Accident Near Mangalore Airport - Possibly 2 Aircraft down
Triadic, I am not suggesting your switch one radio off (or have the volume on 0%). I consider it commonsense to monitor both, but use only one as the "active". I routinely hear taxiing calls on Area after I have "changed to CTAF", and I have even on occasion got a traffic alert from ATC about a recalcitrant aircraft doing something silly. Active volume 80%, inactive 50%. I can even tell what frequency they are talking on. And if I was SP IFR, I'd do exactly the same.
Having, as an SOP, that it will be normal to run two radios (presumably, you have one and the FO has the other?) is, in my view, asking for trouble. I would be not at all surprised if that, or something similar, is a factor in this accident; certainly the running of both active freqs so close to the airport increases workload dramatically. And that's what Class E will bring with it.
As far as briefing goes, there should be no need; it's not that hard. If a crew has to specifically brief how to run the radios in a CTAF, they shouldn't be there.
Having, as an SOP, that it will be normal to run two radios (presumably, you have one and the FO has the other?) is, in my view, asking for trouble. I would be not at all surprised if that, or something similar, is a factor in this accident; certainly the running of both active freqs so close to the airport increases workload dramatically. And that's what Class E will bring with it.
As far as briefing goes, there should be no need; it's not that hard. If a crew has to specifically brief how to run the radios in a CTAF, they shouldn't be there.
Join Date: Jan 1999
Location: Abeam Alice Springs
Posts: 1,109
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
As far as briefing goes, there should be no need; it's not that hard. If a crew has to specifically brief how to run the radios in a CTAF, they shouldn't be there.
I am not offering comment on the accident as with my safety hat on, we really don't know enough at this time.
There is a bit more to getting E down to 1200ft, mostly in the training for both the controllers and the flight crews
however I would concede that it is probably achievable and I suspect achievable with the current staff. While I think I understand the concept of what you're proposing,
I don't have the details However I guarantee people will have to be dragged kicking and screaming for it to occur.
My question would be what metric is used to decide which aerodromes get E down to 1200ft? Is it any aerodrome that has an instrument approach? Or any aerodrome with more than a certain number of movements? Keep in mind that movements may not be the best indicator of business because a lot of our IFR training aerodromes the aircraft doesn't physically land on the aerodrome.
ASA, CASA, ATSB need to spend a bit of time on a work study in the States. Not the usual stooges, line controllers.
ATC staff who held operational endorsements and worked traffic (talked to and separated aircraft) did get redundancies.
The trainee pipeline (as they call it) was stopped by the current CEO, who also bet the house on using 457 VISA to fill the void. A stroke of a pen changed this. Add in multiple redundancies of ATC Instructors at the college...
Join Date: Nov 2019
Location: Australia
Posts: 55
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Yers, indeed.
I don't think you'll have the staff, mainly because of the enormous sectors you run. I mean, 30 miles north of Melbourne to 30 south of Sydney. Ridiculous.
ASA, CASA, ATSB need to spend a bit of time on a work study in the States. Not the usual stooges, line controllers.
If it involves reorganising the sectorisation then that actually is a pretty substantial amount of work. As you can probably imagine, an ATC really knows their airspace quite intimately. To give you an idea of the amount of training involved to get a controller rated on a sector consider it roughly equivalent to a type rating. We get to know a handful of sectors very well. Once again not impossible, but if that could happen with any less than 1 year lead in I would be quite surprised. And I’m not sure ASA has the training capacity for that. They would need to call in help.
As for the final bit, we’ll those who can make the change in the organisations won’t, those who would at least be open minded to a change aren’t in a position to make the change. Everything moves at a glacially slow pace inside all three of those organisations. And as much as I would love a paid trip to America it would be wasted because even if I fully agreed with the changes I couldn’t do anything about it.
These comments do not relate to the accident in question as we are not aware of what exactly the lead up to the event was and considering there were two experienced pilots involved it is hard to understand what may have occurred, and there is no doubt the possibility of many contributing factors.
As an experienced RPT/GA operator in both Class G and CTAFs and the former MBZs, I make some comment on something that has not been specifically discussed here to date. And that is the training of pilots in operating in that category of airspace within Oz. For a start, the last time I looked, the operation in a CTAF was NOT covered in any of the associated exams for any class of licence. If this is still the case, such teachings are therefore the responsibility of the flying school or operator, be it the individual instructor of someone under the guidance of the CFI/Chief Pilot.
