Avoiding VFR into IMC accidents
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Having abandoned a sightseeing trip because of weather, I was stuck at the airfield with said disappointed lady. Clouds BKN020, OK let's just go up for a quick circuit instead.
In between taxi and climbout, cloudbase dropped to 600-900ft. Leaving us up in the soup unable to see the ground, at an airfield with no ILS, no diversion planned, sandwiched between Heathrow and Luton airspace, and somewhere underneath us is a 600ft radio transmission tower.
Luckily my FAA PPL training included some real IMC sessions, so my eyes went straight to instruments without thinking. 700ft circuit dipping in and out of the cloudbase. However, lady has declined to fly with me ever again. Quite right.
Lessons:
1) All PPLs must have some real IMC thrown in. Weather is too unpredictable, at some point you're going to be in it.
2) The terror of that event made me revise my planning and minimums. There's no such thing as a simple circuit if there are clouds anywhere near.
3) It doesn't matter how hot your lady friend is. She'll respect you more for saying "no" than for scaring her witless.
Last edited by PerPurumTonantes; 22nd Jan 2020 at 11:19.
Most flying schools have a simulator of sorts. They are flight training devices. Before a student's first flight in a real aeroplane he/she/they/should be given several "simulator" sessions in the clear so that when the big day arrives for their first dual flight in the real thing, the student is entirely familiar with terminology and positions and operation of all applicable bits and pieces that form the cockpit. Saves money in taxiing time and holding point time.
Fast forward to their first dual navex. Before that occurs it is back to the FTD and undertake several hours of simulated instrument flight including unusual attitude recovery. No need for a full flight expensive simulator as all you need to learn is instrument flying skill and a standard no motion FTD is good enough. All this unencumbered by an instrument flying hood as the instructor simply selects IMC on the instructor panel.
By the time the student is ready for his first solo cross-country navex he will have at least the rudimentary skills to handle inadvertent flight into IMC safely.
Flight under the hood or using foggles in a Cessna or Warrior is really a waste of time as it is all to easy to peep outside from under the hood. FTD are a relatively cost effective of learning to fly on instruments and can be flown dual or solo. What is needed though are instrument capable instructors who may not necessarily hold an instrument rating but who have the ability to teach instrument flying in a FTD. All grade 3 instructors should have that skill.
It follows that instructor course syllabus must include at least ten hours in a FTD and the demonstrated ability to teach instrument flying in an FTD. With all that basic grounding on instrument flying hopefully it would translate into losing less aircraft accidents due to VMC into IMC flight.
Fast forward to their first dual navex. Before that occurs it is back to the FTD and undertake several hours of simulated instrument flight including unusual attitude recovery. No need for a full flight expensive simulator as all you need to learn is instrument flying skill and a standard no motion FTD is good enough. All this unencumbered by an instrument flying hood as the instructor simply selects IMC on the instructor panel.
By the time the student is ready for his first solo cross-country navex he will have at least the rudimentary skills to handle inadvertent flight into IMC safely.
Flight under the hood or using foggles in a Cessna or Warrior is really a waste of time as it is all to easy to peep outside from under the hood. FTD are a relatively cost effective of learning to fly on instruments and can be flown dual or solo. What is needed though are instrument capable instructors who may not necessarily hold an instrument rating but who have the ability to teach instrument flying in a FTD. All grade 3 instructors should have that skill.
It follows that instructor course syllabus must include at least ten hours in a FTD and the demonstrated ability to teach instrument flying in an FTD. With all that basic grounding on instrument flying hopefully it would translate into losing less aircraft accidents due to VMC into IMC flight.
VFR pilots getting themselves trapped in IMC conditions has been a problem since the Wright brothers.
There are many causes, such as press on itis, blatant disregard of rules, or simply unintentionally getting caught out.
Considering the dwindling number of GA pilots in Australia there seems a disproportionate number of these incidents
compared with the massive industry in the USA and our weather conditions are far more benign than theirs.
Our aviation police endeavour to tackle the issue with convoluted draconian regulation and penalties.
In the USA the FAA approach is education and mentoring.
