Mooney accident pilot refused a clearance at 6,500'
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Iron Jayeh, the report doesn't really make it totally clear how long they were clear of controlled airspace for. However, the report states that the aircraft was tracking Murwillimbah direct Taree. Drawing that on a chart would have the aircraft just clipping the C step near Grafton. So realistically at an estimate the pilot was at least 10 minutes past the CTA boundary with a choice of levels ranging from surface to FL175. So its clear that Dick is totally correct, it must have been ATC that forced the pilot down low.....
Also assuming the report is correct, the pilot planned over this high terrain, which goes against Dicks assertion that ATC forced them over the high terrain. You should probably leave Dick alone though, he is doing great work, and rumour has it he is even getting close to successfully pinning the crash of MDX on the centre controller. Just look at the quality of his arguments on other threads, like the huey. The pilot is not night rated in a day VFR aircraft flying 30 mins after last light on one of the most turbulent days of the year. Totally understandable that the pilot was up flying after last light, I can't imagine there being anywhere you could land a helicopter between CFS and Williamtown. The controller clears the aircraft to operate as required, but somehow its still the fault of WLM airspace..... May as well tell the ATSB to pack up shop, the DS fan squad has solved it.
Whatever the airspace, nothing absolves the pilot in command of their responsibility for the safe conduct of the flight. All the arguments about low time pilots lacking assertiveness are irrelevant, if you lack the temperament required to meet your obligations as the PIC then you have no business flying an aircraft. Ultimately the pilot had to have had a multitude of options right up until the end, even if the option left was ask for help. Sadly for some reason the pilot didn't ask for help.
Not sure how accurate the Townsville refuellers account would be, there is a chance that some of the lead from the avgas may be affecting his/her memory.
Also assuming the report is correct, the pilot planned over this high terrain, which goes against Dicks assertion that ATC forced them over the high terrain. You should probably leave Dick alone though, he is doing great work, and rumour has it he is even getting close to successfully pinning the crash of MDX on the centre controller. Just look at the quality of his arguments on other threads, like the huey. The pilot is not night rated in a day VFR aircraft flying 30 mins after last light on one of the most turbulent days of the year. Totally understandable that the pilot was up flying after last light, I can't imagine there being anywhere you could land a helicopter between CFS and Williamtown. The controller clears the aircraft to operate as required, but somehow its still the fault of WLM airspace..... May as well tell the ATSB to pack up shop, the DS fan squad has solved it.
Whatever the airspace, nothing absolves the pilot in command of their responsibility for the safe conduct of the flight. All the arguments about low time pilots lacking assertiveness are irrelevant, if you lack the temperament required to meet your obligations as the PIC then you have no business flying an aircraft. Ultimately the pilot had to have had a multitude of options right up until the end, even if the option left was ask for help. Sadly for some reason the pilot didn't ask for help.
Not sure how accurate the Townsville refuellers account would be, there is a chance that some of the lead from the avgas may be affecting his/her memory.
Sunfish
Go back and look at post 34. You appear to form your judgments from negative posts on pprune rather than actual experience or knowledge. I have been flying in most states as a VFR PPL for 46 years and have not had the experiences you complain about.
Go back and look at post 34. You appear to form your judgments from negative posts on pprune rather than actual experience or knowledge. I have been flying in most states as a VFR PPL for 46 years and have not had the experiences you complain about.
which goes against Dicks assertion that ATC forced them over the high terrain.
It is known from the ATSB outline that ATC refused a request to enter the control steps at the aircraft's cruising level of 6500 ft, which forced it to be low level over rugged terrain.
The ATSB has not presented any weather information. Dick's hypothesis which he is seeking to test (and which has alarmingly not been considered by the ATSB) is that the Mooney was VFR on top of cloud and could have sailed above the mountain terrain happily and safely if the pilot revived a clearance to enter a control step and cut through a corner of the control steps. This is a critical piece of information that must be examined.
And Vag277, I agree with Sunfish and have experienced being screwed around by ATC because (even IFR GA) is low priority for them. I have had controllers admit to me that they descend aircraft under control steps purely for procedural ease on their part. I also believe there has been another fatal accident that was caused by controllers descending an aircraft under the steps for nothing other than procedural ease.
