Accident Near Mangalore Airport - Possibly 2 Aircraft down
My ADSB-In has saved my bacon on one occasion and I consider it to be priceless. It was a high speed twin passing across my front from right to left and in my blind-spot. I had zero idea it was there otherwise. I watched it coming from 10 miles out on the screen and we would have come within less than 100 metres without the forewarning.
I might make up a YouTube video to show how well it works. There’s plenty of units available that do the job. If someone knows a good way to way record from the iPad screen, please PM me.
Someone will correct me if I'm wrong, but I understand that pretty much all the ADS-B in traffic solutions are UNCERTIFIED. That is, they are not legal for use in IFR - or situations such as this accident.
As i understand it, unlike the USA, Australia elected the ADS-B out only system. The proper certified ADS-B in and out system would require AsA to invest in a network of transmitters.
I'm not suggesting for a moment that the traffic display via the 4G network offered by AvPlan & Ozrunways is not a good thing. As is the Stratux reciever, the Stratus receiver, The Dual XGPS190, Sage clarity, Dynon DRX, etc. These systems work relatively well in VFR type situations at low level and in 4G areas, but at higher altitudes, remote areas, congested areas and outside 4G areas they cannot be relied upon at all.
But none of these systems are a) fully reliable or b) part of the Government designed airways system. In the wake of this accident we, as IFR pilots need to do 2 things:
1. Learn what we can from the accident and figure out how to stay safe in an imperfect airways system and an imperfect AsA system and
2. Keep the pressure on AsA to fix its problem areas.
I don't like the notion that if we all just connect a a Stratux receiver to our iPads or an uncertified Dynon display that the problem goes away. we deserve a more robust system that has AsA sanction.
As i understand it, unlike the USA, Australia elected the ADS-B out only system. The proper certified ADS-B in and out system would require AsA to invest in a network of transmitters.
I'm not suggesting for a moment that the traffic display via the 4G network offered by AvPlan & Ozrunways is not a good thing. As is the Stratux reciever, the Stratus receiver, The Dual XGPS190, Sage clarity, Dynon DRX, etc. These systems work relatively well in VFR type situations at low level and in 4G areas, but at higher altitudes, remote areas, congested areas and outside 4G areas they cannot be relied upon at all.
But none of these systems are a) fully reliable or b) part of the Government designed airways system. In the wake of this accident we, as IFR pilots need to do 2 things:
1. Learn what we can from the accident and figure out how to stay safe in an imperfect airways system and an imperfect AsA system and
2. Keep the pressure on AsA to fix its problem areas.
I don't like the notion that if we all just connect a a Stratux receiver to our iPads or an uncertified Dynon display that the problem goes away. we deserve a more robust system that has AsA sanction.
Someone will correct me if I'm wrong, but I understand that pretty much all the ADS-B in traffic solutions are UNCERTIFIED. That is, they are not legal for use in IFR - or situations such as this accident.
As i understand it, unlike the USA, Australia elected the ADS-B out only system. The proper certified ADS-B in and out system would require AsA to invest in a network of transmitters.
I'm not suggesting for a moment that the traffic display via the 4G network offered by AvPlan & Ozrunways is not a good thing. As is the Stratux reciever, the Stratus receiver, The Dual XGPS190, Sage clarity, Dynon DRX, etc. These systems work relatively well in VFR type situations at low level and in 4G areas, but at higher altitudes, remote areas, congested areas and outside 4G areas they cannot be relied upon at all.
But none of these systems are a) fully reliable or b) part of the Government designed airways system. In the wake of this accident we, as IFR pilots need to do 2 things:
1. Learn what we can from the accident and figure out how to stay safe in an imperfect airways system and an imperfect AsA system and
2. Keep the pressure on AsA to fix its problem areas.
I don't like the notion that if we all just connect a a Stratux receiver to our iPads or an uncertified Dynon display that the problem goes away. we deserve a more robust system that has AsA sanction.
As i understand it, unlike the USA, Australia elected the ADS-B out only system. The proper certified ADS-B in and out system would require AsA to invest in a network of transmitters.