What this results in in my opinion is that the training in this area is not subject to any across the industry standardisation and the results show. For example, one operator may do it one way and another do some things differently eg: first call, listening watch prior to first call, use of two comms, separation assurance with known traffic etc etc. Some even believe that if you talk a lot it solves the problem, but that just jams the airwaves with stuff we should already know. As for what some flying schools teach that is yet another story. My experience with some CFI conferences hosted by CASA is that there is many different ideas on how one should participate in uncontrolled airspace and it seems that CASA believe the existing non standardisation is ok. I have put forward a number of times that these teachings should be subject to standardisation and subject to questions in related exam papers. One of the problems is that the folk in CASA responsible for this, don't seem to realise it is a problem and have varied views themselves! Even within this thread we see a variety of views/opinions on how it should be done. Why is it so?
As an experienced RPT/GA operator in both Class G and CTAFs and the former MBZs, I make some comment on something that has not been specifically discussed here to date. And that is the training of pilots in operating in that category of airspace within Oz. For a start, the last time I looked, the operation in a CTAF was NOT covered in any of the associated exams for any class of licence. If this is still the case, such teachings are therefore the responsibility of the flying school or operator, be it the individual instructor of someone under the guidance of the CFI/Chief Pilot.
What this results in in my opinion is that the training in this area is not subject to any across the industry standardisation and the results show. For example, one operator may do it one way and another do some things differently eg: first call, listening watch prior to first call, use of two comms, separation assurance with known traffic etc etc. Some even believe that if you talk a lot it solves the problem, but that just jams the airwaves with stuff we should already know. As for what some flying schools teach that is yet another story. My experience with some CFI conferences hosted by CASA is that there is many different ideas on how one should participate in uncontrolled airspace and it seems that CASA believe the existing non standardisation is ok. I have put forward a number of times that these teachings should be subject to standardisation and subject to questions in related exam papers. One of the problems is that the folk in CASA responsible for this, don't seem to realise it is a problem and have varied views themselves! Even within this thread we see a variety of views/opinions on how it should be done. Why is it so?
Given the amount of traffic, including HCRPT, in and out of aerodromes in G, the content and quality of CTAF comms has a direct impact on safety risk. The variability in the content and quality of CTAF comms is mind-boggling. Sadly, I’m not surprised that CASA doesn’t have the corporate competence to sort it out.
LB:
Effective use of radio is NOT taught in the PPL syllabus and the standard of all (including CPL) from my limited experience in CTAF, is woeful.
Please note, this is not about being a “pronunciation and procedure nazi” but about ensuring that your massages are (a) Heard and (b) understandable.
Luckily for me, I was taught the topic of “voice procedure” in the Army and I assume it’s still taught today.
The CASA syllabus, as far as I can tell, doesn’t cover much about comms at all. It tells you what you are supposed to send, but not how.
Given the amount of traffic, including HCRPT, in and out of aerodromes in G, the content and quality of CTAF comms has a direct impact on safety risk. The variability in the content and quality of CTAF comms is mind-boggling. Sadly, I’m not surprised that CASA doesn’t have the corporate competence to sort it out.
Please note, this is not about being a “pronunciation and procedure nazi” but about ensuring that your massages are (a) Heard and (b) understandable.
Luckily for me, I was taught the topic of “voice procedure” in the Army and I assume it’s still taught today.
The CASA syllabus, as far as I can tell, doesn’t cover much about comms at all. It tells you what you are supposed to send, but not how.
If it involves reorganising the sectorisation then that actually is a pretty substantial amount of work.
Join Date: Dec 2013
Location: Sydney
Posts: 24
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Trying to learn
As a PPL (IR training), I find myself thinking hard about how to learn from this horrible event even before a report is completed. (ADSB-in for OzRunways has just been ordered - it can’t hurt)
I’m not going to touch the hornet’s nest of airspace comments (I am likely the *least* experienced here).
The comment above about the departing aircraft staying on the ground got me thinking though. Without suggesting any of this is what happened in this case, I imagined myself taxying, hearing the inbound call and deciding to take off but level out below the cloud base until the incoming aircraft was visual. That would have seemed reasonable to me.
