Flying by the seat of a computer’s pants
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"nobody seems to have noticed a rather similar problem in its competitor aircraft, the Airbus A320"
"Gone are the air speed indicator, the altimeter, turn and bank indicator and the gyro compass." ??
"Contrast the superbly logical sequenced actions of the Qantas pilots of QF32 when one of the engines of their Airbus 380 exploded four minutes after taking off from Singapore with the actions of the crews in the LionAir and Ethiopian 737 Max crashes."
"Soon after takeoff, both the autopilot and the auto-thrust (engine control) disconnected. The pilots climbed to 20,000 feet to trouble-shoot the problem, then landed safely back in Perth."
"Before they could work out whether it was a speed problem or and angle problem" - "the pilots wrongly concluded that they had a problem with the angle of attack sensors,"
Similar! oh for get the random nose down inputs and it can be seen as very similar to the MAX and QF32 incidents.
"Gone are the air speed indicator, the altimeter, turn and bank indicator and the gyro compass." ??
"Contrast the superbly logical sequenced actions of the Qantas pilots of QF32 when one of the engines of their Airbus 380 exploded four minutes after taking off from Singapore with the actions of the crews in the LionAir and Ethiopian 737 Max crashes."
"Soon after takeoff, both the autopilot and the auto-thrust (engine control) disconnected. The pilots climbed to 20,000 feet to trouble-shoot the problem, then landed safely back in Perth."
"Before they could work out whether it was a speed problem or and angle problem" - "the pilots wrongly concluded that they had a problem with the angle of attack sensors,"
Similar! oh for get the random nose down inputs and it can be seen as very similar to the MAX and QF32 incidents.
Aviation has become extremely safe because it has systematized things to the extreme. The logical conclusion to this progression is a complete 100% (99.99%, perhaps) automation.
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Often technology can work against us, this we have seen of late. I've flown pre computer to post computer or current A/C and can compare for good or bad but today's training pilots will never experience that but the question these days is.......does it matter? The question can open up a whole can of worms but at the end of the day future pilots won't have a choice! I enjoy both, commercially I have no choice however privately my own plane is old school, 6 pack and it keeps me connected to skills that will be lost forever one day!
What does the future hold for fully autonomous A/C? That depends on just how much control are we prepared to hand over, as humans we like to be in control, the insurance Co's will play a big part in that future!
What does the future hold for fully autonomous A/C? That depends on just how much control are we prepared to hand over, as humans we like to be in control, the insurance Co's will play a big part in that future!
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(I’m not a pilot) I’ve always found it curious that right in front of the seat occupant are, usually -on the big jets-, true airspeed and ground speed indications.
Do these serve ANY purpose inflight when dubious AIR DATA (Analogue) indications need cross referencing with INERTIAL REFERENCE (digital) for validation? I know they’re not going to be 1 for 1, but could serve as a gross error check of sorts?
Could this simple check have made a difference in the Air France crash that had its pitots frosted over?
Do these serve ANY purpose inflight when dubious AIR DATA (Analogue) indications need cross referencing with INERTIAL REFERENCE (digital) for validation? I know they’re not going to be 1 for 1, but could serve as a gross error check of sorts?
Could this simple check have made a difference in the Air France crash that had its pitots frosted over?
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(I’m not a pilot) I’ve always found it curious that right in front of the seat occupant are, usually -on the big jets-, true airspeed and ground speed indications.
Do these serve ANY purpose inflight when dubious AIR DATA (Analogue) indications need cross referencing with INERTIAL REFERENCE (digital) for validation? I know they’re not going to be 1 for 1, but could serve as a gross error check of sorts?
Could this simple check have made a difference in the Air France crash that had its pitots frosted over?
Do these serve ANY purpose inflight when dubious AIR DATA (Analogue) indications need cross referencing with INERTIAL REFERENCE (digital) for validation? I know they’re not going to be 1 for 1, but could serve as a gross error check of sorts?
Could this simple check have made a difference in the Air France crash that had its pitots frosted over?
The AF flight was a combination of the above as well as both pilots where not overly experienced (2x F/O's), the Airbus side stick philosophy is very different & needs to be understood. Adopting basic Pitch & Power = Performance would have saved that flight but it never happened!
Automation has removed some of that intuitive skill from days gone by, we see this every now & then with such automation related accidents.
But in answer to your question yes ALL the basic info is there in front of the drivers, it's how they interpret it & react is where the challenge is!
Will we ever be able to 'fix' it? Nope I dot believe so!
Mankind is always learning, this is subject is just that!
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I was merely thinking (a danger in itself!) that perhaps a quick check would be to cross-reference the ‘mechanical’ airspeed to the synthesized ‘electronic’ one, especially when the ‘mechanical’ airspeed is derived from probes subject to all manner of influence, from pitot probe covers, to icing, to bees/nests and other fod... whereas, on the modern jets, the A320 atleast, are equipped with gps and unless a failure or accuracy issue is annunciated, could be relied on. Whoever designs something to replace pitot probes and gets required approvals and uptake will be a VERY rich man/woman.
all this notwithstanding the other influencing factors including the startle, disorientation and distraction (human) factors that came about from the engine messaging that got prioritised and arguably suppressed the air data problem. Anyway, thanks! (Apologies for over simplification). im not a pilot, but a curious engineer
all this notwithstanding the other influencing factors including the startle, disorientation and distraction (human) factors that came about from the engine messaging that got prioritised and arguably suppressed the air data problem. Anyway, thanks! (Apologies for over simplification). im not a pilot, but a curious engineer
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I was merely thinking (a danger in itself!) that perhaps a quick check would be to cross-reference the ‘mechanical’ airspeed to the synthesized ‘electronic’ one, especially when the ‘mechanical’ airspeed is derived from probes subject to all manner of influence, from pitot probe covers, to icing, to bees/nests and other fod... whereas, on the modern jets, the A320 atleast, are equipped with gps and unless a failure or accuracy issue is annunciated, could be relied on. Whoever designs something to replace pitot probes and gets required approvals and uptake will be a VERY rich man/woman.