I'm not suggesting for a moment that the traffic display via the 4G network offered by AvPlan & Ozrunways is not a good thing. As is the Stratux reciever, the Stratus receiver, The Dual XGPS190, Sage clarity, Dynon DRX, etc. These systems work relatively well in VFR type situations at low level and in 4G areas, but at higher altitudes, remote areas, congested areas and outside 4G areas they cannot be relied upon at all.
But none of these systems are a) fully reliable or b) part of the Government designed airways system. In the wake of this accident we, as IFR pilots need to do 2 things:
1. Learn what we can from the accident and figure out how to stay safe in an imperfect airways system and an imperfect AsA system and
2. Keep the pressure on AsA to fix its problem areas.
I don't like the notion that if we all just connect a a Stratux receiver to our iPads or an uncertified Dynon display that the problem goes away. we deserve a more robust system that has AsA sanction.
I don't know of any "IN" systems that are "certified". Certified for what? You aren't using the information for navigation, only for situational awareness. If you can't get your ATC to call out the conflicts, this seems to me to be a good backup plan. If your VFR potential conflicts don't have ADS-B, this won't help. But my understanding is that all of your IFR traffic has ADS-B. Of course, you are welcome to ignore the information.
Old Akro, do some research* on 1090es and UAT so you can understand the difference. 1090es is a transponder, UAT is not! UAT requires ground transmitters, supplies radar returns as well as ground received 1090es as well as weather information. It operates on 978mhz and only works within range of a ground station. TCAS does not see UAT hence the need to also carry a transponder. A 1090es in or ADS-B Rx receives the extended squitter message regardless of ground station coverage..twice a second..(UAT data is twice a minute.)
* The AirServices article refers to TIS-B in the US 1090ES equipment actually receiving TIS-B (new one on me).
For my thoughts? I still believe the issue lies in separate CTAF and mandated verbal diarrhea. Also,CTAF does not have a facility to record transmissions.
* The AirServices article refers to TIS-B in the US 1090ES equipment actually receiving TIS-B (new one on me).
For my thoughts? I still believe the issue lies in separate CTAF and mandated verbal diarrhea. Also,CTAF does not have a facility to record transmissions.
Last edited by OZBUSDRIVER; 7th Jun 2020 at 03:47.
If it is E airspace to 700 agl as per the FAA the pilot remains on the ATC frequency when in cloud.
A VFR aircraft wanting to enter the airspace if cloud was at the minima would have to get a special VFR clearance from ATC.
It’s a fail safe system that does not require a pilot to be on two frequencies at one time.
Works superbly in the USA.
A VFR aircraft wanting to enter the airspace if cloud was at the minima would have to get a special VFR clearance from ATC.
It’s a fail safe system that does not require a pilot to be on two frequencies at one time.
Works superbly in the USA.
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TIS/B and ADS/B IN
There is a description of the TIS/B and ADS/B IN systems in the Benefits of Surveillance paper prepared in response to the CASA RFQ 09/327.
MJG
MJG
Posted yesterday on the ATSB site (sorry, I can't post links yet):
In March, the ATSB released its final report from its investigation into the accident which found that, following receipt of verbal traffic information provided to both aircraft by air traffic control, the pilots of both aircraft did not successfully manoeuvre or establish direct radio communications to maintain separation, probably due to not recognising the risk of collision.
The accident was the first mid-air collision between two civil registered aircraft operating under the instrument flight rules (IFR) in Australia. As the collision occurred outside of controlled airspace, air traffic control (ATC) was required to provide traffic information on other IFR aircraft, but was not responsible for ensuring separation. This meant that the pilots were self-separating using radio communications and, where possible, the ’see and avoid’ principle.
‘See and avoid’ has known limitations, and central to the investigation was determining the likelihood that the pilots of each aircraft could detect the other visually in sufficient time to take avoiding action.
“To support the investigation, the ATSB initiated an aircraft performance and cockpit visibility study to determine when each aircraft may have been visible to the pilots of the other aircraft,” said ATSB Chief Commissioner Angus Mitchell.
“In addition, the study was undertaken to determine what effect an ADS-B IN system would have had on the pilots’ ability to detect traffic as they converged.”
Aircraft fitted with ADS-B OUT transmit positional and speed information derived from GPS to receivers including those used for air traffic control. Aircraft fitted with ADS-B IN equipment can receive this information on nearby aircraft, aiding pilot situational awareness.