There is also the fact that almost 80% of private pilots in the USA hold instrument certificates.
They do so because sensible regulations make it relatively cheap to obtain a certificate and maintain it,
they are not burdened with the same regulatory cost burden that apply here making aircraft far cheaper to operate thus
increasing participation and therefore recency.
Unlike Australia committing aviation is encouraged in the USA, Inane security requirements just don't exist in the home of 9/11.
Airports are not locked up by local owners with silly restrictions and burdensome costs.
All this aids and encourages participation. A practiced pilot is far safer than an out of practice one.
There are many causes, such as press on itis, blatant disregard of rules, or simply unintentionally getting caught out.
Considering the dwindling number of GA pilots in Australia there seems a disproportionate number of these incidents
compared with the massive industry in the USA and our weather conditions are far more benign than theirs.
Our aviation police endeavour to tackle the issue with convoluted draconian regulation and penalties.
In the USA the FAA approach is education and mentoring.
There is also the fact that almost 80% of private pilots in the USA hold instrument certificates.
They do so because sensible regulations make it relatively cheap to obtain a certificate and maintain it,
they are not burdened with the same regulatory cost burden that apply here making aircraft far cheaper to operate thus
increasing participation and therefore recency.
Unlike Australia committing aviation is encouraged in the USA, Inane security requirements just don't exist in the home of 9/11.
Airports are not locked up by local owners with silly restrictions and burdensome costs.
All this aids and encourages participation. A practiced pilot is far safer than an out of practice one.
Would that this were were the case.
There were 163,695 estimated private pilots in the US as of 12/31/18, and, according to the FAA, 47.961 had instrument ratings.
https://www.faa.gov/data_research/av...men-stats.xlsx
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Some sort of basic IFR training is always good.
Other than that, trust the instruments.... use wing leveler or auto pilots if available.... and take your feet of the pedals. Call ATC if within range, and get their help navigating in the right direction.
But the best is to stay out of it.
Other than that, trust the instruments.... use wing leveler or auto pilots if available.... and take your feet of the pedals. Call ATC if within range, and get their help navigating in the right direction.
But the best is to stay out of it.
From my personal experience the biggest single factor in flying in IMC when not trained, qualified or experienced in doing that is huge and unjustified over-confidence in one's own ability. This applies to people under about 40 years old.
Paradoxically, the IMC Rating, in my day, and I guess the IR(R) today, had/have the dual effect of improving PPLs' ability to fly safely in IMC, while increasing their unjustified belief that they can do it perfectly, even when things go slightly wrong.
(In my case, "things going slightly wrong" was an engine failure (of the only engine) while climbing through cloud to "VFR on top" over hills, which was a challenge I felt quite unprepared for, even though I had an IMC Rating.
Paradoxically, the IMC Rating, in my day, and I guess the IR(R) today, had/have the dual effect of improving PPLs' ability to fly safely in IMC, while increasing their unjustified belief that they can do it perfectly, even when things go slightly wrong.
(In my case, "things going slightly wrong" was an engine failure (of the only engine) while climbing through cloud to "VFR on top" over hills, which was a challenge I felt quite unprepared for, even though I had an IMC Rating.
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I completed my U.K. PPL a few years ago and during training we did a fair bit of 180 turns (2 minute turn?) under foggles and also a full hour of unusual attitude recovery. I was also flown into a cloud to try it out for real.
Avoid imitations
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and take your feet of the pedals.
Do the fires and extreme levels of smoke have anything to do with this?
I know from personal experience as a VFR PPL that smoke can reduce the visibility well below what is reported just when you'd like to know exactly where you are.
I know from personal experience as a VFR PPL that smoke can reduce the visibility well below what is reported just when you'd like to know exactly where you are.
As to flying VFR at night...
(My training included several hours of IFR training under the hood.)
[Edited to add that I've had actual IFR instruction, including flying through clouds, but not enough to try it solo.]
Everywhere I've flown under VFR conditions at night in the USA, there are so many lights on the ground that there's no chance I could confuse which side is up, at least under conditions I'd risk flying.