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What crash is that old acro?
And Dick is not trying to ascertain anything. He's pushing his own agenda by using the atsb preliminary report. There is no investigative analysis included in the so he had no idea what or isn't being investigated.
He is a politician and a business man. You need to look at his comments from that angle and you may see through the way he writes.
All of this discussion at this point is useless until we know actually what happened.
And Dick is not trying to ascertain anything. He's pushing his own agenda by using the atsb preliminary report. There is no investigative analysis included in the so he had no idea what or isn't being investigated.
He is a politician and a business man. You need to look at his comments from that angle and you may see through the way he writes.
All of this discussion at this point is useless until we know actually what happened.
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i don't think Dick is asserting that they were forced over high terrain. The crash site is pretty much on track.
It is known from the ATSB outline that ATC refused a request to enter the control steps at the aircraft's cruising level of 6500 ft, which forced it to be low level over rugged terrain.
The ATSB has not presented any weather information. Dick's hypothesis which he is seeking to test (and which has alarmingly not been considered by the ATSB) is that the Mooney was VFR on top of cloud and could have sailed above the mountain terrain happily and safely if the pilot revived a clearance to enter a control step and cut through a corner of the control steps. This is a critical piece of information that must be examined.
And Vag277, I agree with Sunfish and have experienced being screwed around by ATC because (even IFR GA) is low priority for them. I have had controllers admit to me that they descend aircraft under control steps purely for procedural ease on their part. I also believe there has been another fatal accident that was caused by controllers descending an aircraft under the steps for nothing other than procedural ease.
It is known from the ATSB outline that ATC refused a request to enter the control steps at the aircraft's cruising level of 6500 ft, which forced it to be low level over rugged terrain.
The ATSB has not presented any weather information. Dick's hypothesis which he is seeking to test (and which has alarmingly not been considered by the ATSB) is that the Mooney was VFR on top of cloud and could have sailed above the mountain terrain happily and safely if the pilot revived a clearance to enter a control step and cut through a corner of the control steps. This is a critical piece of information that must be examined.
And Vag277, I agree with Sunfish and have experienced being screwed around by ATC because (even IFR GA) is low priority for them. I have had controllers admit to me that they descend aircraft under control steps purely for procedural ease on their part. I also believe there has been another fatal accident that was caused by controllers descending an aircraft under the steps for nothing other than procedural ease.
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OCTA, you hit the nail on the head.
“If you lack the temperament required to meet your obligations as the PIC then you have no business flying an aircraft.”
Good airspace design helps. There is likely grounds to change airspace. It doesn’t absolve blame from the PIC for not flying their aircraft safely, even if that necessitates declaring a pan at the extreme end. There’s a range of options before having to do that.
“If you lack the temperament required to meet your obligations as the PIC then you have no business flying an aircraft.”
Good airspace design helps. There is likely grounds to change airspace. It doesn’t absolve blame from the PIC for not flying their aircraft safely, even if that necessitates declaring a pan at the extreme end. There’s a range of options before having to do that.
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Hard to get back up on top to be VFR over the top when you are down under the crud. They would not have have had any level available to them if it was 8/8 as suggested by others. There’s nothing worse than being stuck underneath when you can be in brilliant sunshine on top but you can’t get there.
Most of us “sheep” understand the responsibilities and obligations of a PIC.
Most of us “sheep” have more experience in the real world of command decision making than do Dick’s detractors.
When you grow up, junior, you’ll hopefully realise the extent of the damage done as a consequence of rules that are not a proportionate response to objective risk.
Most of us “sheep” have more experience in the real world of command decision making than do Dick’s detractors.
When you grow up, junior, you’ll hopefully realise the extent of the damage done as a consequence of rules that are not a proportionate response to objective risk.
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Most of us “sheep” understand the responsibilities and obligations of a PIC.
Most of us “sheep” have more experience in the real world of command decision making than do Dick’s detractors.
When you grow up, junior, you’ll hopefully realise the extent of the damage done as a consequence of rules that are not a proportionate response to objective risk.