Mr Mitchell said the investigation found that the pilots had insufficient time to visually acquire the opposing aircraft as cloud likely obscured the aircraft up until the collision, and added the study found that even in clearer conditions the aircraft were unlikely to have had sufficient time to visually acquire one another in time to avoid a collision.
“Analysis indicated that even in clearer conditions than experienced on the day of the accident, closing speeds and shielding by the aircraft structures would have limited the pilots’ opportunities to acquire the other aircraft, with two of the four pilots involved likely having the opposing aircraft shielded from their view at key moments prior to the collision,” he said.
As part of the study the ATSB developed scale three-dimensional models of the internal and external structures of representative aircraft using laser scanning technology, and determined the pilots’ approximate eye position within each model.
Investigators then developed animations using ADS-B position and aircraft performance data showing the cockpit view for both pilots in each aircraft overlaid with simulated cockpit traffic displays and alerts. This was supplemented by recorded air traffic control data.
These animations help illustrate the limitations of visual acquisition. Moreover, they demonstrate the significant additional alerting time that would be provided by an ADS-B IN display with an aural alert.
“The study has clearly shown that had the aircraft been equipped with ADS-B IN, the pilots would have been assisted in locating the other aircraft and alerted to its position much earlier than by visual acquisition,” Mr Mitchell said.
“The ATSB continues to strongly encourage the fitment and use of ADS-B transmitting, receiving and display devices in all general and recreational aviation aircraft, as these devices can significantly assist pilots with the identification and avoidance of conflicting traffic, and are available at relatively low-cost.”
While both aircraft involved in the mid-air collision were equipped with ADS-B OUT, neither aircraft were equipped with ADS-B IN systems, and nor were they required to be.
“Both a cockpit display of traffic information with an ADS-B traffic alerting system or an electronic conspicuity device connected to an electronic flight bag application could have provided this advance warning of a potential collision to the pilots of both aircraft,” Mr Mitchell said.
“While effective radio communication remains the primary means of self-separation in non-controlled airspace, the targeted and accurate information provided by ADS-B IN can provide pilots with significant assistance.”
Read the aircraft performance and cockpit visibility study: AS-2022-001 – Aircraft performance and cockpit visibility study supporting investigation into mid air collision of VH-AEM and VH-JQF near Mangalore Airport Vic. on 19 February 2020
Read the final report: AO-2020-012 – Mid-air collision involving Piper PA-44-180 Seminole, VH-JQF, and Beech D95A Travel Air, VH-AEM, 8 km south of Mangalore Airport, Victoria, on 19 February 2020
More information about ADS-B and the benefits of using the technology: Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast - Airservices
Visibility study highlights how ADS-B IN can assist pilots to better identify potential traffic conflicts
A cockpit display or electronic flight bag app showing traffic information from ADS-B IN data would have alerted the pilots of two training aircraft involved in a fatal mid-air collision near Mangalore, Victoria to the position of the other aircraft much earlier compared to visual acquisition, an Australian Transport Safety Bureau study concludes.In March, the ATSB released its final report from its investigation into the accident which found that, following receipt of verbal traffic information provided to both aircraft by air traffic control, the pilots of both aircraft did not successfully manoeuvre or establish direct radio communications to maintain separation, probably due to not recognising the risk of collision.
The accident was the first mid-air collision between two civil registered aircraft operating under the instrument flight rules (IFR) in Australia. As the collision occurred outside of controlled airspace, air traffic control (ATC) was required to provide traffic information on other IFR aircraft, but was not responsible for ensuring separation. This meant that the pilots were self-separating using radio communications and, where possible, the ’see and avoid’ principle.
‘See and avoid’ has known limitations, and central to the investigation was determining the likelihood that the pilots of each aircraft could detect the other visually in sufficient time to take avoiding action.
“To support the investigation, the ATSB initiated an aircraft performance and cockpit visibility study to determine when each aircraft may have been visible to the pilots of the other aircraft,” said ATSB Chief Commissioner Angus Mitchell.
“In addition, the study was undertaken to determine what effect an ADS-B IN system would have had on the pilots’ ability to detect traffic as they converged.”