I can easily imagine that most of Australia is far darker on the ground once you get away from coastal regions, hence far harder to discern a horizon.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_F...r._plane_crash
(My training included several hours of IFR training under the hood.)
[Edited to add that I've had actual IFR instruction, including flying through clouds, but not enough to try it solo.]
Everywhere I've flown under VFR conditions at night in the USA, there are so many lights on the ground that there's no chance I could confuse which side is up, at least under conditions I'd risk flying.
I can easily imagine that most of Australia is far darker on the ground once you get away from coastal regions, hence far harder to discern a horizon.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_F...r._plane_crash
July 16, 1999, John F. Kennedy Jr., son of US president John F. Kennedy, died when the light aircraft he was flying crashed into the Atlantic Ocean off Martha's Vineyard, Massachusetts....
The official investigation by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) concluded that Kennedy fell victim to spatial disorientation while he was descending over water at night and consequently lost control of his plane. Kennedy did not hold an instrument rating and therefore he was only certified to fly under visual flight rules. At the time of the crash, the weather and light conditions were such that all basic landmarks were obscured, making visual flight challenging, although legally still permissible...
The official investigation by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) concluded that Kennedy fell victim to spatial disorientation while he was descending over water at night and consequently lost control of his plane. Kennedy did not hold an instrument rating and therefore he was only certified to fly under visual flight rules. At the time of the crash, the weather and light conditions were such that all basic landmarks were obscured, making visual flight challenging, although legally still permissible...
Last edited by visibility3miles; 22nd Jan 2020 at 23:29.
my 2c, as others have said, VFR into IMC has been a problem forever. I do not know if it is more prevalent now, suspect it is not but do not have evidence to categorically say.
I seem to remember an article in one of the old Aviation Safety Digests lamenting how regularly they reported the same VFR->IFR story over and over again and seem to recall(?) the writer asking whether reporting the stories in ASD really made any difference because it kept happening.
The idea students should have instrument training so they can simply do a 180 on instruments and get clear of IMC seems a bit trite to me. I suspect a lot of VFR into IMC happens more gradually and people get suckered into IFR like the frog in boiling water. By the time they go on instruments a 180 turn into the clear is not going to be available.
Sometimes I worry students get over confident about their ability to handle the aircraft on instruments if they have a high natural aptitude and their PPL BIF training goes well. Doesn't mean we should abandon that training but it is not a cure and sometimes can give people a false sense of their ability. Do not abandon that but it is not a cure, it just helps mitigate bad outcomes in some cases.
I worry that the proliferation of GPS solutions and EFBs and panel GPS's means people are more confident about pushing on because they feel confident of navigating where in the 'old' days the fear of losing contact with the ground or having limited vis meant they were more reluctant to press on. It may save the day as well but also may cause situations to occur that didn't in the past.
Ultimately I see it is a human factors issue. Teaching human factors (in the sense of teaching people to not be human!) is I believe one of the hardest tasks of instructors and one I feel we do not really have a good grasp on how best to do it yet.
No simple answers.
I seem to remember an article in one of the old Aviation Safety Digests lamenting how regularly they reported the same VFR->IFR story over and over again and seem to recall(?) the writer asking whether reporting the stories in ASD really made any difference because it kept happening.
The idea students should have instrument training so they can simply do a 180 on instruments and get clear of IMC seems a bit trite to me. I suspect a lot of VFR into IMC happens more gradually and people get suckered into IFR like the frog in boiling water. By the time they go on instruments a 180 turn into the clear is not going to be available.
Sometimes I worry students get over confident about their ability to handle the aircraft on instruments if they have a high natural aptitude and their PPL BIF training goes well. Doesn't mean we should abandon that training but it is not a cure and sometimes can give people a false sense of their ability. Do not abandon that but it is not a cure, it just helps mitigate bad outcomes in some cases.
I worry that the proliferation of GPS solutions and EFBs and panel GPS's means people are more confident about pushing on because they feel confident of navigating where in the 'old' days the fear of losing contact with the ground or having limited vis meant they were more reluctant to press on. It may save the day as well but also may cause situations to occur that didn't in the past.