Most of us “sheep” have more experience in the real world of command decision making than do Dick’s detractors.
When you grow up, junior, you’ll hopefully realise the extent of the damage done as a consequence of rules that are not a proportionate response to objective risk.
What many people are forgetting is there is no such thing as a perfect airspace system, all airspace will have limitations. Every time we fly there are potential threats, be they weather, mechanical, terrain, aeromedical, all the possibilities. They will always exist to some extent and that’s our job as pilots to manage them. For some reason dick seems hyper focussed on airspace, probably because it’s easy to create the outrage in the public he enjoys so much. Ultimately there are far bigger killers of pilots we really need to work on, and most of those killers are built into the pilot.....
Originally Posted by Dick Smith
Clearly C over D doesn’t fit the commonsense test.
Ok let’s assume you’re correct and it was totally clear on top, the pilot could have easily just turned and went around the CTA, it would only be a few extra track miles, not a big deal really. Or when they were at 4500ft they could have turned back and climbed in clearer conditions. Or are you trying to suggest there was a magic corridor of clear weather exactly one Mooney width in diameter conveniently lined up Murwillimbah direct Taree? Ultimately unless the controller in the day physically instructed the aircraft to be where they were (highly unlikely, ATC as a general rule don’t seem to issue control instructions OCTA) then it was the pilot of the aircraft that put the aircraft there, not ATC. Why are dick smiths sheep so unwilling to accept that the pilot is really responsible for the safety of their flight....
I reckon I've privately flown into the Sydney basin from all directions about 300 times in the last 10y.
Probably a 50/50 mix of IFR and VFR.
100% without exception been advised/informed/told to be OCTA if I'm not doing the RNAV.
Its never been an operational issue for me as I'm on descent anyway and terrain isn't an issue....
But its pretty clear they CBF dealing with me in the terminal area regardless of traffic (which I can obv see on multiple platforms and is never remotely conflicting) and the fact I'm paying via airways charges.
Even when you do RNAV you just get told radar services terminated mid approach out of the 4500 step on the YSBK RNAV into G in cloud. Full radar coverage.
Why bother paying airways for no service at the time you actually need it and the systems are there. WOFTAM. No wonder everybody scud runs.
Clearly you could count the IFR traffic in the western sector of the CFS CTA early in the morning on about zero or 1 finger.
As frustrating as this all is (ts just arse covering and corporatisation of essential services) I don't think it had much to do with this unfortunate event.
Probably a 50/50 mix of IFR and VFR.
100% without exception been advised/informed/told to be OCTA if I'm not doing the RNAV.
Its never been an operational issue for me as I'm on descent anyway and terrain isn't an issue....
But its pretty clear they CBF dealing with me in the terminal area regardless of traffic (which I can obv see on multiple platforms and is never remotely conflicting) and the fact I'm paying via airways charges.
Even when you do RNAV you just get told radar services terminated mid approach out of the 4500 step on the YSBK RNAV into G in cloud. Full radar coverage.
Why bother paying airways for no service at the time you actually need it and the systems are there. WOFTAM. No wonder everybody scud runs.
Clearly you could count the IFR traffic in the western sector of the CFS CTA early in the morning on about zero or 1 finger.
As frustrating as this all is (ts just arse covering and corporatisation of essential services) I don't think it had much to do with this unfortunate event.
Hi Bronte - If you want to see what is wrong with Bankstown and the rest of the Sydney Airspace have a read of this https://www.casa.gov.au/file/158911/...token=HgBrFWtF
It's available on the CASA web site and dates from 2015. CASA seems to have identified most if not all of the issues but then kicks the can down the road by referring to something called the Bankstown Joint Airspace and Procedures Analysis Team (JAPAT). As you will see the J stands for Joint so if you thought anything good ever came from a committee this will convince you other wise. Their reports if any do not seem to be available however the CASA recommendations are still matter of public record:
Recommendation 1:
CASA and Airservices should utilise strategies developed through the Bankstown JAPAT to reduce any potential risk factors that might be identified and apply these, where appropriate, to the wider Sydney Basin airspace, including:
o Class D airspace architecture;
o VAPs;
o Airspace integration; and
o VFR routes.