all this notwithstanding the other influencing factors including the startle, disorientation and distraction (human) factors that came about from the engine messaging that got prioritised and arguably suppressed the air data problem. Anyway, thanks! (Apologies for over simplification). im not a pilot, but a curious engineer
all this notwithstanding the other influencing factors including the startle, disorientation and distraction (human) factors that came about from the engine messaging that got prioritised and arguably suppressed the air data problem. Anyway, thanks! (Apologies for over simplification). im not a pilot, but a curious engineer
Originally Posted by 1/4 Inch SocketE
I’ve always found it curious that right in front of the seat occupant are, usually -on the big jets-, true airspeed and ground speed indications. Do these serve ANY purpose inflight when dubious AIR DATA
Last edited by Capn Bloggs; 19th Apr 2019 at 00:46.
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I'm just a lowly ppl with a handful of hours so forgive me if this is a stupid question. But in events like this can't airliners be flown in a pitch+power=performance type of way? Are these just errors made because of the tunnel vision we experience in high stress situations?
It’s interesting that the ‘veteran pilot’ author of the Quadrant article seems to believe that AoA sensors indicate climb or descent...
My 2c - I have supervised (in one way or another) more than a few pilots, and one thing that I continue to see as a red flag is pilots who seem scared of aeroplanes. I have even employed one or two, hoping they'd grow out of it, but they didn't.
I've flown with pilots who are greatly perturbed by unexpected bumps and turbulence, or terrified of the thought of TS, or scared of crunchy water, or paralyzed by mechanical failure. Now I'll be the first to admit that each of those things might lead down that path to a smoking hole in the ground. But none of those things, of themselves, are a disaster - bumps is almost always just bumps when everyone/thing is strapped down; airliners used to routinely fly through TS; there are plenty of pilots who'll tell you their aircraft is a great carrier of ice; and there are very very few mechanical failures that render an aircraft truly unflyable.
The real disaster is the lack of big picture thinking - when a pilot focuses on the problem or the fear and stops flying the aircraft. The disaster is the pilot who overreacts to turbulence and rips the wings off the aircraft; the AF470 disaster was the pilot overcome by fear of TS and stalls; the LA610 disaster was the crew who focused on procedures instead of staying (at least partially) in control; but the crews who kept their fears (no matter how justified) under control saved UA232 and OO-DLL.
So to all those starting out, the single best advice we've all heard is "never stop flying the aircraft". Procedures are great, and clearly permit even mediocre crew to fly airliners safely almost all of the time. But the moment you stop being in-command is the moment you've passed through that last slice of swiss cheese and are about to become a headline.
Our aircraft are becoming more automated and procedural, the nature of the problems we see is changing, but the response does not - keep calm and fly the aircraft.
I've flown with pilots who are greatly perturbed by unexpected bumps and turbulence, or terrified of the thought of TS, or scared of crunchy water, or paralyzed by mechanical failure. Now I'll be the first to admit that each of those things might lead down that path to a smoking hole in the ground. But none of those things, of themselves, are a disaster - bumps is almost always just bumps when everyone/thing is strapped down; airliners used to routinely fly through TS; there are plenty of pilots who'll tell you their aircraft is a great carrier of ice; and there are very very few mechanical failures that render an aircraft truly unflyable.
The real disaster is the lack of big picture thinking - when a pilot focuses on the problem or the fear and stops flying the aircraft. The disaster is the pilot who overreacts to turbulence and rips the wings off the aircraft; the AF470 disaster was the pilot overcome by fear of TS and stalls; the LA610 disaster was the crew who focused on procedures instead of staying (at least partially) in control; but the crews who kept their fears (no matter how justified) under control saved UA232 and OO-DLL.
So to all those starting out, the single best advice we've all heard is "never stop flying the aircraft". Procedures are great, and clearly permit even mediocre crew to fly airliners safely almost all of the time. But the moment you stop being in-command is the moment you've passed through that last slice of swiss cheese and are about to become a headline.
Our aircraft are becoming more automated and procedural, the nature of the problems we see is changing, but the response does not - keep calm and fly the aircraft.
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I'm just a lowly ppl with a handful of hours so forgive me if this is a stupid question. But in events like this can't airliners be flown in a pitch+power=performance type of way? Are these just errors made because of the tunnel vision we experience in high stress situations?
Fewer & fewer pilots are coming up thru the ranks that can't actually manage an A/C unless they have help by way of an Auto Flight System!
What would be one of the very few jobs available to a newly minted CPL to build hours?
Fewer & fewer pilots are coming up thru the ranks that can't actually manage an A/C unless they have help by way of an Auto Flight System!
The PF kept going until right at the end of the runway with the 737 at V2 plus 30 knots and still on the runway, the PF turned to the PM and said accusingly "You forgot to call V1 and VR." By then the aircraft would have gone through the localiser aerials beyond the end of the runway. This, and numerous other items gave grave cause to doubt his ability to fly an aeroplane; let alone undertake an IPC.
Yet his licence showed he had a command instrument rating on a Seminole issued at an Australian flying school 12 months earlier. In the meantime he had been issued with a 737 type rating at an approved FAA facility in the USA..