Ultimately I see it is a human factors issue. Teaching human factors (in the sense of teaching people to not be human!) is I believe one of the hardest tasks of instructors and one I feel we do not really have a good grasp on how best to do it yet.
No simple answers.
Perhaps an instructor can answer.... how long does it usually take a student to get used to flying off the AH in IMC by hand?
Surely it’s not that hard for a student to learn to climb and descend under the hood in order to simply immediately climb (if the aircraft is equipped) and to be able to descend into a known safe area by gps.
How much hood time is genuinely being taught these days, is it realistically 2 hours? Are the students ok with this at the time and then forgetting how to soon after? Are instructors doing AFR’s covering off under the hood to reinforce those skills? I know my AFR’s haven’t except for one of them which include recovering from unusual attitudes.
I guess this doesn’t help the guy who is scud running above a mountain range who runs out of options and can’t turn around as the mountains head up into the clouds. I’ve been there before myself. Committing to a climb through cloud in that situation feels as bad legally as blasting off from your local and heading through a few thousand feet of cloud. Human factors indeed...
Surely it’s not that hard for a student to learn to climb and descend under the hood in order to simply immediately climb (if the aircraft is equipped) and to be able to descend into a known safe area by gps.
How much hood time is genuinely being taught these days, is it realistically 2 hours? Are the students ok with this at the time and then forgetting how to soon after? Are instructors doing AFR’s covering off under the hood to reinforce those skills? I know my AFR’s haven’t except for one of them which include recovering from unusual attitudes.
I guess this doesn’t help the guy who is scud running above a mountain range who runs out of options and can’t turn around as the mountains head up into the clouds. I’ve been there before myself. Committing to a climb through cloud in that situation feels as bad legally as blasting off from your local and heading through a few thousand feet of cloud. Human factors indeed...
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Perhaps a government subsidy for those wishing to self fund a IF rating?
Not only could it save your arse, a CPL with a IF rating, and not many have that combo, obviously stands out more than the others to prospective employers for the first few jobs.
What’s the ratio of PPL pilots with a IF rating? 5%?
Not only could it save your arse, a CPL with a IF rating, and not many have that combo, obviously stands out more than the others to prospective employers for the first few jobs.
What’s the ratio of PPL pilots with a IF rating? 5%?
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Jonkster I think it is the centre page of ASD #82 from November 1972 to which you are referring:
"What More Can We Say
WITH one exception, every Aviation Safety Digest produced in the past two years, this one included, has dealt at length with the unhappy results of attempted visual operations in "Below VMC" weather. The one exception is more than offset by the fact that last year's March issue was given wholly to a detailed study of accidents in this category. In addition, nearly all these issues have included editorial and technical comment on the attitudes of mind and the operational circumstances that combine to produce accidents of this type. In this two year period, 17 accidents of this type have been studied in the Digest. All but three of these were fatal and, in total, they cost a staggering 52 lives.
Eight years ago, a similar "Below VMC" accident trend, though on a much smaller scale, developed during the winter months of 1964. Some very forceful Departmental publicity followed, including a personal letter to all general aviation pilots from the Director-General, as well as a detailed analysis of each of the accidents in the Aviation Safety Digest. It was subsequently most encouraging to find that, despite the steady growth in general aviation activity that followed this time, there was only one further fatal accident of this type in Australia for almost five years. Unfortunately as it turned out, this proved to be only the calm before the storm, for in the latter part of 1969 and throughout 1970, there was a veritable spate of accidents, most of them fatal, in the same category. It was these that prompted the very emphatic treatment of the subject in our March issue last year.
To judge from our 1964 experience and what followed, it seemed reasonable to suppose that this further publicity in the Digest might prove similarly efficacious in averting future potential accidents of this type. Regrettably, the issues that have followed tell quite a different story and any such pious hopes have been well and truly shattered.Now, having examined all these further accidents at length, and having considered and discussed in depth the reactions and motives that combined to bring them about, we must confess to having almost scraped the bottom of the safety education barrel on the subject. So what more can we say about this seemingly elementary problem which yet continues to be responsible for such a high proportion of our general aviation fatalities?