Aircraft fitted with ADS-B OUT transmit positional and speed information derived from GPS to receivers including those used for air traffic control. Aircraft fitted with ADS-B IN equipment can receive this information on nearby aircraft, aiding pilot situational awareness.
Mr Mitchell said the investigation found that the pilots had insufficient time to visually acquire the opposing aircraft as cloud likely obscured the aircraft up until the collision, and added the study found that even in clearer conditions the aircraft were unlikely to have had sufficient time to visually acquire one another in time to avoid a collision.
“Analysis indicated that even in clearer conditions than experienced on the day of the accident, closing speeds and shielding by the aircraft structures would have limited the pilots’ opportunities to acquire the other aircraft, with two of the four pilots involved likely having the opposing aircraft shielded from their view at key moments prior to the collision,” he said.
As part of the study the ATSB developed scale three-dimensional models of the internal and external structures of representative aircraft using laser scanning technology, and determined the pilots’ approximate eye position within each model.
Investigators then developed animations using ADS-B position and aircraft performance data showing the cockpit view for both pilots in each aircraft overlaid with simulated cockpit traffic displays and alerts. This was supplemented by recorded air traffic control data.
These animations help illustrate the limitations of visual acquisition. Moreover, they demonstrate the significant additional alerting time that would be provided by an ADS-B IN display with an aural alert.
“The study has clearly shown that had the aircraft been equipped with ADS-B IN, the pilots would have been assisted in locating the other aircraft and alerted to its position much earlier than by visual acquisition,” Mr Mitchell said.
“The ATSB continues to strongly encourage the fitment and use of ADS-B transmitting, receiving and display devices in all general and recreational aviation aircraft, as these devices can significantly assist pilots with the identification and avoidance of conflicting traffic, and are available at relatively low-cost.”
While both aircraft involved in the mid-air collision were equipped with ADS-B OUT, neither aircraft were equipped with ADS-B IN systems, and nor were they required to be.
“Both a cockpit display of traffic information with an ADS-B traffic alerting system or an electronic conspicuity device connected to an electronic flight bag application could have provided this advance warning of a potential collision to the pilots of both aircraft,” Mr Mitchell said.
“While effective radio communication remains the primary means of self-separation in non-controlled airspace, the targeted and accurate information provided by ADS-B IN can provide pilots with significant assistance.”
Read the aircraft performance and cockpit visibility study: AS-2022-001 – Aircraft performance and cockpit visibility study supporting investigation into mid air collision of VH-AEM and VH-JQF near Mangalore Airport Vic. on 19 February 2020
Read the final report: AO-2020-012 – Mid-air collision involving Piper PA-44-180 Seminole, VH-JQF, and Beech D95A Travel Air, VH-AEM, 8 km south of Mangalore Airport, Victoria, on 19 February 2020
More information about ADS-B and the benefits of using the technology: Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast - Airservices
A cockpit display or electronic flight bag app showing traffic information from ADS-B IN data would have alerted the pilots of two training aircraft involved in a fatal mid-air collision near Mangalore, Victoria to the position of the other aircraft much earlier compared to visual acquisition, an Australian Transport Safety Bureau study concludes.
Yeah, I'm not so sure about that. We all see those 'paints' on our EFB's and it's not often I see the aircraft in the position the EFB says it's in. The aircraft had traffic on each other, they knew about each other yet still hit. It doesn't appear that any effort was made by either aircraft to arrange their own separation. You know what would have prevented this accident? Controlled airspace.
Me too. I flew over Mangalore last week with my SkyEcho fitted. One or two others around, one overhead Mangalore at about the same altitude who knew that I was there (on his EFB too I guess and also from my earlier radio call) and called me requesting my intentions and he advised his clearly (good because IFR buzzwords are meaningless to me). AvPlan soon showed us going in different directions although I never saw him at all.
Along the lane NE of Melbourne I only saw some traffic because I looked where AvPlan indicated. Centre advised of one that I was already aware of from AvPlan. Passenger in the back saw them before I did - as I was more interested in looking for others who may be around but not showing on AvPlan.
Along the lane NE of Melbourne I only saw some traffic because I looked where AvPlan indicated. Centre advised of one that I was already aware of from AvPlan. Passenger in the back saw them before I did - as I was more interested in looking for others who may be around but not showing on AvPlan.
