Light plane flips at Moorabbin airport, trapping pilot
Join Date: Feb 2015
Location: Santa Barbara
Posts: 912
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Then another 5 knots if it's turbulent. And it's it's turbulent, don't use full flap, add another 5 knots for that. And if there's a crosswind, add 5 knots for that. And if it's gusting, don't forget to add half the gust factor!! All of that should quite comfortably bring in a 172 at 90 knots over the fence
Join Date: Aug 2013
Location: Qatar
Posts: 54
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts

Also, don't forget to take away the number you first thought of......
Might be okay for jet aircraft with 140 kt approach speeds, but adding 5 kt multiples here and there on aircraft with very low approach speeds can be fraught with danger.
Might be okay for jet aircraft with 140 kt approach speeds, but adding 5 kt multiples here and there on aircraft with very low approach speeds can be fraught with danger.
Join Date: Feb 2015
Location: Santa Barbara
Posts: 912
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
No!!! Really??? Say it isn't so???
I wonder who else will appear on the ASQA website tomorrow???
Ohhhh, IBAC, what have you to say?
Shit's getting real now.
cnuts in aviation getting what's coming to them???
Say it isn't so ;-)
I wonder who else will appear on the ASQA website tomorrow???
Ohhhh, IBAC, what have you to say?
Shit's getting real now.
cnuts in aviation getting what's coming to them???
Say it isn't so ;-)
Join Date: Feb 2015
Location: Santa Barbara
Posts: 912
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I hope the REAL reasons for this are made public.
There are other frauds on the list now, one at a time.
Report out. Amazing. https://www.atsb.gov.au/media/577965...-071-final.pdf
It was also identified that the student pilot did not have the necessary qualifications and skills to safely operate the Bristell solo.
Finally, the required Soar Aviation solo flight dispatch procedures were not followed. As a result, it was not identified that the student pilot was not authorised for, nor met the required competencies, to conduct the flight.
What the ATSB found
The ATSB found that the pilot commenced a go‑around at low level when the aircraft deviated from the runway centreline in crosswind conditions. During the go‑around, the aircraft aerodynamically stalled and commenced a spin.It was also identified that the student pilot did not have the necessary qualifications and skills to safely operate the Bristell solo.
Finally, the required Soar Aviation solo flight dispatch procedures were not followed. As a result, it was not identified that the student pilot was not authorised for, nor met the required competencies, to conduct the flight.
Pretty easy to lay a large chunk of blame on them, why was it so easy for any Student to grab the keys and go for a burn? This wasn't some early morning flight before any admin or instructors were around to monitor. How was he able to book this into their system? Why did he mention in the report that he was told "You're good to go" by his Instructor? Why was it not clearly stated from the previous debrief that he was not ready for solo as they "don't usually say that, it is clear from the debrief"? Why did he continue even though he felt uncomfortable and didn't feel he could bring this to an instructor?
Might be able to shed some light on this - I passed my CPL there early 2020...
The keys have always been in the aircraft folder, was like this since day dot. Had never heard any issues prior to this one of other students grabbing an aircraft without permission (although I once grabbed YWM instead of YWN and we didn’t pick up on it until after the flight).
Scuttlebutt at the time is scheduling made a human error and swapped him out from a Vixen to a Bristell while working on the schedules.
In terms of progression, I was given a flight schedule at the start of my CPL which did have 3 famil flights to be completed. Majority of my debriefs (I have some copies still) usually end with “next flight xxx”. However was pretty aware of the next flight anyway.
The general process for getting ready and being signed out was - Grab folder (had keys, MR, dipstick) go and preflight plane. Either before or after this do all your flight planning, then fill out necessary paperwork (you had to fill out a risk matrix for each solo, regardless of where you were in the syllabus). Once that’s all done you have to grab an instructor and depending on the matrix you grabbed a grade 1/2/3 and they checked. Licence, Medical, MR, planning, ASIC, Matrix, W&B, your hours on type (cant remember if anything else). Then once they were happy they signed the matrix and then despatched you on the system. Post flight you also needed to see an instructor to discuss any issues.
From my perspective I never had an issue speaking up to someone and at that stage the chief instructor was very approachable.
Apologise for any poor formatting/grammar. On my phone typing this!
The keys have always been in the aircraft folder, was like this since day dot. Had never heard any issues prior to this one of other students grabbing an aircraft without permission (although I once grabbed YWM instead of YWN and we didn’t pick up on it until after the flight).
Scuttlebutt at the time is scheduling made a human error and swapped him out from a Vixen to a Bristell while working on the schedules.
In terms of progression, I was given a flight schedule at the start of my CPL which did have 3 famil flights to be completed. Majority of my debriefs (I have some copies still) usually end with “next flight xxx”. However was pretty aware of the next flight anyway.
The general process for getting ready and being signed out was - Grab folder (had keys, MR, dipstick) go and preflight plane. Either before or after this do all your flight planning, then fill out necessary paperwork (you had to fill out a risk matrix for each solo, regardless of where you were in the syllabus). Once that’s all done you have to grab an instructor and depending on the matrix you grabbed a grade 1/2/3 and they checked. Licence, Medical, MR, planning, ASIC, Matrix, W&B, your hours on type (cant remember if anything else). Then once they were happy they signed the matrix and then despatched you on the system. Post flight you also needed to see an instructor to discuss any issues.