Recommendation 2:
Commonwealth aviation agencies should establish a Working Group under the auspices of the Aviation Policy Group to investigate options for the future airspace arrangements in the Sydney Basin. This will include consideration of:
o Current airspace architecture in the Sydney Basin;
o PBN airspace concepts;
o Integration of air traffic operations across the Sydney Basin;
o Optimising airspace volumes;
o Western Sydney Airport (Badgerys Creek) airspace requirements;
o ICAO SARPs and Global Air Navigation Plan; and
o International best practice such as the use of Class E airspace.
The Working Group should also build on the near term work that will be completed by the JAPAT during 2015.
Office of Airspace Regulation Page 11 of 131
Sydney Basin Aeronautical Study March 2015 Version: 1.0
Recommendation 3:
The Working Group established under Recommendation 2 should also consider Air Traffic Management (ATM)/Air Traffic Services (ATS) arrangements as part of the integration of air traffic operations across the Sydney Basin. This should include consideration of how changes to ATM policy could facilitate implementation of PBN trajectories, improve efficiency and reduce environmental impact.
Recommendation 4:
CASA should further investigate the risks associated with inappropriate flying activities reported to be occurring in close proximity to the Class D CTRs within the Sydney Basin.
Recommendation 5:
CASA and Airservices should apply strategies utilised by the JAPAT to enhance the safety and efficiency of TIFPs at other locations within the Sydney Basin including Camden and Westmead Hospital.
Recommendation 6:
Airservices should review relevant Sydney Airport TIFPs to identify areas to improve efficiency, including:
o Reduced interaction between arrival (STAR) and departure (SID) procedures to maximise potential for continuous climb and descent operations;
o Reduce radar vectoring (where appropriate); and
o Maximise use of PBN where possible.
Recommendation 7:
CASA and Airservices should review and revise, as appropriate, all sub-optimal descriptive, illustrative, regulatory, standards, guidance and advisories references to the Sydney Basin in publications (including the AIP) identified in this study to enhance safety in the Sydney Basin.
Recommendation 8:
CASA and Airservices should conduct further study of the communications issues across the wider Sydney Basin, including frequency congestion within broadcast areas and VFR routes.
Recommendation 9:
CASA and Airservices should consider the issues raised by stakeholders regarding limited access to portions of Sydney Class C airspace in the work undertaken by the Bankstown JAPAT and the Working Group established under Recommendation 2.
Recommendation 10:
Defence should consider a review of:
Holsworthy and Richmond airspace to improve access for IFR and VFR aircraft, including airspace redesigns; and
The use of restricted areas as substitutes for CTR/CTA airspace architecture and the dimensions of the Richmond
Has any of this ever happened? If not why not? What happens to CASA recommendations? Are they binding on anyone, even CASA?
It's available on the CASA web site and dates from 2015. CASA seems to have identified most if not all of the issues but then kicks the can down the road by referring to something called the Bankstown Joint Airspace and Procedures Analysis Team (JAPAT). As you will see the J stands for Joint so if you thought anything good ever came from a committee this will convince you other wise. Their reports if any do not seem to be available however the CASA recommendations are still matter of public record:
Recommendation 1:
CASA and Airservices should utilise strategies developed through the Bankstown JAPAT to reduce any potential risk factors that might be identified and apply these, where appropriate, to the wider Sydney Basin airspace, including:
o Class D airspace architecture;
o VAPs;
o Airspace integration; and
o VFR routes.
Recommendation 2:
Commonwealth aviation agencies should establish a Working Group under the auspices of the Aviation Policy Group to investigate options for the future airspace arrangements in the Sydney Basin. This will include consideration of:
o Current airspace architecture in the Sydney Basin;
o PBN airspace concepts;
o Integration of air traffic operations across the Sydney Basin;
o Optimising airspace volumes;
o Western Sydney Airport (Badgerys Creek) airspace requirements;
o ICAO SARPs and Global Air Navigation Plan; and
o International best practice such as the use of Class E airspace.
The Working Group should also build on the near term work that will be completed by the JAPAT during 2015.