Much of the trouble associated with unforeseen disasters of this type seems to be that their symptoms are so very subtle; Flying is such an enjoyable and effortless way of getting from A to B; To a qualified pilot, even if not greatly experienced, a modern, comfortable and speedy light aeroplane is so easy and satisfying to handle; On the other hand, it can be so very frustrating when unexpected cloud or poor visibility dictates that this desirable means of transport should be turned back and landed at some "alternate" aerodrome to wait hours, or even overnight, for some improvement in the weather.Indeed, it is the very performance of our machine itself, that makes it all the more frustrating, for we know that we could be through that "little area of dirty weather" in only a few minutes. And our aircraft seems so safe, solid and reliable - surely it is worth "giving it a go". After all, we can still turn back if we find the going too tough, so where's the problem?
The whole trouble with this reasoning is that, by the time the pilot has learnt to his horror that there is indeed a problem, it is already too late - more often than not the aeroplane is completely out of control in a screaming spiral dive! It's not good enough to say "it won't happen to me!" Pilots who are not instrument trained but who insist on pressing their luck in marginal weather, even "cautiously'', will sooner or later find this out for themselves. And what of those pilots who have the ability to fly on instruments,but who yet, in their own wisdom, choose to compromise the very terrain clearance standards that hard-won experience has consistently shown to be vital to safe flight in Instrument Meteorological Conditions? when their moment of truth comes, they probably won't have enough time to reason why!
Sceptical readers need not take our word for these claims - intelligent study of all material referred to will establish the facts clearly enough. Perhaps the greatest tragedy of it all is that some of the victims caught in these situations are not the swashbuckling, press-on-regardless, accident-going-somewhere-to-happen types we might expect. They are quite often ordinary, normally careful and responsible private pilots, who simply don't recognise their limitations.
All that needs to be said about the mechanics of these accidents has been repeated ad nauseam in the Digest over the past two years. We make no apology for having continued to cover this subject - the need for repetition is not of our making and, in fact, we would like to be able to devote space to other air safety problems. We therefore earnestly suggest that you re-read what has been said on the subject in the Digest over the past two years - it could literally mean the difference between life and death - YOURS! ...,."
"What More Can We Say
WITH one exception, every Aviation Safety Digest produced in the past two years, this one included, has dealt at length with the unhappy results of attempted visual operations in "Below VMC" weather. The one exception is more than offset by the fact that last year's March issue was given wholly to a detailed study of accidents in this category. In addition, nearly all these issues have included editorial and technical comment on the attitudes of mind and the operational circumstances that combine to produce accidents of this type. In this two year period, 17 accidents of this type have been studied in the Digest. All but three of these were fatal and, in total, they cost a staggering 52 lives.
Eight years ago, a similar "Below VMC" accident trend, though on a much smaller scale, developed during the winter months of 1964. Some very forceful Departmental publicity followed, including a personal letter to all general aviation pilots from the Director-General, as well as a detailed analysis of each of the accidents in the Aviation Safety Digest. It was subsequently most encouraging to find that, despite the steady growth in general aviation activity that followed this time, there was only one further fatal accident of this type in Australia for almost five years. Unfortunately as it turned out, this proved to be only the calm before the storm, for in the latter part of 1969 and throughout 1970, there was a veritable spate of accidents, most of them fatal, in the same category. It was these that prompted the very emphatic treatment of the subject in our March issue last year.
To judge from our 1964 experience and what followed, it seemed reasonable to suppose that this further publicity in the Digest might prove similarly efficacious in averting future potential accidents of this type. Regrettably, the issues that have followed tell quite a different story and any such pious hopes have been well and truly shattered.Now, having examined all these further accidents at length, and having considered and discussed in depth the reactions and motives that combined to bring them about, we must confess to having almost scraped the bottom of the safety education barrel on the subject. So what more can we say about this seemingly elementary problem which yet continues to be responsible for such a high proportion of our general aviation fatalities?