From my perspective I never had an issue speaking up to someone and at that stage the chief instructor was very approachable.
Apologise for any poor formatting/grammar. On my phone typing this!
Join Date: Jun 2000
Location: Australia
Posts: 4,182
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I felt the ATSB report lacked investigative depth. It was also damned annoying trying to read the politically correct "they or their" instead of "he". "He" being the student of course. Nothing worse than jarring grammar.
One way or another the student botched the very low altitude go around. It begged the question had he ever had the manoeuvre demonstrated to him? Why did he fail to counter the yaw and pitch up associated with a full power low energy go-around in the Bristell? There was nothing in the report that indicated the manufacturer's recommended go-around procedure compared with the procedure the student was taught to use.
Was there much difference (if any) between the Bristell arcraft manufacturer's recommended go-around procedure and the go-around procedure for the previous type he had been flying?
Did the investigator ask each SOAR instructor what procedure they taught ? You can bet some adhere to the manufacturer's published procedure while others have their own personal ideas. If there was no such advice in the POH why didn't CASA airworthiness notice this when the Bristell was approved for student training?
Seems to me the ATSB report missed the opportunity to check the standardisation of go-around procedures by simply asking all the flying school students at Soar and not just a sample. Understandably, much of the ATSB report was about administrative failings of SOAR operations. It is just a pity that more attention was not paid to the actual aircraft handling side of the accident.
A low altitude low energy go-around can be a demanding manoeuvre in any aircraft. Particularly for a student pilot. Experience has shown few instructors are competent at teaching the manoeuvre. Moreover, inexperienced instructors can be quite apprehensive of demonstrating the sequence - if at all.
If, as claimed in the report, some instructors said the Bristell would drop a wing in the stall, then could this be an airworthiness issue? After all, there are certification rules that govern wing drop tolerances.
Even if little is learned from this accident, I would plead ATSB to trash its adherence to Public Service political correctness in future reports and use normal Queen's English grammar. It makes official reports easier to read.
One way or another the student botched the very low altitude go around. It begged the question had he ever had the manoeuvre demonstrated to him? Why did he fail to counter the yaw and pitch up associated with a full power low energy go-around in the Bristell? There was nothing in the report that indicated the manufacturer's recommended go-around procedure compared with the procedure the student was taught to use.
Was there much difference (if any) between the Bristell arcraft manufacturer's recommended go-around procedure and the go-around procedure for the previous type he had been flying?
Did the investigator ask each SOAR instructor what procedure they taught ? You can bet some adhere to the manufacturer's published procedure while others have their own personal ideas. If there was no such advice in the POH why didn't CASA airworthiness notice this when the Bristell was approved for student training?
Seems to me the ATSB report missed the opportunity to check the standardisation of go-around procedures by simply asking all the flying school students at Soar and not just a sample. Understandably, much of the ATSB report was about administrative failings of SOAR operations. It is just a pity that more attention was not paid to the actual aircraft handling side of the accident.
A low altitude low energy go-around can be a demanding manoeuvre in any aircraft. Particularly for a student pilot. Experience has shown few instructors are competent at teaching the manoeuvre. Moreover, inexperienced instructors can be quite apprehensive of demonstrating the sequence - if at all.
If, as claimed in the report, some instructors said the Bristell would drop a wing in the stall, then could this be an airworthiness issue? After all, there are certification rules that govern wing drop tolerances.
Even if little is learned from this accident, I would plead ATSB to trash its adherence to Public Service political correctness in future reports and use normal Queen's English grammar. It makes official reports easier to read.
Last edited by Centaurus; 5th May 2021 at 15:23.
Did the investigator ask each SOAR instructor what procedure they taught ? You can bet some adhere to the manufacturer's published procedure while others have their own personal ideas. If there was no such advice in the POH why didn't CASA airworthiness notice this when the Bristell was approved for student training?.
Was thinking just that, the student was in the wrong but the main cause was the unsuccessful go around
Did the investigator ask each SOAR instructor what procedure they taught ? You can bet some adhere to the manufacturer's published procedure while others have their own personal ideas. If there was no such advice in the POH why didn't CASA airworthiness notice this when the Bristell was approved for student training?
Seems to me the ATSB report missed the opportunity to check the standardisation of go-around procedures by simply asking all the flying school students at Soar and not just a sample. Understandably, much of the ATSB report was about administrative failings of SOAR operations. It is just a pity that more attention was not paid to the actual aircraft handling side of the accident.
Seems to me the ATSB report missed the opportunity to check the standardisation of go-around procedures by simply asking all the flying school students at Soar and not just a sample. Understandably, much of the ATSB report was about administrative failings of SOAR operations. It is just a pity that more attention was not paid to the actual aircraft handling side of the accident.
POH is as follows;
Balked Landing (Go around) 1. Throttle - full power (max.5800 rpm) 2. Wing flaps - extend as needed 3. Trim - adjust as needed 4. Wing flaps - retract at height of 150 ft after reaching 120 km/h (65 KIAS) 5. Trim - adjust 6. Repeat circuit pattern and landing