Lockhart Crash
The Flight Safety Foundation model allows an approach, but if you try once and can't get visual you are not allowed to try again. THAT model would have perhaps prevented this accident.
Check Attitude
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just revisiting this thread:
in amongst the responders there is a lot of useful input.
Toodogs : you hit the nail on the head regarding temperature dewpoint spread. Less than two degrees difference high probability of reduced visibility,
less than one degree fog / cloud reduced visibility.
PoppaJo: Alternates, after two missed approaches divert to Weipa, 81 nm West, multiple approach aids and procedures,
low MDA's and circling minima, PAPI lights etc and no terrain problems.
Sheppey: Rain affected windscreen, no wipers, RainX will clear most precipitation if you are above 50 kts.
Amber or Yellow lens glasses (night driving shooters / low vis mining ops) will also give an edge with contrast and available light in bad weather.
Crosswhinge: NDB approach with letdown on inbound turn.
Historically, particularly with a SE weather flow, one becomes visual inbound before reaching MDA. A visual approach to RWY 30 is usually possible.
SMS7777: Microbursts. I have personally encountered them at both LHR and Weipa
Lockhart River aerodrome has significant terrain to the West and South of the field, and terrain to the North.
As with most communities there is a significant communications tower (580') near the circuit area.
This aerodrome does not lend itself to circling approaches and has a published No Circling restriction to the Sth and SW of the strip.
The original GPS RNAV procedure for rwy 12 was dangerously close to terrain and
after the Metro crash the approach was realigned to clear some terrain.
The original approach was designed in accordance with applicable standards but did not include a common sense profile.
I have 20 years experience at YLHR and it's weather problems.
I have years of experience in East Timor, Qld Gulf Country, PNG, Bougainville and Solomon Islands.
I am not an armchair expert commenting on something of which I have no experience.
In closing, I note that there was no post impact fire, given that the Titan has two turbocharged engines
that would have had red hot turbos ready to ignite any fuel from ruptured fuel lines.
Was there a double engine failure resulting in a glide approach hence the extremely low altitude at impact?
Was the GPS reset to the aerodrome reference point or was it still in approach mode?
Why wasn't a diversion to an alternate (Weipa?) initiated after the 2nd missed approach?
Recovered data from GPS etc will shed some light on what may have happened.
Lets wait for the ATSB report which should have better access to the facts than we do.
Mainframe
in amongst the responders there is a lot of useful input.
Toodogs : you hit the nail on the head regarding temperature dewpoint spread. Less than two degrees difference high probability of reduced visibility,
less than one degree fog / cloud reduced visibility.
PoppaJo: Alternates, after two missed approaches divert to Weipa, 81 nm West, multiple approach aids and procedures,
low MDA's and circling minima, PAPI lights etc and no terrain problems.
Sheppey: Rain affected windscreen, no wipers, RainX will clear most precipitation if you are above 50 kts.
Amber or Yellow lens glasses (night driving shooters / low vis mining ops) will also give an edge with contrast and available light in bad weather.
Crosswhinge: NDB approach with letdown on inbound turn.
Historically, particularly with a SE weather flow, one becomes visual inbound before reaching MDA. A visual approach to RWY 30 is usually possible.
SMS7777: Microbursts. I have personally encountered them at both LHR and Weipa
Lockhart River aerodrome has significant terrain to the West and South of the field, and terrain to the North.
As with most communities there is a significant communications tower (580') near the circuit area.
This aerodrome does not lend itself to circling approaches and has a published No Circling restriction to the Sth and SW of the strip.
The original GPS RNAV procedure for rwy 12 was dangerously close to terrain and
after the Metro crash the approach was realigned to clear some terrain.
The original approach was designed in accordance with applicable standards but did not include a common sense profile.
I have 20 years experience at YLHR and it's weather problems.
I have years of experience in East Timor, Qld Gulf Country, PNG, Bougainville and Solomon Islands.
I am not an armchair expert commenting on something of which I have no experience.
In closing, I note that there was no post impact fire, given that the Titan has two turbocharged engines
that would have had red hot turbos ready to ignite any fuel from ruptured fuel lines.
Was there a double engine failure resulting in a glide approach hence the extremely low altitude at impact?
Was the GPS reset to the aerodrome reference point or was it still in approach mode?
Why wasn't a diversion to an alternate (Weipa?) initiated after the 2nd missed approach?
Recovered data from GPS etc will shed some light on what may have happened.
Lets wait for the ATSB report which should have better access to the facts than we do.
Mainframe
As quick as some have been to suggest that this flight shouldn't have been attempted given the TAF, or that the approach(es) shouldn't have been attempted based on the AWIS, it's worth noting that two other IFR twins arrived without difficulty that morning - one a bit earlier and one about half an hour after the accident. Both reputable companies, both reportedly got visual comfortably above the RNAV minima. I'm not doubting that it was fluctuating and was rubbish when OZO arrived, but the TAF was nothing out of the ordinary for a tropical wet season day. There is also a suggestion that the aircraft may have only made one missed approach and that the accident was on the second attempt - doesn't change the outcome but it might change the tone of the conversation about how hard he had been trying to get in.