Much of the trouble associated with unforeseen disasters of this type seems to be that their symptoms are so very subtle; Flying is such an enjoyable and effortless way of getting from A to B; To a qualified pilot, even if not greatly experienced, a modern, comfortable and speedy light aeroplane is so easy and satisfying to handle; On the other hand, it can be so very frustrating when unexpected cloud or poor visibility dictates that this desirable means of transport should be turned back and landed at some "alternate" aerodrome to wait hours, or even overnight, for some improvement in the weather.Indeed, it is the very performance of our machine itself, that makes it all the more frustrating, for we know that we could be through that "little area of dirty weather" in only a few minutes. And our aircraft seems so safe, solid and reliable - surely it is worth "giving it a go". After all, we can still turn back if we find the going too tough, so where's the problem?
The whole trouble with this reasoning is that, by the time the pilot has learnt to his horror that there is indeed a problem, it is already too late - more often than not the aeroplane is completely out of control in a screaming spiral dive! It's not good enough to say "it won't happen to me!" Pilots who are not instrument trained but who insist on pressing their luck in marginal weather, even "cautiously'', will sooner or later find this out for themselves. And what of those pilots who have the ability to fly on instruments,but who yet, in their own wisdom, choose to compromise the very terrain clearance standards that hard-won experience has consistently shown to be vital to safe flight in Instrument Meteorological Conditions? when their moment of truth comes, they probably won't have enough time to reason why!
Sceptical readers need not take our word for these claims - intelligent study of all material referred to will establish the facts clearly enough. Perhaps the greatest tragedy of it all is that some of the victims caught in these situations are not the swashbuckling, press-on-regardless, accident-going-somewhere-to-happen types we might expect. They are quite often ordinary, normally careful and responsible private pilots, who simply don't recognise their limitations.
All that needs to be said about the mechanics of these accidents has been repeated ad nauseam in the Digest over the past two years. We make no apology for having continued to cover this subject - the need for repetition is not of our making and, in fact, we would like to be able to devote space to other air safety problems. We therefore earnestly suggest that you re-read what has been said on the subject in the Digest over the past two years - it could literally mean the difference between life and death - YOURS! ...,."
Last edited by Frontal Lobotomy; 22nd Jan 2020 at 23:44. Reason: formatting
Jonkster I think it is the centre page of ASD #82 from November 1972 to which you are referring:
"What More Can We Say
WITH one exception, every Aviation Safety Digest produced in the past two years, this one included, has dealt at length with the unhappy results of attempted visual operations in "Below VMC" weather
...
[snipped/]
...
Regrettably, the issues that have followed tell quite a different story and any such pious hopes have been well and truly shattered.
Now, having examined all these further accidents at length, and having considered and discussed in depth the reactions and motives that combined to bring them about, we must confess to having almost scraped the bottom of the safety education barrel on the subject. So what more can we say about this seemingly elementary problem which yet continues to be responsible for such a high proportion of our general aviation fatalities?
...
[snipped/]
"
"What More Can We Say
WITH one exception, every Aviation Safety Digest produced in the past two years, this one included, has dealt at length with the unhappy results of attempted visual operations in "Below VMC" weather
...
[snipped/]
...
Regrettably, the issues that have followed tell quite a different story and any such pious hopes have been well and truly shattered.
Now, having examined all these further accidents at length, and having considered and discussed in depth the reactions and motives that combined to bring them about, we must confess to having almost scraped the bottom of the safety education barrel on the subject. So what more can we say about this seemingly elementary problem which yet continues to be responsible for such a high proportion of our general aviation fatalities?
...
[snipped/]
"
Would that this were were the case.
There were 163,695 estimated private pilots in the US as of 12/31/18, and, according to the FAA, 47.961 had instrument ratings.
https://www.faa.gov/data_research/av...men-stats.xlsx
There were 163,695 estimated private pilots in the US as of 12/31/18, and, according to the FAA, 47.961 had instrument ratings.
https://www.faa.gov/data_research/av...men-stats.xlsx
It is true that thorny’s ‘nearly 80%’ is an exaggeration of the actual 68%, but so is your implied suggestion that the percentage is only around 30%.
