concentrate on positively separating multiple constantly level-changing aircraft in close proximity? The only result I can see is that access is going to be incredibly restricted, to the point that training will just move to somewhere else in G where you can actually get in and get it done when you want to get it done.
You make a good point. I was actually having the same general discussion with sone other interested parties today!
However if the SAFIS is introduced at at MNG and presumably the operating hours are ? For example 0800 - 1800 EST then NAVAID Training in E would only outside those hours. In reality I have no idea given the very limited brief on general and specific info on SAFIS.
Regardless you post raises similar issues to those raised over a few beers today....
Will the controller responsible for the MNG SAFIS be only responsible for the SAFIS and not responsible for the surrounding low level airspace as well?
Presumably the controller responsible for the MNG SAFIS be able to hear all broadcasts on the SAFIS frequency?
Will the controller be able to broadcast on the MNG SAFIS frequency?
Will the MNG SAFIS frequency program be retransmitted on the other control frequency if that controller is responsible for other sectors at the same time or will only the controller hear it?
What will happen to frequency management outside MNG SAFIS hours?
How will the service provided to aircraft in MNG SAFIS be different that what is provided now?
I am assuming similar questions could be asked about the Ballina SAFIS which may have different issues as well as similar let alone the other aero drones proposed for SAFIS a;location.
And we haven’t even started on CLASS E to 1500 AGLs
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And therein lies the rub. Never, in almost 30 years, has Dick or anybody else revealed the true cost of providing ATC separation down to low level all over Australia (wait for it).
I predict this will be a copout, as Traffic alludes-to; in the Mangalore case, we'll just get "clearance not available, standby" until the other aircraft has landed because of what will be procedural separation. We will not get an "approach" service as I predict they get in the USA. Hence the CAGRO (or "insert a name") proposal at MNG.
I predict this will be a copout, as Traffic alludes-to; in the Mangalore case, we'll just get "clearance not available, standby" until the other aircraft has landed because of what will be procedural separation. We will not get an "approach" service as I predict they get in the USA. Hence the CAGRO (or "insert a name") proposal at MNG.
If the missed approach segment stays below controlled airspace, it shouldn't be a problem to give a clearance to a departure when the arriving aircraft is below controlled airspace (this we do all the time where I work at least).
Nothing stops you from departing VFR and pick up an IFR clearance when ATC has room for it if the controlled airspace above is class E. Just consider that you may end up flying quite a bit before being able to get that IFR clearance then.... well, you know the drill