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I am the pilot's partner. I have avoided this thread for as long as I could but the thought of there being misinformation out there is too much to bear. For what it's worth, I am also a professional pilot and saw the TAF and radar that morning.
There were passing SPECIs, but the TAF itself was something along the lines of broken at 2000' and 10km vis with the usual tempos. Whether a SPECI was passed on to him during the flight, I don't know. VHF coverage at lower levels isn't great at LHR.
He had return fuel for Cairns plus tempos plus more. He was never one to skimp on fuel. I have the planning figures at home.
He only made TWO approaches in total. The second approach is where something went wrong. I have his OzRunways details and have seen the track log.
All we know is that he was in a Titan, hand-flying in sh*t visibility, potential turbulence or downdrafts, with no GPWS and no ADSB coverage (no chance for a low altitude alert like you might receive from ATC in the States) and limited ability to appreciate an increase in sink rate given the over-water approach. He certainly would've been doing his damnedest to get everyone in safely.
He was also very experienced and had at least 5 wet seasons under his belt, between the Territory and FNQ. Most of his clients were regulars and many have reached out to tell us how safe they felt and how much they enjoyed his company.
I know this is a professional forum, not one for emotional reminiscing. I understand questions and speculation. I have my own regarding weather station readings from the time of the approach, whether the AWIS was functioning and whether the GPS sequenced correctly. That said, given that this was a GA accident at Lockhart River, not an A380 at Heathrow I know there were be very limited hard data.
We used to pore over ATSB reports together and it was always the light aircraft accidents that struck us. There is no CVR, no FDR, and usually no witnesses. What you're left with is your legacy - and his was one of being thoroughly professional - and hopefully the kindness of those of us who have flown these sorts of aircraft, in this sort of weather and understand how thin the line can sometimes be between life and death.
Always in my heart SW.
There were passing SPECIs, but the TAF itself was something along the lines of broken at 2000' and 10km vis with the usual tempos. Whether a SPECI was passed on to him during the flight, I don't know. VHF coverage at lower levels isn't great at LHR.
He had return fuel for Cairns plus tempos plus more. He was never one to skimp on fuel. I have the planning figures at home.
He only made TWO approaches in total. The second approach is where something went wrong. I have his OzRunways details and have seen the track log.
All we know is that he was in a Titan, hand-flying in sh*t visibility, potential turbulence or downdrafts, with no GPWS and no ADSB coverage (no chance for a low altitude alert like you might receive from ATC in the States) and limited ability to appreciate an increase in sink rate given the over-water approach. He certainly would've been doing his damnedest to get everyone in safely.
He was also very experienced and had at least 5 wet seasons under his belt, between the Territory and FNQ. Most of his clients were regulars and many have reached out to tell us how safe they felt and how much they enjoyed his company.
I know this is a professional forum, not one for emotional reminiscing. I understand questions and speculation. I have my own regarding weather station readings from the time of the approach, whether the AWIS was functioning and whether the GPS sequenced correctly. That said, given that this was a GA accident at Lockhart River, not an A380 at Heathrow I know there were be very limited hard data.
We used to pore over ATSB reports together and it was always the light aircraft accidents that struck us. There is no CVR, no FDR, and usually no witnesses. What you're left with is your legacy - and his was one of being thoroughly professional - and hopefully the kindness of those of us who have flown these sorts of aircraft, in this sort of weather and understand how thin the line can sometimes be between life and death.
Always in my heart SW.
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Tragic, so very tragic, sadly he isn't alone, a lot of well meaning pro pilots have left us all too early. I enjoyed driving the C404 a very capable machine. I've lost a few mates like this. Rest assure that the memories don't die, we are all each owed a death so cherish those little moments you once had -)
Gone but not forgotten.
Gone but not forgotten.
Last edited by machtuk; 9th Apr 2020 at 12:45.
The last few posts, very real and my condolences as well.
GA is the toughest flying we will ever do, single pilot, complex aircraft, none of the whizz bang tools of the modern aircraft. Ok some have retrofitted upgrades.
Still in my eyes, always has been that it is this flying that stays with you forever.
The true cause as stated will probably never be known, but as has been well and truly said, no one goes out looking for this to happen. The Swiss cheese lined up.
RIP fellow aviator.
GA is the toughest flying we will ever do, single pilot, complex aircraft, none of the whizz bang tools of the modern aircraft. Ok some have retrofitted upgrades.
Still in my eyes, always has been that it is this flying that stays with you forever.
The true cause as stated will probably never be known, but as has been well and truly said, no one goes out looking for this to happen. The Swiss cheese lined up.
RIP fellow aviator.
