A320 incident wrong lever in haste
Thread Starter
I don't physically touch it, never had anyone say anything.
I move my hand to the vicinity if we are getting close to the limit speed. Both speeding up and slowing down. Is this not sensible to prevent an overspeed or ending up below speed? I don't physically touch it, never had anyone say anything.
That way you may bring both of you back into shated situational awareness when their mind has drifted - for which they should thank you:
"Aprroaching flap overspeed there, John", or "Getting a bit slow for flap 2 there, John." , or
you may detect a subtle incapacitation which has gone unnoticed up until that stage.
If if I called every time the speed trend went near a limit I’d be talking all day. No, the last thing the airbus has time for is more talking. I’ll stay ready to select the flap.
I have noticed some crew, in excited anticipation of your next call, place their hand either on or very close to the controls, eg. flap lever. So guess what happens when you sneeze!!
I agree with Slezy9.
In previous jobs, I have politely placed my hand next to the flap lever to kindly remind the old bloke flying that we are approaching GS capture and that if we don't get any drag out somewhat soon-ish, then we're NEVER gonna slow down! And, in situations when I've been under the pump (usually the sim), a colleague placing their hand next to the flap lever, has politely reminded me that a bit of drag might help the situation.
It has never been about being "sneaky" - just a team working together.
In previous jobs, I have politely placed my hand next to the flap lever to kindly remind the old bloke flying that we are approaching GS capture and that if we don't get any drag out somewhat soon-ish, then we're NEVER gonna slow down! And, in situations when I've been under the pump (usually the sim), a colleague placing their hand next to the flap lever, has politely reminded me that a bit of drag might help the situation.
It has never been about being "sneaky" - just a team working together.
It's "sneaky" because it's easy to miss - and thus ineffective.
Really? Wow.
if I called every time the speed trend went near a limit I’d be talking all day.
Last edited by Checkboard; 12th Oct 2019 at 13:00.
I have politely placed my hand next to the flap lever to kindly remind the old bloke flying that we are approaching GS capture and that if we don't get any drag out somewhat soon-ish, then we're NEVER gonna slow down! And, in situations when I've been under the pump (usually the sim), a colleague placing their hand next to the flap lever, has politely reminded me that a bit of drag might help the situation.
As I said, it's not "sneaky", well, not the way I do it. And also, not "ineffective" - indeed I have found it to be very effective - or why would I use it?
In my experience it has been a technique that has worked well for me, and been appreciated by me when a colleague has done it. I have used this technique a handful of times in my time flying multi-crew operations.
But, each to their own - all part of life's rich tapestry!
In my experience it has been a technique that has worked well for me, and been appreciated by me when a colleague has done it. I have used this technique a handful of times in my time flying multi-crew operations.
But, each to their own - all part of life's rich tapestry!
Last edited by josephfeatherweight; 12th Oct 2019 at 16:12.
I've heard of a captain, in his haste, initiating an emergency descent mid Pacific Ocean following an unrelated cockpit aural warning
Accordingly, the captain directed the F/O to carry out the memory items which included closing the outflow valve (manual operation) while captain started down with no delay.
Severe ear distress experienced and a closer look at cabin altitude a few seconds after descent had got going, showed 3000 ft cabin altitude which meant cabin altitude had gone from 12,000 ft to 3000 ft in around two minutes - explaining ear distress. Aircraft levelled around 23,000 ft and situation evaluated. The full closing of the outflow valve had caused the cabin pressure to increase causing ear distress. All this being wise after the event. .
Aircraft did 180 and returned to base landing 20 minutes later. . Investigation revealed the replacement cabin controller from the earlier flight which was a spare from the flyaway kit, was filled with moisture from being in a plastic bag in the aircraft hold. Another cabin controller was installed and the flight proceeded normally. The emergency descent was never needed because the symptom was an uncommanded pressurisation change (albeit a gradual one) until the cabin passed 10,000 ft which triggered the warning horn. The captain accepted full responsibility for the incorrect decision to treat the event as worthy of a rapid descent when it should have been treated as only an uncommanded change of cabin altitude and that particular non-normal checklist applied. Paucity of proper training in the simulator for this type of non-normal set the scene for a stuff up and was no help.
Paucity of proper training in the simulator for this type of non-normal set the scene for a stuff up and was no help.[/QUOTE]
Thanks Judd for providing the full details, as I said I only heard about the incident and you know how that goes.
Interestingly enough, not long after the incident this outfit dropped ALL simulator training as an unnecessary expense, some pilots however, just one or two, considered this as only a "perceived" safety issue.
Thanks Judd for providing the full details, as I said I only heard about the incident and you know how that goes.
Interestingly enough, not long after the incident this outfit dropped ALL simulator training as an unnecessary expense, some pilots however, just one or two, considered this as only a "perceived" safety issue.