Office of Airspace Regulation Page 11 of 131
Sydney Basin Aeronautical Study March 2015 Version: 1.0
Recommendation 3:
The Working Group established under Recommendation 2 should also consider Air Traffic Management (ATM)/Air Traffic Services (ATS) arrangements as part of the integration of air traffic operations across the Sydney Basin. This should include consideration of how changes to ATM policy could facilitate implementation of PBN trajectories, improve efficiency and reduce environmental impact.
Recommendation 4:
CASA should further investigate the risks associated with inappropriate flying activities reported to be occurring in close proximity to the Class D CTRs within the Sydney Basin.
Recommendation 5:
CASA and Airservices should apply strategies utilised by the JAPAT to enhance the safety and efficiency of TIFPs at other locations within the Sydney Basin including Camden and Westmead Hospital.
Recommendation 6:
Airservices should review relevant Sydney Airport TIFPs to identify areas to improve efficiency, including:
o Reduced interaction between arrival (STAR) and departure (SID) procedures to maximise potential for continuous climb and descent operations;
o Reduce radar vectoring (where appropriate); and
o Maximise use of PBN where possible.
Recommendation 7:
CASA and Airservices should review and revise, as appropriate, all sub-optimal descriptive, illustrative, regulatory, standards, guidance and advisories references to the Sydney Basin in publications (including the AIP) identified in this study to enhance safety in the Sydney Basin.
Recommendation 8:
CASA and Airservices should conduct further study of the communications issues across the wider Sydney Basin, including frequency congestion within broadcast areas and VFR routes.
Recommendation 9:
CASA and Airservices should consider the issues raised by stakeholders regarding limited access to portions of Sydney Class C airspace in the work undertaken by the Bankstown JAPAT and the Working Group established under Recommendation 2.
Recommendation 10:
Defence should consider a review of:
Holsworthy and Richmond airspace to improve access for IFR and VFR aircraft, including airspace redesigns; and
The use of restricted areas as substitutes for CTR/CTA airspace architecture and the dimensions of the Richmond
Has any of this ever happened? If not why not? What happens to CASA recommendations? Are they binding on anyone, even CASA?
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It really has to be reiterated that denying clearance is not necessarily as a result of conflicting traffic.
The ATC may have complex procedures that they need to go through to allow your airways clearance. There may be coordination, route requirements, local instructions, etc etc, that all need to be sorted before a clearance can be given. Not to mention systems issues with a rapidly aging ATC system.
Plus, they may not just be controlling your particular part of the world. They may be getting pumped in another section of their airspace. Plus, because of the staffing pressure that airservices is currently experiencing (due to funding pressure from industry and government), these areas of jurisdiction are getting ever larger.
I am led to believe that you can fly all the way from Archerfield to Bankstown talking to a single controller (excluding a few minutes with the Approach guys). That's a huge area to deal with, considering some of the aviation hotspots in that particular corridor.
Please don't see me as an ATC apologist. I just don't like people in this thread that are blaming ATC, when instead it's the system and culture created by industry that might be worth looking at.
The ATC may have complex procedures that they need to go through to allow your airways clearance. There may be coordination, route requirements, local instructions, etc etc, that all need to be sorted before a clearance can be given. Not to mention systems issues with a rapidly aging ATC system.
Plus, they may not just be controlling your particular part of the world. They may be getting pumped in another section of their airspace. Plus, because of the staffing pressure that airservices is currently experiencing (due to funding pressure from industry and government), these areas of jurisdiction are getting ever larger.
I am led to believe that you can fly all the way from Archerfield to Bankstown talking to a single controller (excluding a few minutes with the Approach guys). That's a huge area to deal with, considering some of the aviation hotspots in that particular corridor.
Please don't see me as an ATC apologist. I just don't like people in this thread that are blaming ATC, when instead it's the system and culture created by industry that might be worth looking at.
I was sitting at Coffs this afternoon waiting for my ride. The high speed jet traffic was incredible, I can see why there is no VFR corridor - way too dangerous in such a heavily trafficked area, why, there must have been one movement every half hour. That includes jet water bombers.