I similarly imagine myself inbound and hearing the intention of the traffic to remain VMC as comforting as I continue my descent in cloud.
I think I need to rethink how I’d approach these hypothetical situations and will discuss this with my instructor next time I have a lesson.
What separation would the good folks here use in that situation? Vertical seems problematic - even 1,000ft below cloud may not give enough time to see the descending aircraft (who would be unlikely to see me). Lateral separation is better but harder to mentally visualize, describe accurately and agree on the radio confidently. Staying on the ground whenever someone is inbound IMC may cause long delays if busy but a safe option.
Thoughts? (or personal attacks if you must - I can take it)
I’m not going to touch the hornet’s nest of airspace comments (I am likely the *least* experienced here).
The comment above about the departing aircraft staying on the ground got me thinking though. Without suggesting any of this is what happened in this case, I imagined myself taxying, hearing the inbound call and deciding to take off but level out below the cloud base until the incoming aircraft was visual. That would have seemed reasonable to me.
I similarly imagine myself inbound and hearing the intention of the traffic to remain VMC as comforting as I continue my descent in cloud.
I think I need to rethink how I’d approach these hypothetical situations and will discuss this with my instructor next time I have a lesson.
What separation would the good folks here use in that situation? Vertical seems problematic - even 1,000ft below cloud may not give enough time to see the descending aircraft (who would be unlikely to see me). Lateral separation is better but harder to mentally visualize, describe accurately and agree on the radio confidently. Staying on the ground whenever someone is inbound IMC may cause long delays if busy but a safe option.
Thoughts? (or personal attacks if you must - I can take it)
Lean of Peak, obviously your instructor is the your best learning resource here. Hopefully you've got one that's been around a while?
Vert's a Cert, that is, OCTA arranging your own vertical separation with other IFR traffic. It usually means going into the hold and waiting your turn. If you are inbound to MNG from the terminal you have an extremely high work load, switching from the terminal frequency to the centre frequency, unloading your airwork details, receiving IFR traffic then switching to the CTAF to sort yourself out. Add to that the complication of high level skydiving ops that can be operating IFR and then the odd ambo heading up to Shepparton.
Airspace, in my opinion this airspace class is hopelessly inadequate for the level of traffic, AT TIMES.
Maintaining VMC below cloud on departure whilst another is descending from IMC is hugely problematic, it's another accident waiting to happen, apart from that, how are you going to get your self to LSALT or MSA if you're not established on a track?
At some point the workload in this scenario gets beyond 5 or 6 pilots self arranging separation. ASA will tell you that the cost will be significant, it would cost what it should if the sectors were staffed correctly, Australian sectors are enormous but they are designed to be split, this particular group has multiple sectors, but I'm tipping it is understaffed preventing splits when the traffic warrants.
Operational Controllers were given redundancy during a time of short staffing. Yes, genius management did the only thing they knew how to reduce costs. Any fool can do that.
Vert's a Cert, that is, OCTA arranging your own vertical separation with other IFR traffic. It usually means going into the hold and waiting your turn. If you are inbound to MNG from the terminal you have an extremely high work load, switching from the terminal frequency to the centre frequency, unloading your airwork details, receiving IFR traffic then switching to the CTAF to sort yourself out. Add to that the complication of high level skydiving ops that can be operating IFR and then the odd ambo heading up to Shepparton.
Airspace, in my opinion this airspace class is hopelessly inadequate for the level of traffic, AT TIMES.
Maintaining VMC below cloud on departure whilst another is descending from IMC is hugely problematic, it's another accident waiting to happen, apart from that, how are you going to get your self to LSALT or MSA if you're not established on a track?
At some point the workload in this scenario gets beyond 5 or 6 pilots self arranging separation. ASA will tell you that the cost will be significant, it would cost what it should if the sectors were staffed correctly, Australian sectors are enormous but they are designed to be split, this particular group has multiple sectors, but I'm tipping it is understaffed preventing splits when the traffic warrants.
Operational Controllers were given redundancy during a time of short staffing. Yes, genius management did the only thing they knew how to reduce costs. Any fool can do that.
Last edited by Hoosten; 4th Mar 2020 at 07:39.
Where is the nearest ADSB ground station to Mangalore?
What is the lowest level of SSR and ADSB coverage at Mangalore?
What is the lowest level of SSR and ADSB coverage at Mangalore?