I do find it somewhat amusing that ADSB was to be the be-all-end-all solution. There was a mad rush to implement it and mandate it and the push for manufacturers to hit the market with low cost ADSB-out devices, with everyone thinking that ATC would magically guide us all to a safe flight.
Now after the first mid-air tragedy, all of a sudden everyone realises that OUT is useless without IN and that ADSB-in devices are next big thing.
The issue is the lack of devices available to fit into the fleet. It’s great to have one of the two EFB’s, however you still need an ADSB-in device and that’s not simple. So we go and fit a $10,000 certified out solution and have to buy a $900 Skyecho and IPad to receive traffic to save our own butt as ATC can’t do it for us.
There are some units that will hook into the EFB’s without having to buy more kit, but they aren’t cheap. Dynon have a good ASDB-in solution, however that requires a lot of costly components and isn’t going to work for your average flying school.
Now after the first mid-air tragedy, all of a sudden everyone realises that OUT is useless without IN and that ADSB-in devices are next big thing.
The issue is the lack of devices available to fit into the fleet. It’s great to have one of the two EFB’s, however you still need an ADSB-in device and that’s not simple. So we go and fit a $10,000 certified out solution and have to buy a $900 Skyecho and IPad to receive traffic to save our own butt as ATC can’t do it for us.
There are some units that will hook into the EFB’s without having to buy more kit, but they aren’t cheap. Dynon have a good ASDB-in solution, however that requires a lot of costly components and isn’t going to work for your average flying school.
The Dynon ADSB IN solution works pretty well as far as I can tell.
I say “as far as I can tell” because the unit (which is made for Dynon by Uavionics) has a filtering algorithm built in to its software that normally doesn’t paint aircraft unless they are a potential threat. While this might be useful for display clarity in a congested traffic situation, it deprives you of the ability to manually confirm all other aircraft are painted. This is disconcerting sometimes.
There is a work - around for this with the current software that gives you all targets but it’s provided by accident not design.
Furthermore, I wonder if there should be a compulsory standard radio call for announcing that you have acquired an aircraft on ADSB? This is the equivalent of “traffic sighted”. When arranging or confirming separation, I call ‘Got you on ADSB’ and have had ‘got you on TCAS” or ADSB back. IMHO you need to do this especially with RPT as part of confirming that both of you agree on how you are going to separate.
I say “as far as I can tell” because the unit (which is made for Dynon by Uavionics) has a filtering algorithm built in to its software that normally doesn’t paint aircraft unless they are a potential threat. While this might be useful for display clarity in a congested traffic situation, it deprives you of the ability to manually confirm all other aircraft are painted. This is disconcerting sometimes.
There is a work - around for this with the current software that gives you all targets but it’s provided by accident not design.
Furthermore, I wonder if there should be a compulsory standard radio call for announcing that you have acquired an aircraft on ADSB? This is the equivalent of “traffic sighted”. When arranging or confirming separation, I call ‘Got you on ADSB’ and have had ‘got you on TCAS” or ADSB back. IMHO you need to do this especially with RPT as part of confirming that both of you agree on how you are going to separate.
I do find it somewhat amusing that ADSB was to be the be-all-end-all solution. There was a mad rush to implement it and mandate it and the push for manufacturers to hit the market with low cost ADSB-out devices, with everyone thinking that ATC would magically guide us all to a safe flight.
Now after the first mid-air tragedy, all of a sudden everyone realises that OUT is useless without IN and that ADSB-in devices are next big thing.
The issue is the lack of devices available to fit into the fleet. It’s great to have one of the two EFB’s, however you still need an ADSB-in device and that’s not simple. So we go and fit a $10,000 certified out solution and have to buy a $900 Skyecho and IPad to receive traffic to save our own butt as ATC can’t do it for us.
There are some units that will hook into the EFB’s without having to buy more kit, but they aren’t cheap. Dynon have a good ASDB-in solution, however that requires a lot of costly components and isn’t going to work for your average flying school.
Now after the first mid-air tragedy, all of a sudden everyone realises that OUT is useless without IN and that ADSB-in devices are next big thing.