Last edited by Lead Balloon; 22nd Jan 2020 at 22:48.
Nope. Table 10, I believe, enumerates the number of Ppls who have instrument ratings. It doesn’t make any sense to look at all pilots, because more than half are cpl/atp types, who overwhelmingly are instrument rated.
my numbers are, I believe, correct, and extracted from the data supplied.
an instrument rating over here involves essentially as much training (hour wise) as a ppl. The vast majority of private pilots are not so rated.
my numbers are, I believe, correct, and extracted from the data supplied.
an instrument rating over here involves essentially as much training (hour wise) as a ppl. The vast majority of private pilots are not so rated.
Is Prevention better than Cure?
If education and recurrent awareness and training is what 'prevention' offers - then Yes!
It is very helpful to students if the instructor is able to introduce them to deteriorating conditions of both forward visibility, and lowering cloud ceiling. Until a student can actually see for themselves what we are all talking about, and they can match the published VMC minima to what's in front of them - as instructors we are not helping to minimise this all too common way of becoming a statistic.
Forward visibility estimation is only possible where the distance between certain landmarks is already known, eg, 3nm, 5nm etc. GPS distance from a 'going to' location also helps with becoming familiar with what visibility is actually being seen. With cloud ceiling, it also helps if you actually have a good GPS with a reasonably accurate database to help with height above ground estimates, but this can also be done safely by simply using the altimeter and flying over a location of known height amsl in VMC.
The above only 'works' when you have a good VMC fallback position for 180 degrees of horizon, which allows for skirting of poor weather with clear cut escape direction. But, I have found it useful.
For what it's worth......
If education and recurrent awareness and training is what 'prevention' offers - then Yes!
It is very helpful to students if the instructor is able to introduce them to deteriorating conditions of both forward visibility, and lowering cloud ceiling. Until a student can actually see for themselves what we are all talking about, and they can match the published VMC minima to what's in front of them - as instructors we are not helping to minimise this all too common way of becoming a statistic.
Forward visibility estimation is only possible where the distance between certain landmarks is already known, eg, 3nm, 5nm etc. GPS distance from a 'going to' location also helps with becoming familiar with what visibility is actually being seen. With cloud ceiling, it also helps if you actually have a good GPS with a reasonably accurate database to help with height above ground estimates, but this can also be done safely by simply using the altimeter and flying over a location of known height amsl in VMC.
The above only 'works' when you have a good VMC fallback position for 180 degrees of horizon, which allows for skirting of poor weather with clear cut escape direction. But, I have found it useful.
For what it's worth......
Nope. Table 10, I believe, enumerates the number of Ppls who have instrument ratings. It doesn’t make any sense to look at all pilots, because more than half are cpl/atp types, who overwhelmingly are instrument rated.
my numbers are, I believe, correct, and extracted from the data supplied.
an instrument rating over here involves essentially as much training (hour wise) as a ppl. The vast majority of private pilots are not so rated.
my numbers are, I believe, correct, and extracted from the data supplied.
an instrument rating over here involves essentially as much training (hour wise) as a ppl. The vast majority of private pilots are not so rated.
You will see from the notes that the categorisation is by reference to the ‘highest’ qualification held, and therefore the holder of both commercial and private pilot certificates is counted in the statistics only as a commercial certificate holder. Those persons can (and do) still engage in private flying.
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When I was earning my instrument rating and after I had become pretty cocky on my ability to fly the gauges, my instructor took me up into a layer of thick stratus. I'm hooded, climbing out and before we hit the clouds, my instructor said to take the hood off and look around. I did. Nice view. Then suddenly we're in a bowl of cotton candy. Old crappy trainer, the air vents start leaking water. My heart rate went up times two. I'll never forget that day and how true IMC felt the first time.
This October past I earned my CFI. It's not in the syllabus, but I would love to give my students a flight into real IMC. Of course they wouldn't pay for it.
This October past I earned my CFI. It's not in the syllabus, but I would love to give my students a flight into real IMC. Of course they wouldn't pay for it.