Last edited by Dick Smith; 4th Mar 2020 at 05:38.
So what service would the crew of the aircraft involved in this tragedy have been entitled, and what equipment would the aircraft have been required to be fitted - say - 30 years ago, that would have averted the tragedy and is not a service to which the crew were entitled or was equipment that was not required to be fitted to the aircraft, on the day of the tragedy?
Join Date: Sep 2019
Location: Oz
Posts: 38
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Do we yet know how many aircraft were operating in the area when the incident occurred?
I still think we are looking for outside solutions where pilot skills and training could be the answer.
And again I think this entire discussion is pointless until we get more details of the incident.
I still think we are looking for outside solutions where pilot skills and training could be the answer.
And again I think this entire discussion is pointless until we get more details of the incident.
Join Date: Nov 2019
Location: Australia
Posts: 55
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
There’s the issue, but not in way you’re putting it. Two highly experienced instructors who have grown up in the current system, whom have trained perhaps hundreds of others, presumably possessing the highest level of skill, still managed to achieve this result. The issue is bigger than them alone.
The ‘bigger issue’ could be the one identified earlier by AndrewR with which I agree: It could be that this highly improbable event is just the consequence of the probabilities never being zero.
There is no such thing as airspace in which the risk of collision between aircraft is zero. There is no such thing as a mistake-free pilot. There is no such thing as a mistake-free ATS. There is no such thing as a continuously perfectly-serviceable aircraft.
Class G airspace is the one in which the probabilities of a mid-air collision are least remote.
Sometimes the occurrence of highly improbable events is not as positive as winning the lottery.
There is no such thing as airspace in which the risk of collision between aircraft is zero. There is no such thing as a mistake-free pilot. There is no such thing as a mistake-free ATS. There is no such thing as a continuously perfectly-serviceable aircraft.
Class G airspace is the one in which the probabilities of a mid-air collision are least remote.
Sometimes the occurrence of highly improbable events is not as positive as winning the lottery.
The question, balloon, is therefore whether there are enough layers of cheese at untowered airports where RPT and IFR are using them. It sounds to me like there needs to be another layer, or the ones we have contain too many holes.
Why isn’t ADS-B in mandated? That is effectively poor mans TCAS isn’t it? I am floored that after all the trouble and money spent at the direction of Government, that it is discounted by ATC as a risk mitigating tool. As others have said, radio and CTAF procedures aren’t standardised and taught either.
There is also the behavioural issue. CASA treats pilots as “uncaught criminals”; is it any wonder then that non professional pilots sometimes behave like street racing Bogans? Then there is the Professional snobbery of some RPT pilots and the typical Australian reaction to that. Now add in an ATC bent on cost recovery, avaricious airport operators with outrageous landing fees, poor training in radio and CTAF procedures, lack of standardisation, lack of compulsory radios and/or ADS-B and transponders, poor ATC infrastructure and overworked ATC controllers. This is a recipe for disaster.
My concern is exactly who is competent to do the analysis and make a recommendation that is not biased by special interests. Sadly the ATSB is partisan these days and CASA is ruled by lawyers who have their own axes to grind. That usually means more rules and regulations that raise costs, do nothing for safety and inconvenience the maximum number of pilots.
Why isn’t ADS-B in mandated? That is effectively poor mans TCAS isn’t it? I am floored that after all the trouble and money spent at the direction of Government, that it is discounted by ATC as a risk mitigating tool. As others have said, radio and CTAF procedures aren’t standardised and taught either.
There is also the behavioural issue. CASA treats pilots as “uncaught criminals”; is it any wonder then that non professional pilots sometimes behave like street racing Bogans? Then there is the Professional snobbery of some RPT pilots and the typical Australian reaction to that. Now add in an ATC bent on cost recovery, avaricious airport operators with outrageous landing fees, poor training in radio and CTAF procedures, lack of standardisation, lack of compulsory radios and/or ADS-B and transponders, poor ATC infrastructure and overworked ATC controllers. This is a recipe for disaster.
My concern is exactly who is competent to do the analysis and make a recommendation that is not biased by special interests. Sadly the ATSB is partisan these days and CASA is ruled by lawyers who have their own axes to grind. That usually means more rules and regulations that raise costs, do nothing for safety and inconvenience the maximum number of pilots.