The issue is the lack of devices available to fit into the fleet. It’s great to have one of the two EFB’s, however you still need an ADSB-in device and that’s not simple. So we go and fit a $10,000 certified out solution and have to buy a $900 Skyecho and IPad to receive traffic to save our own butt as ATC can’t do it for us.
There are some units that will hook into the EFB’s without having to buy more kit, but they aren’t cheap. Dynon have a good ASDB-in solution, however that requires a lot of costly components and isn’t going to work for your average flying school.
The key to remember is that even with all the bells and whistles the other aircraft may not be fitted with or have a defect preventing its use or the system just switched off. That then makes them invisible to all other units. So even the best ACAS now still has large holes that really mean its a fallback system after your eyes and ears have done their job out the windscreen and on the radio. A recent midair in the US between seaplanes highlighted this when one aircraft had its ACAS switched off and they collided.
A good ACAS will tell you when something is too close highlighting the conflict. So it's not just about visual clutter, however the visuals do give you a heads up as to whats around before you get there.
There are so many other things that highlight how archaic our air traffic systems are, and how overwhelmed they have become. Simple weather or single runway usage sends RPT traffic into meltdown with hours of delays, the system can only cope with one emergency at once, there's normal ops, and then there is chaos it seems. One aircraft blocks 20 miles around it, and I can't sight report clear traffic in VMC above 10,000, even when its clearly passed by and heading away. Not allowed to track direct because an aircraft is holding about 30 miles from the new track, which is only 5 miles from the old track, and so on. And don't even get started with noise abatement etc people complaining when they live in a city anyway and probably next to a highway or trainline.
Last edited by 43Inches; 14th Dec 2022 at 01:44.
The key part of the lengthy report.
1.2 Recommendations
The following recommendations, observations, or opportunities to enhance services are made because of CASA’s analysis of the airspace within the aeronautical study:
Recommendation 1
CASA Aviation Safety Advisors should conduct a safety seminar at Mangalore and surrounding aerodromes with an agenda that focusses on awareness and safety for operations within the vicinity of a non-controlled aerodrome and the importance of precise and concise radio calls.
Recommendation 2
Enroute Supplement Australia entries at Mangalore, Ballarat, Latrobe Valley and Busselton be amended to remove or clarify the requirements for the addition of 1,000 FT to prescribed altitudes during practice instrument approach procedures.
Observations/Opportunity to enhance regional services.
(1) Local operators should consider the need for additional visual flight rules (VFR) approach points and/or VFR routes to enhance situational awareness using the Melbourne Visual Navigation Chart (VNC). The OAR, where appropriate, should assist operators in preparing an airspace change proposal (ACP).
(2) The Mangalore Aerodrome operator should amend the En Route Supplement Australia (ERSA) entry for Mangalore to include the flying training area used by local operators. The area should be designed to avoid the circuit area at Mangalore.
(3) The OAR should identify and arrange for the addition of gliding symbols on the Melbourne VNC (and other appropriate aeronautical information publications).
(4) The OAR will update the contact information for Danger Area D333.
1.2 Recommendations
The following recommendations, observations, or opportunities to enhance services are made because of CASA’s analysis of the airspace within the aeronautical study:
Recommendation 1
CASA Aviation Safety Advisors should conduct a safety seminar at Mangalore and surrounding aerodromes with an agenda that focusses on awareness and safety for operations within the vicinity of a non-controlled aerodrome and the importance of precise and concise radio calls.
Recommendation 2
Enroute Supplement Australia entries at Mangalore, Ballarat, Latrobe Valley and Busselton be amended to remove or clarify the requirements for the addition of 1,000 FT to prescribed altitudes during practice instrument approach procedures.
Observations/Opportunity to enhance regional services.
(1) Local operators should consider the need for additional visual flight rules (VFR) approach points and/or VFR routes to enhance situational awareness using the Melbourne Visual Navigation Chart (VNC). The OAR, where appropriate, should assist operators in preparing an airspace change proposal (ACP).
(2) The Mangalore Aerodrome operator should amend the En Route Supplement Australia (ERSA) entry for Mangalore to include the flying training area used by local operators. The area should be designed to avoid the circuit area at Mangalore.
(3) The OAR should identify and arrange for the addition of gliding symbols on the Melbourne VNC (and other appropriate aeronautical information publications).
(4) The OAR will update the contact information for Danger Area D333.
